Defendant appealed the trial court’s determination that he could not have the return of his firearms after a second domestic violence complaint. Upon appeal the appellate division reversed. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the defendant was not entitled to the return of his firearms if the court were to find he posed a threat to public health, safety or welfare under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. Before the plaintiff and the defendant divorced, the plaintiff filed two domestic violence complaints. During the first complaint, the police confiscated the defendant’s guns and firearms purchaser identification card. The defendant ultimately obtained his firearms back. Subsequently, as the parties’ divorce action was pending, the second complaint arose when the plaintiff went to pick up their son from the defendant’s house. The police once again confiscated the defendant’s weapons. In addition to these confrontations, the defendant had affixed post-it notes to the windows stating, “danger, enter at your own risk,” and set up devices that appeared like booby traps. Further, during the parties’ marriage, the defendant would play music, strap on a holster and walk around the house with his gun. The plaintiff never knew if the gun was loaded on these occasions. The court found this established enough evidence to warrant denial of returning the firearms, as the defendant posed a threat to public safety and health under the Prevention to Domestic Violence Act.
Women and Justice: Keywords
On July 15, 1994, a domestic violence protective order involving Gonzales and Wife was entered. The order contained a “stay away” provision, one that prohibited Gonzales from visiting Wife’s workplace. Five days later, on July 15, 1994, Gonzales was arrested for being at Wife’s workplace. The trial court found that Gonzales had violated the protective order in contempt and sentenced him to jail. Five days later, on July 25, 1994, Gonzales was again charged, this time for criminal false imprisonment, battery, stalking, and harassment. The July 25 charges were based on the same encounter as the July 20 conviction. Gonzales filed a motion to dismiss on the charges of stalking and harassment. He argued that the July 20 conviction for contempt should preclude a successive prosecution on stalking and harassment. Following this “double jeopardy” theory, the trial court dismissed the sexual harassment and stalking claims. The state appealed.
Plaintiff worked for the defendant as a police officer. During training where plaintiff was one of three women amongst twenty-four participants, plaintiff started to feel that she could never raise complaints because of her gender as a result of comments such as how the male troopers had better “watch out” or she would charge them with sexual harassment, or about another female trooper whose sex discrimination complaint had been dismissed by the Board. Plaintiff also received lewd and sexually inappropriate comments from a male officer in training who also attacked her in a kick-boxing fashion, and ridiculed her when she protested. After completing training, plaintiff was the only female full-time officer in her department and continued to experience more harassment, including exposure to openly-displayed pictures of semi-nude women, an officer telling his girlfriend that plaintiff was his sex slave, personnel and supervisors frequently discussing plaintiff’s marital difficulties, and interfering with her personal relationship with a former police officer. During the plaintiff’s first evaluation, she received a good score for her work performance but her overall score was lowered due to comments from others. Further, when it was a male colleague’s birthday, he demanded the plaintiff kiss him and when she refused, he made fun of her appearance. When plaintiff’s supervisor did not respond to her complaints regarding these incidents, she met with the Commissioner, setting forth her sexual harassment claims. She was offered an unfeasible transfer far from her home and children as the only alternative. When the plaintiff failed to report to the transfer location, she was terminated. Plaintiff subsequently filed claims for sexual harassment and hostile work environment with the Board. The Board found there was discrimination and ordered her reinstatement and reimbursement of back pay. In response to the state’s appeal, the court agreed with the Board and found that the plaintiff’s work environment, characterized by her colleagues’ and supervisor’s attitudes towards her as a woman, established that she was judged more harshly than her male colleagues. The court found the evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that there existed a hostile work environment and that the plaintiff was sexually harassed.
Appellant, a former dispatcher with the Cheyenne Police Department, appealed from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of police officer-appellee, also employed by the Cheyenne Police Department, on appellant’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, because as a matter of law, appellant presented sufficient evidence in support of her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on inappropriate sexual conduct by a co-employee in the workplace, to survive appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The court identified several recurring factors that could be used in determining whether particular conduct in the workplace is sufficiently outrageous to survive a preliminary motion: (1) abuse of power; (2) repeated incidents and/or pattern of harassment; (3) unwelcome touching and/or offensive, non-negligible physical contact; and (4) retaliation for refusing or reporting sexually-motivated advances. The court found that conditions and circumstances alleged by appellant, including repeated incidents over a period of time and offensive, non-negligible physical contact, could lead a jury to construe appellee’s conduct as outrageous. Furthermore, appellant’s evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue on the severity of her emotional distress.
In May of 1990, Piatt represented clients A and B in their respective domestic relations actions. During his representation of client A, Piatt repeatedly asked her questions such as whether she had masturbated at the age of fourteen, and whether she had ever had sexual relationship without emotional involvement. He also made comments about the length of client A’s skirt and how “delicious” she looked. Piatt later told client A during a meeting that if she did not respond to his sexual advances, he would be forced to charge her a large sum of money for continued representation. Piatt threatened client B in substantially the same way.
Loayza-Tamayo was detained by the National Counter-Terrorism Bureau ("DINCOTE"). While detained, she was threatened with torture and was repeatedly raped in an effort to force her to confess to belonging to the Peruvian Communist Party ("Shining Path"). She was charged and found guilty of treason and was held in solitary confinement. She filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, alleging numerous human rights violations and requesting her release. The Commission, unable to reach a decision, submitted the case to the Inter-American Court. The Court held that Peru violated Articles 5, 7, 8(1), 8(2) and 8(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Articles 25 and 1(1) thereof. The Court ordered that Loayza-Tamayo be released, and that she and her next of kin be compensated for any relevant expenses.