Women and Justice: Keywords

Legislation

Сімейний кодекс України № 2947-III, Статті 109-115: розлучення за рішенням суду (Family Code, arts. 109-115: divorce by court decision) (2002)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination

Spouses who have children may file to a competent court a divorce application supported by a written agreement detailing with whom the children will live following the divorce, to what extent the other parent will support the children, and the other parent's right to care for the children. The competent court shall award a divorce one month following the submission of the divorce application, if it is established that the divorce application is in line with the genuine intent of the wife and husband. It is interesting that the family law establishes rules according to which the court shall attempt to facilitate the reunification of the couple through measures that are not in conflict with the moral principles of society (in such circumstances, the court may suspend the proceedings and set a time limit for the spouses to reconcile, which may not exceed six months). If both spouses agree to dissolve the marriage, the terms for reconciliation are usually not set by the court. Either spouse may apply for a divorce. At the same time, the legislature limited access to justice to certain categories of persons, namely: pregnant wives and their husbands, as well as parents of children under one year of age. Thus, a divorce application may not be filed during the wife's pregnancy and within one year of childbirth, unless either spouse engages in illegal behavior that may be classified as a criminal offense against the other spouse or the child. Such a limitation does not typically preserve the family, and may interfere with a person's right to marry another person with whom they already live, affects decision-making regarding the acquisition of property, because in this case it will be considered joint property (it will be very difficult for a person to challenge the presumption of joint property in court even if the persons do not live together). When deciding the issue of divorce, the court shall investigate the actual relationship of the spouse and genuine grounds for filing for divorce, with due regard to whether the spouses have a minor child or any other important factors. After divorce, a person has the right to revert their pre-marriage last name. In case of divorce granted by the court, the marriage shall be deemed terminated as of the effective date of the court judgment awarding the divorce.

Подружжя, яке має дітей, може подати до компетентного суду заяву про розірвання шлюбу, яка супроводжується письмовою угодою, в якій вказується, з ким проживатимуть діти після розірвання шлюбу, в якому обсязі другий з батьків утримуватиме дітей, а також право другого з батьків піклуватися про дітей. Компетентний суд ухвалює рішення про розірвання шлюбу через місяць після подання заяви про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що заява про розірвання шлюбу відповідає справжнім намірам дружини та чоловіка. Цікаво, що сімейне законодавство встановлює правила, відповідно до яких суд намагається сприяти возз’єднанню подружжя за допомогою заходів, які не суперечать моральним засадам суспільства (за таких обставин суд може призупинити провадження та призначити строк для примирення подружжя, який не може перевищувати шести місяців). У разі згоди обох з подружжя на розірвання шлюбу строк примирення судом зазвичай не встановлюються. Будь-хто з подружжя може подати заяву на розірвання шлюбу. Водночас законодавець обмежив доступ до правосуддя певним категоріям осіб, а саме: вагітним дружинам та їхнім чоловікам, а також батькам дітей віком до одного року. Таким чином, заява про розірвання шлюбу не може бути подана під час вагітності дружини та протягом одного року після пологів, за винятком випадків, коли будь-хто з подружжя вчинив протиправну поведінку, яка може бути кваліфікована як кримінальний злочин щодо іншого з подружжя або дитини. Таке обмеження, як правило, не зберігає сім’ю, може перешкоджати праву особи на шлюб з іншою особою, з якою вони вже проживають, впливати на прийняття рішення щодо придбання майна, оскільки в цьому випадку воно вважатиметься спільною власністю (вкрай важко оскаржити презумпцію спільної власності в суді, навіть якщо особи не проживають разом). При вирішенні питання про розірвання шлюбу суд з'ясовує фактичні стосунки подружжя та дійсні підстави для звернення до суду з позовом про розірвання шлюбу, з урахуванням наявності у подружжя неповнолітньої дитини та інших важливих обставин. Після розірвання шлюбу особа має право повернути своє дошлюбне прізвище. У разі розірвання шлюбу за рішенням суду шлюб вважається припиненим з дня набрання законної сили рішенням суду про розірвання шлюбу.

Сімейний кодекс України №2947-III 2002, Статті 49, 50, 123, 136: право на материнство, право на батьківство та використання репродуктивних технологій (Family Code of Ukraine, arts. 49, 50, 123, 126: right to maternity, paternity, reproductive technology) (2002)

Abortion and reproductive health rights, Divorce and dissolution of marriage

Articles 49, 50 of the Family Code of Ukraine refer the right to maternity and the right to parentage to the personal non-property rights of spouses. The term “maternity” means women’s legally guaranteed right to reproductive opportunity on (i.e., to give birth to children, raise them). The core of this personal non-property right is the wife's authority to decide whether or not to have a child. In addition, these articles establish that a woman's reluctance to have a child or her inability to conceive a child can be grounds for the dissolution of marriage. The same consequences entail if a man's refuses to, or his cannot, have a child. Such rules of the family legislation on the reason for the dissolution of marriage due to the wife's or husband's unwillingness or inability to have children restrict the freedom of behavior of women and men in marriage and violate the right to reproductive freedom. Article 123 establishes that if a married couple produce an embryo that is carried by a surrogate, then, the spouses are deemed the parents of the child. Similarly, the spouses are recognized as the parents when the wife gives birth to a child via implantation of an embryo that is not biologically hers. Article 136 of the Family Code of Ukraine allows a person legally registered as a child’s father to contest that registration, and thus his legal responsibilities as a parent to that child, if he believes or knows that he is not the child’s biological father. An analysis of court practice indicates that, as evidence of the lack of a parent-child relationship, the court accepts testimony of witnesses and results of forensic genetic examination.

Статтями 49, 50 Сімейного кодексу України право на материнство та право на батьківство віднесено до особистих немайнових прав подружжя. Термін "материнство" означає гарантоване законом право жінки на репродуктивну можливість (тобто народжувати дітей, виховувати їх). Ядром цього особистого немайнового права є правомочності дружини вирішувати питання про народження чи ненародження дитини. Крім цього, ці статті встановлюють, що підставою для розірвання шлюбу може бути небажання жінки мати дитину або її нездатність зачати дитину. Такі ж наслідки виникають, якщо чоловік відмовляється або не може мати дитину. Такі норми сімейного законодавства про підстави розірвання шлюбу через небажання чи нездатність дружини чи чоловіка мати дітей обмежують свободу поведінки жінки та чоловіка у шлюбі та порушують право на репродуктивну свободу. Статтею 123 встановлено, що, якщо у подружжя зароджується ембріон, виношуваний сурогатною матір'ю, то батьками дитини визнається подружжя. Так само, подружжя визнається батьками, коли дружина народжує дитину, шляхом перенесення в її організм ембріона, який їй біологічно не належить. Стаття 136 Сімейного кодексу України дозволяє особі, яка в установленому законом порядку записана батьком дитини, оскаржити таку реєстрацію, а отже, і свої обов’язки як батька щодо цієї дитини, якщо вона вважає або знає, що не є біологічним батьком дитини. Аналіз судової практики вказує на те, що як доказ відсутності зв’язку між батьком та дитиною суд приймає показання свідків та результати судово-генетичної експертизи.

Family Violence Prevention Act (Victoria) (2008)

Domestic and intimate partner violence

The Family Violence Protection Act aims to maximise safety for children and adults who have experienced family violence, and to prevent and reduce family violence to the greatest extent possible. It also aims to promote accountability for those who perpetrate family violence. The Act provides for police protection before court, family violence intervention orders (and their enforcement), and counselling orders.

Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act (Victoria) (2006)

Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights, Trafficking in persons

The Charter aims to protect and promote the human rights set out in Part 2, including property rights and freedom from forced work (slavery), as well as the right to enjoy those human rights without discrimination. With respect to any proposed new law, the Victorian Parliament must prepare a “statement of compatibility,” which must examine the proposed law’s compatibility (or incompatibility) with the human rights protected in the Charter. While this statement has no effect on the validity of any law, it furthers the purpose of the Charter in promoting human rights. Further, under section 32 of the Charter, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights (to the extent it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose). The Charter also allows the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission to intervene in any court or tribunal proceeding in relation to the Charter.

23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5301, Domestic Relations - Child Custody (2010)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage

In making custody and visitation decisions, Pennsylvania courts look to various factors in determining what is in the “best interest of the child.” The factors weighed by the court include: (1) the well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s maturity and judgment; (2) the need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, family life and community life; (3) which parent is more likely to foster a relationship between the noncustodial parent and the child; (4) each parent’s history of violent or abusive conduct; and (5) specific criminal convictions. The court will only award sole custody when it is in the best interest of the child. Shared custody will only be awarded if: (1) one or both parents apply for it; (2) the parents have agreed to shared custody; or (3) the court determines it is in the best interest of the child. It is within the court’s discretion to require the parents to attend counseling sessions. Further, the court may review and consider recommendations from the counselor in making the final custody decision.

Domestic Case Law

R. v. Mponda (Child Criminal Review Case No. 8 of 2017) High Court of Malawi (2017)

Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Three minor girls, victims of human trafficking who the defendant lured in with promises of working in a restaurant, but instead sent to work at a bar, appealed their case. When the work conditions turned out to be exploitative, the appellants reported the defendant to the police. The case was appealed to the High Court on the basis that: (i) the case file did not go through the standard process whereby a case is registered in the Criminal Registry then distributed to a Magistrate by a Chief Resident Magistrate, and (ii) the magistrate did not follow proper procedure for the child witnesses’ testimony. In concluding that a proper lower court be assigned to re-hear the matter, the High Court underscored the importance of following legal procedure designed to protect the rights of vulnerable child witnesses. The High Court pointed out a number of procedural protocols, such as ensuring that the child witnesses did not come into direct contact with the accused, making provision for the witness to be accompanied by a supportive figure in court, and considering the possibility of a pre-recorded interview of a child witness as evidence. The court noted that a court competent in handling child witnesses must re-hear the matter, as causing witnesses to endure repeat trials as a result of the failure to follow proper judicial procedure is akin to repeat victimization of such witnesses.

Archibald v. Archibald Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal (1998)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage

The appellant, a mother who shared two young children with the respondent, appealed a judgment awarding custody of the couple’s children to the respondent after their divorce. At the time of the original custody order, the children were residing with the appellant in Malawi, but the court granted custody to the respondent to raise them in England. The original order was predicated on the respondent’s assertion that while he was not presently best suited to support his children, his parents, the children’s grandparents, were available to raise the children until such time in the short-term future that respondent could acquire his own home. The lower court that issued the order appeared to favor this arrangement over the children remaining with their mother, at least in part due to her living with a new man who was unrelated to the children and with whom she had no immediate prospect for marriage. Ultimately, in the time between argument at the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Court’s decision, the parties came to a custody agreement and filed a Consent Order with the court, which obviated the issue. The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, still filed this opinion, stating that the lower court had erred and should have awarded custody to the appellant based on consistency in the lives of the children. The Supreme Court of Appeal emphasized that the lower court’s reliance on the appellant’s relationship with another man was inappropriate without evidence of harm to the children.

Kone v. Holder United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2010)

Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The plaintiff, who was from Côte d'Ivoire, appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of her asylum application, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Her asylum claim was based on female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and her fear that her daughters would be subjected to FGM if she was removed. An applicant who demonstrates past persecution benefits from the presumption that he or she faces future persecution unless the government rebuts that presumption by showing that there is either a change of circumstances such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened upon return to his or her native country, or a reasonable possibility of internal relocation within the country. Here, the BIA found that the plaintiff’s several voluntary return trips to her native country prior to her application for asylum rebutted that presumption and undermined her credibility. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding that a safe return on one occasion does not preclude potential future harm and that the regulation does not require an applicant to show that she would immediately be persecuted upon return. Similarly, the Second Circuit also found that an applicant’s return trips are not sufficient to undermine an applicant’s credibility. The Second Circuit accordingly vacated the BIA decision and remanded the case, noting that the agency may wish to consider the application for “humanitarian asylum.”

R.M., L.R. v. C.A., A.D. (Denuncia por violencia familiar) Camara Civil (Civil Court) (2014)

Domestic and intimate partner violence, International law

Child protective services appealed a decision of the court of first instance denying its request to extend to Ms. R.M.’s children an order of protection against her partner on the basis that (1) Ms. R.M. did not request that protection and (2) weaknesses were found in the determination by the Office of Domestic Violence regarding the degree of risk faced by the children. In overturning the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court (1) found that applicable rules permit a judge to take measures that put an end to the crisis in order to enable the victim of domestic violence to return to a daily routine free from the influence of violence and (2) noted that the Office of Domestic Violence reported that the situation presented a high degree of risk, including in relation to the children. In addition, the appellate court noted that in the cases brought before the judiciary, judges must ensure that the principals and rights set forth in the Treaty on the Rights of Children are observed.

Los servicios de protección infantil apelan una decisión del tribunal de primera instancia que denegó su solicitud de extender a los niños de la Sra. R.M. una orden de protección contra su pareja sobre la base de que (1) la Sra. R.M. no solicitó que se encontraran protección y (2) debilidades en la determinación de la Oficina de Violencia Doméstica con respecto al grado de riesgo que enfrentan los niños. Al anular el fallo del tribunal de primera instancia, el tribunal de apelación (1) encontró que las reglas aplicables permiten que un juez tome medidas para poner fin a la crisis a fin de permitir que la víctima de violencia doméstica regrese a una rutina diaria libre de la influencia de violencia y (2) notó que la Oficina de Violencia Doméstica informó que la situación presentaba un alto grado de riesgo, incluso en relación con los niños. Además, la corte de apelaciones señaló que en los casos presentados ante el poder judicial, los jueces deben garantizar que se respeten los principios y derechos establecidos en el Tratado sobre los Derechos del Niño.

平成29年（受）2015 (2017 (Ju) No. 2015) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2018)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage, International law

This case concerns the custody of a Japanese couple’s son who was born and raised in the United States until the mother, without the father’s consent, took him to Japan when he was 11 years old. Pursuant to the Japanese implementation of The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the father, who was still based in the U.S., petitioned for the return of the son to the U.S. A family court in Tokyo granted the petition. However, the attempt to enforce the order of the court failed as the mother strongly resisted when a court execution officer approached her––the son also voiced his desire to stay in Japan at the time. Subsequently, the father requested habeas corpus relief seeking release of the child. The High Court dismissed the request. In this appeal, the Supreme Court of Japan reversed the High Court’s ruling and remanded the case. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court first recalled its old ruling that care for a child is tantamount to “restraint” within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act and the Habeas Corpus Rules in special circumstances where it cannot be deemed that the child is staying with the care provider based on the child’s free will, even if the child is capable of making her/his own decisions. The Supreme Court found such a special circumstance––undue emotional influence from his mother––existed with respect to the son in light of the fact that he was not capable of making decisions regarding his life when he was taken to Japan, he appeared to have had less than sufficient opportunities to communicate with his father, and he had been largely dependent on his mother. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the restraint at issue was unequivocally unlawful, taking into account that the mother had refused to follow the family court’s order to return the child to the U.S., and that there was no special circumstance in which removing the child would be significantly unjust. This Supreme Court’s unanimous decision may be an indication that the Court will put significant weight on compliance with The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

本件は、日本人夫婦の妻が、夫の同意を得ることなく、米国出身の11歳の息子を米国から日本に連れて帰り、米国にいる夫が東京家庭裁判所に息子の返還命令を申し立た事案である。日本が国際的な親による子の奪取を規定している「ハーグ条約」に加盟したことにより、東京家庭裁判所は返還命令の決定を下した。しかし、執行官が裁判所の命令を執行しようとしたところ、妻が強く抵抗したため、裁判所の命令を執行することができなかった。その後、夫は子の監護等を求めて人身保護請求を求めたが、高裁は夫の請求を棄却した。最高裁は、高裁の判決を破棄し、原審に差し戻した。その理由として、まず、旧判例では、人身保護法及び人身保護規則にいう「拘束」に当たるのは、意思能力がある子の監護について、子が自由意思に基づいて監護者の下にとどまっているとはいえない特段の事情があるときと示していた。本件では、子供が日本に連れて行かれた時点で自分の生活について判断する能力がなかったこと、父親とのコミュニケーションの機会が十分ではなかったと思われること、母親に大きく依存していたことなどから鑑みると、母親からの過度の精神的影響という特別な事情が存在すると最高裁は判断した。さらに、最高裁は、母親が家庭裁判所の返還命令に従わなかったこと、子を連れ去ることが著しく不当となる特段の事情がないことなどを考慮して、問題となっている拘束は紛れもなく違法であると判断した。本最高裁の全員一致による判決は、裁判所が「ハーグ条約」を遵守する姿勢を示している。

Nimely v. Paye, et al. Supreme Court of Liberia (2011)

Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment that appellant was guilty of rape. The complainant alleged that the appellant had sex with her when she was 13 years old and he was 18 years old. She alleged that the appellant invited her to his room, gagged her, and had sexual intercourse with her. Her brother’s wife forced open the door after the complainant failed to answer her phone call. The complainant's brother then called the police. The appellant admitted to police that he and the complainant had sex. The court found the appellant guilty of rape because the elements of Liberian statutory rape law are (1) sexual intercourse, (2) the perpetrator is at least 18 years of age, and (3) the victim is less than 18 years of age. However, the court reversed his conviction because the trial court relied on inaccurate information in determining the appellant’s age. The appellant testified that he was 17 years old at the time of the rape. Documents such as a passport or birth certificate were unavailable. The court held that in the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the prosecution, the court must accept that the appellant was 17 years old and therefore a juvenile when he had sex with the complainant. Under Liberian law, a juvenile cannot commit a crime, but is instead considered a juvenile delinquent. If a case involves a juvenile delinquent who is over 16 years of age and is accused of conduct that would constitute a felony carrying a sentence of life imprisonment or death if committed by an adult of at least 18 years of age, then the circuit court must consider the best interests of the Republic and the juvenile to determine whether to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter and preside over the case or choose to refer it to the juvenile court. However, the circuit court did not make this determination. Rather, it proceeded with the trial as though the the appellant was an adult and sentenced him to life imprisonment as an adult. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded him to the custody of his parents until the age of 21.

Masusu v. Masusu High Court of Botswana at Lobatse (2007)

Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The appellant-wife sought and was granted a divorce from her husband on the grounds of domestic violence and that he did not financially support her or their two children. The wife appeals a decision by the Customary Court of Appeal granting the house to the respondent-husband on the grounds that under customary law, a wife who divorces her husband is at fault because a wife is supposed to remain in her marital home regardless of her husband's actions. The High Court found that the Customary Court's reasoning discriminated against women because it automatically faulted the wife for filing a divorce no matter what her husband did and ordered the marital home be sold and the profits given to the appellant-wife.