The appellants were charged with the murder of a 13-year-old girl. The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the prosecutor proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The victim was found hanging by rope in the appellants’ bathroom and died the same day in the hospital. The appellants brought the victim to the hospital prior to her death. Evidence showed that she had bruises on the left and right side of her neck, and she had sexual intercourse prior to her death. The grand jury indicted the appellants in the circuit Court. The Judge granted the appellants’ motion for bail. In the trial, the appellants produced multiple witnesses to testify that they were in the same house when the incident occurred. The prosecutors had two autopsy reports proving that the victim’s death was caused by sexual abuse or homicide. The Circuit Judge convicted the appellants for murder and sentenced them to death by hanging. The appellants filed a petition for the writ of certiorari for a crime not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that in the case of murder, the prosecutors are required to overcome the presumption of innocence. Here, the government failed to establish each element of the crime of murder, specifically, the government failed to prove that each of the appellants choked the victim to death, failed to prove that each of the appellants hanged her body in the bathroom in their house, and failed to prove the missing belt, which was used to tie the victim belonged to the appellants. The Supreme Court also explained that the government failed to produce the DNA specimens from the victim to test after taking the appellants’ DNA for testing, and could not produce any evidence that linked the hanging to the appellants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment for the lower court to reconsider.
Women and Justice: Keywords
Domestic Case Law
Williams v. Republic of Liberia Supreme Court of Liberia (2014)
Guerra Abreu, Sentencia núm. 5 Suprema Corte de Justicia (2018)
The defendant was convicted of assault, violence against women, and domestic violence. He appealed, arguing that the court lacked sufficient objective evidence for conviction. The Supreme Court denied the appeal, noting that the lower court did not only consider the victim’s testimony, but also examined medical evidence submitted by the National Institute of Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses). The medical evidence demonstrated that the victim suffered injuries, that the defendant caused those injuries, and that the victim suffered from battered women’s syndrome, also caused by the defendant. The Supreme Court found that this evidence constituted sufficient grounds for the conviction and that there had been no error—procedural or substantive—in the lower court’s findings. This decision provides a helpful description of the types of evidence required to secure a conviction for domestic violence in the Dominican Republic.
El acusado fue condenado por agresión y violencia contra la mujer y por violencia doméstica. Apeló, argumentando que el tribunal carecía de pruebas objetivas suficientes para la condena. La Corte Suprema denegó la apelación, señalando que el tribunal de primera instancia no solo había considerado el testimonio de la víctima, sino que también examinó las pruebas médicas presentadas por el Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses. Las pruebas médicas demostraron que la víctima había sufrido lesiones, que el imputado causó esas lesiones y que la víctima padecía el síndrome de la mujer maltratada, también causado por el imputado. La Corte Suprema determinó que estas pruebas constituían un fundamento suficiente para la condena y que no había habido error, procesal o sustantivo, en las conclusiones del tribunal inferior. Esta decisión proporciona una descripción útil de los tipos de pruebas necesarias para asegurar una condena por violencia doméstica en la República Dominicana.
Peralta Melo v. Fernández Collado, Sentencia núm. 677 Supreme Corte de Justicia: Sala Civil y Comercial (2017)
The appellant challenged a lower court ruling granting the respondent, his ex-partner, an equitable division of marital assets (bienes de la comunidad de hecho) upon the dissolution of their relationship. The appellant argued that 1) the court erroneously found the relationship to be a “common law marriage” (unión more uxurio) and 2) regardless of the character of the relationship, the appellant was the sole owner of the assets at issue as the respondent did not work outside the home. The appellant and the respondent had been in a monogamous, cohabiting relationship for 17 years and had three children together. The lower court found these facts supported by the testimony of witnesses through sworn affidavits, which the appellant challenged as insufficient to establish the character of the relationship. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that a court may take into consideration such sworn testimony and that the birth of three children to the couple was indisputable and officially documented. The Supreme Court agreed that a stable, monogamous, familial relationship had been sufficiently established, giving rise to the presumption that the respondent was entitled to her share of the common assets, if proven that she contributed to their acquisition. The Supreme Court also rejected the appellant’s arguments that the respondent could not be entitled to common assets because she was not employed outside the home and thus did not contribute financially to the acquisition of the common assets. The Court cited the Fundamental Rights of the Family (number 11, article 55) recognizing that work in the home is also “economic activity that creates added value and produces wealth and societal wellbeing” (“actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social”). Following this principle, the Court stated that a partner working in the home and caring for the children sustained and supported the partner working outside the home. Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the lower court.
El apelante discutió una decisión del tribunal inferior que le otorgaba a la demandada, su ex pareja, una división equitativa de los bienes de la comunidad de hecho al disolverse su relación. El apelante argumentó que 1) el tribunal consideró erróneamente que la relación era un “matrimonio de hecho“ o “unión libre“ (unión more uxurio) y 2) independientemente del carácter de la relación, el apelante era el único propietario de los bienes en cuestión porque la demandada nunca trabajó fuera de casa. El apelante y la demandada habían estado en una relación de convivencia monógama durante 17 años y tenían tres hijos juntos. El tribunal de primera instancia encontró estos hechos respaldados por el testimonio de testigos mediante declaraciones juradas, que el apelante impugnó como insuficientes para establecer el carácter de la relación. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema rechazó este argumento, señalando que un tribunal puede tomar en consideración dichos testimonios jurados y que el nacimiento de tres hijos de la pareja era indiscutible y oficialmente documentado. La Corte Suprema acordó que se había establecido con suficiencia legal una relación familiar estable, monógama. La Corte continúo que este establecimiento daba lugar a la presunción de que la demandada tenía derecho a su parte de los bienes comunes, si se demostraba que contribuyó a su adquisición. La Corte Suprema también rechazó los argumentos de la recurrente de que la demandada no podía tener derecho a bienes comunes porque no estaba empleada fuera del hogar y, por lo tanto, no contribuía financieramente a la adquisición de los bienes comunes. La Corte citó los Derechos Fundamentales de la Familia (número 11, artículo 55) reconociendo que el trabajo en el hogar es también “actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social” (“actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social ”). Siguiendo este principio, la Corte manifestó que un miembro de una pareja que trabajaba en el hogar y cuidaba a los niños sostenía y apoyaba al otro miembro que trabajaba fuera del hogar. En consecuencia, la decisión del tribunal inferior fue afirmada.
Resolución No. 0160-2013, Juicio No. 010-2013 Corte Nacional de Justicia (Sala de la Familia Niñez y Adolescencia) (2013)
The petitioner filed for divorce, stating that only days after their wedding, the respondent began to subject her to aggressive verbal and psychological abuse that continued via telephone even after he emigrated to the United States. After the respondent returned to Ecuador, the abuse became physical. Once he severed a portion of her finger with a knife. The Provincial Court of Justice of Azuay declared their marriage dissolved. The respondent appealed, arguing that the court committed legal errors by failing to apply the correct evidentiary standard. The National Court of Justice affirmed the lower court’s decision, noting that such judgments are protected by a presumption of correctness. The Court noted that Ecuador is a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). With regard to the petitioner’s testimony detailing her abuse, the Court stated that the character of cyclical domestic violence makes it difficult for victims to detail every incident. The pattern of violence described by the petitioner was sufficient evidence for the court to grant her a divorce. (External link to search page of Ecuador National Court of Justice website.)
La demandante solicitó el divorcio, afirmando que solo días después de su boda, el demandado comenzó a someterla a agresivos abusos verbales y psicológicos que continuaron vía telefónica, incluso después de él que emigró a Estados Unidos. Después de que el demandado regresó a Ecuador, el abuso se volvió físico. Una vez le cortó una parte del dedo con un cuchillo. La Corte Provincial de Justicia del Azuay declaró disuelto su matrimonio. El demandado apeló, argumentando que el tribunal cometió errores legales al no aplicar el estándar probatorio correcto. La Corte Nacional de Justicia confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia, señalando que tales sentencias están protegidas por una presunción de corrección. La Corte señaló que Ecuador es signatario de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW). Con respecto al testimonio de la peticionaria que detalla su abuso, la Corte señaló que el carácter de la violencia doméstica cíclica dificulta que las víctimas detallen cada incidente con particularidad. El patrón de violencia descrito por la víctima fue prueba suficiente para que el tribunal le concediera el divorcio. (Enlace externo a la página de búsqueda del sitio web de la Corte Nacional de Justicia de Ecuador).
People of the Philippines v. Rupal Supreme Court of the Philippines (2018)
The appellant was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of raping a 13-year-old girl by dragging her to a nearby farm, raping her and later threatening her with retaliation if she did not stay silent. The appellant appealed, pointing to inconsistencies in the number of times the victim testified as being raped and arguing that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. According to the court, the victim making inconsistent statements about the number of times the appellant raped her did not harm her credibility, given the fear and distress the victim suffered, and the frequency is also not an element of the crime. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age, or demented. The medical examination and victim’s credible testimony meets the first element. The element of force or intimidation is met by the fact that the appellant dragged her and pushed her to the ground to abuse her. The appellant also intimidated her after the act. Thus, the required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are met. The appellant’s alibi or denials were weak and uncorroborated.
Between S.A.J. and S.P.J. Supreme Court of Grenada and the West Indies Associated States (2014)
In a pending divorce case, the trial court entered an order for the parties to “refrain from molesting, harassing, besetting, intimidating and/or threatening and carrying out physical or other abuse of the other.” The wife subsequently accused the husband of sexual molestation and violating the court’s order. The court explained that “an allegation of sexual molestation in any form is very serious and the onus is on the wife to prove to the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband breached the Order by committing the acts of sexual molestation as alleged.” The court held that the “wife has failed to discharge this burden” because: (i) there was no evidence from any corroborating witness; (ii) there was no corroborating evidence from the doctor who examined the wife; (iii) both parties chose not to cross-examine the deponents who swore to the affidavits in the committal application; and (iv) “the husband’s version of the events on 5th March is equally plausible as the wife’s” version of events.
Mientras un caso de divorcio estaba pendiente, el tribunal de primera instancia emitió una orden para que las partes "se abstengan de molestar, acosar, acosar, intimidar y / o amenazar y llevar a cabo abuso físico o de otro tipo del otro." Posteriormente, la esposa acusó al marido de abuso sexual y de violar la orden del tribunal. El tribunal explicó que “una acusación de abuso sexual en cualquier forma es muy grave y la esposa tiene la responsabilidad de demostrarle al tribunal más allá de toda duda razonable que el esposo violó la Orden al cometer los actos de abuso sexual como se alega.” El tribunal sostuvo que la “esposa no había cumplido con esta carga” porque: (i) no hubo evidencia de ningún testigo que lo corrobore; (ii) no hubo evidencia que corrobore por parte del médico que examinó a la esposa; (iii) ambas partes optaron por no contrainterrogar a los declarantes que habían jurado las declaraciones en la solicitud inicial; y (iv) "la versión del marido de los hechos del 5 de marzo era igualmente plausible que la versión de la esposa" donde lo acusaba de los hechos.
H.V.N. v. EM-M Defensa-FAA and Others Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal (National Federal Administration Appeals Court) (2015)
The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Ministry of Defense—Argentine Air Force, seeking damages for sexual harassment and workplace persecution because her supervisor made indecent proposals, threatened her employment if she did not accede to his demands, made sexually explicit comments, and impeded her advancement. The trial court ruled against the plaintiff on the basis that (1) a psychological report indicated that she suffered from “moderate reactive development,” therefore making it impossible to determine the level of fault that corresponded to the alleged hostile conduct or to her “moderate reactive development,” (2) while certain testimony indicated the plaintiff was subject to certain “inconveniences” caused by her supervisor, the court found that these were insufficient to support a claim of sexual harassment or other unlawful conduct and (3) the plaintiff was therefore subject to a higher burden of proof in relation to the alleged conduct and that this burden was not met. In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court noted that (1) workplace sexual harassment is characterized by extreme psychological violence in the workplace that is both systematic and prolonged and that is carried out for the purpose of devaluing, perturbing, or debasing the victim so that the victim abandons the workplace or accepts other workplace conditions, and (2) particular difficulties arise in proving that the offensive conduct took place. For this reason, the court noted, special importance must be given to testimony given by work colleagues, medical or psychological reports to determine the existence of physical or psychological damage and documentary evidence. Specifically, the appellate court found that the plaintiff presented sufficient witness testimony, documentary evidence and psychological and accounting reports to sustain her claims. In addition to allowing damages, the appellate court ordered the defendants to pay costs.
La demandante interpuso una demanda contra su empleador, el Ministerio de Defensa - Fuerza Aérea Argentina, reclamando daños por acoso sexual y persecución laboral porque su supervisor le hizo propuestas indecentes, amenazó su empleo si no accedía a sus demandas, hizo comentarios sexualmente explícitos y impidió su avance profesional. El tribunal de primera declaró en contra de la demandante sobre la base de que (1) un informe psicológico indicó que padecía de “desarrollo reactivo moderado”, por lo que no se pudo determinar el nivel de culpa que correspondía a la presunta conducta hostil o a su “moderado desarrollo reactivo ”, (2) mientras que ciertos testimonios indicaron que la demandante estaba sujeta a ciertos“ inconvenientes ”causados por su supervisor, el tribunal determinó que estos eran insuficientes para sustentar una denuncia de acoso sexual u otra conducta ilegal y (3) la demandante fue por lo tanto, sujeto a una mayor carga de la prueba en relación con la conducta alegada y que esta carga no se cumplió. El tribunal de apelaciones revirtió estas conclusiones. En la apelación, el tribunal señaló que (1) el acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo se caracteriza por una violencia psicológica extrema en el lugar de trabajo que es tanto sistemática como prolongada y que se lleva a cabo con el propósito de devaluar, perturbar o degradar a la víctima. de modo que la víctima abandone el lugar de trabajo o acepte otras condiciones laborales, y (2) surjan dificultades particulares para probar que la conducta ofensiva tuvo lugar. Por ello, señaló el tribunal, se debe otorgar especial importancia a las declaraciones de los compañeros de trabajo, los informes médicos o psicológicos para determinar la existencia de daño físico o psicológico, y la prueba documental. Específicamente, la corte de apelaciones determinó que la demandante presentó suficiente testimonio de testigos, evidencia documental e informes psicológicos y contables para sustentar sus acusaciones. Además de otorgar daños, el tribunal de apelaciones ordenó a los acusados pagar los costos judiciales.
Sisnero, et al. v. Taldelva SRL, et al. Corta Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (2014)
The plaintiffs, Mirtha Graciela Sisnero and the Women’s Foundation (Fundación Entre Mujeres), filed suit against the Automotive State Transportation Company (Sociedad Anònoma del Estado del Transporte Automotor), the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Autoridad Metropolitana de Transporte), and seven companies that provided public transportation services in the city of Salta. The plainiffs alleged, citing Ms. Sisnero’s failure to obtain a bus driver position despite having met the job requirements, that defendants refuse to hire female drivers in violation of equal rights and anti-discrimination laws. The plaintiffs demanded that (1) the defendants cease to discriminate based on gender, (2) Ms. Sisnero be hired as a bus driver, and (3) the defendants set aside a certain number of positions to be filled exclusively by women until such time as the composition of drivers reflected gender integration. The court of first instance found in favor of the plaintiffs, mandating that 30% of openings for bus drivers be set aside exclusively for women. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision based on the plaintiff’s failure to prove that the defendants failed to hire Ms. Sisnero solely because she was female, further noting that the defendants’ failure to accept Ms. Sisnero’s multiple applications for employment were insufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination because the defendants were under no constitutional obligation to hire her. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, noting that the appellate court failed to adequately consider the evidence provided by the plaintiffs. The lower court should have considered (1) the fact that the defendants had not hired any female bus drivers after receiving complaints from Ms. Sisnero and (2) discriminatory statements made by representatives of the defendants (e.g., “women should focus on demonstrating their culinary abilities”). The Supreme Court further noted that once the claimant has proven the existence of acts that are allegedly discriminatory, it is the defendant’s burden to disprove the existence of the alleged discrimination.
Las demandantes, Mirtha Graciela Sisnero y la Fundación Mujeres (Fundación Entre Mujeres), demandaron conjuntamente a: la Empresa Estatal de Transporte Automotor (Sociedad Anònoma del Estado del Transporte Automotor), la Autoridad Metropolitana de Transporte (Autoridad Metropolitana de Transporte) y siete empresas que proporcionaron servicios de transporte público en la ciudad de Salta. Los demandantes alegaron, citando que la Sra. Sisnero no consiguió un puesto de chofer de autobús a pesar de haber cumplido con los requisitos laborales y que los acusados se niegan a contratar chóferas mujeres en violación de la igualdad de derechos y las leyes contra la discriminación. Los demandantes exigieron que (1) los imputados dejaran de discriminar por motivos de género, (2) la Sra. Sisnero fuera contratada como conductora de autobús y (3) los imputados apartaron un cierto número de puestos para ser ocupados exclusivamente por mujeres el tiempo necesario para que la composición de los impulsores reflejara la integración de género. El tribunal de primera instancia decidió a favor de los demandantes, ordenando que el 30% de las vacantes para conductores de autobuses se reservaran exclusivamente para mujeres. El tribunal de apelaciones revocó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia debido a que el demandante no demostró que los acusados no contrataron a la Sra. Sisnero únicamente porque era mujer, y señaló además que el hecho de que los acusadosno aceptaran las múltiples solicitudes de empleo de la Sra. Sisnero eran insuficientes para sustentar una denuncia de discriminación porque los acusadosno tenían la obligación constitucional de contratarla. La Corte Suprema revocó la decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones, señalando que la corte de apelaciones no consideró adecuadamente las pruebas proporcionadas por los demandantes. El tribunal de primera instancia debería haber considerado (1) el hecho de que los acusados no habían contratado a ninguna conductora de autobús después de recibir las quejas de la Sra. Sisnero y (2) evidencia de declaraciones discriminatorias hechas por representantes de los acusados (por ejemplo, “las mujeres deberían centrarse en demostrar su habilidades culinarias ”). El Tribunal Supremo señaló además que, una vez que el demandante ha probado la existencia de actos supuestamente discriminatorios, es responsabilidad del acusado refutar la existencia de la supuesta discriminación.
Employment Termination (Jurisprudential Thesis Docket: 2a./J.66/2017 (10a.)) Supreme Court of Mexico (2017)
“EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION. WHEN EMPLOYMENT IS TERMINATED DURING AN EMPLOYEE’S PREGNANCY, THE EMPLOYER BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SUCH TERMINATION WAS NOT DISCRIMINATORY.”
This jurisprudential thesis is a relevant example of case law, as the criteria issued by the Mexican Supreme Court is binding on all courts in the country. Mexico recognizes labor matters as independent from other matters of law, with a unique set of courts, legislation, and doctrine. This case law in particular comes from two different isolated theses, as settled by two different federal courts. The first case was settled by the Third Collegiate Tribunal in Labor Matters of the Third Circuit, and the second case was settled by the Third Collegiate Tribunal of Circuit in the Assistant Center of the Tenth Region. Both court resolutions contained contradictory substantive issues, which prompted the Supreme Court to settle these discrepancies. The Supreme Court acknowledged that all pregnant women should enjoy certain specific rights resulting from pregnancy. The Court also found that these rights should be extended to the postnatal period. The Supreme Court recognized that most pregnant women will likely face a lack of job security given the costs that maternity leave implies for most employers. The Supreme Court determined that pregnant women require certain social security benefits in order to eliminate the barriers and obstacles that they may face during the pre- and postnatal periods. When a pregnant employee is terminated and argues that the termination was discriminatory, the employer bears the burden of proving that such termination was not due to the woman’s pregnancy or any other discriminatory reason. In such scenarios, the courts must take a gender perspective approach in deciding such controversies in order to be able to effectively guarantee the rights of women recognized under the Mexican Constitution and international treaties to which Mexico is a signatory.
“TERMINACIÓN DEL EMPLEO. "CUANDO EL EMPLEO SE TERMINA DURANTE EL EMBARAZO DE UN EMPLEADO, EL EMPLEADOR ASUME LA CARGA DE PROBAR QUE DICHA TERMINACIÓN NO FUE DISCRIMINATORIA".
Esta tesis jurisprudencial es un ejemplo relevante de jurisprudencia, ya que los criterios emitidos por el Tribunal Supremo de México son de relevancia para todos los tribunales del país. México reconoce que los asuntos laborales son independientes de otros asuntos de la ley, con un conjunto único de tribunales, legislación y doctrina. Esta jurisprudencia en particular proviene de dos tesis diferentes, según lo resuelto por dos tribunales federales diferentes. El primer caso fue resuelto por el Tercer Tribunal Colegiado en Asuntos Laborales del Tercer Circuito, y el segundo caso fue resuelto por el Tercer Tribunal Colegiado de Circuito en el Centro Asistente de la Décima Región. Ambas resoluciones judiciales contenían cuestiones sustantivas contradictorias, lo que llevó a la Corte Suprema a resolver estas discrepancias. La Corte Suprema reconoció que todas las mujeres embarazadas deberían disfrutar de ciertos derechos específicos derivados del embarazo. El Tribunal también determinó que estos derechos deberían extenderse al período postnatal. La Corte Suprema reconoció que la mayoría de las mujeres embarazadas probablemente enfrentarán una falta de seguridad laboral, dado los costos que la licencia de maternidad implica para la mayoría de los empleadores. La Corte Suprema determinó que las mujeres embarazadas requieren ciertos beneficios de seguridad social para eliminar las barreras y obstáculos que pueden enfrentar durante los períodos pre y postnatal. Cuando una empleada embarazada es despedida y argumenta que la terminación fue discriminatoria, el empleador tiene la responsabilidad de probar que dicha terminación no se debió al embarazo de la mujer ni a ninguna otra razón discriminatoria. En tales escenarios, los tribunales deben adoptar un enfoque de perspectiva de género al decidir tales controversias para poder garantizar de manera efectiva los derechos de las mujeres reconocidos en la Constitución mexicana y los tratados internacionales de los que México es parte.
Kamaze v. State High Court (2013)
The appellant was convicted of raping his minor daughter and sentenced to 18 years and three years imprisonment, for rape and incest respectively, to run concurrently. He appealed his conviction, claiming that his minor daughter was the only witness to the alleged crime, that the trial judge improperly assumed the complainant was under 18 years old, that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof, that his rights to legal representation were not explained, and that the sentences were unreasonable. The High Court of Namibia (“High Court”) determined that the child’s testimony was sufficient to sustain the conviction pursuant to Section 208 of Act 51 of 1977, which allows for conviction based on “the single evidence of any competent witness.” The High Court held that “although the complainant is a single witness to the actual rape, the fact that she immediately reported that to her sister and her niece corroborates her evidence,” and that the medical report, which was the result of a doctor’s examination conducted on the night of the rape after the complainant took a bath, corroborated her account of being raped. However, the High Court allowed the appeal on the charge of incest. The High Court cited the “single intent” test, which requires that two criminal acts be considered as one transaction if the evidence for one of the acts necessarily involves proof of another criminal act. The Court stated that the defendant had a single intent – to rape his daughter – so he should only be convicted of one crime (rape) rather than two.
State v. Naruseb High Court of Namibia (2012)
The accused was tried for beating and raping his girlfriend A.S. (the third complainant), sexually abusing and beating their five-month-old male and female twin children, and murdering his son by throwing him on the floor. Medical experts testified that the injuries on the twins suggested sexual and other physical violence. Denying the charges, the accused testified that A.S., the children’s mother, beat the twins and assaulted the accused. The accused also argued that there was no credible evidence of the crime and that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof because A.S. was the only eye-witness to the accused’s alleged crimes. The High Court of Namibia disagreed, finding the accused not credible and finding the A.S. credible, not least because the circumstantial and medical evidence supported her testimony. Citing precedent regarding single witnesses, the Court determined that a single eye-witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness (a) is credible, (b) gives her statement in a straight-forward manner, and (c) has no reason to falsely incriminate the accused. In addition, an inference may be properly drawn from the fact that the accused and the complainant were the only two adults in the room between the time the complainant went to bed at night without injuries and when she awoke in the morning with injuries. This finding is significant for domestic violence cases, which often do not involve unbiased third-party testimony.
Roper v. Jolliffe Court of Appeals of Texas (2015)
Joliffe was granted a temporary ex parte protective order against Roper, with whom she aws in a relationship, following an incident of violence at Roper’s apartment, with a hearing on the matter of the protective order scheduled eight days later. Roper motioned for limited discovery and a jury trial. The jury trial was denied but the limited discovery was granted. The court granted Jolliffe a two year protective order, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Roper was a threat, and ordered Roper to participate in the Batterer’s Intervention and Counselling Program (BIPP). Roper argued to the Court of Appeals that he was entitled to a jury trial under the Texas state Constitution. The court determined that Roper was not entitled to a jury because the state legislature’s intent concerning protective orders was for the court to be the sole fact finder. Roper never formally requested discovery, so he was not denied a meaningful opportunity to defend himself under the due process clause. Roper argued that he was entitled to a higher burden of proof than preponderance of the evidence, citing the criminal undertones of domestic violence civil proceedings, but the court found that preponderance of the evidence was the correct standard.
Expediente 07-200123-0306-PE Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, Sección Tercera (2013)
The public defender is appealing a conviction of sexual assault on behalf of his client. The appeal argues that (1) the facts alleged are imprecise and ambiguous (e.g., how is it possible to restrain someone’s arms while touching them at the same time?) and (2) the sexual contact was consensual because there was no evidence of the victim’s fighting back, she didn’t scream for help, had no injuries or physical signs of assault. Given the alleged failure to show that the contact was not consensual, the public defender argues that a charge of sexual harassment would be more appropriate, since the defendant was the victim’s employer. The court rejected the appeal, stating that the burden is not on the victim to show physical or objective signs of nonconsent; rather, the burden is on the defendant to show that the victim consented, which he failed to do. The court notes that victims are not obligated to display certain actions or behaviors to prove they did not consent to sexual contact. The court also notes that it is important to analyze each case on an individual basis, and not to reinforce stereotypes regarding victims’ behaviors. The court also dismissed the argument regarding the imprecise nature of the facts presented at the initial proceeding on the basis that the incident occurred six years ago, when the victim was 18 years old.
El defensor público está apelando la convicción de asalto sexual de su cliente. La apelación propone que, (1) los hechos alegados son imprecisos y ambiguos (por ejemplo, ¿cómo es posible contener los brazos de alguien y tocarlos sexualmente al mismo tiempo?) y (2) el acto sexual fue consensual porque no hay evidencia de que la víctima se resistiera, gritara pidiendo ayuda, o tuviera lesiones u otras marcas físicas de asalto. Dado el fallo en mostrar que el acto no fue consensual, el defensor público propone que un cargo de acoso sexual sería más apropiado, ya que el acusado era el empleador de la víctima. La corte rechazó la apelación concluyendo que la carga legal de probar que hubo falta de consenso mútuo en el acto sexual, no está en la víctima. La carga probatoria cae en el acusado, quien tiene que mostrar que la víctima consintió al acto sexual, lo cuál él falló en demostrar. La corte agregó que las víctimas no están obligadas a mostrar actos específicos o ciertos comportamientos para demostrar que no consintieron al acto sexual. Es importante analizar cada caso individualmente y no intensificando estereotipos con respecto a los comportamientos esperados de una víctima. La corte también rechazó el argumento con respecto a la imprecisión de la evidencia física discutido en el procedimiento inicial referente a que los actos ocurrieron seis años atrás cuando la víctima tenía 18 años de edad.