The defendant was charged the defilement of the complainant, a 17-year-old girl. In his defence, the accused claimed that he could not get an erection (albeit, apparently, only after the magistrate raised the question himself). During the proceedings, a woman stood up in court and volunteered to ascertain whether the accused could obtain an erection. One week later, the magistrate, prosecutor, court interpreter, accused, complainant, and the woman who had volunteered met in the magistrate’s chambers to witness whether the woman could touch the defendant sexually until he obtained an erection. The magistrate observed, after approximately 30 minutes of sexual contact, that the accused’s “penis got a bit hard but not very hard.” Following a complaint from the complainant’s parent, the High Court was requested to review the conduct of the magistrate to determine the veracity of the complaint. At this point, the magistrate had not reached a verdict. By way of a preliminary conclusion, the High Court noted that “this illegal show seemed to come out of the blue” and found that the manner of investigation into the accused’s ability to obtain an erection was “raised by the magistrate, thereby making the [High] Court conclude that there were extra judicial discussions” between the accused and the magistrate. The Court also expressed serious concern about secondary victimisation, given that the sexual act occurred in the presence of the complainant. The Court then outlined its reasons for arriving at its ultimate decision, focusing on two matters: the existence of bias and judicial stereotyping. Regarding the first issue, the Court cited caselaw from across common law jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights relating to actual or perceived bias. Regarding the second issue, the Court highlighted the significant dangers associated with gender stereotyping on the part of the judiciary. The Court emphasised that judges should be alive to the concerns of victims of sexual offences, specifically that gender stereotypes harm such victims and contribute to further violations of their rights. Presiding officers are obliged to ensure that the courts offer equal access to men and women. In this context, it was emphasised that it matters not only how judges conduct themselves, but also how their conduct could be perceived during a trial. A judicial officer has to be aware of the negative results of displaying condescension toward women in court. In this case, the complainant was concerned about judicial bias, corruption, and/or collusion with the accused. The decision implied that the magistrate’s conduct could have arisen from his bias against, and stereotyping of, the complainant as a complainant in a sexual offence case. The Court highlighted that the judiciary could not condone the perpetuation of “structural gender-based violence, where courts instill fear in women and girls who are victims of sexual offences, using the criminal justice system.” Therefore, in order to create a discrimination-free judicial system that victims can rely on, it is incumbent on the judiciary to remain cognisant of its own biases and stereotypes, especially in the context of victims of sexual offences, and conduct cases in a manner which counteracts such biases and stereotypes. In conclusion, the High Court ordered a retrial under a different magistrate, and that the complainant and her family be provided with the resources needed to ensure her attendance at court. The Court referred (i) the magistrate’s conduct in the trial and (ii) the wider question of gender bias among judicial officers to the Judicial Service Commission. Finally, the Court recommended that the Chief Justice, through the judiciary’s training committee, should develop training programmes to avoid a matter like this re-occurring in the future.
Women and Justice: Keywords
Domestic Case Law
R. v. Yusuf Willy (Criminal Review No. 6 of 2021/Criminal Case No. 183 of 2021) High Court of Malawi (2022)
Cправа № 642/4714/16-к (Case No.642/4714/16-к) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2018)
The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.
Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.
Attorney-General v. Tion Kiribati Court of Appeal (2015)
The respondent had drunken intercourse with the complainant. He claimed that he mistook the complainant for his wife in his drunken stupor. She also mistook the respondent to be her husband during the intercourse. After intercourse, she realized that the respondent was not her husband. The respondent also claimed that he did not know the complainant was not his wife until this moment. Consequently, the court acquitted the respondent of rape and criminal trespass. The lower court reasoned that the onus was on the prosecution to establish whether the respondent had done something to impersonate the complainant’s husband and concluded that there was no evidence to support a finding of impersonation with the intent to deceive. The Attorney-General appealed this decision. The appellate court remarked that the lower court’s conclusion that there was no evidence of impersonation was incorrect. Whereas the lower court was focused on the testimony of the complainant regarding her own state of mind, the proper analysis should have concerned the state of mind of the respondent. While the Court of Appeal was suspicious of the respondent’s account that his actions had been the result of a mistake, it still found that the trial judge “had the great advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses,” and could have reasonably found the respondent’s testimony credible. Therefore, the lower court could have had “reasonable doubt” as to his guilt. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
R. v. Barton Supreme Court of Canada (2019)
The accused was charged with first degree murder of an Indigenous woman who was sex worker. The deceased was found in his hotel room. The cause of death was found to be loss of blood due to an 11cm wound in the victim’s vagina. In its opening address, the prosecution referred to the deceased as a “prostitute” and discussed how she and the accused had struck up a working relationship the night before her death. In addition, without ordering a separate hearing or considering the relevance of the evidence as is required pursuant to section 276 of the Criminal Code (evidence of complainant’s sexual history), the trial judge allowed the accused to testify at length about his previous sexual activity with the deceased. The jury acquitted the accused, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on first degree murder. In the Supreme Court, the majority agreed that a new trial should be ordered, but on the lesser charge of unlawful act manslaughter. This was because the trial judge’s mistakes in not considering the relevance of evidence did not affect the decision on murder. The Supreme Court said that defences to sexual assault cannot rely on things that support myths about women and consent. The first myth being that a woman’s consent to previous sexual activity means she consents to the current act in question and the second myth being that such women might not tell the truth.
R. v. Goldfinch Supreme Court of Canada (2019)
The accused was charged with sexual assault of a woman he had once dated. The complainant claimed that on the night in question, she had called to the accused’s house for drinks and that he snapped, dragged her to his bedroom, hit her, and forced her to have sex with him. At trial, the accused requested that evidence of a “friends with benefits” relationship be admitted to the jury as it was important context for the jury to know. The trial judge allowed what he called the “benign” evidence to be admitted. The jury found the accused not guilty but the Court of Appeal said the evidence should not have been allowed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court said the evidence should not have been allowed and that it was used to suggest that as she had agreed to sex in the past, she was more likely to agree on this occasion which is exactly what the “rape shield law” (section 276 of the Criminal Code (evidence of complainant’s sexual history)) is designed to protect. The Supreme Court said that the judge should have made the accused show that the evidence was useful for some other important reason. A new trial was ordered.
R v. Lazarus Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Criminal Appeal) (2017)
In his initial trial, a jury found the accused guilty of the crime of sexual intercourse without consent. He appealed and was granted a retrial, which was a bench trial (no jury). The focus of the retrial was whether the complainant had consented and, if not, whether the accused knew. The complainant (then 18) and the accused (then 21) met at a Sydney nightclub. Soon after meeting, and after having danced and kissed on the dance floor, the accused anally penetrated the complainant in an alleyway behind the club. During the retrial, the court did not believe that the complainant “by her actions, herself meant to consent to sexual intercourse and in her own mind was not consenting to sexual intercourse,” but the issue was “[w]hether or not the accused knew that she was not consenting.” The court held that the accused did not know that the complainant had not consented. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the complainant did “not say ‘stop’ or ‘no.’ She did not take any physical action to move away from the intercourse or attempted intercourse.” The court accepted that the “series of circumstances on the early morning of 12 May 2013 amounts to reasonable grounds, in the circumstances for the accused to have formed the belief […] that in fact the complainant was consenting to what was occurring even though it was quick, unromantic, they had both been drinking and in the case of both of them may not occurred if each had been sober.” The court acquitted the accused on the basis that the “the Crown ha[d] [not] made out the third element, namely to prove that the accused had no reasonable grounds for believing that the complainant was not consenting…” The court’s judgment of acquittal was upheld on appeal. This case is important because it led to the NSW Attorney General requesting that the NSW Law Reform Commission review section 61HA of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in order to determine if the law should be amended to better protect victims. District Court re-trail decision available here: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/556710/27630007/1500427752463/Tupman_Lazarus.pdf?token=mHtsYtApoYyV2KbtbIvqb0GxWmc%3D
Case No. B 2590-16 – F.L. through the Prosecutor General v. W.B.F. Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court) (2017)
A man, W.B.F., put his cell phone camera under a woman’s skirt and took pictures of her on an escalator in a subway station in Stockholm. The woman, F.L., did not notice the picture being taken, but was made aware of it shortly thereafter. Under Swedish law, taking insulting pictures of another person is prohibited only if the person being photographed is inside a house or in another location especially purposed for privacy. However, under Chapter 6 Section 10 of the Swedish Penal Code, one who by word or act molests another person in a sense that is intended to violate the person’s sexual integrity may be convicted for sexual molestation. The assessment must be made objectively. The Supreme Court found that the regulation must include situations where the offender does not physically touch the victim, and the victim does not notice the violation. If the act constitutes a clear offense of the victim’s right over his or her body, it should be equated with an act that involves physical touch. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that W.B.F. should be convicted for sexual molestation and sentenced him to 60 daily fines of SEK 50 each, an amount which was based on his economic situation.
Ap.-Kz. 307/2012 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2012)
The victim, a minor of the age of 15, was trafficked by men including defendants I.I. and Sh. G, from Albania to Kosovo, where she was imprisoned and forced to work as dancer at multiple restaurants. She eventually escaped and met two men who helped her find accommodations and work as a waitress. One of the men, S.B., had sexual intercourse with her, as did D.B., the manager who hired her as a waitress. I.I., Sh. G., and the men involved in the victim’s trafficking and employment were convicted of Trafficking in Persons contrary to Article 139 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and S.B. and D.B. were additionally convicted of Sexual Abuse of Persons under the Age of 16 contrary to Article 198. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the court of first instance’s ruling that the fact that the victim perceived I.I. as a person who had helped her was a mitigating circumstance, and agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on I.I. was very lenient, noting that I.I. had participated in the victim’s trafficking despite his awareness of the victim’s age and vulnerable situation, including her dependency on narcotics, presence alone in a foreign country, and lack of options to return home. The court accordingly increased I.I.’s sentence from one year to two years. The tribunal then dismissed Sh. G.’s argument that he was found guilty based only on the statement of the victim, holding that in the case of human trafficking, “it is the injured party who is the most reliable person.” The Supreme Court also agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on S.B. was very lenient, considering that he had intercourse with the victim, being aware of her age and vulnerable situation, and thus increased S.B.’s sentence from one year and one month to one year and six months. Finally, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on D.B. was very lenient. The tribunal held that the trafficking of minors need not involve the use of force or violence, and that a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor could stand even if it was proven that it was done with the permission of the victim. The court accepted that the victim may have shown gratitude to D.B. for his assistance, but dismissed it as the “distorted perception” of a “vulnerable victim” and held that the gratitude did not change the criminal nature of the act or serve as an exculpatory circumstance. D.B.’s sentence was accordingly increased from two years to two years and four months. (Also available in English.)
Nadeem Masood v. The State Lahore High Court (2015)
The appellant arrived at the respondent’s home armed with a pistol and raped her. The respondent, 16 years old at the time, was already 32 weeks pregnant with the appellant’s child due to multiple previous rapes. The respondent filed a suit against the appellant and gave birth to a daughter during the trial. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment, to which he appealed to the Lahore High Court. Under the criminal laws of Pakistan, it is rape when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman with or without her consent when she is 16 years old or under. It is also rape when a woman gives consent due to fear of death or being hurt. The appellant argued the lesser offence of fornication, which is a crime committed when two people have sexual intercourse outside of marriage. The appellant argued that the Trial Court should not have convicted him of rape as the respondent had consented to the sexual intercourse. The offence of fornication is only punishable by imprisonment for up to five years with a maximum fine of ten thousand rupees, whereas rape is punishable by imprisonment for up to 25 years and/or a fine. The High Court held that since the respondent was 16 years old at the time of rape, it qualified as rape irrespective of the respondent’s consent. The High Court also expressed its concern over the Trial Court’s failure to award compensation to the child. Notably, the High Court held that children born because of rape would suffer “mental anguish and psychological damage” for their entire life, and should, therefore, be entitled to compensation. The appellant was ordered to pay a fine of one million rupees to the child born as a result of the rape, in addition to the compensation payable to the respondent.
M.D. v. Prieta, Caso 312/2007 Tribunal Apelaciones Familia 1ºT (First Family Appeals Court) (2017)
A Trial Court awarded the plaintiff UR$4,500 for actual damages and UR$30,000 for emotional distress damages, resulting from the domestic violence committed by the defendant, her common-law husband. The defendant appealed, arguing that, beyond the plaintiff’s testimony and a medical diagnosis based on that testimony, there was no proof that he had committed acts of domestic violence. The defendant further argued that the plaintiff’s depression and anxiety were the consequences of a preexisting medical condition. Additionally, the defendant proposed on appeal that the law does not recognize emotional distress damages in a common law marriage because the duty of fidelity and the duty to do no harm only arise from marriage. Finally, the defendant said that the plaintiff had consented to the acts of domestic violence acts and, therefore, there could be no damages. The Family Appeals Court determined that domestic violence is a human rights violation: a victim cannot consent to be the victim of domestic violence and every person has a general duty to not harm another. The Family Appeals court also ruled that the medical and psychological diagnoses were not hearsay. The Family Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and partially affirmed the decision of the Trial Court, concluding that the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff, that there was causation between the harm and the domestic violence, and that the plaintiff suffered damages. However, it reduced the award of actual damages from $4,500 to $2,250 due to the fact that the defendant had already made payments to the plaintiff.
Un Tribunal de Primera Instancia le otorgó al demandante UR $ 4,500 por daños reales y UR $ 30,000 por daños por angustia emocional, como resultado de la violencia doméstica cometida por el acusado, su marido en matrimonio común. El acusado apeló, argumentando que, más allá del testimonio del demandante y un diagnóstico médico basado en ese testimonio, no había pruebas de que hubiera cometido actos de violencia doméstica. El acusado argumentó además que la depresión y la ansiedad del demandante fueron las consecuencias de una afección médica preexistente. Además, el acusado propuso en apelación que la ley no reconoce los daños por angustia emocional en un matrimonio común porque el deber de fidelidad y el deber de no hacer daño solo surgen del matrimonio. Finalmente, el acusado dijo que el demandante había consentido a los actos de violencia doméstica y, por lo tanto, no podía haber daños. El Tribunal de Apelaciones de la Familia determinó que la violencia doméstica es una violación de los derechos humanos: una víctima no puede consentir ser víctima de violencia doméstica y cada persona tiene el deber general de no dañar a otra. La corte de Apelaciones de Familia también dictaminó que los diagnósticos médicos y psicológicos no eran rumores. El Tribunal de Apelaciones de la Familia desestimó la apelación y confirmó parcialmente la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, concluyendo que el acusado incumplió el deber del demandante, que había conexión entre el daño y la violencia doméstica, y que el demandante sufrió daños. Sin embargo, redujo la adjudicación de daños reales de $ 4,500 a $ 2,250 debido al hecho de que el acusado ya había realizado pagos al demandante anteriormente.
AA v. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Caso No. 299/2010 Tribunal Apelaciones Penal 1º Tº (First Criminal Appeals Court) (2010)
The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to two years in prison for aggravated domestic violence. The court considered the aggravating circumstances to be the accused’s recidivism and the use of his strength to overpower his female victim. AA had a history of domestic violence against his wife (BB). Even though he had repeatedly assaulted BB and stabbed her once, BB refused to file a complaint against him. A family court judge imposed a restraining order against AA pursuant to which he could not get closer than 300 meters to BB and her children. However, BB on several occasions allowed AA back in her home and near the children. On October 7, 2008, AA came over to BB’s house with the intention of moving back in, but when BB declined, AA locked her and her children in a room for two hours. He did not physically assault them, but did threaten to kill them. BB filed a complaint and AA was convicted of domestic violence. AA appealed arguing that BB had subsequently withdrawn her criminal complaint against him, which constituted consent to his conduct. The Appeals Court determined that the victim’s withdrawal of her complaint was a consequence of “battered women’s syndrome,” and had no bearing on a criminal action. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a dos años de prisión por violencia doméstica agravada. El Tribunal consideró que las circunstancias agravantes eran la reincidencia del acusado y el uso de su fuerza para dominar a su víctima femenina. AA tenía antecedentes previos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). Aunque había asaltado repetidamente a BB y la apuñaló una vez, BB se negó a presentar una queja contra él. Un juez de un tribunal de familia impuso una orden de restricción contra AA en virtud de la cual no podía acercarse más de 300 metros a BB y sus hijos. Sin embargo, BB en varias ocasiones permitió que AA regresara a su casa y estuviera cerca de los niños. El 7 de octubre del 2008, AA vino a la casa de BB con la intención de regresar, pero cuando BB declinó, AA la encerró a ella y a sus hijos en una habitación durante dos horas. No los agredió físicamente, pero amenazó con matarlos. BB presentó una queja y AA fue condenado por violencia doméstica. AA apeló argumentando que BB había retirado posteriormente su denuncia penal contra él, lo que constituía un consentimiento para su conducta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que la retirada de la denuncia de la víctima fue una consecuencia del "síndrome de las mujeres maltratadas" y no tenía relación con una acción penal. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.
Musumhiri v. State High Court of Zimbabwe (2014)
The 47-year-old male applicant requested bail pending the appeal of his conviction and 15-year sentence for raping the 16-year-old complainant. The applicant appealed, arguing that the intercourse was consensual because the victim did not scream or immediately report the rape after a witness stumbled upon the incident. The applicant had to show, among other things, the likelihood of success of his appeal to obtain bail. The court dismissed the bail application after rejecting the state's concession that the applicant had a meritorious appeal because complainant's failure to scream or to immediately report the rape cast doubts upon her lack of consent. Citing research about cultural inhibitions on gender violence victims, the court concluded that silence could not be equated to acquiescence. With women often held culturally as custodians of appropriate sexual conduct, and with the responsibility for sexual restraint being placed on a woman, regardless of her age or power imbalances, the court found it understandable that the complainant failed to make an immediate report. The court noted that a young girl may not make a voluntary report because her cultural context makes it difficult for her to do so without being re-victimized. Consequently, the proposition that the victim's initial silence implied consent was untenable and could not be ground for bail.
U.S. v. Robinson United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2012)
A federal grand jury convicted the defendant-appellant of child sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. A minor victim testified that she started dating the defendant when she was 17 years old but had told him and others that she was 19 years old. She insisted that the defendant was only living off her income as a prostitute and was not a pimp facilitating prostitution. However, the prosecution introduced videotaped statements in which the defendant repeatedly implored Doe to make money for him and threatened her when she failed to deliver the money. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sex trafficking of a minor. On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), an evidentiary provision added by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), which provides that “[i]n a prosecution . . . in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe [the victim], the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that this provision imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age and relieves the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the victim’s underage status under § 1591(a). The Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s challenges to this provision as lacking merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Molina v. Commonwealth of Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia (2006)
The defendant appealed his convictions for rape and sodomy, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the victim was incapacitated due to voluntary intoxication. The victim suffered from bipolar disorder and substance abuse. She was found non-responsive and half-naked behind a convenience store with rape-related injuries. She had high amounts of cocaine and alcohol in her blood, but low amounts of her prescribed lithium. She stated that she had kissed the defendant but did not consent to sexual intercourse and had no recollection of intercourse with the defendant. The defendant claimed the intercourse was consensual. The issue before the Court was whether defendant could be convicted for rape because of the victim’s incapacity if such incapacity was not a permanent condition but a transitory condition such as voluntary intoxication. In affirming the conviction, the court explained that “[n]othing in the statutory definition itself limits the definition of ‘mental incapacity’ to a permanent condition,” but rather the statute defines incapacity to mean a condition existing “at the time of the offense” that “prevents the complaining witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act.” Accordingly, the Court held that “mental incapacity” could extend to a transitory circumstance such as intoxication because the nature and degree of the intoxication went beyond the stage of merely reduced inhibition and reached a point where the victim did not understand “the nature or consequences of the sexual act.” Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions.
Ah-Chong v. The Queen Supreme Court of New Zealand (2015)
Appellant Ah-Chong was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual violation by rape. As a defense, Ah-Chong claimed that the victim consented to the sexual activity. The trial judge gave the jury instructions that they had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe that consent existed. The appellant argued that the jury instructions were wrong, claiming that there were two separate mens rea elements: one for the assault and one for intention to rape. The Supreme Court previously held in L v R that only a reasonable belief of consent, even if mistaken, could provide a defense to the charge of sexual violation by rape. The appellant argued that a mistaken belief of consent constitutes a defense to the charge of assault, even if the belief was unreasonable. The Court rejected this jury instruction. The trial judge correctly informed the jury that based on the complainant’s account of the event, there was no possibility of finding a mistaken belief in consent relating to the assault, but not the intention to rape. The Court extended the analysis from L v. R, holding that the mental element for attempted rape was satisfied if there was a mistaken and unreasonable belief that consent was present.
S (CA338/2016) v. The Queen Court of Appeal of New Zealand (2017)
Appellant (who was 38 years of age at the time of the offences) appealed a sentence of imprisonment for kidnapping, disfiguring with intent to injury and wounding with intent to injure the complainant (who was 17 years of age at the time of the offences). The complainant and appellant began a relationship after the complainant left the care of Child, Youth and Family (Ministry for Vulnerable Children). The appellant accused the complainant of sexually assaulting his daughter. As punishment for the sexual assault and a condition for continuing their relationship, he convinced the complainant to allow him to break her finger with a rock. He subsequently subjected the complainant to other physical abuse, after which she fled to a neighbor for help. The appellant argued at the Court of Appeal that a High Court Judge had wrongly withheld the defense of consent on the charge of wounding with intent to injure. The Court dismissed the appeal and concluded that it was possible to eliminate the defense of consent depending on the specific facts of the case. In this case, the Court found it permissible to eliminate the defense of consent because of the power imbalance between the parties, the fact that the complainant acquiesced because of a threat to their relationship, the gravity of domestic violence, and the severity of the injury.
Ministério Público v. [Undisclosed Parties], 43/13.4JAPRT.P1 Tribunal da Relação de Porto (Court of Appeal of Porto) (2016)
The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) brought charges against defendant, “B” (name omitted from public record), for the crime of rape for having anal sex with the victim without the victim’s consent. The Lower Court found B guilty. B appealed, arguing that the victim facilitated the anal penetration, and therefore the court should find that the victim consented. The Appellate Court found that, although the victim facilitated penetration, the victim did so to preserve his integrity, which does not qualify as consent. The Appellate Court affirmed the Lower Court’s decision finding B guilty of rape under section 164 of the Penal Code.
O Ministério Público trouxe acusações contra o réu, “B” (nome omitido do registro público), pelo crime de estupro por ter feito sexo anal com a vítima, sem o consentimento dela. O Tribunal da Relação condenou B. B apelou, argumentando que a vítima facilitou a penetração anal, e então a corte deveria considerar que a vítima consentiu. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que, apesar da vítima facilitar a penetração, a vítima fez isso para preservar a sua integridade, o que não qualifica como consentimento. O Tribunal da Relação reafirmou a decisão da Corte Inferior condenando B pelo crime de estupro sob a seção 164 do Código Penal.
Ministério Público v. [Undisclosed Parties], 1004/07.8TALMG.P1 Tribunal da Relação de Porto (Court of Appeal of Porto) (2013)
The defendant, “B” (name omitted from public record), was sentenced in the Lower Court for statutory rape and qualified rape of the victim, a minor girl. The court found that the defendant had repeated sexual intercourse with the victim, who had initially consented to sexual intercourse but, over time, changed her mind and wanted to end her sexual relationship with B. B threatened to have sexual intercourse with the victim’s sister, and in order to prevent that, the victim continued her sexual relationship with B. On appeal, the Appellate Court partially overturned the decision to absolve B from the charges of qualified rape. The Appellate Court held that B did not threaten the victim personally, and therefore could not be charged with qualified rape under section 163 of the Penal Code. However, the Appellate Court further held that, under Section 174 of the Portuguese Penal Code, when an adult practices sexual acts with a minor aged from 14 to 16, it is considered statutory rape if the evidence suggests that the adult has taken advantage of the minor’s inexperience, and consent from the minor does not automatically rebut the presumption of inexperience. Therefore, the Lower Court’s decision was affirmed with respect to the sentencing of the defendant as guilty for statutory rape.
O réu, “B” (nome omitido do registro público), foi sentenciado na Corte Inferior por estupro legal e estupro qualificado da vítima, uma garota menor de idade. A corte decidiu que o réu teve relações sexuais repetidas com a vítima, que inicialmente tinha consentido a ter relações sexuais, mas, ao longo do tempo, mudou de ideia e queria acabar com a sua relação sexual com B. B ameaçou ter relações sexuais com a irmã da vítima, e para impedir isso, a vítima continuou a sua relação sexual com B. Na apelação, o Tribunal da Relação anulou parcialmente a decisão de absolver B das acusações de estupro qualificado. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que B não ameaçou a vítima pessoalmente, e então não poderia ser acusado de estupro qualificado sob a seção 163 do Código Penal. No entanto, o Tribunal da Relação posteriormente considerou que sob a Seção 174 do Código Penal Português, quando um adulto pratica relações sexuais com uma menor de idade entre 14 e 16 anos, é considerado estupro legal se as provas sugerem que o adulto tirou vantagem da inexperiência do menor, e o consentimento do menor não refuta automaticamente a presunção de inexperiência. Então, a decisão da Corte Inferior foi afirmada com relação à sentença do réu pelo crime de estupro legal.
Public Prosecutor of Zurich Canton v. X., BGE 129 IV 81 Supreme Federal Court (2002)
The defendant, X., procured women for the purpose of prostitution from a recruiter operating in Thailand. She deliberately chose women from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds because of their greater vulnerability and their perceived inability to resist demands made by X. On February 14, 2000, the Zurich District Court convicted X on charges relating to the promotion of prostitution of others under Article 195(3) of the Penal Code (Switzerland), but found the defendant not guilty in relation to trafficking in persons, assault, and other prostitution related offenses. Her conviction resulted in a sentence of two-and-a-half years of imprisonment and a fine of CHF 10,000. On January 24, 2001, the Zurich Court of Appeal, found X. guilty of multiple counts of trafficking in human beings (under Article 196 of the Criminal Code), promotion of prostitution (under Article 195(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code), and for offenses relating to bribery (Articles 288a and 305). X.’s prison sentence was increased to four and a half (4.5) years and the fine of CHF 10,000 was affirmed. X. appealed to the Supreme Federal Court for the annulment of the decision made by the Zurich Court of Appeal. The Supreme Federal Court confirmed the decision of the Zurich Court of Appeal, adding that any consent that may have been given by any of the trafficked women after they had been trafficked and were present in Switzerland would have been irrelevant.
Blake v. R. Court of Appeal (2015)
The applicant pleaded guilty before the Circuit Court of Westmoreland for the offence of having sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, in violation of section 10(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. He was in a serious relationship with the underage girl, but the matter was brought to the attention of the police when the complainant discovered she was pregnant and there was a dispute regarding the defendant’s paternity (tests showed he indeed was the father). He then argued that he was lured and tempted by the complainant, who would attend to his shop in revealing clothes and make sexual advances to him. The grounds for the defendant’s application was that the four-year sentence was manifestly excessive and that the judge was obliged to indicate, as a matter of law, the sentence that would have been imposed if the applicant had been convicted at trial and use that as a starting point for taking into account the fact that the applicant had plead guilty. In addition, his counsel highlighted as mitigating factors: the girl was just six months away from the age of consent and the sexual intercourse was consensual. His counsel also argued that the judge did not take into consideration the character and antecedents of the applicant, as well as the classic sentencing principles of retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. However, the Court decided that, although the indication of a starting point for sentencing would have been desirable, they do not see the omission as being fatal to the reasoning underlying the sentencing. They also highlighted that it’s clear that Parliament has recognized this offence as a serious one, and their commitment against it. This case is particularly important because the Court stated that Jamaica has particular difficulties in dealing with offences involving young girls constantly being abused and exploited by older men, and that they have to get the message out that the children must be allowed to transition into adulthood without any molestation. Furthermore, the court stated that the pregnancy of the girl must not be taken as a mitigating factor, because that would send the message that a man who gets the girl pregnant is likely to be treated more favorably by the Court. Finally, the Court insisted that these pronouncements, in the context of the alarming local circumstances, should be guiding principles in sentencing these matters and cases.
NJA 2017 s. 316 Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court) (2017)
K.K. had sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old child. The issue before the court was whether KK had reasonable reason to believe that the child was under the age of 15 and, thus, whether the sexual act constituted rape against a child. The child (Sw. målsäganden) initially lied about her age to K.K. but, according to her own testimony, she revealed her true age to KK before they had sex. The Supreme Court concluded that the child’s age was unclear and, in any event, that her testimony was not trustworthy because the defendant’s attorney was not present when she was initially questioned and she was not subject to cross examination. As a result, the Supreme Court held that evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
Miloslav v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2014)
The appellant was charged with the offence of indecent assault on a female contrary to Section 137(1) of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The victim worked for the appellant as a maid when she was indecently assaulted. The appellant advanced four grounds of appeal: (i) the trial court erred when (i) it found the appellant had a case to answer at the close of the prosecution’s case; (ii) it convicted the appellant of the offence in the absence of corroborative evidence; (iii) the trial court erred when it convicted the appellant on the evidence of the victim who suffered from unsoundness of mind without satisfying itself that the victim understood the nature of an oath and was capable of giving rational testimony; and, (iv) it held that the findings in the medical report supported the prosecution’s evidence and when it held that the appellant had corroborated the evidence of the victim when he admitted touching the victim. The Court dismissed all grounds for appeal on the following bases: (i) the Court was satisfied that the victim’s testimony was presented in a very coherent manner and that the three ingredients of the offence had been established and that the victim’s testimony was not discredited at all; (ii) there was medical evidence which corroborated the crime as well as evidence that the victim did not consent to the indecent assault; (iii) the victim’s testimony was very consistent and was given with ‘lucid clarity’, therefore there was nothing in the victim’s testimony that could have compelled the trial court to conduct a voir dire; and, (iv) there was medical evidence which corroborated the victim’s testimony and there was no evidence of a romantic relationship between the parties which would indicate consent. Further, the Court held that, because of the ‘master and servant’ nature of the relationship, the minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment was inappropriate and should be set aside and replaced by a sentence of 20 years imprisonment with hard labor effective from the date of conviction.
X. Court of Appeal of Ghent (2016)
Defendant X was condemned under Article 433quinquies and 733septies of the Penal Code for human trafficking with the aim of exploiting three women by prostitution. The fact that the women may have given their consent, and came to Belgium for the specific purpose of prostituting themselves, was considered irrelevant. The Court of Appeal further considered irrelevant the possibility that the women in question had been active in prostitution before. The key test is whether there has been exploitation, and that this is the case when direct or indirect benefit is derived by the exploiter from the income generated by the prostitution, and this becomes the exploiter’s main source of income, regardless of whether the exploiter lives with, or is married to, the prostitute.
Uganda v. Kusemererwa High Court at Fort Portal (2015)
At issue in this case is the distinction between rape, simple defilement, and aggravated defilement in the Uganda Penal Code. The crime of defilement, created in 1990, prohibits having or attempting sexual intercourse with a girl under 18 years of age and carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Defilement is considered aggravated if the girl is under 14 years old, the offender has HIV/AIDS, the offender is the victim’s parent or guardian, the girl has a disability, or the offender is a serial offender, and it carries a maximum penalty of death. There is no consent requirement for defilement because children cannot consent to sexual intercourse. The Penal Code section prohibiting rape describes it as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl without her consent” (emphasis added) or if consent is obtained through any force, threat, or intimidation. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The victim in this case was 16 when the defendant had unlawful carnal knowledge of her without her consent. The defendant argued that he should be charged with simple defilement instead of rape because rape only applies to an adult woman who can give consent. The State argued that the statutes give the State discretion to choose between the charges. Citing other cases in which the State charged for rape instead of defilement because the defendant used excessive force, the State argued that this case the charge of rape was justified. The Court found that these cases were decided before Parliament had fully settled the statutory details of rape, simple defilement, and aggravated defilement. Now that the law is settled, the law does not allow rape charges for children because of the element of consent; unlawful sexual intercourse with children must be prosecuted as defilement.
Rex v. Makebe High Court of Lesotho (2011)
The complainant alleged that the defendant raped her. The defendant vehemently denied the allegations and testified that the sex was consensual. The High Court treated the defendant’s claim of consent as an affirmative defense ruling that he had the burden of proving consent. The Court found that the defense was unable “through cross examination, to show that the sex was consensual” (p. 4). Consequently, the Court convicted the defendant of rape. This was a landmark case because it essentially shifted the burden of proof in rape cases. Instead of requiring the prosecution to prove a lack of consent, the court made the defendant prove that the victim consented to the sexual encounter.
Rex v. Tekane High Court of Lesotho (2007)
The defendant was convicted of persistent sexual abuse of a minor child. The trial evidence showed that the defendant was the victim’s uncle and that he convinced her that, in accordance with tradition and custom, he was supposed to teach her to have sex. As instructed, the minor allowed the defendant to perform sexual acts on her. Since the child was below the legal age of consent, the High Court did not consider her level of resistance. The Court found the defendant guilty of sexually abusing a minor and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.
Supreme Court Decision 2014Do17346 Supreme Court of South Korea (2015)
The defendant, who was in his mid-20s, illegally had sex on four occasions with the victim (a 14-year-old middle school student) with a Level Three intellectual disability (which means a weak cognitive capacity and decision-making capacity). He initially met the victim through an online chat room and lied about his age. He used his cell phone to record videos of his sexual intercourse with the victim and to take nude pictures of the victim. The victim instantaneously objected but half-heartedly acquiesced to the defendant's requests and ultimately asked him to erase the photos. Under the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, the Prosecutor indicted Defendant on charges of having illicit sex with a disabled juvenile and producing juvenile pornography. The trial and appellate courts found the defendant guilty, and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that “cognitive capacity” means the ability to rationally discern between good and evil or right and wrong, and “decision-making capacity” means the ability to control one’s behavior. Evaluating these capacities requires relying on an expert’s opinion of the child or juvenile's capacities, objective evidence, testimonies of witnesses on the child or juvenile's daily verbal expressions and behaviors, and circumstances that led to the charge, including the child or juvenile’s speech and behavior. The Court held that the Article 8(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse ("the Act") punishes those who have illicit sex with a disabled child or juvenile who has a cognitive capacity much weaker than ordinary children and juveniles, and who lacks the ability to exercise the right to sexual self-determination. Furthermore, the Court held that Article 11(1) of the Act punishes those who produced, imported, or exported child or juvenile pornography. The Court held that even if the victim implicitly consented, such consent could not be viewed as an act of a child or juvenile with sufficient cognitive capacity who voluntarily or earnestly exercised the right to sexual self-determination on an informed or educated basis. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. English version available here.
피고인은 자신의 나이를 속이면서 처음부터 피해자가 중학교 3학년생인 아동 청소년임을 알고도 단지 성적 행위를 목적으로 피해자에게 인터넷 채팅을 통해 접근하여 몇 차례 연락하고 만난 사이다. 피해자는 지적 장애 3급으로서 사물을 분별하거나 의사를 결정할 능력이 미약하다. 피고인은 피해자와 처음 만난 날에 성관계를 2회 가지는 등 몇 차례 만나 성관계를 가지면서 그 장면과 피해자의 나체 사진을 촬영했다. 피해자는 순간적으로 거부감을 표시했지만 피고인은 계속 요구를 하였고 결국 피해자는 소극적으로 응하였다. 일부 사진에 대해서는 지워 달라고 요청하기도 하였다. “사물을 변별할 능력”이란 사물의 선악과 시비를 합리적으로 판단하여 정할 수 있는 능력을 의미하고, “의사를 결정할 능력을 의미한다. 사물변별능력이나 의사결정능력이 미약한지 여부는 전문가의 의견, 아동 청소년의 평소 언행에 관한 제3자의 진술 등 객관적 증거, 공소사실과 관련된 아동 청소년의 언행 및 사건의 경위등 여러 사정을 종합하여 판당할 수 있다. 아동 청소년의 성보호에 관한 법률 제8조 제1항은 19세 이상의 사람이 “장애 아동 청소년”을 간음하는 행위를 처벌한다. 청소년성보호법 제11조 제1항은 아동 청소년이용음란물을 제작 수입 또는 수출한 자를 처벌한다. 대법원은 피고인이 원심판시와 같은 사진을 각 촬영한 행위는 청소년성보호법 제11조 제1항에서 규정하는 아동 청소년이용음란물의 제작에 해당한다고 파결을 내렸다. 설령 피해자의 묵시적 동의가 있었다고 불 여지가 있더라도 사리분별력이 충분한 아동 청소년이 성적 행위에 관한 자기결정권을 자발적이고 진지하게 행사한 것으로 보기 어렵다고 판단했다. 따라서 원심이 이 부분 공소사실을 유죄로 판단한 것은 정당하다고 판단했다.
Nombuyiselo Siholongonyane v. Mholi Joseph Sihlongonyane High Court of Swaziland (2013)
Husband challenged his wife’s capacity to initiate legal proceedings without his consent. The common law permitted a married woman to sue without the consent of her husband only if the woman attained approval from the court first. The High Court held that this common law requirement was unfair discrimination because it applied only to women and not to men, a violation of Sections 20 and 28 of the Constitution, which respectively state that “all persons are equal before and under the law” and that “women have the right to equal treatment with men.”
Nimely v. Paye, et al. Supreme Court of Liberia (2011)
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment that appellant was guilty of rape. The complainant alleged that the appellant had sex with her when she was 13 years old and he was 18 years old. She alleged that the appellant invited her to his room, gagged her, and had sexual intercourse with her. Her brother’s wife forced open the door after the complainant failed to answer her phone call. The complainant's brother then called the police. The appellant admitted to police that he and the complainant had sex. The court found the appellant guilty of rape because the elements of Liberian statutory rape law are (1) sexual intercourse, (2) the perpetrator is at least 18 years of age, and (3) the victim is less than 18 years of age. However, the court reversed his conviction because the trial court relied on inaccurate information in determining the appellant’s age. The appellant testified that he was 17 years old at the time of the rape. Documents such as a passport or birth certificate were unavailable. The court held that in the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the prosecution, the court must accept that the appellant was 17 years old and therefore a juvenile when he had sex with the complainant. Under Liberian law, a juvenile cannot commit a crime, but is instead considered a juvenile delinquent. If a case involves a juvenile delinquent who is over 16 years of age and is accused of conduct that would constitute a felony carrying a sentence of life imprisonment or death if committed by an adult of at least 18 years of age, then the circuit court must consider the best interests of the Republic and the juvenile to determine whether to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter and preside over the case or choose to refer it to the juvenile court. However, the circuit court did not make this determination. Rather, it proceeded with the trial as though the the appellant was an adult and sentenced him to life imprisonment as an adult. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded him to the custody of his parents until the age of 21.
Gudu Masuku v. The State High Court of Zimbabwe (2004)
The appellant was convicted of raping the complainant ten years before she reported it to anyone and eleven years before she reported it to the police. He was sentenced to three and half years of imprisonment, with two years suspended on condition of good behavior. Although the trial judge found the complainant credible, the court found that she was not consistent in her evidence. It emphasized the trail court’s finding that she was suffering from post- traumatic stress disorder and her delay in reporting. As there was no independent evidence beyond the complainant’s testimony, the court could not hold that (i) the danger of false or erroneous implication was excluded beyond reasonable doubt or (ii) the state proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the conviction was quashed and the sentence was set aside.
R. v. J.A Supreme Court of Canada (2011)
This appeal involved the interpretation of “consent” under the sexual assault provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada in its seminal decision in 1999 in R. v. Ewanchuk unanimously confirmed that consent to sexual activity must be active, voluntary and revocable, meaning that a woman can say “no” at any time. Further, the Supreme Court in Ewanchuk held that consent cannot be implied, whether from a complainant’s dress or the fact that she said “yes” on an earlier occasion. R. v. J.A. involved a woman who reported that she was sexually assaulted by her common-law spouse where the accused strangled the complainant into unconsciousness. When the complainant awoke, she found herself bound and being anally penetrated. The accused argued that the complainant consented “in advance” to the strangulation and anal penetration that took place while she was unconscious. In its judgment, the Supreme Court held that “an individual must be conscious throughout the sexual activity in order to provide the requisite consent” and that “the definition of consent…, requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy the requirement.”
Egglestone v. The State Supreme Court of Appeal (Hoogste hof van Appèl) (2008)
A high school teenage girl from an impoverished neighborhood consented to undergo job training as a receptionist at the appellant's escort agency. She alleged that during her training, the appellant held her against her will, and raped and sexually assaulted her. The appellant argued that his conviction should be overturned because the victim had consented. The court dismissed the kidnapping charges, but upheld the rape and sexual assault charges. The court acknowledged that although the victim consented to parts of the training (i.e. wearing lingerie and taking up residence at the employer's compound), she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the appellant. The court also noted that because of the appellant's age (twice that of the victim) and his promise of employment, he exercised a dominant position over the victim that made it difficult for her to refuse his advances.
'n Tienermeisie op hoërskool uit 'n verarmde woonbuurt het toegestem dat sy as ontvangsdame by die escort-agentskap van die appellant werksopleiding sal kry.. Sy beweer dat appellant haar tydens haar opleiding teen haar wil vasgehou het, en haar verkrag en seksueel aangerand het. Die appellant het aangevoer dat sy skuldigbevinding omgekeer moet word omdat die slagoffer toestemming gegee het. Die hof het die aanklagte van ontvoering van die hand gewys, maar die aanklagte van verkragting en seksuele aanranding bevestig. Die hof het erken dat hoewel die slagoffer toestemming gegee het vir dele van die opleiding (d.w.s. om onderklere aan te trek en in die werkgewer se verblyf in te woon), sy nie tot seksuele omgang met die appellant toestem het nie. Die hof het ook opgemerk dat weens die ouderdom van die appellant (twee keer die van die slagoffer) en sy belofte vir indiensneming ,'n dominante posisie oor die slagoffer uitgeoefen het, wat dit vir haar moeilik gemaak het om sy aanvoeringe te weier.
SONKE Gender Justice Network v. Malema Equality Court for the District of Johannesburg (Gelykheidshof vir die Distrik Johannesburg) (2009)
The respondent made comments at a political rally regarding the consent of the complainant in Jacob Zuma's rape trial. Specifically, he opined that a rape victim would leave early in the morning, but the complainant in this case had stayed for breakfast and requested money for a taxi. The plaintiff, a gender justice organization, sued him for hate speech, unfair discrimination, and harassment of women. The court found that the respondent's comments were based on prohibited grounds as outlined in South Africa's Equality Act, specifically sex and gender. The court also found the comments expressed by the respondent constituted "generalizations about women, rape, and consent which reinforce[d] rape myths." Moreover, the respondent's words suggested "that men need not obtain explicit [sexual] consent from women." The court found the respondent liable for hate speech and harassment. For these reasons, the court concluded the respondent infringed the rights of women and ordered him to pay a fine and make a public apology.
Die respondent het tydens 'n politieke saamtrek kommentaar gelewer rakende die toestemming van die klaer in die verkragtingsverhoor van Jacob Zuma. Spesifiek het hy gesê dat 'n verkragtingslagoffer vroegoggend sou vertrek, maar die klaer het in hierdie geval vir ontbyt gebly en geld gevra vir 'n taxi. Die eiser, 'n organisasie vir geslagsregverdigheid, het hom gedagvaar vir haatspraak, onbillike diskriminasie en teistering van vroue. Die hof het bevind dat die kommentaar van die respondent gebaseer is op verbode gronde soos uiteengesit in die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Gelykheid, spesifiek seks en geslag. Die hof het ook bevind dat die opmerkings deur die respondent uitgespreek 'veralgemenings oor vroue, verkragting en toestemming wat verkragtingsmites versterk'. Verder het die respondent se woorde voorgestel "dat mans nie eksplisiete [seksuele] toestemming van vroue hoef te verkry nie." Die hof het bevind dat die respondent aanspreeklik is vir haatspraak en teistering. Om hierdie redes het die hof tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die respondent die regte van vroue geskend het en hom beveel het om 'n boete te betaal en 'n openbare verskoning te doen.
Kamau v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Nakuru (2004)
The appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labor and six strokes of a cane. The complainant testified that on the day of the incident, she met the appellant at a bar and agreed to spend the night with him for a sum of money. The appellant took her to a house where he and two colleagues raped the complainant all night in turns. The appellant testified at trial that they had an "arrangement" with the complainant and did not rape her. The complainant testified that she had withdrawn her consent before intercourse with the appellant and his co-perpetrators. The morning after, the complainant escaped the house to report the rapes to the police and received treatment for her injuries at a hospital. Ruling on the appeal, the High Court found that that the complainant withdrew her initial consent before the sexual act and that the appellant is guilty of rape. The Court also reduced the sentence to six years imprisonment and set aside the corporal punishment, which was outlawed by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2003.
Chepkwony v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Nakuru (2006)
The appellant was convicted of defilement for having sexual intercourse with the complainant, who was 12 years old at the time. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of proofs, that there was no evidence of violent force, that the complainant was his girlfriend, and that she consented. The prosecution presented evidence of the complainant's physical injuries and the appellant's HIV-positive status. The Court dismissed the appeal because sex with any girl younger than 16 years old is unlawful regardless of consent, and the appellant had not raised the defense that he had a reasonable belief that the girl was above the age of consent. The Court rejected appellant's plea for special consideration because of his alleged HIV status. Instead, the Court cited the appellant's decision to expose a 12-year-old child to HIV/AIDS in its decision to uphold the life sentence.
Rex v. Rankhebe High Court of Lesotho (1987)
The accused was convicted of raping an 11 year-old girl. In considering sentencing, the High Court upheld the conviction and, citing South African and English law, noted the presumption that girls under the age of 12 are considered too young to give their consent to intercourse, but in cases involving girls between the ages of 12 and 16 the prosecution must demonstrate that there was non-consent for the accused to be convicted of rape. If a girl of 12 to 16 years old does consent to sexual intercourse with a man, then the man should be found guilty of defilement or statutory rape under the Women and Girls Protection Proclamation No. 14 of 1949. [Note: The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child/minor as any person under 18 years of age in the absence of domestic laws. Generally, minors do not have the capacity to give consent.]
Kamwendo v. Republic High Court of Malawi (2004)
The accused was convicted of rape and sentenced to a custodial term of imprisonment of 18 months. He appeals on the grounds that the lower court erred in convicting him in contradiction of the Medical Report that found it was a fabricated rape. The Court dismissed the appeal finding that the complainant's story was corroborated by the evidence and did not therefore require the Medical Report's corroboration as well and also that the Medical Report is not to be taken as conclusive evidence of penetration. The evidence also showed that the intercourse the appellant had with the complainant was non-consensual because the consent was fraudulently obtained. After this decision, the Malawi High Court banned the corroboration rule in sexual violence cases in Republic v Kaliyati.
Republic v. Hwangwa High Court of Malawi (2008)
The appellant was convicted of defiling a 12-year-old girl and appealed the conviction on the grounds that the intercourse was consensual and that he believed the complainant was older than 12 years at the time. The Court dismissed the appeal and noted that the evidence was sufficient to prove a lack of consent but also that, at 12 years old, the complainant was too young to give consent. The Court also noted aggravating factors, including that the appellant had intercourse with the complainant on multiple occasions and the appellant had threatened the complainant against telling her parents.
Mogodu v. State High Court of Botswana (2005)
The appellant appealed his conviction for rape in the subordinate court of the first class for the North West Magisterial District on the grounds that the evidence did not show lack of consent, and that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complainant was consensual. The Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the evidence showed that the appellant used threats and coercion to force the complainant to have intercourse with two other persons, which rape. Therefore, the Court upheld the conviction. The Court also discussed proper procedures for handling criminal trials for defendants who are minors at the time of the alleged crime but over the age of majority at the time of trial, as the appellant's two co-accused were in this case.
State. v. Ketlwaeletswe Court of Appeal of Botswana at Lobatse (2007)
The appellant was found guilty in magistrates court of raping a 10-year-old girl and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He appeals on the question of whether sexual intercourse with a girl of that age should be considered as rape or "defilement" because rape requires a lack of consent while the Penal Code defines defilement as carnal knowledge of anyone under the age of 16. The High Court held that, in accordance with the principle followed by the common law in South Africa incorporated by Botswana, a girl under the age of 12 is deemed incapable of consenting to intercourse and therefore intercourse with any person under the age of 12 is deemed rape.
Legislation
Articles 32-53 of this law reinforced the provisions of the French Civil and Criminal Codes to provide enhanced protection to victims of domestic violence, including in relation to custody and housing. Articles 54-55 of the law reinforced the provisions of the French Civil Code preventing forced marriages. Notably, pursuant to Article 55, notwithstanding that each spouse’s “loi personnelle” (i.e., the law of the country of which the spouse is a national) generally determines the criteria and conditions required to marry, each spouse’s consent is required regardless of the spouses’ “loi personnelle.”
Articles 32-53 de la loi renforce les provisions du Code Civil et Code Pénal Français avec le but de renforcer la protection pour les victimes de violences domestiques, en particulier liée à la garde des enfants et du logement. Articles 54-55 de cette loi renforce les provisions du Code Civil Français avec l’objectif d’empêché les mariages forcés. En particulier, selon l’Article 55, même si chaque conjoint a une loi personnelle (la loi de leur pays de citoyenneté), qui normalement détermine les critères et conditions nécessaires pour un mariage, le consentement de chaque conjoint est requis.
Article 11 amended the French Criminal Code to recognize that a spouse can commit rape against their spouse. It also states that the presumption that a spouse has consent to sexual acts within the matrimonial relationship only continues until proof to the contrary. Furthermore, in sentencing a person convicted of rape, the fact that the victim is the accused’s spouse does not affect the application of rape sentencing guidelines. Article 14 amended the French Criminal Code to allow for the prosecution of female genital mutilation committed abroad on a minor victim legally residing in France. This paralleled a legal shift making female genital mutilation an exception to medical confidentiality that must be reported to the police, social services, and administrative services.
Article 11 modifie le Code Pénal Français, pour reconnaître qu’un conjoint peut commettre le viol contre leur conjoint. L’article conclut que le fait qu’un conjoint a consenti à des actes sexuels durant leur relation matrimoniale ne continue que jusqu’à preuve du contraire. Par ailleurs, durant la période d’imposition de peine, le fait que la victime de viol est le conjoint de l’accusé n’affecte pas le besoin de suivre les directives légales d’années de peines pour viol. Article 14 a modifié le Code Pénal Français pour permettre la poursuite en justice de tout acte de mutilations sexuelles féminines fait à l’étranger sur une victime mineur résident habituellement sur le territoire Français. Cette décision est prise en parallèle à d’autres modifications de lois, faisant que tout acte de mutilations sexuelles féminines est une exception au privilège médical, et qu’il faut informer la police, les services sociaux, et administratifs.
The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). In part, these amendments increased the punishment for an illegal abortion (meaning that it was conducted by a person who had no special medical education; or forcing an abortion without voluntary consent, which is punishable by a fine of 50-100 tax-free minimum incomes, community service of 100-240 hours, correctional labor for up to two years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or imprisonment for the same term. The amendments criminalized forcing an abortion and forced sterilization without consent. Rape (i.e., sexual acts involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration using the genitals or any other item, without voluntary consent) is punishable with imprisonment for three to five years and sexual violence (nonconsensual, non-penetrative sexual assault) is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.
У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни, що містять положення Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), ухваленої у 2011 році. Внаслідок цих змін статтю 134 Кримінального кодексу України, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту (проведення аборту особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти; примус до проведення аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої), було змінено, в частині посилення відповідальності за це небезпечне злочинне діяння (тобто тепер незаконний аборт карається штрафом від 50 до 100 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадськими роботами на строк від 100 до 240 годин, або виправними роботами за на строк до двох років, або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк). Також криміналізовано примус до аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої, а також примусову стерилізацію без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи. Змінено статті, які передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за зґвалтування та сексуальне насильство. Зокрема, зґвалтування (тобто вчинення статевих дій, пов’язаних із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло іншої особи за допомогою статевих органів або будь-якого іншого предмета без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до п’яти років, а також сексуальне насильство (не пов'язане з проникненням в тіло іншої особи без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк до п'яти років. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.
The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). As a result of these amendments, new dangerous acts were criminalized. For example, Article 151-2 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by providing criminal liability for forced marriage. Forced marriage (meaning coercing a person to marry, to continue a forcible marriage, to enter into cohabitation without marriage, to continue cohabitation, or to move to a territory other than that in which they reside, regardless of citizenship) is punishable by arrest for a term of up to six months, by restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by imprisonment for the same term. Article 126-1 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code by providing criminal liability for domestic violence. Domestic violence (meaning intentional systematic physical, psychological, or economic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or another person with whom an offender has had a family or close relationship) is punishable by community service of up to 150-240 hours, or arrest for up to six months, restriction of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. A new chapter, “Restrictions,” established that, in the interests of domestic violence victims, the convicted person might be (i) banned from living with a person who suffered from domestic violence or (ii) restricted in communications with their child if the child was a victim or observer of domestic violence. In addition, these amendments provide criminal liability for failure to comply with restrictive measures, which is punishment with arrest for up to six months or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, in consideration of attending circumstances.
У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни з метою закріплення положень Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), прийнятої у 2011 році. У результаті цих змін нові суспільно небезпечні діяння були криміналізовані. Наприклад, особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України доповнено статтею 151-2, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за примушення до шлюбу. Примусовий шлюб (тобто примушування особи до вступу в шлюб або до продовження примусово укладеного шлюбу, або до вступу у співжиття без укладання шлюбу, або до продовження такого співжиття, або спонукання з цією метою особи до переміщення на територію іншої держави, ніж та, в якій вона проживає (там «проживає» означає постійне місце проживання в певному місці, не обов’язково пов’язане з громадянством) карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Також у 2017 році особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України було доповнено статтею 126-1, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за домашнє насильство. Домашнє насильство (тобто умисне систематичне вчинення фізичного, психологічного або економічного насильства щодо подружжя чи колишнього подружжя або іншої особи, з якою винний перебуває (перебував) у сімейних або близьких відносинах, що призводить до фізичних або психологічних страждань, розладів здоров’я, втрати працездатності, емоційної залежності або погіршення якості життя потерпілої особи) караються громадськими роботами на строк від 150 до 240 годин, або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. Додано новий розділ «Обмежувальні заходи». Встановлено, що в інтересах потерпілого від злочину, пов'язаного з домашнім насильством, на засудженого можуть бути покладені такі обов'язки: заборона перебувати в спільному місці проживання з жертвою; обмеження спілкування з дитиною у разі вчинення насильства в сім'ї щодо дитини або в її присутності; крім того, ці зміни передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за невиконання обмежувальних заходів (покарання у вигляді арешту на строк до шести місяців або обмеження волі на строк до двох років). Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.
Article 155 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that an adult who commits acts of sexual nature associated with the vaginal, anal, or oral penetration into the body of a person under the age of 16, using genitals, another body part, or any item, shall be punished by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same term. If such acts are committed by close relatives or family members, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim; or if they are associated with the provision of monetary or other remuneration to the victim or a third party or with a promise of such remuneration; or where they have caused infertility or any other grave consequences, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Article 156 provides criminal liability for debauched actions committed against a person under 16 years of age. This dangerous culpable act shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years or imprisonment for the same term. If the same acts committed against a child or committed by family members or close relatives, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Harassment of a child for sexual purposes is criminalized by the Article 1561. Harassment under this article means proposal of a meeting made by an adult to a person under the age of 16, for the purpose of committing any acts of sexual nature or debauched acts, after which at least one action was taken to ensure that meeting will take place.
Стаття 155 Кримінального кодексу України визначає, що повнолітня особа, яка вчинила дії сексуального характеру, пов’язані із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло особи, яка не досягла шістнадцятирічного віку, з використанням геніталій, іншого органу чи частини тіла або будь-якого предмета, карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. У випадку, якщо ті самі дії, вчинені близькими родичами або членами сім’ї, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілої особи або піклування про неї, або якщо вони поєднані з наданням грошової чи іншої винагороди потерпілій особі чи третій особі або з обіцянкою такої винагороди, або якщо вони спричинили безплідність чи інші тяжкі наслідки, злочинець карається позбавленням волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Стаття 156 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за розпусні дії, вчинені щодо особи, яка не досягла 16 років. Це суспільно небезпечне винне діяння карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Якщо ті самі дії вчинені щодо малолітньої особи або вчинені членами сім’ї чи близькими родичами, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілого або піклування про нього, винний підлягає покаранню у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Домагання дитини для сексуальних цілей криміналізовано статтею 1561. Домагання за цією статтею означає пропозицію зустрічі, зроблену повнолітньою особою, особі, яка не досягла 16 років з метою вчинення стосовно неї будь-яких дій сексуального характеру або розпусних дій, у разі якщо після такої пропозиції було вчинено хоча б одну дію, спрямовану на те, щоб така зустріч відбулася.
Under the Criminal Code, rape is defined quite narrowly as “sexual intercourse against a person’s will with the use or threat of physical violence present or deprivation of possibility of resistance.” There is also no mention of rape in marriage. To hold a person liable for rape, which is punished by imprisonment for up to seven years, the victim or their representative must file a complaint. However, in the case of rape (i) by a group of accomplices or (ii) of a minor or a young child, the term of imprisonment can be longer, and complaint filing is not needed. Further, sexual assault is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to seven years, sexual abuse is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to three years, and sexual harassment is punished by a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest. However, Lithuania is one of the few European Union states to have not yet criminalized stalking. Trafficking in Human Beings is punished by imprisonment from two to ten years. Infanticide is punished by arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. In the case of illegal abortion, as defined in Decree No. 50 of the Minister of Health “On the Termination of Pregnancy Operation Procedure,” the doctor and assisting persons are liable. Finally, the Code recognizes acts committed to express hatred towards persons due to their, amongst other characteristics, gender and sexual orientation, to be an aggravating circumstance. English translation available here.
Pagal baudžiamąjį kodeksą išžaginimas gana siaurai apibrėžiamas kaip lytiniai santykiai prieš asmens valią „panaudojant fizinį smurtą ar grasinant tuoj pat jį panaudoti, ar kitaip atimant galimybę priešintis, ar pasinaudojant bejėgiška nukentėjusio asmens būkle”. Apie išprievartavimą santuokoje neužsimenama. Laikyti asmenį atsakingu už išžaginimą, kuris baudžiamas laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, auka ar jų atstovas turi pateikti skundą. Tačiau tuo atveju, kai išžaginama (i) bendrininkų grupės arba (ii) nepilnametį vaiką, laisvės atėmimo bausmė gali būti ilgesnė ir skundo padavimo nereikia. Už seksualinę prievartą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, už seksualinį smurtą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki trejų metų, o už seksualinį priekabiavimą baudžiama bauda, laisvės apribojimu arba areštu. Lietuva yra viena iš nedaugelio Europos Sąjungos valstybių, kuri dar nėra kriminalizavusi persekiojimo. Už prekybą žmonėmis baudžiama laisvės atėmimu nuo dvejų iki dešimties metų. Už nužudymą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki penkerių metų. Neteisėto aborto atveju, kaip apibrėžta sveikatos apsaugos ministro įsakyme Nr. 50 „Dėl nėštumo operacijos procedūros nutraukimo“, atsako gydytojas ir pagalbą teikiantys asmenys. Galiausiai kodekse pripažįstama, kad veiksmai, kuriais siekiama išreikšti neapykantą asmenims dėl jų, įskaitant kitų savybių, lyties ir seksualinės orientacijos, yra sunkinanti aplinkybė.
Section 201 states that a person who coerces another person, by force, deprivation of personal liberty, or by threat to life, to perform or tolerate sexual intercourse, or a sexual act equivalent to sexual intercourse, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 2-10 years. If the act causes serious bodily harm or pregnancy of the raped person, or if the act places the raped person in a state of agony for a prolonged period of time or humiliates that person in an extraordinary way, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 5-15 years. If the act results in the death of the raped person, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 10 to 20 years or by life imprisonment. Section 202 punishes other forms of sexual violence involving coercion by force or threat of violence with a term of imprisonment of six months to five years.
Nach § 201 wird mit Freiheitsstrafe von 2 bis 10 Jahren bestraft, wer eine andere Person mit Gewalt, unter Entziehung der persönlichen Freiheit oder durch Drohung mit dem Leben dazu nötigt, den Geschlechtsverkehr oder eine dem Geschlechtsverkehr gleichgestellte sexuelle Handlung vorzunehmen oder zu dulden. Führt die Tat zu einer schweren Körperverletzung oder zu einer Schwangerschaft der vergewaltigten Person oder versetzt sie die vergewaltigte Person für längere Zeit in einen Zustand der Agonie oder demütigt sie in außergewöhnlicher Weise, so wird der Täter mit Freiheitsstrafe von 5 bis 15 Jahren bestraft. Führt die Tat zum Tod der vergewaltigten Person, so wird der Täter mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von 10 bis 20 Jahren oder mit lebenslänglicher Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. Andere Formen der sexuellen Gewalt, die eine Nötigung durch Gewalt oder die Drohung mit Gewalt beinhalten, werden nach § 202 mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft.
Section 106(a) states that a person who coerces another person to marry or establish a registered partnership, by force or by dangerous threat or threat of breaking off family contacts, is liable to a term of imprisonment of six months to five years. The same punishment applies to the act of coercing a person or forcing a person by dangerous threat of threat of interruption or withdrawal of family contacts, to move to another state or transports them to another state, with the intention of coercing the person to marry or establish a registered partnership in such other state. If the conduct results in a suicide (including an attempt) of the victim, the term of imprisonment is 1-10 years (Section 106a(3) in connection with Section 106(2)). The principle of territoriality does not apply under Section 64(1) no. 4a – even if the location of the crime is outside of Austria, a perpetrator is liable under Austrian law when he or the victim is Austrian.
Gemäß § 106a ist eine Person mit 6 Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren Freiheitsstrafe zu bestrafen, wenn sie eine andere Person mit Gewalt oder Drohung zur Eingehung einer Ehe oder eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft nötigt. Dies gilt ebenso, wenn eine Person eine andere Person durch Täuschung, Gewalt oder Drohung in einen anderen Staat bewegt, wo die Eheschließung oder Eintragung einer Partnerschaft erzwungen wird. Wenn dieses Verhalten dazu führt, dass sich das Opfer umbringt oder versucht sich umzubringen, erhöht sich die Gefängnisstrafe auf 1-10 Jahre (§ 106a Abs. 3 i.V.m. § 106 Abs. 2). Das Territorialitätsprinzip findet auch hier keine Anwendung. Vielmehr gilt nach § 64 Abs. 1 Ziff. 4a, dass der Täter auch strafbar hiernach ist, wenn der Tatort außerhalb von Österreich liegt, aber das Opfer zum Beispiel österreichischer Staatsangehöriger ist.
Criminal Code Chapter 20: Crimes Against Sexual Inviolability or Sexual Freedom (1999)
Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.
Division 10 of the Act prohibits and defines sexual violence against adults and children. A person consents to sexual intercourse if the person freely and voluntarily agrees (§ 61HE(2)). As provided in section 61HE(3), a perpetrator is deemed to know that the other person does not consent if they have actual knowledge, are reckless as to consent, or had no reasonable belief that the other person consented. In determining consent, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances, including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents, but not including any self-induced intoxication of the person. There can be no consent if the person is a minor, unconscious or asleep, cognitively incapacitated, under duress, or unlawfully detained.
Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.
España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.
Art. 189 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a monetary penalty for any person who uses threats, force or psychological pressure on another person or makes that other person incapable of resistance in order to compel him or her to tolerate a sexual act similar to intercourse or any other sexual act. If the offender acts with cruelty, and if the offender used an offensive weapon or other dangerous object, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than three years. Art. 190 provides that a person can be sentenced to between 1 and 10 years in custody or a fine for using violence, threats, or psychological pressure to force a female to engage in a sexual act, or for making her incapable of resisting. Art. 191 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a monetary penalty for any person who, in the knowledge that another person is incapable of judgement or resistance, has sexual intercourse with, or commits an act similar to sexual intercourse or any other sexual act on, that person. Art. 192 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who, by abusing a dependent relationship with a person in institutional care, an inmate of an institution, a prisoner, a detainee or a person on remand, induces the dependent person to commit or submit to a sexual act. Art. 193 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who induces another to commit or submit to a sexual act by exploiting a position of need or a dependent relationship based on employment or another dependent relationship. Unofficial English translation available here.
This Virginia law defines rape as sexual intercourse with a complaining witness, or causing a complaining witness to engage in sexual intercourse with any other person, regardless of the existence of a spousal relationship and such act is accomplished (i) against the complaining witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another person; or (ii) through the use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical helplessness; or (iii) with a child under age 13 as the victim.
HIV Control of the Disease and Related Issues (Amending Title 33) (2010)
The Act regulates sexually transmitted diseases including HIV, provides information for treatment of HIV, and provides punishment for violations. §18.3 of the Act provides that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports shall provide education on the prevention and control of HIV. §18.4-18.5 provide that educating the public regarding HIV and AIDS is part of the national response, and the government shall train all relevant personnel. While §18.7 provides that all employees shall receive the HIV training regarding the prevention and control of HIV and AIDS. Several portions of the act speak to the rights of women and girls specifically. §18.9(a) of the Act notes that when providing HIV and AIDS service to women and girls differences in sex and gender should be considered. §18.9(b) directs the government agencies, when implementing the strategies, policies and programs to address the following issues: protection of the equality of women in private and public life, to address their rights to refuse sex and to access reproductive services independently, to address men’s equal responsibilities in sexual and reproductive health, to increase educational, economic, and employment opportunities to women, to reduce inequalities in laws regarding marital issues, and to protect women’s rights in religious contexts. §18.9(c) covers pregnant women with HIV and grants them the right to marry. The government shall provide them with consultation and information regarding future pregnancy decisions and the protection of future children from HIV. Section 18.9(d) requires the government to implement national education and training to health care providers to reduce HIV infection caused by sexual assault, protect the confidentiality of the HIV test result, report the sexual violence, and assist the investigation of such violence, and to develop and implement education and training for security personnel and prosecuting authorities in conducting investigations and prosecutions about the sexual violence. §18.27 provides that willful transmission of HIV by an infected person who knows his or her HIV test constitutes first degree felony. §18.28 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV status.