Women and Justice: Keywords

Articles

Judging Women (2011)

Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Employment discrimination

By Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, & Eric A. Posner. 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 504-532 (2011).


Domestic Case Law

Strickland v. Prime Care of Dothan United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division (2000)

Gender discrimination, Employment discrimination

Ms. Strickland sued her former employer, Prime Care of Dothan, on the theory Prime Care terminated her employment as a medical assistant because of her pregnancy. Prime Care filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether Ms. Strickland had sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact on the question of pretext. In order to rebut the inference of discrimination, Prime Care was required to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Ms. Strickland. To this end, Prime Care asserted that it based its termination decision on violation of work rules, including that Ms. Strickland was rude and/or unprofessional on several occasions, was frequently tardy, and failed to return to work after attending a doctor’s visit. Because, if true, the reasons asserted by Prime Care were nondiscriminatory, the burden shifted back to Ms. Strickland to show that the proffered reasons were really pretext for unlawful discrimination. Ms. Strickland achieved this by showing her conduct did not violate Prime Care’s established policies, and presenting circumstantial evidence that, if true, demonstrated her supervisor harbored a discriminatory animus toward unmarried pregnant women. Prime Care also argued that even if it did discriminate against unmarried, pregnant women, such discrimination did not violate Title VII because the differential treatment was not based on sex. Rather, Prime Care claimed such a policy was neutral toward women, since women were both members of the group of married pregnant women and unmarried pregnant women. The court held that Congress and the Supreme Court had expressly rejected this argument, finding that the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include because of or on the basis of pregnancy. Thus, an employer violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act when it premises an employment decision, in whole or in part, on the fact that one of its female employees or applicants was pregnant out of wedlock. For these reasons, the court denied Prime Care’s motion for summary judgment.


Hoy v. Angelone Superior Court of Pennsylvania (1997)

Sexual harassment

Louise Hoy worked at Shop-Rite as a meat-wrapper.  During her tenure there, Dominick Angelone repeatedly subjected her to sexual propositions, filthy language, off-color jokes, physical groping, and the posting of sexually suggestive pictures in the workplace.  Eventually Hoy took medical leave to receive psychiatric treatment; when she returned, she requested that the store manager move her to another department.  In order to recover under a hostile environment claim, the employee must prove that (1) she suffered intentional sex discrimination because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the employee; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.  Hoy established the first four elements but Shop-Rite argued that it could not be liable under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act for Angelone’s conduct because it did not know nor had reason to know of the existence of a sexually hostile environment, and it took remedial action.  A plaintiff may establish an employer’s knowledge by showing (i) that she complained to higher management or (ii) that the harassment was so pervasive that the employer will be charged with constructive knowledge.  The court upheld the jury’s finding that the store manager knew or should have been aware of the conduct before Hoy requested transfer out of the meat department and failed to take remedial action; indeed, the conduct was so pervasive that several of Hoy’s coworkers knew of the abuse.  Thus, Shop-Rite was liable for Angelone’s conduct because the manager failed to take remedial action despite this knowledge.


State v. Human Rights Commission Court of Appeals Fourth District (1989)

Gender discrimination, Sexual harassment

Lynda Savage filed a complaint against the Illinois Department of Corrections alleging that she had been sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, Nicholas Howell, and discharged in retaliation. Howell would describe women by their physical attribut


Reports

Women's Empowerment Principles: Equality Means Business (2010)

Gender discrimination

UNIFEM report offering practical guidance to business and the private sector on how to empower women in the workplace, marketplace and community (2010).