Women and Justice: Keywords

The Criminal Trial Court issued a condemnatory sentence against the defendants for the repeated rape of their daughter and for other sexual crimes, including sexual abuse of a minor of less than 14 years of age and production of child pornography. The defendants sought to reverse the judgment, alleging that the Trial Court failed to consider the mental disabilities of one of the perpetrators and erred by failing to consider a lesser sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the failure of the Trial Court to consider the mental disability of the defendant was an error and should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the mother should have been charged solely as an accomplice because she had also actively participated in photographing the sexual abuse of the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely in respect to the sentencing calculation, as the crimes were of the same nature and, therefore, the Trial Court should have granted a lesser sentence. (External Link leads to the website of the Chilean Judicial System. This case is available by searching by the case number.)

El Tribunal Penal de Primera Instancia dictó sentencia condenatoria contra los imputados por la violación reiterada de su hija y por otros delitos sexuales, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor de 14 años y la producción de pornografía infantil. Los acusados ​​buscaron revocar la sentencia, alegando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no consideró la discapacidad mental de uno de los imputados y cometió un error al no considerar una sentencia menor. El Tribunal de Apelaciones sostuvo que el hecho de que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no tuviera en cuenta la discapacidad mental del acusado fue un error y debería haber sido considerado como una circunstancia atenuante en la sentencia. La Corte de Apelaciones rechazó el argumento de que la madre debería haber sido acusada únicamente como cómplice porque también había participado activamente en la fotografía del abuso sexual de la víctima. La Corte de Apelaciones revocó la sentencia únicamente en lo que respecta al cálculo de la sentencia, ya que los delitos eran de la misma naturaleza y, por lo tanto, la Corte de Primera Instancia debería haber dictado una sentencia menor. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial de Chile. Este caso está disponible buscando por el número de caso).

The appellant was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of raping his daughter AAA (who was eight at the time), and of acts of lasciviousness against his other daughter BBB (age nine at the time). On appeal, the appellant argued that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He pointed to inconsistencies in witness testimonies about when his daughters told their aunt and others about the sexual abuse. The Supreme Court found that such inconsistencies are not related to the elements of the crime and do not diminish the credibility of the victim. Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, when the victim is under 12, the elements of rape are sexual congress with a woman by a man. Through the birth records, the age of the victim was clearly under 12, and through AAA’s testimony and physical examinations by the doctor, the element of sexual congress was met. The rule is that factual findings and evaluation of witnesses’ credibility made by the trial court should be respected unless it is shown that the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. The court refused to find AAA’s failure to tell others immediately as affecting her credibility. The court also reiterated that only the credible testimony of the offended party is necessary to establish the guilt of the accused. With respect to damages, the court overruled the lower courts, which had held that awarding damages would be a miscarriage of justice because the defendant-father was a compulsory heir to his daughters. It awarded BBB a total of P300,000 in civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. The court awarded AAA P20,000 civil indemnity, P30,000 moral damages, and P20,000 exemplary damages because of the heinous nature of the crime. The court imposed sentences of reclus​ión perpetua (minimum of 30 years imprisonment) for the rape and 12 – 20 years imprisonment for the crime of lasciviousness.

The defendant pled guilty to rape and was before the court for sentencing. Both victims were young girls between the ages of 14 and 15 at the time of the offense. The defendant raped the victims multiple times, and one of the victims became pregnant as a result. In sentencing the defendant, the court observed that there were several aggravating factors: the victims were minors and the defendant was 16 years their senior; the defendant was a relative and a person of trust; after one of the victims became pregnant, she sought help from the defendant but defendant again sexually assaulted her; and the offense occurred while the defendant was on bail. The only mitigating factor was the defendant’s guilty plea. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to 10 years imprisonment.

El acusado se declaró culpable de violación y compareció ante el tribunal para dictar sentencia. Ambas víctimas eran niñas de entre 14 y 15 años en el momento del delito. El acusado violó a las víctimas varias veces y, como resultado, una de las víctimas quedó embarazada. Al dictar sentencia al imputado, el tribunal observó que existían varios agravantes: las víctimas eran menores de edad y el imputado era 16 años mayor que ellas; el acusado era un familiar y una persona de confianza; después de que una de las víctimas quedara embarazada, buscó la ayuda del acusado, pero el acusado volvió a agredirla sexualmente; y el delito ocurrió mientras el acusado estaba en libertad bajo fianza. El único factor atenuante fue que el acusado se declaró culpable. En consecuencia, el tribunal condenó al acusado a 10 años de prisión.

The defendant was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of his minor daughter and appealed, challenging the trial court’s refusal to order the victim to undergo a mental health examination and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The defendant’s daughter, who was 11 years old, reported to her mother that defendant had sex with her on two occasions when she was seven and eight years old. In a motion to order a psychiatric examination of the child, defendant pointed to the child’s mental health history, which showed that she “had been diagnosed with psychological disorders and exhibited dysfunctional behavior.” The trial court denied the motion and the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to subject the plaintiff, a rape victim, to a psychiatric examination and whether the plaintiff’s testimony alone, without the requested mental examination, was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction. The Court affirmed the lower courts, finding that the trial process afforded “adequate safeguards to the accused to test the competency of the complaining witness without a court-ordered mental health examination of that witness.” Therefore, “a trial court has no authority to order a complaining witness in a rape case to undergo a psychiatric or psychological evaluation.” With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted its precedents establishing that “the victim’s testimony alone, if not inherently incredible, is sufficient to support a conviction for rape,” and that because the child’s testimony was not inherently incredible, it was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to subject plaintiff to a mental examination and the plaintiff’s testimony, by itself, was sufficient to support the conviction.

One month after marrying the victim, “BB” (name omitted from public record), the defendant, “AA” (name omitted from public record) coerced BB to become a prostitute so she could help with their financial problems. After BB engaged in sexual relations as a prostitute, AA began to physically assault BB and to threaten to kill her children, alleging that was enjoying being a prostitute. Concurrently, AA’s 15-year old daughter “CC” (name omitted from public record) moved in with AA and BB, and shortly thereafter, AA engaged in non-consensual sexual activities with CC for approximately six months. AA had previously convictions for robbery, physical harassment and child pornography, among others. The Superior Court of Justice found AA guilty of the crimes of promoting prostitution under section 169 of the Portuguese Penal Code, domestic violence under section 152 of the Portuguese Penal Code, sexual abuse of a person incapable of resistance under sections 164 and 177 of the Portuguese Penal Code and illegal possession of weapon, and sentenced AA to 16 years of imprisonment.

Um mês depois de se casar com a vítima, “BB” (nome omitido do registro público), o réu, “AA” (nome omitido do registro público) coagiu BB a se tornar uma prostituta para que ela pudesse ajudar com os seus problemas financeiros. Depois de BB começar a ter relações sexuais como uma prostituta, AA começou a agredir fisicamente BB e ameaçar a matar os seus filhos, alegando que ela estava gostando de ser uma prostituta. Simultaneamente, “CC” (nome omitido do registro público), a filha de 15 anos de “AA”, se mudou para morar com AA e BB, e logo após, AA começou a ter relações sexuais não consentidas com CC por aproximadamente seis meses. AA tinha condenações anteriores por roubo, assédio físico e pornografia infantil, entre outros. A Corte Superior de Justiça considerou AA culpado dos crimes de promoção de prostituição sob a seção 169 do Código Penal Português, violência doméstica sob a seção 152 do Código Penal Português, abuso sexual de pessoa incapaz de resistir sob as seções 164 e 177 do Código Penal Português e posse ilegal de arma, e sentenciou AA a 16 anos de prisão.

A mother was charged with sexual abuse of her own son and daughter. The trial court issued an order of detention pending trial. When the mother brought an extraordinary constitutional petition seeking protection against the order, the court of appeals declined to hear the petition on the ground that such a petition can heard only after ordinary remedies have been exhausted. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the mother argued that the underlying order of detention suffered from various constitutional defects, mainly that special courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving sexual violence against a girl and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction. (The mother argued, moreover, that she was being prosecuted and detained in order to prevent enforcement of her visitation rights—this after she had already been deprived of them the two years prior.) The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, noting that the mother had not exhausted any of the three remedies still available to her: motion for reconsideration, motion for substitution, and an ordinary appeal.

The appellant was charged with defilement contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia (unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 16 years) and was sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. On behalf of the appellant, the appeal was filed on two grounds. On ground one, it was contended that the Court had erred in law by deciding not to conduct a voir dire and proceeding to receive the sworn evidence of a child. On ground two, it was contended the court below erred by finding corroboration and concluding the appellant was guiltywwww. Relative to the first grounds, the Court held that, while there had been no voir dire and while the Magistrate had failed to inquire as to whether the child understood the nature of the oath, this did not necessitate a re-trial, given that such orders are typically discretionary and this was not the only evidence tendered at trial. Relative to the second grounds, the Court observed that the question of identity was not in dispute and that there was substantial corroborative evidence that the crime had been committed. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the grounds lacked merit, as the Court was competent to convict the appellant even without the victim’s evidence. The Court further noted that the crime was compounded by the breach of trust that the appellant (who was the prosecutrix’s step-grandfather and exercising parental responsibility over her at the time) had committed against the victim and, therefore, set aside the 15-year minimum sentence in favor of a 20-year hard labour sentence.

S.J.D.S and M.J.D.S (16 and 13 years old) were sexually abused by their father, Joao María Dos Santos on several occasions. The victims testified that they were forced to have sexual relations with their father. The accused admitted that he raped them. The accused was sentenced to 16 years in prison. His sentenced was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1997.

A nine-year-old girl was sexually abused by her father, Florencio Arias, on several occasions. The defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 25, 2003.

Una niña de nueve años fue abusada sexualmente por su padre, Florencio Arias, en varias ocasiones. El imputado fue condenado a 10 años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 25 de abril de 2003.

The accused pleaded not guilty to aggravated defilement for performing a sexual act with his 15-year-old daughter. The judge found the accused guilty despite his denial because of DNA testing of the victim’s twin children, the testimony of the victim, and the testimony of a social worker. In dicta before sentencing, the judge stated that African traditions must be upheld and American and European abhorrent practices like sodomy and homosexuality must be avoided. The judge added that even these cultures reject incest. Then the judge sentenced the defendant to 25 years, including four years subtracted for remand served.

The accused was tried for beating and raping his girlfriend A.S. (the third complainant), sexually abusing and beating their five-month-old male and female twin children, and murdering his son by throwing him on the floor. Medical experts testified that the injuries on the twins suggested sexual and other physical violence. Denying the charges, the accused testified that A.S., the children’s mother, beat the twins and assaulted the accused. The accused also argued that there was no credible evidence of the crime and that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof because A.S. was the only eye-witness to the accused’s alleged crimes. The High Court of Namibia disagreed, finding the accused not credible and finding the A.S. credible, not least because the circumstantial and medical evidence supported her testimony. Citing precedent regarding single witnesses, the Court determined that a single eye-witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness (a) is credible, (b) gives her statement in a straight-forward manner, and (c) has no reason to falsely incriminate the accused. In addition, an inference may be properly drawn from the fact that the accused and the complainant were the only two adults in the room between the time the complainant went to bed at night without injuries and when she awoke in the morning with injuries. This finding is significant for domestic violence cases, which often do not involve unbiased third-party testimony.

The defendant was convicted for sexual assault and attempted rape of his 16-year-old niece. The appellate court upheld the conviction, but overturned the sentence imposed by the trial court. The appellate court held that the lower court failed to consider aggravating factors, including the close relationship between the parties. Given the prevalence of sexual assault in Lesotho, the court determined that jail sentences needed to serve as a deterrent for both the perpetrator and the general public. According to the court, “a very loud and clear message must be sent to all those who consider themselves with power and right to abuse or rape girls and women, that they will be dealt with the seriousness their unlawful actions demand” (p. 5). The Court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment with one year suspended for five years, unless the defendant commits another violent offense.

The appellant was found guilty of the crime of statutory rape of his daughter. On appeal, the appellant argued there was insufficient physical evidence of the rape. The Supreme Court noted that the results of the physical examination did not discount the possibility that the daughter was raped. The Supreme Court further noted that rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. It explained that (a) in statutory rape, only the following two elements must be established: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that the woman is below 12 years of age and (b) both of those elements had been established.

Anonymous had been continually sexually abused and raped by her father since 2001 at the age of twelve. An Argentinean trial court had sentenced the father to eighteen years in prison for abusing his daughter, but this decision was overturned by an Argentinean appellate court, believing the father was not clearly guilty and his punishment was, thus, incommensurate with the crime. The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision, stating that there was clear guilt on the father’s part, repeated cries for help by Anonymous, and that the appellate court showed a lack of regard for the facts and the suffering of Anonymous. The case was remanded for new sentencing.

Anónimo había sido continuamente abusada sexualmente y violada por su padre desde 2001 a la edad de doce años. Un tribunal de primera instancia argentino había condenado al padre a dieciocho años de prisión por abusar de su hija, pero esta decisión fue revocada por un tribunal de apelación argentino, creyendo que el padre no era evidentemente culpable y que su castigo era, por lo tanto, incompatible con el crimen. La Corte Suprema anuló la decisión de la corte de apelaciones, declarando que había una clara culpabilidad por parte del padre, repetidos gritos de ayuda por parte de Anonymous, y que la corte de apelaciones mostró una falta de respeto por los hechos y el sufrimiento de Anonymous. El caso fue remitido para nueva sentencia.

The appellant, M., was tried before a regional magistrate for the rape of his six-year-old daughter during 1989. He was convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, which he appealed. The Court held that, especially given the age of the complainant at the time, the question of a consensual sexual relationship is moot and further stipulated that the sexual history of the complainant is not relevant in a charge of rape, unless the Court specifically judges it to be so.

Die appellant, M., is voor 'n streeklanddros verhoor weens die verkragting van sy sesjarige dogter gedurende 1989. Hy is skuldig bevind en gevonnis tot tien jaar gevangenisstraf, waarop hy appèl aangeteken het. Die hof het beslis dat die vraag na 'n konsensuele seksuele verhouding, veral gegewe die ouderdom van die klaagster destyds, verkeerd is en verder bepaal dat die seksuele geskiedenis van die klaer nie relevant is op 'n aanklag van verkragting nie, tensy die hof dit spesifiek beoordeel om so te wees.

Defendant appealed a conviction for raping his 15-year old niece as many as three times, rape which resulted in her pregnancy. Defendant argued that the evidence against him was circumstantial and insufficient, and alleged that the victim had engaged in sexual relations with another man, from which the pregnancy resulted. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence not only of the fact that the victim was a minor at the time of the rape, but that force and intimidation had been used by the defendant. The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.

El acusado apeló una condena por violar a su sobrina de 15 años hasta tres veces, violaciones que resultaron en su embarazo. El imputado argumentó que las pruebas en su contra eran circunstanciales e insuficientes, y alegó que la víctima había mantenido relaciones sexuales con otro hombre, de las cuales resultó el embarazo. El Tribunal sostuvo que existían pruebas suficientes no solo del hecho de que la víctima era menor de edad en el momento de la violación, sino que el acusado había utilizado la fuerza y ​​la intimidación. El Tribunal confirmó la condena del acusado.