The 33-year-old defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment by a First Grade Magistrate for defilement after luring a nine-year old girl to his house and raping her. Subsequent medical examinations revealed that the defendant was HIV-positive, as well as injuries and other evidence of the crime on the victim, who did not contract HIV. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that it was insufficient due to the nature of the crime. The High Court agreed, citing 2013 precedent recommending that 14 years’ imprisonment should be the starting point for defilement sentences. However, the High Court noted the increase of defilement cases in Malawi – 2,155 convictions for defilement by July 2020 – indicated that 14 years was an insufficient deterrent. Instead, the High Court recommended that 20 years be the minimum sentence for defilement, noting the recent trend of High Court judges increasing such sentences similarly. In reviewing the defendant’s sentence, the Court considered numerous factors, including that: i) defilement cases against young girls had been on the rise in recent years in Malawi, which justified harsher sentences to protect young girls; ii) statutory rape of a girl under 16 is a serious offence; and iii) the defendant was HIV-positive and could have infected the victim. Ultimately, the High Court ordered that the defendant’s 10-year sentence be increased to 40 years’ imprisonment.
Women and Justice: Keywords
Domestic Case Law
R. v. Makuluni High Court of Malawi (2002)
The defendant was convicted rape, with the trial court finding that he followed the complainant to her house, suggested sexual intercourse, attacked her when she declined, and raped her. The defendant, a first-time offender, received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. A judge reviewed the sentence and sent it to the High Court for consideration on the grounds that the sentence necessitated judicial remand due to manifest inadequacy. In concluding the lack of necessity of remand, the High Court reviewed the approach to sentencing for criminal offenses, which must regard the specific circumstances of the offense, the offender and the victim, and the public interest. The High Court discussed a few factors that must be taken into consideration in sentencing in rape cases, namely the victim’s age, the effect of the rape on the victim, and whether the perpetrator i) used violence above the minimum force to commit the rape, ii) used a weapon to intimidate or wound the victim, iii) repeatedly raped the victim, iv) premeditated and planned the rape, v) had previous convictions for sexual or other violent offences, and vi) subjected the victim to additional sexual indignities or perversions. The High Court affirmed precedent suggesting that three years is the minimum sentence for an adult convicted of rape without aggravating or mitigating factors. Specifically, the Court cited English precedent, which suggested five years as the threshold sentence, before citing the Malawi High Court suggesting that the threshold should be three years because of prison conditions in Malawi. In applying precedential sentencing standards to the specific circumstances of the case, the High Court determined that the lower court’s sentence did not qualify as manifestly inadequate, and therefore did not warrant intervention.
Cправа № 243/9975/16-к (Case No. 243/9975/16-к) Верховний Суд (Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2019)
The defendant, a boy under the age of 18 (juvenile: 16-18 years), committed lewd acts against a girl under the age of 14 (minor). The first-instance court imposed a punishment of five years imprisonment (Part 2 of Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - Criminal Code). However, the court of first instance released the defendant from serving a sentence and instead imposed a probationary period of two years (Articles 75, 104 of the Criminal Code). The Court of Appeal left the decision unchanged. The victim's representative demanded a review of the case due to the mildness of the punishment, failure to take into account the gravity of the crime, and aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (Articles 50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The sentence must be based on the principles of proportionality and individualization, the type and size of the punishment should correspond to the nature of the crime, its dangerousness, and the identity of the perpetrator. When choosing a coercive measure (enforcement), the mitigating circumstances (sincere remorse and the commission of the crime by a minor) and aggravating circumstances (not established during the trial) are essential considerations. An individual analysis of the situation showed a low risk of committing a repeated criminal offense. The Supreme Court found that the defendant presented a low risk for re-offending because the defendant was a child under 18 who, according to psychological analysis, was capable of re-education, moreover it was the first offense he committed, and he sincerely repented. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the victim’s petition to increase the sentence. This case is important because it shows the principle of proportionality and efficiency of punishment, and emphasizes the importance of preventing unreasonably heavier punishment.
Особа, що не досягла 18 років, (неповнолітня: 16-18 років) вчинила розпусні дії щодо особи, яка не досягла 14 років (малолітньої особи). Суд першої інстанції призначив покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 5 років (ч.2 ст. 156 КК), але засудженого було звільнено від відбування покарання з випробуванням з іспитовим строком тривалістю 2 роки (ст. 75, 104 КК). Апеляційний суд залишив рішення без змін. Представник постраждалої особи вимагав перегляду справи через м’якість покарання, неврахування тяжкості злочину та обтяжуючих обставин. Верховний суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, повинно бути призначено покарання, необхідне й достатнє для її виправлення та попередження вчинення нових злочинів (ст. 50, 65 КК ); виходячи із принципів співмірності й індивідуалізації покарання за своїм видом та розміром має бути адекватним (відповідним) характеру вчинених дій, їх небезпечності та даним про особу винного. При виборі заходу примусу мають значення й повинні братися до уваги обставини, які його пом'якшують (щире каяття та вчинення злочину неповнолітнім) та обтяжують (в ході судового розгляду не встановлено). Індивідуальний аналіз ситуації показав, що ризик вчинення повторного кримінального правопорушення низький, а тому перевиховання засудженого без ізоляції від суспільства цілком можливе, тому вимоги представника постраждалої особи не були задоволені. Ця справа є важливою, бо показує дію принципу пропорційності покарання злочину і недопущення необґрунтовано більш тяжкого покарання.
Cправа № 149/1596/16-к (Case No. 149/1596/16-к) Верховний Суд (Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2019)
The defendant physically attacked and raped the victim. The court of the first instance found the defendant guilty of rape (part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - after this The Criminal Code) and sentenced him to three years of imprisonment. However, the appellate court released the defendant from serving the sentence and instead imposed a three-year probationary period (Article 75 of the Criminal Code). In accordance with Article 75, the court may decide to release a person from serving a sentence with probation if the maximum sentence for a criminal offense does not exceed five years of imprisonment (the maximum imprisonment for rape is five years). The prosecutor noted that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. The victim demanded actual imprisonment because, as a result of the attack, she developed depression and needed a rehabilitation course with a psychologist. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary, proportionate to the crime, and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The Supreme Court annulled the appellate decision due to the court’s failure to take into account the gravity of the crime and the consequences for the victim. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, ordering that the court apply the law on a more serious criminal offense or increase the punishment. This means that Article 75 (exemption from punishment with the appointment of probation and probationary period) cannot be applied, and instead the punishment should be imposed in accordance with Article 152 (rape): from three to five years in prison. This case is important because it emphasizes the severity of rape, the need for proportionate punishment, and consideration of the consequences for the victim.
Особа 2 напав на Особу 1 та зґвалтував із застосуванням фізичного насильства. Судом першої інстанції Особу 2 було визнано винним у вчиненні зґвалтування (ч. 1 ст. 152 Кримінального Кодексу України - далі КК) та призначено покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 3 роки, але рішенням апеляційного суду Особу 2 було звільнено від відбування призначеного покарання з випробуванням та іспитовим строком тривалістю 3 роки (ст. 75 КК). Прокурор зазначив, що покарання є невідповідним тяжкості злочину; потерпіла вимагала покарання у вигляді реального позбавлення волі, бо внаслідок вчинення злочину щодо неї вона перебуває у стані депресії, проходить курс реабілітації у психолога. Верховний Суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, має бути призначене покарання, необхідне і достатнє для її виправлення і попередження нових злочинів ( 50, 65 КК); виходячи з вказаної мети й принципів справедливості, співмірності та індивідуалізації, покарання повинно бути співмірним характеру вчинених дій та їх небезпечності. Рішення апеляційної інстанції було скасовано, через неврахування тяжкості злочину та наслідків для потерпілої; було призначено новий розгляд справи у зв'язку з необхідністю застосування закону про більш тяжке кримінальне правопорушення або посилення покарання. Ця справа є важливою, бо наголошує на тяжкості згвалтування, необхідності співмірного покарання та урахування наслідків для жертви.
Cправа №187/1459/15к (Case No. 187/1459/15к) Петриківського районного суду Дніпропетровської області (Petrykivskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) (2016)
The complainant visited the gynecologist for an abortion. In the process, the doctor damaged the complainant’s uterus, bladder, and intestines. The complainant needed surgery to repair the damage and lost the ability to bear children. During the court hearing, the State’s forensic medical examiner found that the doctor did not violate medical protocols. The examiner also found that the doctor's actions did not cause the complainant’s organ damage, and that the accident occurred due to the peculiarities of the complainant’s body. The court of first instance found the doctor not guilty, taking into account the doctor's impressive professional qualifications. The prosecutor filed an appeal, but later refused to continue because of insufficient evidence of the doctor’s guilt. This case is important because it shows the difficulty in gathering evidence in criminal cases related to abortion and the protection of women's reproductive rights. One of the reasons for this is the lack of an independent forensic medical examination in Ukraine, as well as falsification of medical documentation.
Скаржниця звернулася до гінеколога для проведення аборту. При цьому лікар пошкодила скаржниці матку, сечовий міхур і кишечник. Скаржниця потребувала операції, щоб усунути пошкодження, і вона втратила здатність народжувати дітей. Під час судового засідання державна судово-медична експертиза встановила, що лікар не порушував медичних протоколів. Експерт також встановив, що дії лікаря не спричинили ушкодження органів скаржника, а нещасний випадок стався через особливості організму скаржника. Суд першої інстанції визнав лікаря невинним, враховуючи високу професійну кваліфікацію лікаря. Прокурор подав апеляцію, але пізніше відмовилася підтримувати обвинувачення через брак доказів провини лікаря. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки показує складність збору доказів у кримінальних справах щодо абортів та захисту репродуктивних прав жінок. Однією з причин цього є відсутність в Україні незалежної судово-медичної експертизи, а також фальсифікація медичної документації.
Cправа № 334/5052/17 (Case No.334/5052/17) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2020)
The appellant attacked the victim in the park in an attempt to rape her, but he was noticed by other people and fled the scene of the crime before committing rape. The court of first instance sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for three years. However, the court discharged the appellant from imprisonment and instead put him on probation, with the imposition of certain duties. The appellate court overturned this decision and reinstituted the prison sentence of three years, cancelling the discharge from punishment on probation. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, finding that the court of first instance did not sufficiently consider the degree of public danger of the crime, or that the victim was disabled since childhood, which made her exceptionally vulnerable. Also, the first-instance court did not consider the fact that the appellant did not succeed in raping the victim only because of the intervention of other people who forced the appellant to flee the scene, not because he willingly abandoned the crime. This case is significant because it illustrated how Ukrainian courts should apply the sentencing factors for attempted crimes – (i) the gravity of the offense, (ii) the amount of progress made toward completing the crime, and (iii) the reasons the crime was incomplete – in sexual violence cases.
Скаржник напав на жертву в парку, намагаючись її зґвалтувати, але оскільки його помітили інші люди, він втік з місця злочину, перш ніж вчинити зґвалтування. Суд першої інстанції засудив заявника до трьох років позбавлення волі. Проте, суд звільнив скаржника від відбування покарання, натомість призначив йому випробувальний термін із покладенням певних обов’язків. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення та поновив покарання у вигляді трьох років позбавлення волі, скасувавши звільнення від відбування покарання з випробуванням. Верховний Суд залишив без змін рішення апеляційного суду, встановивши, що суд першої інстанції недостатньо врахував ступінь суспільної небезпеки злочину та те, що потерпіла була інвалідом з дитинства, що робило її особливо вразливою. Крім того, суд першої інстанції не взяв до уваги той факт, що скаржнику не вдалося зґвалтувати жертву лише через втручання інших осіб, які змусили скаржника втекти з місця події, а не через те, що він добровільно відмовився від злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки вона продемонструвала, які обставини мають враховувати українські суди при призначенні покарання за замах на злочин у справах, які стосуються сексуального насильства: (i) тяжкість правопорушення, (ii) ступінь досягнутого на шляху завершення злочину, і (iii) причини, через які злочин не був доведений до кінця злочину.
Cправа № 642/4714/16-к (Case No.642/4714/16-к) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2018)
The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.
Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.
Cправа №265/5853/17 (Case No.265/5853/17) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2020)
The appellant was convicted of debauchery for committing lewd acts against the victim, a girl under 14 years old. The first-instance court sentenced the defendant to five years of imprisonment and banned him for three years from continuing to volunteer at a children’s home. The appellate court left this decision unchanged. However, the Supreme Court changed the additional punishment, stating that courts may only impose such additional punishment if the commission of the crime was related to the perpetrator’s position or to engagement in certain activities. The Supreme Court found that, although the appellant provided volunteer assistance to the children's center, his volunteer activity was in no way related to the commission of a crime. This case is significant because the Supreme Court used a narrow definition of “related to” in finding that the defendant’s volunteer work with children unrelated to his sexual abuse of a child.
Скаржник був засуджений за вчинення розпусних дій щодо особи, дівчини віком до 14 років. Суд першої інстанції засудив обвинуваченого до п’яти років позбавлення волі та заборонив йому продовжувати волонтерську діяльність у дитячому будинку строком на 3 роки. Суд апеляційної інстанції залишив це рішення без змін. Проте, Верховний Суд змінив додаткове покарання, зазначивши, що суди можуть призначати таке додаткове покарання лише у тому випадку, якщо вчинення злочину було пов’язане зі службовим становищем винного або із заняттям певною діяльністю. Верховний Суд встановив, що хоча скаржник надавав волонтерську допомогу дитячому центру, його волонтерська діяльність жодним чином не пов’язана зі вчиненням злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки Верховний суд використав вузьке визначення "пов’язаного з", коли встановив, що волонтерська робота обвинуваченого з дітьми не має відношення до сексуального насильства над дитиною.
Cправа № 171/765/15-к (Case No. 171/765/15-к) Касаційного кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Cassation Court within the Supreme Court) (2019)
The two defendants were charged with raping the complainant. The court of first instance sentenced the first defendant to four years of imprisonment, but discharged him from punishment on probation. The court acquitted the second defendant due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the acquitted defendant. The prosecutor argued that discharging the first man from punishment on probation did not correspond to the gravity of the crime. Thus, the prosecutor asked the Court of Appeal to re-evaluate the matter and sentence both men to imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. However, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions and assigned new proceeding, due to the need to impose a more severe punishment in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal did not properly examine and evaluate the prosecutor’s arguments and evidence.
Двох підсудних було обвинувачено у зґвалтуванні скаржниці. Суд першої інстанції засудив першого обвинуваченого до чотирьох років позбавлення волі, але звільнив його від покарання з випробуванням. Другого обвинуваченого суд виправдав за браком доказів. Прокурор подав апеляційну скаргу, стверджуючи, що стороною обвинувачення надано достатньо доказів для доведення вини виправданого обвинуваченого. Прокурор стверджував, що звільнення першого обвинуваченого від покарання з випробуванням не відповідає тяжкості злочину. Таким чином, прокурор просив апеляційний суд переглянути справу та призначити обом чоловікам покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк 10 років. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок суду першої інстанції без змін. Однак, Верховний Суд скасував рішення судів попередніх інстанцій і відправив справу на новий розгляд в суд апеляційної інстанції у зв’язку з необхідністю призначити більш суворе покарання відповідно до закону. На думку Верховного Суду, суд апеляційної інстанції належним чином не перевірив і не оцінив доводи прокурора та докази.
Cправа № 482/297/21 (Case No. 482/297/21) Миколаївського апеляційного суду (Mykolaiv Court of Appeal) (2021)
For years, the appellant lived with his civil wife in the same apartment (in Ukraine, the term 'civil marriage' means cohabitation of a man and a woman without official marriage registration). While intoxicated one evening, he began to accuse his wife of cheating on him with other men and degrading his honor and dignity as a man. After a verbal conflict, the man, decided to kill his wife. In order to cause the most severe physical pain, he purposefully poured sulfuric acid from a bottle on his wife and verbally wished for her death, causing serious chemical burns. In addition, the acid fell on her minor son, which burned him. The court of first instance sentenced the man to eight years imprisonment for attempted murder, as well as causing bodily injury to the wife and her son. Also, the court imposed the obligation on the appellant to pay for the costs of their treatment. The appellant filed an appeal, arguing that the first-instance court wrongly characterized his actions because he did not want to kill his wife, but only cause her bodily injury. The Court of Appeal left the sentence unchanged, citing the following facts: when the appellant poured acid on the victim, he expressed his desire for her death; he poured the acid on her head and face, which are vital organs; and, according to the conclusion of the experts, the man poured most of the acid in the bottle on the victim.
Скаржник роками проживав зі своєю цивільною дружиною в одній квартирі (в Україні термін "цивільний шлюб" означає спільне проживання чоловіка та жінки без офіційної реєстрації шлюбу). Одного вечора, перебуваючи у стані алкогольного сп’яніння, він почав звинувачувати свою дружину в тому, що вона зраджує йому з іншими чоловіками та принижує його честь і гідність як чоловіка. Після словесної сварки чоловік вирішив убити свою дружину. З метою заподіяння сильного фізичного болю, він цілеспрямовано облив дружину сірчаною кислотою з пляшки та на словах побажав їй смерті, спричинивши серйозні хімічні опіки. Крім того, кислота потрапила на її неповнолітнього сина, від чого він отримав опіки. Суд першої інстанції засудив чоловіка до восьми років позбавлення волі за замах на вбивство, а також заподіяння тілесних ушкоджень дружині та її сину. Також суд поклав на скаржника обов'язок оплатити витрати на їх лікування. Скаржник подав апеляцію, вважаючи, що суд першої інстанції неправильно кваліфікував його дії, оскільки він не хотів вбити свою дружину, а лише заподіяти їй тілесні ушкодження. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін, посилаючись на такі факти: коли скаржник облив потерпілу кислотою, він висловив бажання, аби вона померла; він вилив кислоту на її голову та обличчя, які є життєво важливими органами; та, відповідно до висновку експертів, чоловік вилив на потерпілу більшу частину кислоти із пляшки.
Cправа № 135/1530/16-к (Case No.135/1530/16-к) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2018)
The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that a third party staged the crime scene and placed his property there; sexual intercourse with the first woman was consensual; and the forensic medical examination confirmed that the appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized that the conclusions of the lower courts regarding the appellant’s guilt were based on their careful examination of the evidence (e.g., the appellant’s property near the corpses indicated that he was at the place of the crimes; forensic medical examinations found traces of a man's DNA on the bodies). Accordingly, the Supreme Court left the sentence of life imprisonment unchanged. This decision is important because it demonstrates that serving a prison sentence may not deter persons who commit sex crimes from re-offending after their release from custody.
Cкаржник був засуджений судом першої інстанції за вбивство та зґвалтування однієї жінки, а також вбивство та замах на зґвалтування іншої жінки. Враховуючи те, що чоловік раніше був судимий за аналогічні злочини, суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді довічного позбавлення волі. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін. Адвокат скаржника подав до Верховного Суду касаційну скаргу, в якій просив суд скасувати вирок та закрити кримінальне провадження через недостатність доказів. Зокрема, скаржник стверджував, що третя сторона влаштувала інсценування злочину та розмістила там його майно; статевий акт з першою жінкою був за її згодою; і судово-медична експертиза підтвердила, що скаржник не вступав у статеві зносини з іншою жінкою. Верховний Суд підкреслив, що висновки судів попередніх інстанцій щодо винуватості скаржника ґрунтувалися на ретельному дослідженні доказів (наприклад, майно скаржника поблизу трупів вказувало на те, що він був на місці злочинів; судово-медичні експертизи виявили сліди ДНК чоловіка на тілах). Відповідно, Верховний Суд залишив без змін покарання у вигляді довічного ув'язнення. Це рішення є важливим, оскільки воно демонструє, що відбування покарання не може стримувати осіб, які вчинили сексуальні злочини, від повторного вчинення злочину після звільнення з-під варти.
Cправа №685/656/21 (Case No. 685/656/21) Касаційного кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2022)
The appellant was convicted of committing systematic physical and psychological violence against his ex-wife. The eyewitnesses to their fights were minor children. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime, the first-instance court sentenced the appellant to a three-year restriction of liberty, which means holding a person in an open penal institution (“correctional center”) without isolation from society but under supervision and with compulsory engagement in socially useful paid work under a fixed-term labour contract for a term of one to five years. All convicts have the right to wear civilian clothes, have portable personal computers, money, mobile phones. Convicts may be allowed short trips outside the correctional center in the circumstances provided for by law, for example if they need to visit a medical institution. However, the court also discharged him from punishment on probation, meaning that the appellant did not serve the sentence of restriction of liberty, but he had to fulfill other court-imposed obligations during the probationary period. The Court of Appeal overturned the lower court and sentenced the appellant to five months of arrest, which means detention for one to six months with unpaid work on improvements or services to the detention facility. The appellant filed the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the punishment of arrest was not fair. The Supreme Court left the judgment of the Court of Appeal unchanged, noting that the courts should design domestic violence sentences to correct the convicted person and prevent them from committing new crimes. However, the first-instance court did not provide any reasons explaining how correcting the appellant would be possible without a custodial sentence, nor how to take into account that the defendant’s repeated acts of domestic violence. This case is important because it demonstrates how Ukrainian courts can impose minimal punishment for domestic violence, which sends the message that it is not a serious violent crime.
Скаржник був засуджений за вчинення систематичного фізичного та психологічного насильства щодо своєї колишньої дружини. Очевидцями їх конфліктів були неповнолітні діти. Незважаючи на тяжкість злочину, у вчиненні якого обвинувачувався чоловік, суд першої інстанції засудив скаржника до трьох років обмеження волі, що полягає у триманні особи в кримінально-виконавчій установі відкритого типу ("виправному центрі") без ізоляції від суспільства, але в умовах здійснення за нею нагляду з обов'язковим залученням до суспільно корисної оплачуваної праці за строковим трудовим договором на строк від одного до п'яти років. Усі засуджені мають право носити цивільний одяг, мати портативні персональні комп’ютери, гроші, мобільні телефони. Засудженим можуть бути дозволені короткострокові виїзди за межі виправного центру у випадках, передбачених законом, наприклад, у разі необхідності відвідування лікувального закладу. Однак, суд також звільнив його від покарання з випробуванням, тобто скаржник не відбував покарання у вигляді обмеження волі, але він повинен був виконувати інші покладені судом обов'язки протягом іспитового терміну. Апеляційний суд скасував рішення суду першої інстанції та засудив скаржника до п’яти місяців арешту, що полягає у триманні особи під вартою від одного до шести місяців із залученням до виконання неоплачуваної роботи з благоустрою арештних домів або поліпшення житлово-побутових умов засуджених. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, вважаючи несправедливим покарання у вигляді арешту. Верховний Суд залишив рішення апеляційного суду без змін, зазначивши, що суди мають призначати вироки за домашнє насильство, аби виправити засуджених і попередити вчинення ними нових злочинів. Однак суд першої інстанції не навів жодних мотивів, які б пояснювали, яким чином можливе виправлення скаржника без призначення покарання, що пов’язане із позбавленням волі, а також не врахував те, що обвинувачений неодноразово вчиняв насильство в сім’ї. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки він демонструє, як українські суди можуть призначають мінімальне покарання за домашнє насильство, що дає зрозуміти, що це не є серйозний насильницький злочин.
Personas protegidas (Decisión definitiva Nº 5, Marzo 3, 2014) Tribunal de Sentencia de la Circunscripción Judicial de Concepción (2014)
The case concerned domestic violence and resulted in a one-year prison sentence pursuant to article 229 of the Criminal Code. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the police, alleging that three days earlier, at approximately 6:00 A.M., her husband punched her and threated to kill her during an argument. The evidence showed that this violence was not an isolated incident, but part of continuous behavior of the defendant. The Court held that the physical and psychological violence suffered by the victim in the household shall include any conduct that by action or omission is intended to cause harm or pain. Witness testimony proved that the defendant deliberately used threats and intimidation to control and manipulate his wife. Therefore, the defendant was convicted for domestic violence.
El caso se basó en violencia doméstica y resultó en una pena de prisión de un año de conformidad con el artículo 229 del Código Penal. La demandante presentó una denuncia ante la policía, alegando que tres días antes, aproximadamente a las 6:00 a. m., su esposo la golpeó y la amenazó de muerte durante una discusión. La evidencia mostró que esta violencia no fue un incidente aislado, sino parte de un comportamiento continuo del acusado. La Corte sostuvo que la violencia física y psíquica que sufre la víctima en el ámbito doméstico comprende toda conducta que por acción u omisión tenga por objeto causar daño o dolor. El testimonio de los testigos demostró que el acusado usó deliberadamente amenazas e intimidación para controlar y manipular a su esposa. Por lo tanto, el acusado fue condenado por violencia doméstica.
Demanda de Constitucionalidad, Paz Mahecha vs. artículo 229 de la Ley 599/2000 (Código Penal) modificado por el artículo 33 de la Ley 1142/2007 Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2014)
This judicial review concerned domestic violence. The court ruled that there ought to be greater criminal sanctions for domestic violence offenses. The law provides for four to eight years of imprisonment in cases of domestic violence, irrespective of the magnitude of the injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the article went against the proportionality principle set forth by the Colombian Constitution. The Constitutional Court held that special protection should be provided to families and especially to those who are more vulnerable to domestic violence and are in need of enhanced protective measures. The court pointed out that the family unit shall be preserved, among others, by virtue of the State’s powers and sanctions in accordance with article 42 of the Constitution. That is to say, the Colombian State is obliged to enact and establish a number of strict legal provisions allowing for the investigation and adequate punishment of any sort of domestic violence. To that end, the legislature had the power to discourage the forms of violence that may affect the family unit by increasing sanctions for domestic violence offenses, as provided in article 229 of the Criminal Code –and amended by article 33 of Law 1142 of 2007.
Esta demanda de constitucionalidad se refería a la violencia doméstica. La Corte Constitucional dictaminó que debería haber mayores sanciones penales para los delitos de violencia doméstica. La ley prevé de cuatro a ocho años de prisión para casos de violencia intrafamiliar, independientemente de la magnitud de las lesiones. La demandante alegó que el artículo contravenía el principio de proporcionalidad consagrado en la Constitución Política de Colombia. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que se debe brindar protección especial a las familias y especialmente a aquellas que son más vulnerables a la violencia doméstica y necesitan mayores medidas de protección. El tribunal señaló que la unidad familiar se debe preservar, entre otras, a través de las facultades del Estado y de regímenes sancionatorios de conformidad con el artículo 42 de la Constitución. Es decir, el Estado colombiano está obligado a promulgar y establecer una serie de estrictas disposiciones legales que permitan investigar y sancionar adecuadamente cualquier tipo de violencia intrafamiliar. Para tal efecto, el legislador tenía la facultad de desalentar cualquier forma de violencia que pueda afectar la unidad familiar mediante el aumento de las sanciones por delitos de violencia intrafamiliar, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 229 del Código Penal –y reformado por el artículo 33 de la Ley 1142 de 2007.
Mwafenga v. R High Court of Malawi Criminal Division (2017)
The appellant challenged his concurrent sentences for six violations of the Trafficking in Persons Act as manifestly excessive. The sentences ranged from 10-14 years of imprisonment including hard labor. The maximum penalty for a standard count of trafficking under article 14 of the Act is 14 years, the maximum penalty for trafficking children under 18 years is 21 years (article 15), and article 16 lists aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for human trafficking to life imprisonment. The appellate court found that the lower court had inaccurately noted which charges corresponded with each victim, which resulted in confusing and improper sentencing decisions. First, the trial court erroneously sentenced the appellant for article 14 trafficking for Counts 1, 2, 5, and 6, but the victims were children and thus these charges should have been sentenced with reference to article 15’s 21 year maximum. In another error regarding Counts 3 and 4, the trial court found the appellant guilty of trafficking an adult of unsound mind in violation of article 16(1)(c), but the conviction should have been for article 14 trafficking of an adult because the adult victim was of sound mind. Ultimately the appellate court affirmed four of the six sentences related to trafficking children because the aggravating factors meant that those maximum penalties for were substantially longer than 14 years, rendering these sentences judicious. For the erroneous article 16 convictions, the appellate court substituted two article 14 convictions and imposed a substitute sentence of 10 years for each count to run concurrently. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the sentences were manifestly excessive because they were well below the maximum available sentences.
Juma v. Republic High Court of Malawi Criminal Division (2018)
The 21-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to the defilement of a 15-year-old girl with whom he had an ongoing sexual relationship and who was, by the time of the trial, pregnant as a result. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years imprisonment with hard labor. He unsuccessfully appealed to reduce the sentence, claiming the following mitigating factors: (i) his willingness to financially support the girl and her baby; (ii) his age; and (iii) his status as a first-time offender. The court rejected this appeal on the grounds that appellate courts may only interfere with sentences that are either “manifestly excessive (or inadequate) or otherwise erroneous in principle,” citing cases in which the state had successfully enhanced initial sentences from six to eight years as evidence that this sentence was not unusually excessive or otherwise erroneous.
Kambalame v. Republic High Court of Malawi Criminal Division (2017)
The appellant pleaded guilty to raping and impregnating a 12-year-old girl for which he was originally sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labor. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentence was excessive in light of mitigating factors. While recognizing the victim’s age and pregnancy as aggravating factors, the appeals court reduced his sentence to nine years imprisonment. The court articulated several rules regarding mitigation in favor of this outcome based on the citation of cases from the appellant. First, the court stated that guilty pleas should reduce a sentence by one-third, even in the case of serious crimes. Second, citing in Rep v. Bamusi Mkwapatira, the court stated that all first-time offenders, regardless of the severity of the offense, should benefit from mitigation. Finally, the court identified the appellant, who was 33 years old at the time of the offense, as “youthful,” asserting that “men especially grow slowly mentally and at 35 they are at their prime experimenting with life.” Cautioning against mitigating too significantly, however, the court explicitly recognized the victim’s pregnancy, which “disturbed [her] life […] physically and psychologically,” and her very young age as aggravating factors. Thus, the court reduced the sentence by one-quarter, resulting in a nine-year sentence, rather than one-third or more.
Kaliyati v Republic High Court of Malawi (2020)
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment including hard labor for defilement of an11-month-old girl. On appeal, the appellant’s primary argument was that the testimony of the child’s mother was not sufficiently corroborated and therefore the conviction was not supported by the evidence. He also argued that the sentence was excessive. Regarding the corroboration rule in sexual violence cases, the court announced that it was a longstanding practice based on blatant discrimination against women, who are the predominant victims of such offenses and assumed to be unreliable witnesses. The court found the corroboration rule unlawful under existing constitutional (article 20), evidence, and criminal laws. Instead, the court held that courts should take caution basing convictions on uncorroborated evidence to ensure satisfaction of the burden of proof. Regarding the appellant’s arguments, the court found that there was not sufficient evidence of penetration to sustain the defilement conviction, thus acquitting the appellant of defilement. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported a conviction for the lesser offense of indecent assault, for which the court imposed a sentence of three years of imprisonment out of a maximum of 14 years. The court chose a substantially lower sentence than the maximum due to what it described as mitigating factors, including that: (i) the appellant was a first-time offender; (ii) the child was largely unharmed physically according to the medical report; (iii) there was no evidence that the child would subsequently suffer an STI or psychological impacts; and (iv) the crime was not premeditated in the court’s view, but a crime of opportunity.
Ministério Público v. Jonasse Cangahi Mupi Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2019)
The defendant was accused of murdering his wife and sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment, in addition to paying of kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 million kwanzas, i.e. approximately US$ 2,300) to the victim’s family, plus court expenses. The prosecution (Ministério Público) then appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that, in accordance with the court’s own jurisprudence, the compensation amount should be risen to kz. 2.000.00,00, i.e. the equivalent of US$ 3,100. It argued that, as shown by the evidence, the accused had tried to have sexual relations with his wife and, when she declined, beat her in front of their two underage children. When she tried to escape, the defendant stabbed her in the back with a “homemade knife” multiple times, which killed her. The accused fled to the woods, while their nine-year-old daughter went to get help. The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the object used to stab the victim had not been examined, there was no doubt as to the fact that it was used to injure the victim and caused her death. Furthermore, in agreement with the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had undoubtedly committed the crime of which he was accused, noting that he confessed to it during police interrogations. The defendant’s motive was also considered as particularly vile (i.e., as his attempt of sexual intercourse was simply frustrated) and his intent was proven by the predictability of death as a direct consequence of his actions. The appeal was, therefore, granted by the Supreme Court, increasing the compensation amount to the family’s victim to the requested amount.
O réu foi acusado de matar sua esposa e sentenciado a 18 anos de prisão, em adição ao pagamento de kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 milhões de kwanzas, i.e. aproximadamente US$2,300) para a família da vítima, além dos gastos com o tribunal. A acusação (Ministério Público) então apelou para o Tribunal Supremo alegando que, de acordo com a jurisprudência da própria corte, o valor da compensação deve aumentar para kz. 2.000.000,000, i.e. o equivalente a US$3,100. Ele afirmou que, como mostrado pela evidência, o acusado tentou ter relações sexuais com a sua esposa e, quando ela negou, ele bateu nela na frente das suas duas crianças menores de idade. Quando ela tentou escapar, o réu esfaqueou ela nas costas com uma “faca caseira” por múltiplas vezes, o que a matou. O acusado fugiu para a floresta, enquanto a sua filha de nove anos de idade foi buscar ajuda. O Tribunal Supremo raciocinou que, ainda que o objeto usado para esfaquear a vítima não tenha sido examinado, não restou dúvida sobre o fato dele ter sido usado para machucar a vítima e causar a sua morte. Além disso, de acordo com a decisão da corte inferior, o Tribunal Supremo sustentou que o réu sem dúvidas cometeu o crime pelo qual ele foi acusado, já que ele confessou o crime durante interrogações policiais. O motivo do réu também foi considerado particularmente vil (i.e. já que a sua tentativa de relação sexual simplesmente foi frustrada) e a sua intenção foi provada pela previsibilidade da morte como consequência direta das suas ações. A apelação foi, assim, acolhida pelo Tribunal Supremo, aumentando a indenização para a família da vítima para o valor requerido.
Ministério Público v. Joao Bernardo Nelson Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2018)
The trial court convicted the accused of one count of murder and sentenced him to 17 years in prison, in addition to financial compensation the victim’s family. The circumstances of the case showed that the accused and the victim were consuming drugs by a local river when, for unrevealed reasons, he pushed her over the stairs which led to the river, at a height of approximately five meters. The victim ended up by the water with bruises on her face and a broken neck, which was stated as the cause of death. Afterwards, the accused took off the victim’s wig and clothes, subsequently burning them. The prosecution argued that his intent was to make it appear as though the victim had suffered sexual assault. There was no autopsy and the evidence was based on 1) the death certificate, 2) photographs, and 3) eye-witnesses who saw both individuals together on that day. The accused confessed during interrogation, but denied the charges during trial. On appeal, the accused argued for a lower sentence. However, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision. The penalty for murder was increased due to the following circumstances: (i) surprise, (ii) deserted place, and (iii) superiority by reason of gender, under Article 34 of the 1982 Penal Code.
O tribunal de julgamento condenou o acusado por homicídio e sentenciou ele a 17 anos de prisão, em adição a indenização à família da vítima. As circunstâncias do caso mostraram que o acusado e a vítima estavam consumindo drogas perto do rio local quando, por razões não reveladas, ele a empurrou das escadas que levava ao rio, de uma altura de aproximadamente cinco metros. A vítima acabou dentro da água com machucados no rosto e pescoço quebrado, que foi a causa declarada da morte. Após, o acusado retirou a peruca e as roupas da vítima, subsequentemente queimando-as. A acusação argumentou que sua intenção era de fazer parecer com que a vítima tivesse sofrido agressão sexual. Não houve autópsia e a evidência foi baseada em 1) certidão de óbito, 2) fotografias, e 3) testemunhas que viram ambos os indivíduos juntos naquele dia. O réu confessou durante a interrogação, mas negou as acusações durante o julgamento. Na apelação, o acusado pleiteou uma sentença menor. Entretanto, o Tribunal Supremo manteve a decisão da corte inferior. A penalidade por homicídio foi aumentada pelas seguintes circunstâncias: (i) surpresa, (ii) lugar deserto, e (iii) superioridade por razão de gênero, sob o Artigo 34 do Código Penal de 1982.
Ministério Público v. Undisclosed parties (179/09.6TAMLD.C1 – 2020) Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra (Court of Appeals of Coimbra) (2020)
The defendant appealed from a lower court decision convicting him to 12 years of imprisonment for committing the crimes of domestic violence, child mistreatment and sexual abuse, and aggravated coercion. The defendant sought to reduce his sentence, arguing that the lower court erred in applying the law to the facts, since there was no evidence that his actions could be characterized as domestic violence. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra denied the appeal, concluding that the record demonstrated that defendant had treated his spouse inhumanely over the years, through repeated physical, psychological, and moral humiliations and aggressions. The Court of Appeals did not find the 12-year imprisonment sentencing excessive, noting that the defendant’s overall conduct was particularly egregious and manifestly inconsistent with the social values that criminal law seeks to protect (sexual self-determination and human dignity).
O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instância, o qual o condenou a 12 anos de prisão pelos crimes de violência doméstica, maus-tratos e sexual abuso contra seus filhos e coerção agravada. O Defendente buscou no recurso a redução da sua pena, sob a justificativa de que a decisão em 1ª instância errou ao aplicar a lei aos fatos, em razão da inexistência de provas que caracterizariam o crime de violência doméstica. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra negou provimento ao recurso, concluindo que as provas nos autos demonstravam que o Defendente tratava sua esposa de forma desumana ao longo dos anos, a partir de repetidas humilhações e agressões verbais, físicas, psicológicas e morais. Além disso, o Tribunal entendeu correta a aplicação de pena de 12 anos de prisão, ressaltando que a conduta do Defendente foi particularmente grave e manifestamente inconsistente com os valores sociais que o direito penal procura proteger (autonomia sexual e dignidade humana).
Republic v. Arawaia Kiribati Court of Appeal (2013)
The respondent pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent assault and two charges of defilement for repeatedly raping his wife’s 12-year-old granddaughter. When the girl reported the rapes to her grandmother, the respondent’s wife, he apologized. Later, the respondent wanted the victim to sleep with him and the victim’s grandmother told her to do so. The respondent again raped the victim. The High Court, in sentencing the respondent to two years imprisonment, considered his early plea, the seriousness of the case, and his apology to the girl. Counsel for the Republic appealed on the grounds that the two-year sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Republic argued that due to the rising prevalence of sexual offences in Kiribati, sentencing guidelines were needed. She further contended that the High Court erred in considering the respondent’s apology to the girl a mitigating factor. Relying on Kimaere v The Republic, a Kiribati Court of Appeal decision from 2005, and sentencing standards of New Zealand and Australia, the Court found that a five-year prison sentence was an appropriate starting point in defilement cases. The Court noted that in cases involving multiple offenses, it is more important that the overall sentence appropriately reflect the entirety of the defendant’s conduct rather than adding together the sentences for each offense. Determining that the respondent’s conduct justified a prison sentence of seven to eight years, the Court then reduced his sentence for his early plea to a total of five years. The Court found that the sentencing judge incorrectly weighted the respondent’s apology as a mitigating factor. The Court also held that the starting point for the indecent assault charges would have been two-and-a-half years before accounting for mitigating factors.
Attorney-General v. Mataua Kiribati Court of Appeal (2019)
The respondent was convicted of two charges of defilement of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment even though the maximum punishment for each charge was life imprisonment. The Attorney General of Kiribati appealed this sentence as “manifestly inadequate.” The Court of Appeal of Kiribati allowed the appeal and delineated the proper framework for sentencing in the context of this offense. First, the court noted that the minimum sentence for defilement should be five years and that any aggravating or mitigating factors must be accounted for in the final sentencing decision. Second, a court must make an upward adjustment for any aggravating factors external to the criminal act such as a person’s relevant criminal record. Third, a court should allow a reduction of the sentence where there are mitigating factors, such as guilty pleas, expressions of genuine remorse, prior good character, cooperation with police, or the youth of the offender. Fourth, a court should reduce the sentence based on the amount of time the offender spent in custody prior to sentencing. Finally, where a sentence would be less than two years, the court should consider a suspended sentence. Considering the aggravating factor of the multiple instances of sexual abuse against the victim and the mitigating factor of the respondent’s record of past good character, the court found the initial sentence manifestly inadequate and adjusted it to six years and six months imprisonment.
釋字第623號 J.Y. Interpretation 623 Taiwan Constitutional Court (1996)
In this interpretation, the Taiwan Constitutional Court upheld a criminal penalty provision of the Child and Juvenile Sexual Transaction Prevention Act (subsequently amended and retitled as the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act, or “CYSEPA”) that provided for imprisonment and monetary fines for parties publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise spreading information that may by any means induce a person to engage in an unlawful sexual transaction. The Court cited its earlier precedents holding that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was not absolute and that lawmakers may impose restrictions through clear and unambiguous laws. With regard to the Constitution’s Article 23 proportionality principle, the Court addressed the broad scope of the criminal penalty provision, which did not require that the information in question specifically involve or result in underage sexual transactions or inducement of children or juveniles to engage in sexual transactions. The Court noted that children and juveniles are still in danger of becoming objects of sexual transactions because of the wide distribution of such information and, therefore, distribution of such information constitutes a crime. The Court held that the criminal penalty provision in question was a rational and necessary means of achieving the significant state interest of protecting children and juveniles from becoming objects of sexual transactions and therefore was consistent with the principle of proportionality. The Court nonetheless directed competent authorities to design a “classified management system” so that readers and viewers of such information “can be strictly differentiated in light of the technological developments so as to comply with the principle of proportionality.” The current version of this criminal penalty provision, as reflected in the CYSEPA, has a narrower scope and applies to “messages that are deemed to be sufficient to seduce, arrange, suggest, or cause a child or youth to be subjected” to sexual exploitation. English translation available here.
Ministerio Público con Katherine Cerna Henríquez y otros (Case Nº 445-2018) Corte de Apelaciones de Concepción (2018)
The Criminal Trial Court issued a condemnatory sentence against the defendants for the repeated rape of their daughter and for other sexual crimes, including sexual abuse of a minor of less than 14 years of age and production of child pornography. The defendants sought to reverse the judgment, alleging that the Trial Court failed to consider the mental disabilities of one of the perpetrators and erred by failing to consider a lesser sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the failure of the Trial Court to consider the mental disability of the defendant was an error and should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the mother should have been charged solely as an accomplice because she had also actively participated in photographing the sexual abuse of the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely in respect to the sentencing calculation, as the crimes were of the same nature and, therefore, the Trial Court should have granted a lesser sentence. (External Link leads to the website of the Chilean Judicial System. This case is available by searching by the case number.)
El Tribunal Penal de Primera Instancia dictó sentencia condenatoria contra los imputados por la violación reiterada de su hija y por otros delitos sexuales, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor de 14 años y la producción de pornografía infantil. Los acusados buscaron revocar la sentencia, alegando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no consideró la discapacidad mental de uno de los imputados y cometió un error al no considerar una sentencia menor. El Tribunal de Apelaciones sostuvo que el hecho de que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no tuviera en cuenta la discapacidad mental del acusado fue un error y debería haber sido considerado como una circunstancia atenuante en la sentencia. La Corte de Apelaciones rechazó el argumento de que la madre debería haber sido acusada únicamente como cómplice porque también había participado activamente en la fotografía del abuso sexual de la víctima. La Corte de Apelaciones revocó la sentencia únicamente en lo que respecta al cálculo de la sentencia, ya que los delitos eran de la misma naturaleza y, por lo tanto, la Corte de Primera Instancia debería haber dictado una sentencia menor. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial de Chile. Este caso está disponible buscando por el número de caso).
Ministerio Público v. Cesar Rebolledo Espina (Case Nº 3885-2018) Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (2018)
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for the attempted murder of his spouse, and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the lower court erred by (1) failing to consider the facts as exposed by the appellant, (2) failing to take into account that the wounds suffered by the victim were not deadly, (3) refusing to consider the “voluntary and timely abandonment of the act”, (4) failing to set out its reasoning in reaching its conclusions as to the events and the injuries suffered by the victim, and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Trial Court considered witness testimony and set out the facts underlying the decision, which were sufficient to uphold the decision and sentence. It also found that the fact that the wounds suffered by the victim were not fatal was not inconsistent with the crime charged. Finally, it upheld the Trial Court’s determination that the appellant did not voluntarily “abandon[…] the act”, but instead was interrupted by the victim fleeing and seeking assistance from her neighbors, which were independent of the appellant’s actions. Therefore, the appellant never ended his attempt to commit the murder. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. (External Link leads to the website for the Chilean Judicial System. The case is available by searching for the case number.)
El recurrente fue declarado culpable y condenado a siete años de prisión por el intento de asesinato de su cónyuge, y la condena fue confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelación. En la apelación, el apelante alegó que el tribunal inferior incurrió en error al (1) no considerar los hechos expuestos por el apelante, (2) no tener en cuenta que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no eran mortales, (3) negarse a considerar el “abandono voluntario y oportuno del acto,” (4) no exponer su razonamiento para llegar a sus conclusiones sobre los hechos y las lesiones sufridas por la víctima, y (5) imponer una pena excesiva. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia y determinó que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró el testimonio de los testigos y expuso los hechos subyacentes a la decisión, que fueron suficientes para confirmar la decisión y la sentencia. Asimismo, concluyó que el hecho de que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no fueran mortales no contradecía el delito imputado. Finalmente, confirmó la determinación del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de que el recurrente no “abandonó […] el acto” voluntariamente, sino que fue interrumpido por la víctima que huyó y solicitó la asistencia de sus vecinos, quienes ayudaron, y no fue el recurrente quien detuvo el acto por si mismo. Por tanto, el recurrente nunca puso fin a su intento de cometer el asesinato. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial chileno. El caso está disponible buscando el número de caso).
R v. Wong New South Wales District Court (2013)
The accused was charged with conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in violation of section 260.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. She pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, facing charges that she had recruited four women from Malaysia to work at a brothel. The victims entered Australia on student visas, were forced to repay AUD 5,000 each, and were not permitted to leave the brothel until they repaid that amount. The accused also threatened the women with physical violence and deportation. The Court found the work that the women were forced to perform, including being paraded in front of potential customers wearing numbers for identification, was demeaning and dehumanizing. The Court found the accused guilty on all seven counts and sentenced her to six years’ imprisonment.
R v. Netthip New South Wales District Court (2010)
The accused pled guilty to one count of conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in contravention of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Between August 2005 and March 2008, the accused recruited and facilitated the placement of 11 Thai women in brothels in various Australian cities. Each of the women (except for those who worked for one particular brothel) transferred a portion of their net earnings to the accused to repay the debts they were told they owed. She was sentenced to two years and three months imprisonment.
Sieders v. R; Somsri v. R New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (2008)
This was an appeal from convictions for violations of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995, which generally prohibits forced labor. The two appellants, a married couple, ran various brothels in Sydney where five Thai women were sex workers. Four of the Thai women, while still in Thailand, signed contracts agreeing to provide sexual services in Australia. The contracts obligated each of them to repay approximately AUD 45,000 before they could keep any of their earnings. Four of the five women paid the AUD 45,000, and then continued working at the brothels. There was no dispute that the women worked in the brothels; the dispute was whether they had been subjected to sexual servitude. Following a trial, the defendants were convicted of conducting a business involving sexual servitude and sentenced to five years’ and four years’ imprisonment, respectively. Both appealed their convictions on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury on the fault element of the offense, and that their sentences were excessive. The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the convictions.
R v. McIvor and Tanuchit New South Wales District Court (2010)
The case concerns the defendants, a married couple, who kept five Thai women as slaves in a secret room in the basement of their licensed brothel in Sydney. The defendants purchased the Thai women through contacts in Thailand (for between AUD 12,500 – 15,000). Upon arriving in Australia, four of the women were informed that they owed between AUD 35,000 and 45,000 that they had to repay by working in the brothel (one of the victims was told about the debt in Thailand). The defendants confiscated the women’s passports and kept them in locked confinement either at the brothel or at their residence. The women worked extremely long hours, seven days a week. The defendants were each found guilty of five counts of intentionally possessing a slave and five counts of intentionally exercising ownership authority over a slave, in violation of section 270.3(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. The court sentenced Mr. McIvor to 12 years’ imprisonment and Ms. Tanuchit to 11 years’ imprisonment.
Sawyer-Thompson v. The Queen Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal (2018)
After pleading guilty to defensive homicide and being sentenced, the applicant appealed her sentence. The applicant’s violent and abusive partner, Mr. Mifsud, had compelled the applicant to kill the victim, Mr. Nankervis, by threatening to kill her family unless she killed Mr. Nankervis. The sentencing judge described the applicant’s offense as a “very grave example” of defensive homicide on the basis that Mr. Nankervis was innocent, Mr. Mifsud was absent at the time of the killing so the applicant could have gone to the police, and because the attack on Mr. Nankervis was extremely violent and disturbing. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentence (10 years imprisonment) imposed by the judge was manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal had regard to the litany of cruel, humiliating, and violent acts that Mr. Mifsud had subjected the applicant to throughout their 12-month relationship, and Mr. Mifsud’s substantial criminal history. The Court of Appeal also considered the applicant’s youth (she was 19 at the time of the offense), her contrition in pleading guilty, and the effect of the violence on her state of mind, which made it “exceptionally difficult” for her to resist the requests of those in positions of influence. The Court of Appeal found that there was no basis for drawing an adverse inference from the disproportionate violence used to kill Mr. Nankervis. Instead, against the background of family violence, the violence was indicative of the applicant’s fear that Mr. Mifsud would kill her family.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Lade Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal (2017)
The respondent had previously been sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to six charges relating to sexually assaulting, stalking, and threatening to kill his ex-wife, as well as attempting to pervert the course of justice (saying that he would kill himself if the victim did not drop the charges against him), and violating a family-violence intervention order. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed this sentence, arguing that it was “manifestly inadequate.” Upon consideration of the gravity of the offending conduct, its effect on the victim, and aggravating features such as the existence of the intervention order, the Court of Appeal reversed the sentence. The court found that the previous decision gave too much weight to mitigating factors, some of which should not have been taken into account at all, such as the judge’s finding that the respondent regarded “now at least the relationship as [being] over.” He was re-sentenced to two years and 11 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Paulino Supreme Court of Victoria at Melbourne: Criminal Division (2017)
The defendant had been found guilty of murdering his estranged wife in her home. This decision concerned his sentence. The court noted that “family violence” or “gender-based violence” are not separate crimes, but instead categorical descriptions of the relevant crime (here, murder), and that standard sentencing principles apply. The court condemned “family violence in the strongest possible terms” and stressed that general deterrence, denunciation, and just punishment were strong sentencing considerations. In accordance with the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the court considered factors such as the gravity of the offense of murder, the premeditated nature of the offense, as well as the trauma that the victim’s death had imposed upon her family members and friends. The court also gave weight to the fact that a family-violence intervention order had been in place for the victim’s safety, and that the defendant showed no remorse and maintained his innocence. The court discussed the approach adopted by the police and the courts in relation to family violence, and noted that the evolution of society’s values in relation to the treatment of women must be taken into account in sentencing. The court sentenced the defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment (without parole-eligibility for 25 years).
Uzun v. The Queen Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal (2015)
The applicant and his wife had been married for 24 years, but had been separated for approximately eight years at the time of the offense. The applicant was convicted of several charges, including aggravated burglary, breach of a family intervention order, making a threat to kill, and common assault. The applicant had entered the victim’s home, breaching a family-violence intervention order, and threatened to kill the victim verbally and by holding a knife to her throat. The applicant also threatened to shoot his estranged wife with a genuine-looking imitation firearm. Following a trial, the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the applicant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting tendency evidence, that the sentence was manifestly excessive, and that the trial judge failed to take into account the “crushing effect” of the sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, reasoning that “general deterrence is important in cases such as this of violence against domestic partners, so as to deter other like-minded individuals from similar offending.” The Court further reasoned that “sentences imposed for family violence should be set at a level which will send a message to those — predominantly men — who might offend violently against domestic partners or former partners or family members.” The Court also forwarded a copy of its decision to the Royal Commission on Family Violence, which was underway in Victoria at that time.
Republic v. Orero High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Nairobi Law Courts) (2008)
The defendant was charged with murder by stabbing the deceased woman. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused had stalked the deceased for days, at school and at home, and he had threatened to kill the deceased. Four days before the murder, the deceased, her father, and her brother visited the home of the defendant and his brother, with whom the defendant lived, about the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. Witnesses testified that the defendant became angry at the accusations and falsely accused the deceased of following him. After, the defendant’s brother agreed, as the defendant’s guardian, to stop the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. At the murder scene, a road near the entrance to the deceased’s school, the police recovered the murder weapon, a bloody knife. After the murder, the defendant attempted suicide and was taken to a hospital where doctors found photographs of the deceased and a note indicating that the accused had pledged himself to commit suicide and to cause the death of the deceased at the same time. Based on the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.
Case No. B 4003-14 – L.I. v. B.B. Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court) (2015)
A woman, L.I., suffered extensive injuries from being dropped from her balcony by her husband, B.B. From text messages between the parties during the night of the event, it was clear that L.I. was upset about something B.B. had done and it was clear that L.I. did not want B.B. to return to the apartment. The Supreme Court stated that in criminal cases, the prosecutor has the burden of proof. For conviction, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the crime for which he is prosecuted, which is normally difficult in these types of cases. L.I.’s memory of that night was incomplete but she remembered that B.B. had carried her to the balcony. Neighbors’ testimonies, the text messages, technical and forensic evidence all supported L.I’s testimony about the event. The Court ruled that it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that B.B. was guilty of attempted murder, for which he was sentenced to 14 years in prison. This case has become a landmark decision in Sweden regarding the evaluation of evidence in so-called “balcony cases.”
Case No. B 4878-18 – The Prosecutor General v. L.N. Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court) (2019)
A man was sentenced to nine years in prison in the Skane and Blekinge Court of Appeal for approximately 100 cases of rape and other sexual offenses against a child over the course of five years. The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that when assessing the penalty value for repeated serious sexual offenses against the same plaintiff, the court must weigh the connection between the crimes and their characteristics. When the perpetrator has committed crimes for a long time against the same person, the victim is often vulnerable and in a constrained situation. There is therefore particular reason to consider the effects of the crime on the victim. Considering these factors, the Supreme Court increased the sentence to 12 years' imprisonment.
AZ: 500DS 501JS 15031/15 (2017)
In this case a doctor was held criminally liable under section 219a of the Criminal Code for publishing information about abortion services on the her website. The doctor argued that she was not "advertising" abortion (which is prohibited by law under section 219a) but merely providing information on abortions. The court disagreed, holding that the downloadable PDF on the doctor's website that contained information about abortions fell under the prohibited conduct of section 219a. The doctor was required to pay a fine of 6000 Euros (150 euros per day over the course of 40 days).
PAKR Nr. 39/2015 Gjykata e Apelit (Court of Appeals) (2016)
Four defendants were charged with War Crimes against the Civilian Population in violation of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo and the Geneva Conventions, for variously beating “A” and “B,” both Kosovar Albanian female civilians, raping A, and subjecting them to a mock execution. All the defendants were acquitted by the Basic Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Basic Court’s acquittal of two of the defendants as the victims could not positively testify about their participation, and no other evidence conclusively linked them to the crimes. However, the panel held that the lower court failed to fully adjudicate the mock execution charge. It also dismissed as “incomprehensible” the first instance court’s ruling that there was no credible evidence that the victims had direct contact with S.S. (one of the remaining defendants who allegedly beat them), noting the victims’ testimony indicated they were certain of the identity of the defendant. The tribunal held that the lower court’s refusal to allow an in-court identification of S.S. was a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the appellate court agreed that witness identification should be approached with great caution, here the victims had the opportunity to see the defendant clearly for an extended time. The panel disagreed that witness testimonies are by default unreliable, explaining that they are entitled to the same evidentiary value and analysis as any other evidence and in certain cases the victim’s testimony is the only available evidence. The appellate court then pointed out the lower court’s contradiction with regard to the rape charge: it accepted that A was kidnapped, and also that there were intercourses while she was in captivity, yet then assumed that the intercourses may have occurred with consent, only because A and H.2. (the defendant accused of raping her), had an earlier intimate relationship. The tribunal held that it was absurd to assume that someone in captivity would be able to validly express consent, and even if A did consent due to the Stockholm Syndrome, a traumatic bonding of that kind would be a psychological condition and “any consent expressed by a victim in such circumstances would hardly be considered legally valid.” The appellate court further ruled that the events took place during a war, and consent in such a coercive environment would be “void by default,” citing the definition of rape in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. On the question of whether H.2.’s actions constituted a war crime, the panel held that it was irrelevant whether he had any association with the military. The relevant factors were instead whether there was an ongoing armed conflict, whether it was governed by international or domestic conflict norms, whether the victims were protected persons under international law, and whether there was a causal link between the armed conflict and the offense. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Basic Court to clarify facts on the mock execution and the involvement of H.2. in the alleged rape, and to conduct an in-court identification of S.S. (Also available in English.)
Ap.-Kz. Nr. 466/2011 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2012)
In the prosecution of an international human trafficking ring, B.D., a nightclub owner, was charged with Facilitating Prostitution in violation of Article 201 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, for recruiting and organizing 16 Moldovan women for prostitution. His co-defendants B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were immigration officials charged with Abusing Official Position and Smuggling of Migrants in violation of Articles 339 and 138 of the Criminal Code, for enabling 35 illegal immigrants – mostly Moldovan women – to enter Kosovo, including by issuing fake identification documents to them, with the motive of obtaining unlawful material benefits for themselves. B.D. was found guilty by the District Court, while B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were acquitted. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the District Court based B.D.’s guilt exclusively on text messages sent to his mobile phone asking to make reservations to meet with various individuals identified only by nicknames. The challenged judgment did not clarify the identities of the persons behind the nicknames and did not assess whether they were indeed the alleged victims identified in the indictment. The lower court’s decision also made no reference to the statements of the alleged victims, particularly whether the statements corresponded to and corroborated the contents of the text messages. The court further held that the District Court’s judgment did not contain sufficient reasoning a proper assessment of the evidence regarding B.J., M.G., and S.Z’s alleged enabling of illegal immigration. The tribunal also faulted the lower court for failing to determine the complete facts, including the immigration registration system, movements of large sums in the defendants’ bank accounts, and transcripts of intercepted communications between the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court annulled the District Court’s verdict and remanded for retrial. (Also available in English.)
AP-Ki. Nr. 192/2010 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2010)
The defendant husband held enduring suspicions that the late victim, his wife, was involved in an extramarital affair, and required her to seek permission to leave their home without his or their children’s accompaniment. The victim one day attempted to leave the house without the defendant’s permission, resulting in an argument in which he shot and killed her. The defendant was charged with Aggravated Murder under Article 147 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the offense is Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress (Art. 148) rather than Aggravated Murder, because he at the time of the shooting had reacted to the victim’s insult and did not act out of jealousy. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and ruled that the court of first instance correctly qualified the crime as Aggravated Murder rather than Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress. The court reasoned that the offense of Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress did not apply because Article 148 requires that the mental distress happen through no fault of the accused, whereas in this case the victim’s insult was a reaction to the defendant’s previous false accusations, personal offenses, and even physical mistreatment. The tribunal further held that the court of first instance correctly found that the defendant had killed his wife for base motives as required for Aggravated Murder under Article 147, explaining that the defendant did not only kill his wife out of jealousy, but also because she had “dared” to attempt to leave the house without his permission. This reaction demonstrates the defendant’s belief that he was entitled to decide his wife’s right to exist, a “ruthlessly selfish concept” that showed “utmost disrespect for the natural right of another human being to live and is as such a base motive.” Accordingly, the sentence was appropriate. (Also available in English.)
Ap.-Kz. 307/2012 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2012)
The victim, a minor of the age of 15, was trafficked by men including defendants I.I. and Sh. G, from Albania to Kosovo, where she was imprisoned and forced to work as dancer at multiple restaurants. She eventually escaped and met two men who helped her find accommodations and work as a waitress. One of the men, S.B., had sexual intercourse with her, as did D.B., the manager who hired her as a waitress. I.I., Sh. G., and the men involved in the victim’s trafficking and employment were convicted of Trafficking in Persons contrary to Article 139 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and S.B. and D.B. were additionally convicted of Sexual Abuse of Persons under the Age of 16 contrary to Article 198. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the court of first instance’s ruling that the fact that the victim perceived I.I. as a person who had helped her was a mitigating circumstance, and agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on I.I. was very lenient, noting that I.I. had participated in the victim’s trafficking despite his awareness of the victim’s age and vulnerable situation, including her dependency on narcotics, presence alone in a foreign country, and lack of options to return home. The court accordingly increased I.I.’s sentence from one year to two years. The tribunal then dismissed Sh. G.’s argument that he was found guilty based only on the statement of the victim, holding that in the case of human trafficking, “it is the injured party who is the most reliable person.” The Supreme Court also agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on S.B. was very lenient, considering that he had intercourse with the victim, being aware of her age and vulnerable situation, and thus increased S.B.’s sentence from one year and one month to one year and six months. Finally, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on D.B. was very lenient. The tribunal held that the trafficking of minors need not involve the use of force or violence, and that a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor could stand even if it was proven that it was done with the permission of the victim. The court accepted that the victim may have shown gratitude to D.B. for his assistance, but dismissed it as the “distorted perception” of a “vulnerable victim” and held that the gratitude did not change the criminal nature of the act or serve as an exculpatory circumstance. D.B.’s sentence was accordingly increased from two years to two years and four months. (Also available in English.)
Pml.-Kzz. Nr. 62/2013 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2013)
The defendant was arrested for being suspected of touching a female police officer’s shoulder and trying to kiss her, and charged with Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession pursuant to Article 200 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and attempt to commit such an offense, among other crimes. The municipal court found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years and four months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for three years. The district court rejected the charge of Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession, and reduced the sentence to 12 months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for two years. Thereafter, the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality against the lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the lower courts unlawfully convicted him of attempted Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession. The defendant argued that an attempt requires the offender to intentionally take immediate action toward the commission of the offense. Here, the commencing of the criminal offense was not proven because there was no action manifesting a sexual purpose behind his touching. The Supreme Court held the defendant’s claim was unfounded, pointing out that Article 200’s text states only “[w]hoever touches another person for a sexual purpose.” Here, the defendant not only touched the victim but also tried to kiss her, and was prevented from kissing her mouth only by the victim’s resistance. Hence, the defendant did not commit an attempt, but in fact completed the offense. The court, however, determined that the principle of reformatio in peius (prohibiting placing the appellant in a worse position after appeal) barred it from changing the lower courts’ qualification of the criminal offense. The court additionally rejected the defendant’s argument that the attempt in this case was not punishable, determining that an attempt to commit Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession was punishable under the Criminal Code. (Also available in English.)
Nadeem Masood v. The State Lahore High Court (2015)
The appellant arrived at the respondent’s home armed with a pistol and raped her. The respondent, 16 years old at the time, was already 32 weeks pregnant with the appellant’s child due to multiple previous rapes. The respondent filed a suit against the appellant and gave birth to a daughter during the trial. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment, to which he appealed to the Lahore High Court. Under the criminal laws of Pakistan, it is rape when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman with or without her consent when she is 16 years old or under. It is also rape when a woman gives consent due to fear of death or being hurt. The appellant argued the lesser offence of fornication, which is a crime committed when two people have sexual intercourse outside of marriage. The appellant argued that the Trial Court should not have convicted him of rape as the respondent had consented to the sexual intercourse. The offence of fornication is only punishable by imprisonment for up to five years with a maximum fine of ten thousand rupees, whereas rape is punishable by imprisonment for up to 25 years and/or a fine. The High Court held that since the respondent was 16 years old at the time of rape, it qualified as rape irrespective of the respondent’s consent. The High Court also expressed its concern over the Trial Court’s failure to award compensation to the child. Notably, the High Court held that children born because of rape would suffer “mental anguish and psychological damage” for their entire life, and should, therefore, be entitled to compensation. The appellant was ordered to pay a fine of one million rupees to the child born as a result of the rape, in addition to the compensation payable to the respondent.
HKSAR v. C.Y.L. Court of First Instance (2015)
The defendant pleaded guilty to having sexual intercourse with his daughter, a minor. The daughter became pregnant as a result and the child was adopted.. The judge commended the daughter for reporting the offense, despite the defendant’s attempt to persuade her not to. The defendant was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison.
AA v. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Caso No. 375/2007 Tribunal Apelaciones Penal 3º Tº (Third Criminal Appeals Court) (2007)
The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to 20 months in prison for crimes of domestic violence against his wife (BB). AA filed an appeal to the Appeals Court arguing that the scope of the law against domestic violence applied only to victims that were deemed to be defenseless. AA argued that the victim, BB was a member of the military and as such could not be deemed a defenseless person. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal affirming the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court determined that the fact that the victim was a member of the military was irrelevant and that the acts of violence were appropriately analyzed considering only the aggressor’s actions.
El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a 20 meses de prisión por delitos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). AA presentó una apelación ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones argumentando que el alcance de la ley contra la violencia doméstica se aplicaba solo a las víctimas que se consideraban indefensas. AA argumentó que la víctima, BB era miembro del ejército y, como tal, no podía considerarse una persona indefensa. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación afirmando la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que el hecho de que la víctima era miembro de las fuerzas armadas era irrelevante y que los actos de violencia se analizaron adecuadamente considerando solo las acciones del agresor.
AA v. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Caso No. 327/2008 Tribunal Apelaciones Penal 1º Tº (First Criminal Appeals Court) (2008)
The Trial Court of Tacuarembó sentenced AA to 12 months in prison for domestic violence, deemed as aggravated because the victim was a woman. AA and the victim had been living together in a common law marriage since 2000. In 2002 the victim reported on several occasions multiple instances of physical abuse and of psychological violence. In September 2003, the victim filed a complaint against AA for injuries inflicted to her neck and arm, which were verified by a public health doctor. The couple reconciled, but thereafter got separated again. On January 1, 2004 the victim was on her way to visit a friend when AA intercepted her on the street and forcibly grabbed her left arm while pressing a ring against her mouth until he broke her front tooth. Between December 2003 and January 2004 the victim had also reported several threats and aggressions from AA. AA appealed to the Appeals Court. The Court dismissed the appeal affirming the decision of the Trial Court and ruling that the 12-month sentence was appropriate considering the evidence presented and AA’s dangerous personality.
El tribunal de primera instancia de Tacuarembó condenó a AA a 12 meses de prisión por violencia doméstica, lo que se consideró agravado porque la víctima era una mujer. AA y la víctima habían estado viviendo juntas en un matrimonio de hecho desde 2000. En 2002, la víctima denunció en varias ocasiones múltiples casos de abuso físico y violencia psicológica. En septiembre de 2003, la víctima presentó una denuncia contra AA por las lesiones infligidas en su cuello y brazo, que fueron verificadas por un médico de salud pública. La pareja se reconcilió, pero luego se separaron nuevamente. El 1 de enero de 2004, la víctima se dirigía a visitar a una amiga cuando AA la interceptó en la calle y la agarró por la fuerza del brazo izquierdo mientras presionaba un anillo contra su boca hasta que le rompió el diente frontal. Entre diciembre de 2003 y enero de 2004, la víctima también había denunciado varias amenazas y agresiones de AA. AA apeló ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones. El Tribunal desestimó la apelación afirmando la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia y resolvió que la sentencia de 12 meses era apropiada considerando las pruebas presentadas y la personalidad peligrosa de AA.
AA v. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Caso No. 413/2008 Tribunal Apelaciones Penal 2º Tº (Second Criminal Court of Appeals) (2008)
The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to 10 months with a suspended sentence for the crime of domestic violence against his wife (BB). AA intimidated and committed continuous acts of violence against BB. The Trial Court deemed the continuous and manipulative nature of this violence to be an aggravating circumstance. AA appealed, arguing that the Trial Court had improperly analyzed the evidence and that there was not enough evidence to convict him. The Appeals Court determined that the evidence on file should be analyzed in the context of the contentious relationship between AA and BB. While AA argued that BB had mental problems, the court found this argument a mere pretext to deflect attention away from his own misconduct. The facts of the case showed that BB supported the home and paid for AA’s expenses, which demonstrated that AA had interests in BB aside from affection. The doorman of the building where AA and BB lived testified that he once saw AA breaking things in a violent rampage. This testimony contradicted AA’s statement that he was not destructive. The Appeals Court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate AA’s guilt and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a 10 meses con una sentencia suspendida por el delito de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). AA intimidó y cometió actos continuos de violencia contra BB. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró que la naturaleza continua y manipuladora de esta violencia era una circunstancia agravante. AA apeló, argumentando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia había analizado incorrectamente las pruebas y que no había suficientes pruebas para condenarlo. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que la evidencia en el archivo debe analizarse en el contexto de la relación entre AA y BB. Mientras AA argumentó que BB tenía problemas mentales, el tribunal consideró este argumento como un simple pretexto para desviar la atención de su propia mala conducta. Los hechos del caso mostraron que BB apoyaba la casa y pagaba los gastos de AA, lo que demuestra que AA tenía intereses en BB además de ser afectuoso. El portero del edificio donde vivían AA y BB testificó que una vez vio a AA rompiendo cosas en un violento alboroto. Este testimonio contradecía la declaración de AA de que no era destructivo. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que había pruebas suficientes en el expediente para demostrar la culpabilidad de AA y afirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.
AA v. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Caso No. 328/2011 Tribunal Apelaciones Penal 2º Tº (Second Criminal Appeals Court) (2011)
The Trial Court sentenced the 28-year-old accused (AA) to seven years and six months in prison for the crimes of rape, kidnapping and robbery. On March 27, 2011, AA approached the 18-year-old victim (BB) at a bus station and threatened her with a knife. BB offered him money, but AA put a knife to her throat and took her to a nearby field where he sexually assaulted her several times during the night, hit her repeatedly, and videotaped the sexual assault with his cellphone. AA then tied up BB and, before leaving her in the field, used BB’s cellphone to text her mother the location where BB could be found. He stole the cellphone and sold it at a fair. On July 22, 2011, AA was arrested. The police found in his possession a memory card with pornography and the video of BB’s rape. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court amended the qualification of the crimes to aggravated and rendered opinion that the sentence imposed by the Trial Court should have been more severe due to the proven dangerous nature of AA.
El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) de 28 años a siete años y seis meses de prisión por los delitos de violación, secuestro y robo. El 27 de marzo de 2011, AA se acercó a la víctima que tenía 18 años (BB) en una estación de autobuses y la amenazó con un cuchillo. BB le ofreció dinero, pero AA le puso un cuchillo en la garganta y la llevó a un campo cercano donde la agredió sexualmente varias veces durante la noche, la golpeó repetidamente y grabó en video la agresión sexual con su teléfono celular. AA luego ató a BB y, antes de dejarla en el campo, usó el teléfono celular de BB para enviarle un mensaje de texto a su madre sobre el lugar donde se podía encontrar a BB. Robó el teléfono celular y lo vendió en una feria. El 22 de julio de 2011, AA fue arrestado. La policía encontró en su poder una tarjeta de memoria con pornografía y el video de la violación de BB. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones modificó la calificación de los delitos a agravada y emitió una opinión de que la sentencia impuesta por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia debería haber sido más severa debido a la naturaleza peligrosa comprobada de AA.
Decisión nº 002-16 de Corte de Apelaciones de Violencia contra la Mujer (Número de Expediente: CA-1708-14VCM) Corte de Apelaciones de Violencia contra la Mujer (Court of Appeals for Violence Against Women) (2016)
The defendant was convicted for the crimes of human trafficking and association to commit crimes on May 15, 2014 in the state of Nueva Esparta. In its decision, the lower court said that in cases of rape and trafficking of persons, anyone who has been accused of having a relationship or knowledge of such crime could be deprived of liberty during trial, if it is deemed appropriate by the authorities. In the defendant’s case, he was accused of seducing and luring the female victim into the island of Margarita, where she was subjected, tortured, drugged, and raped. The defendant appealed the decision, alleging that it violated his right to be judged in freedom. The Court of Appeal for Violence Against Women on January 8, 2016 dismissed the appeal action and ratified the decision of the lower court and determined that the apprehension of the accused before his conviction did not represent a violation of the law. The appellate court ratified the criteria of the lower court according to which those defendants who are linked to the act of people trafficking and gender violence can be arrested before issuing a conviction decision, if deemed appropriate by the authorities.
R. v. H. Supreme Court of Queensland (2002)
The appellant advertised in Korea for families to come to Australia to attend a missionary school. The appellant was responsible for settling those families’ affairs, and they were dependent on him to organize the necessary extensions of visas. Most of the time, the parents spoke no English and their children spoke little English. The appellant organized accommodation for the parents of the complainant among other families, and at the same time he arranged for separate accommodation for their daughter with children of other families. The accommodation for the daughter was close to the appellant’s house, but an hour’s drive from her parents’ house. The appellant was the only individual who had the keys to the children’s rooms. The appellant advised the father of the complainant to return to Korea to seek more families, and he did. One night, the appellant returned around 1:00 AM to the children’s accommodation and entered the complainant’s room where another girl was with her. That girl left after certain remarks by the appellant. The appellant took the complaint in his van to a remote place where he proceeded to touch her, took off her pyjamas, and then had sexual intercourse with her, despite her resistance. During this resistance, they both fell to the floor of the van and the appellant injured his arm. The appellant threatened the complainant not to inform anyone about this incident, reminding her that her family needed him to renew their visas. The complainant immediately told her friends at the accommodation of the sexual assault. In the morning, the complainant walked to a public telephone where she called her father in Korea and told him about the incident, and then called her mother to inform her of the same. In fear with respect to their visas, the family went with the appellant to Brisbane where they had their visas renewed, acting as if nothing happened. Later, the father flew back to Australia and immediately lodged a complaint with the police. Through investigation, the police found physical evidence of rape, including injuries to her genitals consistent with rape, the appellant’s DNA, and wounds consistent with complainant’s statement of the rape. Based on the evidence, the District Court sentenced the appellant to eight years for two counts of rape and one count of indecent dealing with a circumstance of aggravation. Relying on older cases, the appellant filed this appeal to lower his sentence, claiming it was too high for someone his age, considering he had no previous convictions and that there were no violence or weapon used. The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, stating that the older cases referenced by the appellant were dated before the implementation of new rules that increased the sentences for rape. In addition, even though no violence was used against the complainant, the court found that the appellant took advantage of her because of her visa situation, and this was an aggravating factor. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
Regina v. Richards Supreme Court of Grenada and the West Indies Associated States (2017)
The defendant pled guilty to wounding and causing grievous harm to an adult female after dragging her into the bushes and attacking her with a piece of wood and cutlass, leaving deep lacerations and abrasions. The defendant also pled guilty to the rape and robbery of a 16-year-old female, which occurred just two days later. The defendant was before the court for sentencing. Analyzing the aggravating factors, the court observed that defendant had a criminal history, was not remorseful, preferred violence, and presented a danger to the community. The court also recognized that the victims were not only physically hurt, but had “been severely traumatized by their experiences.” The only mitigating factor was the guilty plea. Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to 14 years and three months imprisonment.
El acusado se declaró culpable de herir y causar graves daños a una mujer adulta después de arrastrarla hacia los arbustos y golpearla con un trozo de madera y un alfanje, dejando profundas laceraciones y abrasiones. El acusado también se declaró culpable de la violación y robo de una joven de 16 años, lo cual ocurrió solo dos días después. El acusado compareció ante el tribunal para dictar sentencia. Al analizar los agravantes, el tribunal observó que el acusado tenía antecedentes penales, no tenía remordimientos, prefería la violencia como medio de resolución a conflictos y representaba un peligro para la comunidad. El tribunal también reconoció que las víctimas no solo estaban heridas físicamente, sino que habían "sido gravemente traumatizadas por sus experiencias." El único factor atenuante fue que el acusado se declaró culpable. En consecuencia, el tribunal condenó al acusado a 14 años y tres meses de prisión.
Z.D.C. v. E.M.S. Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Antwerpen (Court of First Instance in Antwerp) (2017)
The two accused were prosecuted for invading the home of the two victims and assaulting them, which temporarily prevented the victims from being able to work. The first accused organized the crime because she could neither accept the breakup with one of the victims nor the fact that the victim was in a relationship with a man. Additionally, the first accused created a false Facebook profile to make fun of one victim’s sexual orientation and to convince one victim to break up with the other. The Court found that the motive of the crime was, among others, the sexual orientation of the victims, which is an aggravating circumstance of the assault. The Court found that the facts regarding the first accused had been clearly established. However, the interrogation and the investigation did not provide the court with enough evidence to hold the second accused criminally liable. The Court convicted the first accused and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50, i.e., in total EUR 5000), but suspended for five years if the accused complied with the terms of probation.
Public Prosecutor v. S.C. Rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen afdeling Brugge sectie correctionele rechtbank (Bruges Criminal Court) (2018)
The accused was prosecuted for assaulting a trans woman and her partner for being transsexual. The accused confessed to calling the victim and her partner “dirty transsexuals” and assaulting them. Following the assault, a doctor determined that the victim was unable to work. The Court found that the facts were uncontested and therefore proven. According to the Court, the accused showed a lack of respect for social norms and the physical integrity of other human beings. Additionally, the Court found the punishment should reflect that the crime was based on the victim’s transsexual status and that the punishment should serve to have a strong deterrent effect. The court convicted the accused and imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50 (i.e., in total EUR 5000))which would be suspended during three years if the accused obeyed the terms of probation.
The Queen v. Kilic High Court of Australia (2016)
This domestic violence case involved an appeal against a sentencing decision. The defendant set fire to the victim when she was 12 weeks pregnant and caused serious injury. After the attack, she terminated her pregnancy due to the permanent nature of her injuries. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. On appeal by the defendant, the Court of Appeal decided that this was “manifestly excessive” compared to other cases of serious injury by fire and resentenced the defendant to 10 years and six months imprisonment. On appeal by the prosecution, the High Court of Australia held that the Court of Appeal had erred in decreasing the sentence and pointed out that there were not enough comparable cases of intentionally causing serious injury by fire and the few cases mentioned could not establish a sentencing pattern.
Munda v. Western Australia High Court of Australia (2013)
This domestic violence case involved an appeal against a sentencing decision. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five years and seven months imprisonment for the manslaughter of his spouse after a history of domestic violence against his wife and other family members. The trial court considered the defendant's circumstances of disadvantage – that he was an Aboriginal man and grew up in an environment that normalized violence and alcohol abuse – as mitigating factors. In the first appeal, the prosecution successfully argued that the sentence was manifestly inadequate, and the Court of Appeal increased the sentence to seven years and nine months. The defendant then appealed to the High Court of Australia, arguing that there were insufficient grounds for the Court of Appeal to interfere with the original sentence and ignore the mitigating factors considered in the original judgment, in particular his social disadvantage. The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the first appellate court gave proper weight to the defendant’s social disadvantages and acted properly within its discretion in the resentencing.
J. v. The Queen High Court of Australia (2018)
In 2015, the appellant was charged and convicted for committing five sexual offenses against his sister. The had purportedly occurred over years,. Most of the charged offenses, sexual exploitation of a child and two rapes, occurred when the appellant was an adult, but prosecutors also charged him with an indecent assault committed when he was 11 or 12 years old and thus presumed to be incapable of the offense. To rebut this presumption, the prosecution offered evidence of the appellant’s earlier, uncharged acts of sexual violence against his sister beginning when he was five or six years old. In the first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was insufficient to overcome the doli incapax presumption for the indecent assault charge and the evidence was “too sparse” to sustain a conviction for the third count in the indictment. The court upheld the other three convictions. In this appeal, the High Court examined whether it was permissible for the prosecution to use evidence of the dismissed charges for “contextual” purposes related to the remaining three charges, each of which the appellant was convicted. In dismissing this appeal, the High Court found unanimously that the evidence was relevant because it illustrated the family background in which the appellant and his sister were raised and that it was admissible “relationship evidence.” The court found that without such contextual evidence, the sexual abuse claims could easily have been seen as implausible.
施美丽故意杀人案,上海市崇明县人民法院 (People's Procuratorate of Chongming County v. Shi) Chongming County District People's Court of Shanghai Municipality (2014)
On May 20, 2014, the defendant used a hammer to strike her husband’s head three times. She then asked her son to send her husband to hospital where he died. The Court found that throughout their marriage, the deceased often beat and abused the defendant. The day before the incident, the deceased beat the defendant for a long period of time. At approximately 5:30 AM the following day, the defendant, due to the history of abuse, decided to kill her husband. During the trial, multiple witnesses testified to the deceased’s long history of domestic violence. A letter signed by more than 100 people, including close relatives of the deceased, also confirmed that he had abused the defendant over a long period of time. The Court held that the defendant’s conduct qualified as murder. However, because her motive was her husband’s long history of domestic violence, the victim himself was also culpable. Because the defendant had little possibility of recidivism and because there was strong public sympathy for the defendant, the court sentenced her to four years imprisonment. She was due to be released on May 21, 2018. On August 29, 2017, Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court ordered her release on parole.
家庭暴力
2014年5月20日,被告人使用榔头击打其丈夫张某某的头部三次。被告让儿子将张某某送至医院,张某某经医院抢救无效死亡。法院查明,在婚后,被害人经常打骂被告人。事发当天,被害人曾长时间殴打被告人。5月20日凌晨5时30分许,被告人因为长期遭受被害人打骂,遂起杀害张某某之意。庭审时,多位证人证明张某某的长期家庭暴力行为。100余人的请愿书也证明了此家庭暴力行为。法院认为,被告人的行为构成故意杀人罪。但是被害人也因为对被告人的长期家暴行为存在重大过错。因为被告人再犯可能性较小,并受到民众高度同情,法院判决被告人有期徒刑四年。被害人的羁押将于2018年5月21日截止。2017年8月29日,上海第一中级人民法院判决被告人假释。
唐芳故意伤害罪,四川省高级人民法院 (People’s Procuratorate of Dazhou City Sichuan Province v. Tang) Higher People's Court of Sichuan Province (2013)
The lower court convicted the appellant of intentional assault and sentenced her to life imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for life for stabbing her cohabiting boyfriend to death. The lower court held that the defendant’s motive, frivolous arguments, constituted a crime of intentional assault. The lower court found that the consequence of the crime was serious and that the defendant should receive a severe punishment. On appeal, the Higher People’s Court of Sichuan Province reversed the lower court’s holding, finding that (1) the appellant turned herself in and obtained forgiveness from relatives of the deceased; (2) on the day of incident, the victim had attacked the appellant first, and should bear certain responsibility. Thus, the High People’s Court reversed the lower court’s ruling and reduced the sentence to 15 years in prison and deprivation of political rights for three years. Available here.
家庭暴力
四川省达州市中级人民法院原判认定被告人唐芳因持水果刀朝同居男友胸部捅刺数刀,致其死亡,犯故意伤害罪,判处无期徒刑,剥夺政治权利终身。原判认为,本案系婚恋纠纷引发,被告人唐芳有自首情节,并取得被害人亲属谅解,可依法从轻处罚。四川省高级人民法院认为,上诉人(原审被告人)唐芳因生活琐事纠纷,持刀致同居男 友卢某甲死亡,其行为已构成故意伤害罪,后果严重,应予严惩。鉴于本案系婚恋家庭矛盾纠纷引发,案发后唐芳有自首情节,并取得死者亲属的谅解,被害人卢某甲平时对唐芳实施家庭暴力,案发当天先殴打唐,有过错,可依法对被告人从轻处罚。法院撤销四川省达州市中级人民法院判决,即被告人唐芳犯故意伤害罪,判处无期徒刑,剥夺政治权利终身; 并判决上诉人唐芳犯故意伤害罪,判处有期徒刑十五年, 剥夺政治权利三年。
Jacques v. State Supreme Court of Rhode Island (1995)
The defendant appealed a 12-year prison sentence, arguing that his sentence was excessive given that there was no evidence he used violent force or penile penetration. However, the court held that the defendant failed to show the sentence imposed on him by the trial court was excessive or that any serious disparity existed between his sentence and any other sentence imposed for similar convictions, citing the fact that the Supreme Court found he violated Rhode Island’s sexual assault statute even though he did not commit penile penetration or use violent force (“the type of penetration is unimportant under the sexual-assault statute . . . The fact that only digital penetration occurred does not lessen [the victim’s] fear and humiliation.”).
The State v. L.S. High Court of Namibia (2006)
The accused murdered her newborn child and pleaded guilty to the crime. In determining her prison sentence, the judge took into account mitigating circumstances such as her young age (21 years old), the fact that the child’s father denied responsibility for the child, and the fact that her family nearly kicked her out of their home when she had her previous child. The judge also acknowledged that she was a first-time offender and showed remorse for the crime. However, he reiterated the seriousness of the crime and stated that he did not want his leniency in this case to serve as a message to other young women that infanticide was acceptable. He further stated that newborn infants have just as much a right to life as anyone else. For the murder, he sentenced the accused to three years imprisonment with 30 months suspended for five years on the condition that the accused not be convicted of murder during the suspension. For the concealment of the birth of her newborn child, the judge sentenced the accused to six months imprisonment to run concurrently with the murder sentence.
The State v. G.I. High Court of Namibia (2007)
The accused was an 18-year-old woman charged with the crime of abortion under the Abortion and Sterilization Act, 2 of 1975 (the “Act”). The Act outlaws abortion and prescribes no minimum sentence for the crime. The accused pleaded guilty and testified that she performed the abortion on herself, which terminated a two-month-long pregnancy. The Court sentenced her to pay N$3,000 or serve two years in prison. On review, the High Court found the sentence to be “completely” disproportionate to the crime. The Judge referred to the Old Authorities and stated that sentences for abortion should be less harsh in cases where a very young fetus is involved. The Judge also found that the accused personal circumstances and the particular circumstances of her trial, including the fact that she was a minor at the time, did not have counsel to represent her, and was not given the opportunity to explain her actions, warranted mitigation of the penalty. Finding that the lower court did not factor in any of these mitigating circumstances, the High Court reduced the sentence to N$300 or three months in prison, which he suspended on the condition that during that period the accused was not convicted of any abortion-related crime.
The State v. Dausab High Court of Namibia (2018)
The accused was convicted of pre-meditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after stabbing his girlfriend (“the victim”) 27 times and locking her in a room until she bled to death. Prior to murdering the victim, the accused sent her a text message describing how he would kill her. At trial, the court determined the crime was aggravated by the fact that the accused had a direct intention of murdering his girlfriend and did so in a domestic setting. In imposing a sentence, the court took into account retribution, prevention of crime, deterrence and reformation. The court further found that the accused did not care about the victim’s right to life, but rather his own wellbeing, that he “played victim,” and that he showed no remorse. The judge stated that it “is high time that men in relationships with women should understand that once a woman tells them that they are no longer interested in continuing with the relationship, she means just that and her views and feelings should be understood and respected.”
H.D. v. The State Supreme Court of Namibia (2018)
The appellant was charged with the rape and indecent assault of a three-year-old girl (“the complainant”). He pled “not guilty” to both counts but was convicted on the first count and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. The trial court acquitted the appellant on the second count. On appeal, the appellant argued that (a) the charge did not contain adequate particulars of the date and time of the alleged crimes; (b) the degree of the injuries to the complainant made it doubtful that he could have raped her; and (c) the cautionary rule was not correctly applied when the trial court reviewed the complainant’s evidence. The Supreme Court confirmed that the trial court was not only aware of the risks associated with the evidence presented by a sole young witness, but also exercised appropriate caution in considering the complainant’s evidence. It further found that the evidence presented at trial, including testimony by the complainant’s mother and older sister provided sufficient details to uphold the conviction. The appeal was accordingly denied.
Decision No. 246/Pid.B/2013/PN.Trt District Court of Tarutung (2013)
The Defendant forced his wife (the victim) to sleep in the cold outside of the bedroom and when the victim tried to enter the bedroom and sleep on the bed, the Defendant proceeded to push her to the floor and beat her, causing bruises and injuries to the victim. The court found the Defendant guilty of an act of domestic violence under Article 44(1) of Law No.23 2004 on Elimination of Domestic Violence. The court sentenced the Defendant to three months imprisonment.
Decision No. 174/pid.Sus/2013/PN.Kpj District Court of Kepanjen (2013)
The Defendant had an argument with his wife (the victim) and proceeded to hit his head against the victim’s head three times causing bruising and swelling to occur on the victim’s head. The court considered this act as an act of domestic violence under Article 5 of Law No. 23/2004 relating to Elimination of Domestic Violence. The court found the Defendant guilty and sentenced him to three months imprisonment.
Longsworth v. The Queen Court of Appeal of Belize (2012)
The appellant threw an accelerant on her husband, followed by a lit candle. She then immediately attempted to douse the flames in water. Her husband died and she was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant attempted to introduce new evidence that she had suffered from Battered Women Syndrome (“BWS”). This evidence was not available during the appellant’s trial because there were no qualified forensic psychiatrists available in Belize. The Court of Appeal granted the appeal on the ground that (1) it was capable of belief; (2) it was relevant to the issues before the jury; (3) it would have been admissible at trial; (4) the trial attorney had been asked why no medical evidence was presented at trial; (5) the new evidence may have caused the jury to decide differently; (6) the evidence supported a defense of diminished responsibility and (7) it cast doubt as to the reasonableness of the verdict and admission of the evidence was in the interest of justice. The court considered the findings of an experienced and distinguished professional in the field of forensic psychiatry who examined the appellant, interviewed witnesses, reviewed trial documents, and found that the appellant’s history and behavior was consistent with BWS. The forensic psychiatrist concluded that the appellant had been physically, sexually, financially, and psychologically abused by her partner for nine years. This abuse, together with the appellant’s response to the abuse, was found to be consistent with BWS. The Court reduced the appellant’s sentence to eight years. This case was the first time that a court in Belize admitted new evidence in relation to BWS and PTSD in connection with a defense of diminished responsibility.
Lawrence v. The Queen Court of Appeal of Belize (2018)
The appellant was convicted of the murder of his romantic partner of eight years and was sentenced to life in prison. On the night of the murder, the appellant first beat his partner in front of her three children. One of children called the police to report the beating, but the police failed to respond to the residence. Following the beating, the appellant left the house, but returned an hour later, broke into the house, and stabbed his partner to death. The appellant then drove his partner to the hospital where he was subsequently arrested. At the appellant' trial, testimony revealed that the appellant was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the killing and had a history of domestic violence. The first issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge gave adequate instructions on the potential for intoxication to be taken into account when deciding whether there was an intent to kill for the purposes of the appellant’s defense. The Court of Appeal found that such instructions given by the trial judge were adequate. The next issue decided by the Court of Appeal was whether new evidence from a forensic psychiatrist based on a single interview with the appellant regarding the appellant’s mental health necessitated a new trial. The Court of Appeal found the new evidence to be less than credible, but exercised discretion to substitute the original conviction of murder to a conviction of manslaughter and reduced the appellant’s sentence to 18 years. In reducing the sentence, the Court of Appeal began with the range of sentences for murder applicable a street fight (being 15 to 20 years), although acknowledged that the instant case differed in that it was a “vicious attack on an unarmed victim.” Taking into account appellant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia, the Court of Appeal began with a 15-year sentence and then added three years to reflect the aggravating factors of “the choice of weapon, the number of stab wounds, the presence of the children and the previous violence he inflicted on the deceased about an hour before the fatal incident” to arrive at the 18 year sentence ordered.
Carne v Wride & Carne v Nicholas Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (2012)
The appellant Barry Carne was formerly in a relationship with L.S., the victim and the mother of his four children. One day Carne entered L.S.’s home without consent, destroyed property, and confronted L.S.. During the altercation he grabbed and twisted L.S.’s right hand and fingers, causing her to fall in pain. As a result he was charged with aggravated assault, and a domestic violence order was issued against him. The domestic violence order restrained him from contacting, approaching, intimidating or harassing the victim and from exposing their children to domestic violence. While the domestic violence order was in force, Carne again went to L.S.’s house. After L.S. did not answer, he attempted to hang himself outside the home, only to be saved by his son, who was 14 at the time. Carne was charged with breaching the domestic violence order, and pleaded guilty. The sentencing magistrate sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment for the breach and two months for the aggravated assault, to be served concurrently. Carne appealed the sentence, claiming that it was manifestly excessive, and argued that the magistrate took into account irrelevant matters, in particular his suicide attempt. The court of appeal considered the definition of “domestic violence” and whether Carne’s attempted suicide in front of the children was an attempt to cause mental harm to L.S. and/or her children. The court held that the sentencing magistrate had not received sufficient evidence from the prosecution demonstrating that Carne had attempted the suicide in order to cause mental harm to L.S. and/or her children and, accordingly, it was not open to the magistrate to make such a finding. The magistrate was required to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis, permitted by the facts, regarding the attempted suicide before concluding that the intent was to cause mental harm. As such, the sentence was reduced to one month’s imprisonment.
X. v. Y., BGE 131 IV 167 Supreme Federal Court (2005)
Y. was married to X. until 1993. After the divorce, he continued to live with his former wife until March 2001, when he moved into his own flat. The former spouses continued their sexual relationship until September 2, 2001, after which they finally separated. From September 21 to October 12, 2001, Y. sent X. a large number of messages demanding that she perform certain sexual acts and threatening her. X. finally consented to the sexual acts demanded - including sexual intercourse and filming a sex tape. X. was forced to film pornography and suffered sexual abuse for about two months. Initially, the Winterthur Court condemned Y. to sixteen (16) months in prison for sexual coercion and rape. On appeal, the prison sentence was reduced to four (4) months, but Y.’s culpability was firmly reiterated. Y. appealed to the Supreme Federal Court, claiming that the threats to X. were not as severe as the prosecution had claimed. This appeal was rejected by the Supreme Federal Court, and the sentence of four (4) months remained in place.
Sentencia nº 235 de Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Número de Expediente: C15-366) Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (2016)
In the predawn hours of a Sunday morning, police officers came upon a cab parked in a secluded location. A woman (apparently an adolescent) emerged from the car naked and told the officers she was being raped by the driver, who was found with his pants down. Prosecutors charged the driver with attempted sexual violence. After the driver pled guilty and was sentenced to 50 months of imprisonment, the victim appealed the classification of the offense and prosecutors opposed the appeal. Based on evidence in the record, the court of appeals modified the conviction to sexual violence, doubling the time of the prison sentence. On the driver’s cassation appeal, the Supreme Court held that, by upgrading the conviction beyond the driver’s plea, the modification denied the driver the opportunity to present a defense and thus violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court accordingly vacated the modification and remanded the case for rehearing of the victim’s appeal.
Warren v. R. Court of Appeal (2015)
The applicant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Kingston for the offences of indecent assault, incest and assault. Later, a single judge granted leave to appeal and granted legal aid to the appellant. The prosecution conceded that the learned trial judge erred in imposing a sentence of 15 years imprisonment in respect of the incest charge, under the Child Care Protection Act of 2004, because the appellant was actually charged under the Incest (Punishment) Act, which establishes as maximum penalty for the crime is five years. As a consequence, the appeal against the sentence was allowed on the incest charge and this was set aside and substituted for five years imprisonment. The Court didn’t take into account, nor studied, the possibility of amending the indictment due to the specific circumstances and seriousness of the case, that is, the fact that the appellant sexually assaulted an underage girl on more than one occasion, and also, according to the evidence, threatened her to kill her if she made him go to prison.
Blake v. R. Court of Appeal (2015)
The applicant pleaded guilty before the Circuit Court of Westmoreland for the offence of having sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, in violation of section 10(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. He was in a serious relationship with the underage girl, but the matter was brought to the attention of the police when the complainant discovered she was pregnant and there was a dispute regarding the defendant’s paternity (tests showed he indeed was the father). He then argued that he was lured and tempted by the complainant, who would attend to his shop in revealing clothes and make sexual advances to him. The grounds for the defendant’s application was that the four-year sentence was manifestly excessive and that the judge was obliged to indicate, as a matter of law, the sentence that would have been imposed if the applicant had been convicted at trial and use that as a starting point for taking into account the fact that the applicant had plead guilty. In addition, his counsel highlighted as mitigating factors: the girl was just six months away from the age of consent and the sexual intercourse was consensual. His counsel also argued that the judge did not take into consideration the character and antecedents of the applicant, as well as the classic sentencing principles of retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. However, the Court decided that, although the indication of a starting point for sentencing would have been desirable, they do not see the omission as being fatal to the reasoning underlying the sentencing. They also highlighted that it’s clear that Parliament has recognized this offence as a serious one, and their commitment against it. This case is particularly important because the Court stated that Jamaica has particular difficulties in dealing with offences involving young girls constantly being abused and exploited by older men, and that they have to get the message out that the children must be allowed to transition into adulthood without any molestation. Furthermore, the court stated that the pregnancy of the girl must not be taken as a mitigating factor, because that would send the message that a man who gets the girl pregnant is likely to be treated more favorably by the Court. Finally, the Court insisted that these pronouncements, in the context of the alarming local circumstances, should be guiding principles in sentencing these matters and cases.
NJA 2015 s. 1024 Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court) (2015)
Defendant, an 18-year-old man, was convicted of rape and sentenced to one year in prison. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the jail sentence was too long, given the defendant’s age. The Supreme Court noted that that the punishment for rape of the “normal degree” (Sw. normalgraden) is between two and four years’ imprisonment. Normally, courts reduce jail sentences by fifty percent when the defendant is 18 years old. However, for long jail sentences, the courts have discretion to further reduce the punishment. The court also recognized that punishments other than jail sentences also may be considered. Given the crime, the court determined that community service was inappropriate, but reduced the defendant’s sentence to probation and three months’ imprisonment. Though rape is a serious offense, the Supreme Court adhered to the principle that imprisoning young individuals should be avoided, to the extent possible.
Mougdiel S.M., Case No. APN-135-15 Tribunal de Sentencia de Ahuachapan (2015)
This case is an appeal from a judgment by a lower court. Judge Delmy Elizabeth Mejia Salazar found Alvin, a 27-year-old farmer originating from Concepcion de Ataco, guilty of attempted rape of a minor (11 years old) in violation of articles 159 and 172 of the El Salvadoran criminal code, and sentenced Alvin to seven years imprisonment. In the underlying case, the victim testified that Alvin forced her into a crawling position, raped, and sodomized her. On appeal, Alvin argued that the sentencing judge did not properly apply article 179 of the criminal code of procedure as the evidence presented by the forensic expert did not show any injuries in support of a finding of rape and/or sodomization. On appeal, the court emphasized that the medical examination was conducted a month and a half after the attempted rape and sodomization, which provided sufficient time for any injuries to heal. The court further stated that article 159 of the penal code does not require the use of violence and indicated that not every attempted violation will leave physical evidence (e.g., if the victim has a passive reaction to the aggression which does not result in the use of force). Additionally, Alvin did not deny attempting to sexually assault the victim by putting her in a crawling position. Thus, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling and sentence, which was shorter than the eight years imprisonment recommended by the relevant statute.
Este caso es una apelación de una decisión de un tribunal inferior. La jueza Delmy Elizabeth Mejía Salazar encontró culpable a Alvin, un campesino de Concepción de Ataco de 27 años, por intento de violación de una menor (11 años) en violación de los Artículos 159 y 172 del Código Penal salvadoreño, y sentenció a Alvin. a siete años de prisión. En el caso visto en el tribunal inferior, la víctima testificó que Alvin la obligó a gatear, la violó y la sodomizó. En la apelación, Alvin argumentó que el juez de sentencia no había aplicado correctamente el Artículo 179 del Código de Procedimiento Penal, ya que las pruebas presentadas por el perito forense no mostraban lesiones que respaldaran la determinación de violación y / o sodomización. En la apelación, el tribunal enfatizó que el examen médico se realizó un mes y medio después de la violación y sodomización, lo que proporcionó tiempo suficiente para que cicatrizaran las heridas. El tribunal declaró además que el Artículo 159 del Código Penal no requiere el uso de la violencia e indicó que no todo intento de violación dejará evidencia física (por ejemplo, si la víctima tiene una reacción pasiva a la agresión que no da lugar al uso de fuerza). Además, Alvin no negó haber intentado agredir sexualmente a la víctima poniéndola en una posición de gateo. Por lo tanto, el tribunal de apelación confirmó las conclusiones y la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia, la cual era más breve que los ocho años de prisión recomendados por la ley pertinente.
F.A.P.A., Case No. 191-09-2016 Tribunal de Sentencia de Chalatenango (2016)
F.A.P.A., the defendant, was a 54-year-old unmarried Salvadoran farmer residing in La Reina, El Salvador. At the time of the allegations giving rise to the case, he was receiving treatment for epilepsy. An evening, F.A.P.A. visited his niece. F.A.P.A. and his niece, a minor, were sitting on a couch watching television when his niece’s mother left the room to attend to her other children. During that time, F.A.P.A. engaged in sexual behavior with his niece against her will by touching her genitals and kissing her in the mouth. F.A.P.A. was subsequently arrested by Salvadoran police officers for sexually harassing his niece. F.A.P.A. later confessed to these underlying facts. Section 165 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code states a person is liable for sexual harassment when that person (1) engages in sexual behavior involving phrases, touching , signs, or other unequivocal conduct of a sexual nature or content, (2) the action is undesired by the person who receives it, (3) the action does not constitute a more serious sexual offence, (4) in the case of a person of legal age, the action is repeated, and (5) the action is intentional. The court found that F.A.P.A.’s confession of intentionally touching his niece’s genitals and kissing her against her will satisfies the elements of sexual harassment. Although F.A.P.A. was being treated for epilepsy, the court found that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong and acted consciously. The court found F.A.P.A. guilty of sexual harassment punishable by two years imprisonment. However, in lieu of the prison sentence, the court exercised its discretion under articles 77 and 79 of the Penal Code and sentenced F.A.P.A. to two years of probation with the following restrictions: (1) prohibition from leaving the country; (2) prohibition from approaching the victim or her family; (3) prohibition from ingesting intoxicating drinks; and (4) will be under probationary surveillance.
F.A.P.A., el acusado, era un agricultor salvadoreño soltero de 54 años que residía en La Reina, El Salvador. En el momento de las denuncias que dieron lugar al caso, se encontraba en tratamiento por epilepsia. Una noche, F.A.P.A. visitó a su sobrina. F.A.P.A. y su sobrina, menor de edad, estaban sentados en un sofá viendo la televisión cuando la madre de su sobrina salió de la habitación para atender a sus otros hijos. Durante ese tiempo, F.A.P.A. participó en un comportamiento sexual con su sobrina en contra de su voluntad, tocándole los genitales y besándola en la boca. F.A.P.A. posteriormente fue detenido por policías salvadoreños por acosar sexualmente a su sobrina. F.A.P.A. más tarde confesó estos hechos subyacentes. La Sección 165 del Código Penal de El Salvador establece que una persona es responsable de acoso sexual cuando (1) participa en un comportamiento sexual que involucra frases, tocamientos, señas u otra conducta inequívoca de naturaleza o contenido sexual, (2) no deseada por quien la recibe, (3) la acción no constituye un delito sexual más grave, (4) en el caso de una persona mayor de edad, la acción se repite, y (5) la acción es intencional. El tribunal determinó que la confesión de F.A.P.A. de tocar intencionalmente los genitales de su sobrina y besarla en contra de su voluntad satisfacía los elementos del acoso sexual. Aunque F.A.P.A. estaba siendo tratado por epilepsia, el tribunal determinó que era capaz de distinguir el bien del mal y actuó conscientemente. El tribunal encontró a F.A.P.A. culpable de acoso sexual punible con dos años de prisión. Sin embargo, en lugar de la pena de prisión, el tribunal ejerció su discreción en virtud de los Artículos 77 y 79 del Código Penal y sentenció a F.A.P.A. a dos años de libertad condicional con las siguientes restricciones: (1) prohibición de salir del país; (2) prohibición de acercarse a la víctima o su familia; (3) prohibición de ingerir bebidas embriagantes; y (4) mantenerse bajo vigilancia probatoria.
Prosecutor's Office v. Nermin Ćupina Ustavni Sud Bosne i Hercegovine (Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2006)
In 2002, Nermin Ćupina (“Ćupina”) recruited two underage girls and one woman and forced them, through threats of violence to them and their family members, to provide sexual services for money. Each day, the victims were forced to earn KM 400 through prostitution, all of which Ćupina kept. The Court of BiH sentenced Ćupina to 12 years’ imprisonment, which it added to Ćupina’s four-year prison sentence from the Cantonal Court in Mostar, resulting in a single sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment after credit for time served. In addition, in accordance with Article 110 of the Criminal Code of BiH, the Court of BiH confiscated the material gain Ćupina acquired through his criminal enterprise. The court, relying on the findings of an expert, established that Ćupina made at least BAM 100,000 in 2002 by prostituting the victims. The court also concluded that because neither Ćupina nor his wife had regular income during 2002, the construction of an apartment valued at BAM 61,481.55 was financed entirely from Ćupina’s criminal enterprise. The Court of BiH confiscated the apartment and ordered Ćupina to pay the remainder of the estimated material gain, BAM 38,518.45.
Decision available in English here.
Prosecutor's Office v. Predrag Kujundžić Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2010)
From the spring of 1992 to the autumn of 1993, during the Bosnian War, Predrag Kujundžić, a commander in the local military and later police force, led several attacks against non-Serb civilians in Doboj. During that time, he incited, aided, and abetted the murder, rape, imprisonment, and persecution of non-Serb civilians. In addition, from June to December 1992, Kujundžić forced a Muslim minor into sexual slavery by use of force and threats to kill the victim’s mother and younger sister. Kujundžić repeatedly raped the victim, forced her to have sexual intercourse with soldiers, and controlled every aspect of her life. In 2009, the Court of BiH found Kujundžić guilty of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH. The Court found several aggravating circumstances present in Kujundžić’s case, including Kujundžić’s status as a commander, the motives for the attack, the large number of victims, and the fact that the victim of rape and sexual slavery was a minor. The Court accordingly sentenced Kujundžić to 22 years imprisonment. A panel of the Appellate Division later reduced his prison sentence to 17 years.
Second instance verdict available in English here.
Prosecutor’s Office v. Ćerim Novalić Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2011)
In September 1992, during the Bosnian War, the Army of BiH attacked Serb houses in the village of Džepi. During this assault, Ćerim Novalić and an unidentified soldier entered a home to see if the couple was hiding Serbs. While the unidentified soldiers interrogated the husband about his neighbors of Serb ethnicity, Novalić forced the wife into an upstairs room and raped her. In 2010, the Court of BiH found Novalić guilty of a War Crime against a Civilian under Article 173(1) of the CC BiH and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. The following year, a panel of the Appellate Division of the Court of BiH revised Novalić’s conviction, finding him guilty under Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the law in effect at the time of Novalić’s crime. The Appellate Panel considered the “extremely humiliating manner” in which Novalić raped the victim – her underage children and mother-in-law were in an adjacent room and her husband was downstairs – and increased his sentence to eight years and six months imprisonment. This is the upper-end of the typical prison sentence mandated by the Court of BiH for one count of rape during the Bosnian War.
Second revised verdict available in English here.
Prosecutor’s Office v. Veselin Vlahović Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2014)
Between 1992 and 1995 during the Bosnian War, Veselin Vlahović a member of the Serbian paramilitary forces, committed various crimes against humanity against the civilian non-Serb population of Sarajevo, including murder, rape, physical and mental abuse, robbery, and enforced disappearance. His crimes were so horrific that he was known by victims as the “Monster of Grbavica.” In 2010, Vlahović was arrested in Spain and extradited to BiH. In 2013, the Court of BiH found Vlahović guilty of sixty different crimes against humanity, including 35 murders and 11 rapes, as well as torture, imprisonment, and looting. He was sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment. In 2014, the Court of BiH acquitted Vlahović of one of the 60 counts of the indictment and reduced his prison sentence to 42 years. Notably, Vlahović’s original prison sentence of 45 years was the maximum possible penalty and is the longest sentence handed down by the Bosnian war crimes court.
Second instance verdict available in English here.
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Bogdanović Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2015)
In May 1993, during the Bosnian War, Velibor Bogdanović, a member of the Croatian Defence Council, and five unidentified soldiers ransacked the home of a couple in Mostar. The group stole jewelry from the home and took the husband to the local prison where he was unlawfully detained for 30 days. In addition, Bogdanović raped the wife. In 2011, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”) found Bogdanović guilty of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 173(1), as read together with Article 180(1) and Article 29, of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“CC BiH”). In July 2015, the Constitutional Court of BiH overturned Bogdanović’s conviction, finding that it had been based on an inapplicable law. And in September 2015, the Appellate Division of the Court of BiH revised Bogdanović’s sentence, finding him guilty of the criminal offense of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The Court imposed the minimum sentence on Bogdanović – five years imprisonment – reasoning that the accused was a married father, that he had been 22-years-old at the time that he committed the crime, that he had committed no criminal offense since the war, and that he had apologized to the victim after the war and offered her assistance.
Revised second instance verdict in English available here.
Magerer v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Bomet (2016)
The appellant was convicted of (i) aiding the commission of female genital mutilation (“FGM)” on several girls, (ii) failing to report the commission of FGM, and (iii) allowing her premises to be used to perform FGM. She pled guilty to the crimes and was sentenced to pay a fine of Kshs. 200,000 (or 3 years of imprisonment if she defaulted on the payment). On appeal, she argued that the sentence was overly harsh and oppressive because she was a single mother of three children. Justice M. Muya upheld her sentence, as it was the minimum allowed under the Female Genital Mutilation Act. The Justice in this case noted that within this case “lies the clash between traditional values and the law of the land.” Even though the appellant was abiding by a customary practice, it was in violation of Kenyan criminal law, and thus the appellate court upheld her sentence.
Nduta v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Siaya (2015)
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for injuring his wife, who he inherited according to customary practice after her husband died in 2002. On November 8, 2013, his wife attempted to pack clothes to visit her children in Nairobi. The appellant refused to let his wife travel and threatened to murder her. The appellant cut both of his wife’s arms using a panga (machete), but she managed to escape to her nephew’s home. The nephew saw the appellant armed with the panga and a knife before taking his aunt to the police station and later the hospital. The appellant was convicted of Grievous Harm Contrary to Section 234 of the Penal Code and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to consider that this was a mere domestic issue that could have been resolved by village elders. The appellant asked for a non-custodial sentence citing the fact he was an elderly man (78 years old). The High Court upheld the conviction and the sentence, noting, “The appellant’s actions amounted to violence against women. It is my view a gender-based violence which the court cannot condone or tolerate and let perpetrators of violence against women and girls go unpunished.” This case demonstrates the relationship between the criminal courts in Kenya and customary law.
A.M.L. v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Mombasa (2012)
The appellant was convicted of defilement for having intercourse numerous times with a 16-year-old, which is under the age of consent. A.M.L. appealed his conviction and ten-year sentence on four grounds: (i) failure to conduct a voir dire examination on the victim before obtaining her testimony, (ii) failure to conduct a DNA test on the appellant, (iii) insufficiency of evidence, and (iv) the court’s failure to adequately consider his defense. The State wished to enhance A.M.L.’s sentence on appeal. The appellate court found that adequate evidence had been presented at trial that justified the charge of defilement. However, the court found ten-year sentence imposed by the trial magistrate unlawful because 15 years is the legal mandatory minimum sentence for the defilement of a girl aged between 16 and 18 years. Accordingly, AML’s sentence was enhanced to 15 years and his conviction upheld.
Republic v. C.W. High Court of Kenya at Siaya (2016)
The defendant was accused of the killing of her husband. She entered into a plea agreement to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter. The deceased returned home on May 7, 2016, intoxicated and accused the defendant of infidelity. A violent domestic fight ensued and the defendant used a kitchen knife to fatally stab the deceased. The defendant was also injured by the deceased during the altercation. The defendant asked the court for a non-custodial sentence based on a number of mitigating circumstances including the fact that the defendant is the primary caregiver of her three children with the deceased, aged five, three, and one. Relatives and friends of the deceased confirmed that he was verbally and physically abusive to the defendant and the killing occurred in “the heat of the moment.” Furthermore, the defendant had no prior record, demonstrated remorse, and the deceased’s family and the community had forgiven her and were willing to help her raise her children. The High Court agreed that these factors merited a non-custodial status, adding that the defendant is both the accused and the victim, and was acting in self-defense even though she used excessive force. The High Court handed down a three-year non-custodial sentence. This case marks an important example of Kenyan courts treating victims of domestic violence with leniency where excessive force is used while defending themselves from their abuser.
Mwape v. The People Supreme Court of Zambia (2012)
The appellant was charged with defilement contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia (unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 16 years) and was sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. On behalf of the appellant, the appeal was filed on two grounds. On ground one, it was contended that the Court had erred in law by deciding not to conduct a voir dire and proceeding to receive the sworn evidence of a child. On ground two, it was contended the court below erred by finding corroboration and concluding the appellant was guiltywwww. Relative to the first grounds, the Court held that, while there had been no voir dire and while the Magistrate had failed to inquire as to whether the child understood the nature of the oath, this did not necessitate a re-trial, given that such orders are typically discretionary and this was not the only evidence tendered at trial. Relative to the second grounds, the Court observed that the question of identity was not in dispute and that there was substantial corroborative evidence that the crime had been committed. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the grounds lacked merit, as the Court was competent to convict the appellant even without the victim’s evidence. The Court further noted that the crime was compounded by the breach of trust that the appellant (who was the prosecutrix’s step-grandfather and exercising parental responsibility over her at the time) had committed against the victim and, therefore, set aside the 15-year minimum sentence in favor of a 20-year hard labour sentence.
Miloslav v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2014)
The appellant was charged with the offence of indecent assault on a female contrary to Section 137(1) of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The victim worked for the appellant as a maid when she was indecently assaulted. The appellant advanced four grounds of appeal: (i) the trial court erred when (i) it found the appellant had a case to answer at the close of the prosecution’s case; (ii) it convicted the appellant of the offence in the absence of corroborative evidence; (iii) the trial court erred when it convicted the appellant on the evidence of the victim who suffered from unsoundness of mind without satisfying itself that the victim understood the nature of an oath and was capable of giving rational testimony; and, (iv) it held that the findings in the medical report supported the prosecution’s evidence and when it held that the appellant had corroborated the evidence of the victim when he admitted touching the victim. The Court dismissed all grounds for appeal on the following bases: (i) the Court was satisfied that the victim’s testimony was presented in a very coherent manner and that the three ingredients of the offence had been established and that the victim’s testimony was not discredited at all; (ii) there was medical evidence which corroborated the crime as well as evidence that the victim did not consent to the indecent assault; (iii) the victim’s testimony was very consistent and was given with ‘lucid clarity’, therefore there was nothing in the victim’s testimony that could have compelled the trial court to conduct a voir dire; and, (iv) there was medical evidence which corroborated the victim’s testimony and there was no evidence of a romantic relationship between the parties which would indicate consent. Further, the Court held that, because of the ‘master and servant’ nature of the relationship, the minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment was inappropriate and should be set aside and replaced by a sentence of 20 years imprisonment with hard labor effective from the date of conviction.
The People v. Mugala High Court for Zambia (2012)
The accused was charged with one count of rape contrary to Sections 132 and 133 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The accused denied the charge. However, following the trial (during which the prosecution called five witnesses, and after considering the evidence of the accused which was given on oath), the trial magistrate found the accused guilty and convicted him of the subject offence. The case was then remitted to the High Court for sentencing pursuant to Section 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Zambia. Before passing any sentence, the Court was required to satisfy itself that the relevant legal and procedural provisions had been observed by the trial court. The Court held that there was medical evidence in support of the violent nature of the act as well as other corroborative evidence, such as the distressed state of the victim when she reported the act. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence in support of the identification of the accused by the victim including the trial magistrate’s finding that the victim was a truthful witness. On the totality of the evidence, the High Court held that the trial judge’s finding of guilt and the conviction was ‘anchored on firm ground’ and, therefore, concluded that it should be upheld. The High Court sentenced the accused to 25 years imprisonment with hard labor effective from the date of arrest.
Sikazwe v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2012)
The appellant was charged with incest contrary to Section 159(1) of the Penal Code but was convicted of the lesser charge of indecent assault contrary to Section 137(1) as amended by Act No. 15 of 2005, Cap 871, as the medical evidence ‘left a lot to be desired’ (as described by the Magistrate). However, when the matter was sent to the High Court for sentencing, the sentencing judge substituted the charge of indecent assault with incest and sentenced the appellant to 20 years imprisonment with hard labor. The appellant appealed this conviction and sentence on the basis that the Magistrate “erred in law and fact when he tried and convicted the appellant without the Director of Public Prosecutions’ consent.” In support of this argument, the appellant noted that the instructions of the Director of Public Prosecutions were to try the appellant for rape not incest. Therefore, in the absence of express consent by the Director of Public Prosecutions as required by Section 164 of the Penal Code, Cap 871, the trial court had jurisdiction neither to hear the matter nor to proceed to convict the appellant on indecent assault and sentence him to 20-year term for incest. The Supreme Court reviewed the letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions and noted that, while the first paragraph gave the impression that he had sanctioned the prosecution to go ahead with the charge of incest, the remainder of the letter made it clear that he had also sanctioned the appellant’s prosecution on a charge of either rape or defilement. The Supreme Court also noted that the latter could potentially enable a conviction of indecent assault under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code. Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Director of Public Prosecutions rightly guided the prosecution and the court below to invoke whichever of these provisions as necessary. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that the Magistrate rightly concluded that ‘the medical evidence left a lot to be desired.’ Ultimately, it concluded that the appellant was not guilty of the offence of rape, but that he was guilty of the offence of indecent assault contrary to Section 137 of the Penal Code and that the sentencing judge was mistaken to sentence the appellant for incest. The Supreme Court quashed the incest conviction, but still upheld the conviction for indecent assault and imposed a 20-year prison sentence.
Habeenzu v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2012)
The appellant was charged in the Subordinate Court of attempted rape contrary to Section 137 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The statement of offence read defilement, contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code. The appellant was convicted of indecent assault, a minor offence per Section 181(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellant appealed on two grounds. First, the statement of offence was defective, as (i) it did not specify the offence by section and subsection of the provision of the law contravened, and (ii) it was amended late which was unjust. Second, on the available evidence, a court could not have properly convicted appellant for attempted rape or indecent assault because the allegation of attempted rape impliedly includes both an allegation of assault and of indecency; on the facts, there was only an element of indecency (and not assault). The Supreme Court rejected both grounds of appeal on the basis that: (i), indecent assault, attempted rape, rape and defilement are offences of the same genus and therefore a defendant charged with attempted rape may be convicted of a lesser related charge like indecent assault; (ii) the appellant had an opportunity to defend himself in relation to the alternative charge, so there was no constitutional violation of the fairness of the trial; and (iii) the findings of fact were in accordance with the evidence on the record, as the appellant was ‘caught in the act’ and there was medical evidence of injuries sustained by the victim. Accordingly, there was no reason to interfere with the findings of fact or the minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge. The Court dismissed the appeal.
Police v. Apelu Supreme Court of Samoa (2010)
A women inmate at Tafaigata Prison who was two months pregnant asked the defendant to abort the fetus using a duck speculum and uterine sound instrument while she was on weekend parole. Upon returning to the prison and complaining of severe pain, the woman was rushed to the hospital, where she delivered a live, premature female infant. The baby died of respiratory failure as a result of extreme prematurity and neonatal sepsis; the medical report stated that the instruments used by the defendant had infected the victim’s uterus and induced labor. In 2004, she had been sentenced to two and one-half years for the same offense. Although the charges were not prosecuted at the time, they were revisited in 2005 and a year was added to the defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge in the case considered the defendant’s record of recent convictions as aggravating factors. While the maximum sentence for this offence is seven years, the court considered that it warranted a starting point of six and a half years. The only mitigating factor in the defendant’s favor was her guilty plea, which avoided the necessity of a full trial, for which twelve months were deducted from her sentence. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Convention on the Rights of the Child and CEDAW ought to be considered in sentencing. In the course of answering such question in the negative, the judge was clear in relying solely upon national legislation: “This country through its elected representatives namely Parliament has chosen to take a pro-life stand and have legislated against abortion except when it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Parliament having enacted that law, the courts duty is beyond question, it is required to enforce the laws of the land. The rightness, wrongness or morality of such a law is debated in the building next door, not in this one.” The fact that Samoa continues to criminalize abortion after ratifying international conventions evinces clear legislative intent against domesticating CEDAW through specific legislation.
Case of Joao María Dos Santos Supreme Court (1997)
S.J.D.S and M.J.D.S (16 and 13 years old) were sexually abused by their father, Joao María Dos Santos on several occasions. The victims testified that they were forced to have sexual relations with their father. The accused admitted that he raped them. The accused was sentenced to 16 years in prison. His sentenced was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1997.
Case of Francisco Ramírez Irala Supreme Court (2011)
In 2008, Francisco Ramírez Irala was found guilty of domestic violence against his wife. The Justice of the Peace ordered the accused to refrain from living at their home or being within 300 meters of his house or any other place that represented a risk for the victim for a period of 60 days. The accused appealed, and the sentence was confirmed. Subsequently, the accused filed a request before the Supreme Court alleging that the sentence caused him great harm because he is a colonel in the military with an impeccable career and being evaluated for a promotion. The Supreme Court rejected his motion.
En 2008, Francisco Ramírez Irala fue declarado culpable de violencia doméstica contra su esposa. El Juez de la primera corte le ordenó al acusado abstenerse de vivir en su domicilio o estar a menos de 300 metros de su casa o de cualquier otro lugar que representara un riesgo para la víctima por un período de 60 días. El acusado apeló, pero se confirmó la sentencia. Posteriormente, el acusado presentó una solicitud ante la Corte Suprema alegando que la sentencia le causó un gran daño de reputación por tratarse de un coronel en el ejército con una trayectoria impecable y estar siendo evaluado para un ascenso. Aún así, la Corte Suprema rechazó su petición.
Case of Emilio Garay Franco Supreme Court (1996)
Emilio Garay Franco was accused of murdering his mother, María Roque Franco González, in her home on August 3, 1983 at around 11:00 pm. The weapon used to commit the crime was a knife. The accused was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The accused appealed the sentence, but the action was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court confirmed the sentence, noting “no hay delito más horrendo” ("there is no more horrendous crime”) than patricide.
Emilio Garay Franco fue acusado de asesinar a su madre, María Roque Franco González en su case el 3 de Agosto del 1983 alrededor de las 11 de la noche. El arma usada para cometer el crimen fue un cuchillo. El acusado fue sentenciado a 30 años de cárcel. Él apeló la sentencia pero la acción fue rechazada por la Corte Suprema, la cúal afirmó la sentencia y agregó que, “no hay delito más horrendo” que el parricidio.
Case of Alejandro Candia Criminal Appeals Court (2011)
Two minor children, an eight-year-old boy and a twelve-year-old girl, were raped by their father, once and multiple times over several years, respectively. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison, but the Criminal Appeals Court reduced the sentence to 19.6 years in prison on October 11, 2001, after finding that the 20-year sentence was impermissible under Paraguay’s sentencing guidelines.
Dos niños menores, un niño de ocho años y una niña de doce, fueron violados sexualmente por su padre, una y varias veces durante varios años, respectivamente. El acusado fue sentenciado a 20 años de prisión, pero la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal redujo la sentencia a 19,6 años de prisión el 11 de octubre de 2001, tras concluir que la sentencia de 20 años era inadmisible según las directrices de sentencia de Paraguay.
Case of W.F.C.M. and L.M.S.V., No. 556 Supreme Court (2005)
L.M.S.V. and W.F.C.M were accused of sexual coercion against the victim L.del R.A., an 18 year old woman, who was sexually coerced by the two accused males with a knife. The accused, who were minors, were sentenced to 3 years in prison. L.M.S.V appealed and the Court of Appeals confirmed the lower court sentence. Finally, L.M.S.V challenged the decision before the Supreme Court which partially overturned the decision. The Supreme Court found that because L.M.S.V. was a minor at the time of the crime and, in order to hold minors criminally responsible, minors must have sufficient psycho-social maturity (“madurez sico-social”) to understand the criminality of their actions, the sentence should be reduced to two years in prison. The court also ordered that during the probation period, L.M.S.V. must live no less than 10 kilometers away from the victim.
L.M.S.V. y W.F.C.M fueron acusados de fuerza sexual contra la víctima L. del R.A., una mujer de 18 años, quien fue forzada sexualmente por los dos hombres acusados con un cuchillo. Los acusados, que eran menores de edad, fueron condenados a 3 años de prisión. L.M.S.V apeló y el Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia del tribunal inferior. Finalmente, L.M.S.V atacó la decisión ante la Corte Suprema que revocó parcialmente la decisión. La Corte Suprema determinó que debido a que L.M.S.V. era menor en el momento del delito y, para responsabilizar penalmente a los menores, los menores deben tener suficiente madurez psicosocial (“madurez psico-social”) para comprender la criminalidad de sus actos, la pena debía reducirse a dos años de prisión. El tribunal también ordenó que durante el período de prueba, L.M.S.V. debía vivir a no menos de 10 kilómetros de la víctima.
Case of Juan Alveiro Gómez Supreme Court (1997)
In 1994, a married woman was sexually abused and raped by Juan Aveiro Gómez in her home. Law 104 (dated December 17, 1990) modified Paraguay’s penal code to punish the rape of a married woman with prison. The Criminal Appeals Court sentenced the defendant to 12 years in prison. However, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to eight years in prison on February 20, 1997.
En 1994, una mujer casada fue abusada sexualmente y violada por Juan Aveiro Gómez en su casa. La Ley 104 (de 17 de diciembre de 1990) modificó el código penal de Paraguay para sancionar con tiempo en la prisión la violación de una mujer casada. El Tribunal de Apelaciones en lo Penal condenó al acusado a 12 años de prisión. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema redujo la pena a ocho años de prisión el 20 de febrero de 1997.
Case of Derlis Mauro Rodríguez Rojas Criminal Appeals Court (2002)
The child victim was sexually abused by Derlis Mauro Rodriguez. The parents of the victim stated that the child was found with the defendant in an abandoned house while he was touching her. Medical reports confirmed the defendant had been sexually abusing the victim. The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 16, 2002.
La niña víctima fue abusada sexualmente por Derlis Mauro Rodríguez. Los padres de la víctima afirmaron que la menor fue encontrada con el acusado en una casa abandonada mientras la tocaba inapropiadamente. Los informes médicos confirmaron que el acusado había abusado sexualmente de la víctima. El imputado fue condenado a quince años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 16 de abril de 2002.
Case of Florencio Arias, et al. Criminal Appeals Court (2003)
A nine-year-old girl was sexually abused by her father, Florencio Arias, on several occasions. The defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 25, 2003.
Una niña de nueve años fue abusada sexualmente por su padre, Florencio Arias, en varias ocasiones. El imputado fue condenado a 10 años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 25 de abril de 2003.
Rex v. Shongwe High Court (2008)
The 54-year-old accused pleaded guilty to culpable homicide based on allegations that she unlawfully poured boiling water on her husband. He refused to seek medical attention for his injuries because he was embarrassed and he died six days later. The Court ordered a suspended sentence because the accused “had been and was being” viciously attacked by her husband and was escaping his attack. The Court based its judgment on a finding that there was a combination of extenuating factors present, including that the accused suffered from battered wife syndrome, the needs of the six remaining minor children for whom the accused is the sole caretaker and provider, that the accused had already served two years imprisonment before she was released on bail, and the deceased’s refusal to go to the hospital for treatment for fear of being ridiculed by other men.
Kayira v. State High Court of Malawi (2015)
In 2013, the appellant was found having sexual intercourse with the victim, who was 15 years old. The next day the victim told the court that she and the appellant had been in love since June 2011 and that they had a sexual relationship. She testified that they were married and she was his second wife, but Malawi required parental permission for children aged 15-17 to marry (as of 2015, section 14 of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act requires that parties be 18 years old to marry). Malawi charged the defendant with defilement contrary to Penal Code § 138(1) and indecent assault contrary to § 137(1). Section 138(1) provides, “Any person who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of sixteen years shall be guilty of a felony and shall be liable to imprisonment to life” (¶ 7.1). In the lower court, the appellant pleaded not guilty arguing that the victim consented to the sexual acts and that she showed him an identification card that she had doctored to state that she was 17 years old at the time. Acknowledging that the victim had changed her year of birth on her identification, the lower court found the appellant guilty on both counts. The appellant filed two grounds of appeal asking: (i) “whether the conviction of the appellant was proper with regard . . . to the circumstances of the case;” and; (ii) “whether the sentences were manifestly excessive considering the” fact the victim had mislead the appellant with respect to her age (¶ 3.1). The High Court upheld the conviction citing the strict liability nature of the crime. The Court noted that the victim was clearly underage at the time of the sexual intercourse and rejected the defendant’s consent defense noting that “girls under the age of . . . [16] are incapable of giving consent due to immaturity (¶ 7.4).” Notwithstanding, the Court reduced the appellant’s sentence to four years for defilement and one year for indecent assault to run concurrently, noting that the appellant did not know that the victim was under age.
Mugasa v. Uganda Court of Appeal at Kampala (2010)
This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a baby girl and was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. Appellant was a relative of the child and was known as a teacher of Christianity. Appellant requested a more lenient sentence of 10 years. The Court of Appeals ruled against Appellant and increased his sentence to 25 years, citing the policy consideration that, despite the fact that defilement can be punishable by death, individuals still continue to defile babies. Thus, the court used this case as an opportunity to send a message to society that “violating the rights of child females must stop.”
Kalibobo v. Uganda Court of Appeal at Kampala (2001)
The trial court sentenced the 25-year-old Appellant to 17 years in prison after finding him guilty of raping a 70-year-old widow from a neighboring village. The trial court rejected the defense that he was not in her village at the time of the rape. The trial court found that in November 1998 the Appellant broke into the home of the victim, who confronted him with a panga (machete). While raping her after disarming her, the victim called out and the Appellant, worried about being caught, fled with her panga. The police found the panga in his home the next day and he was arrested. The Appellant contested his sentence, arguing that it was manifestly harsh because he has a wife, two children, and two young brothers to care for. The State contended that the sentence was appropriate because of the victim’s age and family circumstances. The standard for appellate court interference is a sentence that is “manifestly excessive or low in view of the circumstances of the case.” The Court noted that the crime of rape, particularly the rape of “grandmothers,” is prevalent in the area and very serious. The Court held “[t]he appellant raped an old lady. That was bad. However, considering all the circumstances of the case, we think that a sentence of 17 years imprisonment was manifestly so excessive as to cause a miscarriage of justice” and reduced the sentence to seven years.
Uganda v. Kamuhanda High Court at Fort Portal (2014)
The accused was charged with murdering his father. The accused’s mother testified that her husband, the deceased, repeatedly physically abused his wife and children. After a day of drinking, the deceased chased his wife and children out of the house. The deceased’s wife went to see her older son, Muhwezi. Muhwezi took his mother to the local council chairman, who took her to the police. After the police refused to do anything, the deceased’s wife and children spent the night at the local council chairman’s home. The deceased was found dead in the family home the next morning. Muhwezi confessed that he argued with his father and killed him in self-defense. The prosecutor requested at least 40 years imprisonment, but the Court, citing researched on the effects of long-term domestic violence, sentenced the accused to two years imprisonment.
Rex v. Latsi High Court of Lesotho (2007)
While considering the appeal of a rape conviction, the High Court condemned the trial court’s failure to punish the defendant in accordance with the severity of his crime. The Court found that where a trial court finds sufficient evidence of rape, the sentence should be more than a mere “slap on the wrist.” The court stated that “rape is always serious even without aggravating circumstances” because the victim’s “virginity has been assaulted and undoubtedly her dignity and reputation have been compromised blighting her prospects for marriage” (p. 1). The Court found that those factors should always be considered before a sentence is imposed. The Court affirmed the conviction and increased the defendant’s prison sentence from five to ten years.
Rex v. Lenyolosa High Court of Lesotho (2003)
The defendant was convicted for sexual assault and attempted rape of his 16-year-old niece. The appellate court upheld the conviction, but overturned the sentence imposed by the trial court. The appellate court held that the lower court failed to consider aggravating factors, including the close relationship between the parties. Given the prevalence of sexual assault in Lesotho, the court determined that jail sentences needed to serve as a deterrent for both the perpetrator and the general public. According to the court, “a very loud and clear message must be sent to all those who consider themselves with power and right to abuse or rape girls and women, that they will be dealt with the seriousness their unlawful actions demand” (p. 5). The Court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment with one year suspended for five years, unless the defendant commits another violent offense.
Washington v. Hodgins Court of Appeals of Washington Third Division (2015)
Hodgins had repeated misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence when the state of Washington brought charges against him for violating an order of protection on seven different occasions. Hodgins pled guilty to two of the seven counts of domestic violence, but the court did not include his prior misdemeanor convictions in its calculation of his offender status for purposes of sentencing. The Court of Appeals found that, under the facts of the case and relevant Washington law, Hodgins should have received an extra point on his offender status for any prior repetitive domestic violence offenses. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to consider his convictions in determining his offender status at sentencing. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for sentencing with a higher offender status.
RO v. R Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Criminal Appeal) (2013)
This case concerns the sentencing of a sexual offender. The offender was convicted of eight counts of sexual intercourse and indecent assault against a sixteen year old girl. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge erred in his determination that the victim “suffered significant psychological damage as a result of the offense.” On appeal, the Court found that the lower court erred in making the finding of “substantial” harm. The Court further held that the victim’s “psychological damage was multifactorial and that in the absence of medical evidence which separated out the effects of these offences,” the lower court’s determination of substantial psychological harm resulting from the offenses was inappropriate.
R v. Hamid Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Criminal Appeal) (2006)
The Respondent in this case faced a prison term of two years and six months based on his convictions for 9 counts of serious domestic violence offenses. The Respondent was also ordered to refrain from any harassment or threatening conduct toward the victims (or those in domestic relationships with the victims) for ten years. In response to the sentencing of the Respondent, “the Crown submitted that the sentences imposed upon the Respondent were manifestly inadequate.” The Crown noted that “a number of individual sentences were themselves inadequate given the objective seriousness of the crimes involved.” The Court emphasized the importance of both specific and general deterrence for domestic violence offenses and noted “[r]ecognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important.” The Court ultimately held that “the sentences imposed upon the Respondent were manifestly inadequate” and resentenced the Respondent.
Public Prosecutor v. Zulkifli Bin Sabang Intermediate Court of Brunei (1993)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to three charges of rape of a 12 year old female, under section 376 of the Penal Code. The complainant alleged that the defendant penetrated her on all three occasions. However, with regard to the first and second occasions, the complainant’s evidence was uncorroborated. As the court was not prepared to convict in the absence of evidence of penetration, the defendant was acquitted on both the first and second charges. The court accepted that there was some corroboration on the third charge, including a DNA report in connection with a pregnancy and an ‘admission’ by the defendant made to a witness who the court found truthful. The court believed the complainant that she did not consent to the sexual intercourse with the defendant, noting that because consent is not defense to a rape of an individual under the age of 14 years, the complainant’s consent was relevant only to the sentencing. The court held that the third charge was proven beyond reasonable doubt against the defendant and convicted him accordingly. The court imposed a sentence of nine years imprisonment with 14 strokes.
Public Prosecutor v. Khairul Bin Haji Dagang Intermediate Court of Brunei (1994)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to two charges of rape of a 14 year old female and a 24 year old female, under section 376 of the Penal Code. Regarding the first charge, the court accepted the first complainant’s evidence. Corroboration that she did not consent included fresh abrasions found by a doctor on the defendant’s arms and chest, the crying and distress of said complainant as observed by several witnesses very soon after the incident and the promptness of the complaints made by her. The court held the defendant guilty of having sexual intercourse with said complainant against her will or without her consent, imposing a sentence of seven years imprisonment and six strokes. The court also accepted the second complainant’s evidence. Corroboration that she did not consent included her sad condition and her crying as observed by a witness immediately after the incident, and the complaints she made to said witness, her mother, brother and the police. The court found that the defendant said threatening words which had put her in fear of death or hurt. The court held the defendant guilty of aggravated rape of said complainant, imposing a sentence of nine years imprisonment and 14 strokes. The sentences as to each rape were to run consecutively.
Jerome Arscott v. R Court of Appeals of Jamaica (2014)
A young woman was sexually assaulted by a male police officer who encountered the woman while he was picking fruit behind her house. The officer followed the woman into her home, where he exposed his genitals and attempted to penetrate the woman’s vagina despite her resistance. Afterwards, the woman successfully identified him in an identification parade and he was subsequently charged with the offences of assault with intent to rape and indecent assault, for which he was convicted at trial and sentenced to nine months hard labor imprisonment. At sentencing, the trial judge found that the aggravating nature of the sexual offence outweighed the defendant’s mitigating circumstances, such as his status as a police officer. The officer appealed the sentence on the ground, inter alia, that his sentence was manifestly excessive and ought to have been non-custodial. The Court of Appeal dismissed the officer’s appeal because it agreed with the trial judge’s balancing approach, and noted that the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was three years of hard labor imprisonment. Moreover, the Court agreed with the trial judge’s statement that to a impose a non-custodial sentence for a case of sexual assault against a woman would send a wrong signal to both members of the police force and the general population in a society, such as Jamaica, where gender-based violence is prevalent.
Public Prosecutor v. Intol Bin Langgar Intermediate Court of Brunei (1993)
The defendant was charged with two charges of rape of the complainant, a 14 year old female, punishable under section 376(1) of the Penal Code, and two charges of unlawful carnal knowledge with a girl under 16 years old, an offence under section 2 of the Unlawful Carnal Knowledge Act (Cap. 29). DNA and other forensic evidence indicated that the defendant was the biological father of the complainant’s child. While that evidence alone could not prove rape, the complainant’s evidence, consisting largely of her testimony, was found credible despite minor discrepancies in the testimony of her various witnesses. The court held that the prosecution had proved beyond the reasonable doubt the four charges against the defendant, and he was accordingly convicted. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment on the first and second charge, and four years imprisonment on the third and fourth charge, to run concurrently. A total sentence of imprisonment was 10 years was imposed.
Public Prosecutor v. Yaha Bin Mansor High Court of Brunei (1991)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to (i) two charges of attempted rape and (ii) two charges of rape, punishable under section 376 of the Penal Code. The prosecution withdrew the fourth charge during the trial. The court noted that since the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time of each alleged incident, her consent was not relevant. As the court found no corroboration of the complainant’s evidence, it had to rely upon her credibility. The court found that the complainant was exaggerating when she claimed that the defendant attempted to rape her. The court did not agree that he did more than commit an act of indecency under Section 354 P.C., which contains the offence of assault or criminal force used on a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. The court acquitted the defendant of attempted rape and rape, but convicted him of the offence of indecency for all three charges. He was sentenced to three years and four strokes for each of the three charges, which are cumulative and consecutive sentences. The defendant was ordered to serve a total of nine years and suffer a total of 12 strokes, with a reduction for time already spent in custody.
Public Prosecutor v. Besar Bin Ahmad Intermediate Court of Brunei (1996)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to raping a 16 year old female, punishable under section 376(1) of the Penal Code, and the alternative charge of attempted rape, punishable under section 376(2) of the Penal Code. The court was satisfied that the complainant’s complaint to her mother was made by her at the earliest possible moment, which was consistent with her complaint to the police and other evidence, therefore corroborating the complainant’s evidence. The court found the complainant credible, and accepted her evidence indicating that she did not consent. In addition, the complainant was examined by a doctor, who found numerous injuries and concluded in her report that there was some injury to the complainant’s vulva, which may be due to attempted sexual intercourse. The court found, however, that the doctor did not seem sure whether penetration occurred. Regarding whether there was penetration, the court found the complainant’s evidence unreliable, and therefore reasonable doubt. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and voluntarily causing hurt. The court imposed sentences of 10 years imprisonment and 12 strokes.
Public Prosecutor v. Abdullah Bin HJ Yakub High Court of Brunei (1991)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to two charges of raping a 14 year old female, under sections 376(1) and (2) of the Penal Code, and having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 16 years, under Section 2 of the Unlawful Carnal Knowledge Act, Cap. 29. The fact of sexual intercourse was not disputed. However, because the complainant was under 14 years old when the offences occurred, her consent was not relevant to the charge of rape. Nonetheless, because of her consent, the defendant was acquitted of the charge of aggravated rape. The court convicted the defendant of rape, and imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment and six strokes. The court also convicted the defendant of having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 16 years, and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment and six strokes. The sentences of imprisonment were concurrent, with the defendant to serve four years total. The sentences of whipping were consecutive, with the defendant to receive 12 strokes total.
Public Prosecutor v. Billy Metussin High Court of Brunei (1993)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to one charge of attempted rape of an 11 years and 10 months old female, under section 376(1) of the Penal Code. The court found that the complainant gave different versions as to the events that occurred. It found the complainant’s evidence unreliable. The court concluded that the complainant was the initiator of the events that led to the attempted intercourse. The court found that there was an attempt at sexual intercourse. In view of medical evidence that revealed that the hymen was intact and that ejaculation may have occurred outside the complainant, the court found doubt as to whether penetration occurred. The court highlighted that consent was not a defense to rape as the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time at issue. Nonetheless, consent becomes relevant to punishment, as a minimum sentence is prescribed for rape which occurs “without the consent of the victim”. The court found that the complainant gave her consent to the defendant’s attempt to have sexual intercourse with her and that she gave a real consent, not vitiated by immaturity or by any of the other factors specified in section 90 P.C. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and imposed sentences of one year imprisonment and three strokes.
Public Prosecutor v. HJ Bidin Din HJ MD Noor High Court of Brunei (1995)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to five charges of rape of an approximately 13 year old female, under section 376 of the Penal Code. The court emphasized that these were rapes only because of the complainant’s age, not because any force was used against her. The court noted that the fact that a rape is committed with consent does not lower the standard of proof which is required of the act itself. The court reasoned that it would be dangerous to convict in reliance on the complainant’s evidence, which had several inconsistencies. Additionally, the testimony of an examining doctor showed that the complainant’s evidence was suspect. The complainant denied having had sexual intercourse with anyone in the date range at issue, which did not agree with the evidence of the examining doctor, which the court accepted. The court found that if she cannot be believed as to that, it could not rely on her uncorroborated evidence on any of the charges. The defendant was acquitted of all five charges and the court ordered his discharge.
Public Prosecutor v. Sapar Bin Badau Intermediate Court of Brunei (1995)
The defendant was charged with two charges of rape of his daughter, under section 375 of the Penal Code. According to the complainant, her father first raped her when she was 12 years old and he raped her about 9 to 12 times in a month. The court found that the evidence did not support the complainant’s allegation that she was raped by the defendant, and that her evidence was uncorroborated. The court further found that the complainant had not been telling the truth in several instances, which made her evidence questionable. The court highlighted that, although the complainant claimed she was raped about 500 times by her father since 1989, nobody ever saw the parties together in one of their rooms, nor the complainant in a distressed condition. The court found it dangerous to convict the defendant by relying solely on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. The court acquitted the defendant of the two charges and discharged him.
Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Tamin Bin HJ Ahmad Intermediate Court of Brunei (1995)
The defendant pleaded not guilty to three charges consisting of (i) attempted rape, under section 376 of the Penal Code, (ii) causing harm, under section 323 of the Penal Code, and (iii) theft of personal property, under section 379 of the Penal Code. The court found the complainant credible, and her version of the events consistent with a note she wrote shortly after the incident and her evidence in court, despite minor discrepancies and details left out in the note. On the contrary, the court found the defendant’s version far-fetched and unacceptable. Corroborating evidence for the complainant included her distressed condition as observed by a witness immediately after the incident, her note, the injuries a doctor found on her and the discovery of her torn underwear on the road-side. The court found that the defendant made an effort to have sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will and without her consent. The court convicted the defendant of (i) attempted rape, with a sentence of six years imprisonment and four strokes, (ii) causing hurt, with a sentence of one month imprisonment and (iii) theft, with a sentence of three months imprisonment. The sentences were to run concurrently.
United States v. Cortes-Castro, 511 Fed. Appx. 942 (11th Cir. 2013) Court of Appeals Eleventh District (2013)
After the Department of Homeland Security learned that Ernesto, Alberto and Israel Cortes Castro, were smuggling women from Mexico into the U.S. for forced prostitution, they were charged with conspiring to traffic women for prostitution by force or coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) and other substantive trafficking crimes. The Defendants plead guilty to the conspiring charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. The factual proffer submitted with the plea agreements stated that the Defendants agreed to establish a sex-trafficking business in the U.S. in which women would be transported from Mexico and prostituted in exchange for money. It also detailed the methods employed by the Defendants to defraud, force and coerce women into prostitution. The district court accepted the plea agreements and sentenced the Defendants to 180 months of imprisonment, an upward variation from the 108-135 month range provided by the advisory guidelines. According to the district court, the upward variation was justified by the “unusually heinous, cruel, brutal and degrading” nature of their conduct. Additionally, the court ordered the Defendants to pay $1,239,200 in restitution losses to the victims. On appeal, the Defendants challenged the upward variation and the restitution award. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court had not abused its discretion by sentencing the Defendants to terms 45 months over the advisory guidelines range because they had “enslaved, demeaned and debased immigrant women” forcing them into prostitution for several years and subjecting them to mental, physical and emotional abuse. The Court further held that the district court reasonably determined that an upward variation was required to address the “abhorrent nature” of the crimes. Finally, the Court held that the district court did not err in granting the restitution award because the victims were statutorily entitled to compensation and such award was based on factual information in the factual proffer and the presentencing report.
Tirivanhu Ndoziva v. The State High Court of Zimbabwe (2011)
The appellant was convicted of two counts of rape for allegedly raping two girls, aged 4 and 8 years, respectively. He was sentenced to 10 years on each count, with five years suspended for five years on condition of good behavior. The appellant appealed against the convictions and the sentences. It was accepted that the two girls were sexually interfered with, which both confirmed through testimony. Both girls were (i) examined by a doctor, who observed attenuation of the hymen and a deep notch on both girls and (ii) able to identify the appellant as the perpetrator to the police. The court was satisfied with the identification, finding that the appellant was correctly convicted. The appellant argued that the sentence was too harsh. The court found that numerous factors were considered before sentencing. It held that the appellant did not use gratuitous violence, and was entitled to some leniency. The court ruled that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh and induced a sense of shock. The sentence was overturned and substituted for 10 years imprisonment, with two years suspended for five years on condition the appellant does not within this period commit any offence of a sexual nature for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.
Decision No. 1028 k/PID SUS/2009 Supreme Court of Indonesia (2009)
The defendant paid his friend to bring the victim, a 14-year-old child, to defendant’s café under the pretext of attending a birthday party. After defendant’s friend abandoned the victim at the café, the defendant told the victim to work as a server but also forced her to have sex with the male clients and kept all payments received for the victim’s services. Because the defendant used fraud to bring the victim to the café and exploited the victim by forcing her to act as a sex worker for profit, the Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty of human trafficking under section 2(1) of Law No. 21 of 2007 and sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment with a fine of Rp. 120,000,000. The High Court upheld the lower court’s decision but amended the defendant’s sentence to seven years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the High Court’s sentence of seven years was an error since the court did not consider that the victim had stayed with the defendant’s friend before coming to the café and therefore the health and condition of the victim may have worsened before coming to the defendant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and did not rule on the sentencing since it was a “judex facti matter (question of fact of the case)”.
Hara v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2014)
The Defendant, Hara, broke into the house of a twelve-year-old girl, forced her down and raped her. He pleaded guilty to defilement, a crime with the sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment, and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with hard labor. Hara appealed the sentence on the grounds that (1) thirty years was too severe absent any aggravating circumstances (i.e. the victim did not sustain any physical injuries, become infected with a sexually transmitted disease or become pregnant) and (2) the lower court did not take into account mitigating circumstances (i.e. the defendant was a first time offender who readily plead guilty). Reasoning that “young girls are no longer safe even in their homes”, the Supreme Court rejected the Hara’s arguments that the absence of factors, such as physical injuries and pregnancy, should reduce his sentence. The Supreme Court further held that the lower court properly considered the Hara’s status as a first time offender, and therefore, the Supreme Court upheld his thirty-year sentence.
The People v. Nyambe High Court of Zambia (2010)
The Defendant, Mr. Nyambe, and the victim, Mrs. Nyambe, were married. Upon return from a fishing trip, Mr. Nyambe found Mrs. Nyambe in bed with another man and reacted by beating the other man. One month later, Mrs. Nyambe revealed that the reason she committed adultery was because Mr. Nyambe “was not a real man,” whereupon the two began to fight, and Mr. Nyambe struck Mrs. Nyambe with an axe and killed her. Despite the one month that had elapsed between the initial discovery of the adultery and the murder, the High Court found that the adultery still constituted provocation. However, under Zambian law, a murder defendant’s reaction must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation to invoke that affirmative defense to reduce the conviction to manslaughter. The High Court found that the Defendant’s retaliation of striking his wife with an axe was not proportional to the provocation and convicted him of murder.
Habeas Corpus No. 81.288/SC Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2003)
The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus of the petitioner, who had been convicted by the Superior Court of Justice (“STJ”) of raping his two minor daughters, both under the age of 14, over a period of five years. Although the petitioner had been sentenced to 16 years and 8 months in jail for his crimes, the lower court subsequently reduced the petitioner’ sentence by one-quarter, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 3,226/99, which grants a pardon to pardon to certain people who are convicted by the courts because they have served part of their sentence. The lower court determined that the reduction was not barred by Article 7, Section 1 of the Decree, which states that a pardon shall not apply to those convicted of “heinous crimes and those of torture, terrorism, illegal trafficking.” In response to the reduced sentence, the public prosecutor argued that the petitioner crime fell within the “heinous crimes” exception to sentence reductions. The Service of Criminal Review subsequently filed for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that crimes of rape and sexual assault do not fall within the scope of the “heinous crimes” exception, except where serious bodily injury or fatality results. The Court examined the legislative language and treatment of rape, sexual assault, and other crimes, with respect to qualifying such crimes as “heinous.” The majority of the Court held that the legislation already had classified rape as a heinous crime. The Court denied the writ, and petitioner’s sentence was not reduced.
O Supremo Tribunal Federal indeferiu o habeas corpus formulado após condenação do paciente no Superior Tribunal de Justiça – STJ por violar suas duas filhas menores, ambas com menos de 14 anos de idade, durante um período de cinco anos. Embora o paciente tivesse sido condenado a 16 anos e 8 meses de prisão por seus crimes, o tribunal de justiça estadual reduziu posteriormente a sentença do paciente em um quarto, de acordo com o Decreto Presidencial nº 3.226/99, que concede perdão a certas pessoas que são condenadas pelos tribunais por terem cumprido parte de sua sentença. O tribunal de justiça estadual determinou que a redução não foi impedida pelo Artigo 7, inciso 1 do Decreto, que estabelece que o perdão não se aplica aos condenados por "crimes hediondos e os de tortura, terrorismo, tráfico ilegal". Em resposta à redução da pena, o promotor público argumentou que o crime do paciente estava dentro da exceção de "crimes hediondos" à redução da pena. Posteriormente, o Serviço de Revisão Criminal apresentou um pedido de habeas corpus, argumentando que crimes de estupro e agressão sexual não se enquadram no escopo da exceção de "crimes hediondos", exceto quando resultam em sérios danos corporais ou fatalidade. A Corte examinou a linguagem legislativa e o tratamento de estupro, agressão sexual e outros crimes, em relação à qualificação de tais crimes como "hediondos". A maioria do STF considerou que a legislação já havia classificado o estupro como um crime hediondo, denegando a ordem e mantendo a sentença sem qualquer redução.
Jit Kumari Pangeni (Neupane) and Others v. Prime Ministers and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2008)
A woman who had been a repeated victim of marital rape petitioned the Supreme Court of Nepal to make sentencing for marital rape on par with sentencing for other types of rape. The Court found that punishing marital rape differently from other forms of rape violated equal rights provisions in the Interim Constitution and international law, especially considering that prior sentencing guidelines of three to six months put the victim in danger of repeated violence and rape. Although the Court did not have the power to change sentencing terms on existing offences, it directed the legislative authorities to change sentencing terms for marital rape, showing recognition of the gravity of rape as a violation of rights and dignity while also exhibiting a proactive will to reform legal codes in the name of equality.
Jan Oompie Kolea v. The State Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (Hoogste Hof van Appèl van Suid Afrika) (2012)
The appellant was convicted of repeatedly raping a woman with another man and sentenced to 15 years in prison under s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act). When the appellant appealed the ruling and the sentence it was found that his conviction should in fact be read under s 51(1) of the Act which imposes a minimum sentence of life in prison when the victim was raped more than once by more than one person. He was duly sentenced to life in prison and his appeal was dismissed. This case broke a previous trend of judges neglecting to impose life sentences under s 51(1), instead giving lighter sentences under s 51(2) even in the case of multiple rapes. The real threat of life imprisonment is a crucial precedent to set in South Africa, where rape is common and often overlooked or punished with leniency.
Mnr. Kolea is skuldig bevind dat hy herhaaldelik 'n vrou met 'n ander man verkrag het en vir 15 jaar in die tronk onder s 51(2) van die Wet op Strafreg 105 van 1997 (die Wet) gevonnis is. Toe Mnr. Kolea die beslissing en die vonnis appelleer is daar bevind dat sy skuldigbevinding in werklikheid gelees moet word onder s 51(1) van die Wet wat 'n minimum vonnis van die lewenslange tronkstraf opgelê het toe die slagoffer meer as een keer verkrag is deur meer as een persoon. Kolea is behoorlik gevonnis tot lewenslange tronkstraf en sy appèl is geweier. Hierdie saak het 'n vorige tendens van regters gebreek om lewenslange vonnisse te verwaarloos onder s 51 (1), en in plaas daarvan ligter vonisse onder s 51 (2) te gee, selfs in die geval van meervoudige verkragtings. Die werklike bedreiging van die lewenslange gevangenisstraf is 'n deurslaggewende presedent wat in Suid-Afrika voorgetstel word, waar verkragting algemeen voorkom en dikwels misken word.
Tumwesigye Kasim v. Uganda Court of Appeals of Uganda (2009)
This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a six-year-old girl and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Appellant was a teacher at the victim’s school. The school held a special program for students during school holidays. During this program, appellant took the victim into his office at school and had sexual intercourse with her. Despite his warning not to tell anyone, the victim told her brother, who told her parents. A medical examiner confirmed that she had been defiled. On appeal, appellant argued that the sentence of 14 years was too harsh. In support, he argued that he was the sole breadwinner for 11 dependents, including two lame dependents and four orphans. Appellant also argued that since the victim was a very young child, she had already gotten over the trauma of the defilement. The court upheld the sentence and ruled against appellant. The court found that, as a teacher, he had a duty to protect the victim, but instead chose to ravish her, disgracing himself, his profession, and society.
Mushabe Abdul v. Uganda Court of Appeals of Uganda (2007)
Appellant was convicted of defilement of a four-year-old girl. The victim was sent to a well to fetch water for her family. On the victim’s way to the well, appellant grabbed the victim, threw her to the ground, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. He then fled but was later arrested. At trial, appellant denied the charges and claimed that the victim’s father had framed him. The trial court rejected his claim and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. On appeal, appellant requested a sentence reduction from 14 years to eight years. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the 14-year sentence was not inappropriate or excessive, and that, in light of the circumstances, there was no reason to reduce the sentence.
Mugasa Joseph v. Uganda Court of Appeal of Uganda (2010)
This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a baby girl and was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. Appellant was a relative of the child and was known as a teacher of Christianity. Appellant requested a more lenient sentence of 10 years. The Court of Appeals ruled against Appellant and increased his sentence to 25 years, citing the policy consideration that, despite the fact that defilement can be punishable by death, individuals still continue to defile babies. Thus, the court used this case as an opportunity to send a message to society that “violating the rights of child females must stop.”
Vistos los autos: “Review of fact by an Appeal court in the cause of Anonymous” Supreme Court of Argentina
Anonymous had been continually sexually abused and raped by her father since 2001 at the age of twelve. An Argentinean trial court had sentenced the father to eighteen years in prison for abusing his daughter, but this decision was overturned by an Argentinean appellate court, believing the father was not clearly guilty and his punishment was, thus, incommensurate with the crime. The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision, stating that there was clear guilt on the father’s part, repeated cries for help by Anonymous, and that the appellate court showed a lack of regard for the facts and the suffering of Anonymous. The case was remanded for new sentencing.
Anónimo había sido continuamente abusada sexualmente y violada por su padre desde 2001 a la edad de doce años. Un tribunal de primera instancia argentino había condenado al padre a dieciocho años de prisión por abusar de su hija, pero esta decisión fue revocada por un tribunal de apelación argentino, creyendo que el padre no era evidentemente culpable y que su castigo era, por lo tanto, incompatible con el crimen. La Corte Suprema anuló la decisión de la corte de apelaciones, declarando que había una clara culpabilidad por parte del padre, repetidos gritos de ayuda por parte de Anonymous, y que la corte de apelaciones mostró una falta de respeto por los hechos y el sufrimiento de Anonymous. El caso fue remitido para nueva sentencia.
Matter of S., R. A., E. O. A. y A., R. A. Buenos Aires Supreme Court (2006)
In this case, a defendant who had been sentenced to twenty five years for kidnapping, among other crimes, appealed his conviction, contending that he had committed lesser kidnapping (plagio) instead of the more serious crime of premeditated kidnapping (rapto) of which he was convicted. The court decided to uphold his conviction, despite the fact that there was only coercion involved. The “lessening of sexual integrity” against the will of the victims made the defendant guilty of the greater crime of rapto under article 130 of the Argentinean Penal Code.
En este caso, un acusado que había sido condenado a veinticinco años por secuestro y otros delitos, apeló su condena, alegando que había cometido secuestro menor (plagio) en lugar del delito más grave de secuestro (rapto) premeditado del cual fue condenado. El tribunal decidió defender su condena, a pesar del hecho de que solo hubo coerción. La "disminución de la integridad sexual" contra la voluntad de las víctimas hizo que el acusado fuera culpable del mayor delito de rapto en virtud del artículo 130 del Código Penal argentino.
Golla Yelugu Govindu v. State of Andhra Pradesh Supreme Court of India (2008)
A fourteen-year marriage broke down when the husband became addicted to “vices”; he began to beat his wife and demand money of her parents. During a quarrel, with their children in the room, the husband killed his wife by hacking her with a sickle in her back and neck. The Trial Court convicted him and sentenced him to a life imprisonment, but he appealed, claiming that his children were too young to be competent witnesses. The Supreme Court held that there is no age restriction on competency. All people are competent to testify unless they cannot understand questions or give rational answers. The Supreme Court did reduce his sentence, however, to ten years, because the murder was done in a sudden act and not premeditated.
Bangaru Venkata Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh Supreme Court of India (2008)
A husband killed his wife by stabbing her in the abdomen and was sentenced under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to life imprisonment. He appealed the sentence, claiming that the record clearly establishes that he only delivered a single blow to his wife in a sudden quarrel, and therefore conviction under Section 302 is not proper. The High Court dismissed the appeal but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the husband’s actions in a sudden fight did not warrant life imprisonment. His sentence should have been brought under the fourth exception of Section 300, accounting for the heat of passion in a sudden fight, and accordingly his sentence was reduced to ten years.
Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar Alhat v. The State of Maharashtra Supreme Court of India (2008)
A man led a nine-year-old girl to a hill where he raped, strangled and murdered her. The girl’s sister testified that she saw her sister leave with the man and the mother later recovered the girl’s body from the hill and filed the police report against the accused. He was convicted and sentenced to death under Sections 376 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The man appealed, claiming that he should not be sentenced to death on circumstantial evidence alone. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that circumstantial evidence establishes the guilt of the accused, forming the conviction, but does not bear any relation to the sentencing. The Supreme Court defers discretion to trial judges in arriving at a proper sentence dealing with the subtleties of each case.
State of Rajasthan v. Madan Singh Supreme Court of India (2008)
The Trial Court convicted a man of raping a ten-year-old girl and sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court reduced his sentence to seven years considering the convicted had already suffered a custodial sentence of six years, was young, and the only breadwinner in a family with two children. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the High Court’s reduction of the sentence because it fell below the statutory minimum. The Supreme Court held that the measure of punishment in a rape case cannot depend on the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend on the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the victim, and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women are to be severely dealt with. The proviso to Section 376(2) specifies that the court may, for special and adequate reasons, impose a sentence of less than ten years. However, the Supreme Court in the present case, found there to be no justifiable extenuating or mitigating circumstances available that would justify imposing a less-than-minimum sentence.
R. v. Smith Ontario Court of Appeal (2005)
The appellant was convicted of two counts of making obscene material, one count of possessing obscene material for distribution, and two counts of distributing obscene material through internet websites. The materials in question, consisting of audiovisual material and written stories, depicted acts of violence perpetrated against women by men. Although no explicit sexual act was depicted in the audiovisual material, the images included depictions of nude women with their genitalia exposed and with weapons protruding from their bodies. The written stories, however, depicted explicit sex and violence. The trial judge imposed a $100,000 fine and a period of probation, during which the appellant was prohibited from accessing the internet or residing in any place where internet access was provided. The appellant appealed both his convictions and sentence. The Court of Appeal judge ruled that he would allow the appeal, set aside the convictions on four of the five counts and ordered a new trial on those counts. With respect to the written stories, the judge dismissed the appeal, set aside the original sentence and probation order, and imposed a $2,000 fine.
R. v. Arcand Court of Appeal of Alberta (2010)
The complainant was raped by the accused, a distant relative, while unconscious in her home. Prior to the incident, out of kindness, the complainant had taken the accused to her home and had offered to let him stay with her. Just before the assault, the two were sitting on a bed talking, drinking, and watching television. The complainant then passed out, and she awoke to find the accused having sexual intercourse with her. She pushed him off and brought suit against him for sexual assault. The trial judge found the accused guilty of sexual assault. Although there is a three-year minimum sentence for serious sexual assault, the judge took the recommendation of defense counsel and sentenced the accused to 90 days imprisonment, to be served intermittently, plus three years probation. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that it should have been in the three- to four-year range. In evaluating the appropriate application of the proportionality principle to sentences for sexual assault, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the Supreme Court had never endorsed the concept of a harmless rape or other major sexual assault. The court held that non-consensual sexual intercourse under any circumstances constituted a profound violation of a person’s dignity, equality, security of person and sexual autonomy, and that under the circumstances of the instant case, the offense should have been sentenced as a serious sexual assault. However, the court also ruled that, having regard to all relevant considerations, a downward departure from the three-year minimum sentence is justified. Finding that the original sentence was inadequate, the court granted the appeal and concluded that a fit and proper sentence would be two years imprisonment plus two years probation.
Rajbir @ Raju & Anr v. State of Haryana Supreme Court of India (2010)
This case involved an appeal of a man’s lifetime imprisonment sentence. He was convicted of murdering his pregnant wife after she asked for money six months into their marriage. The Punjab & Haryana High Court reduced the sentence to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The man’s mother was also awarded two years rigorous imprisonment. While the reduction in the husband’s sentence was issued, the Court directed all trial courts in India to ordinarily add § 302 to the charge of § 304B, so that death sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women.
Sgt. Canbera Dickson v. Uganda Court of Appeals of Uganda (2010)
This is an appeal challenging a rape conviction and sentencing of 15 years imprisonment. Appellant, an army sergeant, went to a village and used a gun to murder his maternal uncle. On the same day, he led his victim, a widow of appellant’s late brother, to an abandoned house and raped her at gunpoint. Three days later, the victim reported the incident and was medically examined. Because she recently had a baby, the medical examiner was unable to find any physical damage to her body. Appellant appeals on two main grounds: (1) without medical proof of penetration, the victim’s accusation requires corroboration to stand; (2) the sentence of 15 years was excessive. On appeal, the court accepted the prosecution’s argument that, because the victim was a new mother and was being held at gunpoint, it was very unlikely that she would have been physically damaged from the penetration or struggle. The court also followed prior precedent that held that, in certain criminal cases, corroboration was not necessary for a conviction. Concerning sentencing, the court also agreed with the prosecution. The court found that appellant had been given a gun by the military to protect the people of Uganda, but instead appellant used that gun to terrorize and rape the victim. Because of those circumstances, the court refused to be lenient, but rather increased appellant’s sentence to 25 years.
Helsingen Hovioikeus 2007:722 Court of Appeal of Helsinki (2007)
The issue here was whether defendants Ilves, Marttila, Zdanovits, Hilden, Maalinn, Traublum and Angelsctock were guilty of aggravated trafficking in human beings of a mentally handicapped person and of aggravated pandering. According to Chapter 25 Section 3 a of the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"), if, in trafficking in human beings, (i) violence, threats or deceitfulness is used instead of or in addition to the means referred to in section 3,(ii) grievous bodily harm, a serious illness or a state of mortal danger or comparable particularly grave suffering is intentionally or through gross negligence inflicted on another person, (iii) the offense has been committed against a child younger than 18 years of age or against a person whose capacity to defend himself or herself has been substantially diminished, or (iv) the offence has been committed within the framework of a criminal organization referred to in chapter 17, section 1a, subsection 4 and the offence is aggravated also when considered as whole, the offender shall be sentenced for aggravated trafficking in human beings to imprisonment for at least two years and at most ten years. Seemen had come to Finland from Estonia to work as a prostitute. According to doctor's testimony, she was mentally handicapped. The Court concluded, in the light of the evidence presented, that Seemen had been threatened by violence and her freedom had been restricted by the defendants. The elements of trafficking were present as a whole when taking into account the intensiveness of the submission, even though Seemen might still have had her passport or key to the apartment. The Court of Appeal considered that the defendants were guilty of aggravated trafficking in human beings. Seemen, who was mentally handicapped, had been deceived and mislead into working as a prostitute in Finland. The court dismissed the claims of aggravated trafficking in human beings against Marttila and Hilden on grounds that they could not have been seen in having such a close connection with Seemen even though they were belonged to a criminal organization responsible for pandering. The Court also held that Angelstock was guilty only of abetting aggravated trafficking in human beings. According to Chapter 20 Section 9a(1) of the Criminal Code if, in pandering, (i) considerable financial benefit is sought, (ii) the offense is committed in a particularly methodical manner, and the offense is aggravated also when assessed as a whole, the offender shall be sentenced for aggravated pandering to imprisonment for at least four months and at most six years. According to the Finnish government proposal (34/2004), for the Criminal Code, "considerable financial benefit" would meant cases where the benefit is larger than on average. The Court decided that Ilves, Marttila, Zdanovits, Hilden, Malinn and Traublum were guilty of aggravated pandering. They were ordered to forfeit the proceeds of the crime and to pay damages to Seemen.
KKO 2011:1 Supreme Court of Finland (2011)
The issue here was whether violation of official duty of a doctor was considered sexual abuse under the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"). A was the working doctor when B went for a breast ultrasonography. A had touched B's breast with bare hands and complemented her on her breasts. A had also massaged gel on the breasts with his hands and several times touched B's breasts. A had also, after getting permission from B, suckled the breasts in order to get excretion. The District Court and the Court of Appeal held that the procedure was not appropriate but did not amount to sexual abuse. The questionbefore the Supreme Court was whether the procedure had a sexual purpose. According to Chapter 20 Section 5(1) of the Criminal Code, a person who abuses his or her position and entices another into engaging in sexual intercourse or another sexual act or submitting to such an act should be sentenced for sexual abuse. The Court held that the procedures that A performed deviated from established and medically recommended practice. As a whole the procedure was done in a way that strongly indicated the purpose of sexual arousal or satisfaction. The fact that B had reacted only afterwards was not significant. The Court held that doctor and patient are not in an equal position and the fact that a patient agrees to a medical examination does not imply that the patient would give up her sexual self-determination. The Court saw that A had misused his position as a doctor and found A guilty of sexual abuse and violation of an official duty in accordance with Chapter 40 Section 9(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court found that this was only a single incident towards a consenting adult and sentenced A to pay 80 days-fine and damages to B of 1,200 Euros.
KKO 2003:76 Supreme Court of Finland (2003)
The issue was whether plaintiff was entitled to compensation for anguish in connection with intimate partner violence. A (male) had assaulted E (female) in E's home and on the staircase in a way that caused brain injury and severe traumatic stress. The District Court and the Court of Appeal sentenced A for an aggravated assault and ordered A to pay damages for pain and suffering for 20,000 Finnish marks. The Courts rejected demands for compensation on anguish. The question before the Supreme Court was about the amount of damages and if E was entitled to damages arising from anguish. The Supreme Court evaluated the pain and suffering as a whole and ordered A to pay 14,000 Euros of damages. In court practice (rulings KKO 1989:141 and KKO 1999:102) an assault has not been held as an act that justifies damages on mental anguish. According to Chapter 5 Section 6 of the Finnish Tort Liability Act (412/1974, as amended) (the "Tort Liability Act"), the provisions of the Tort Liability Act on personal injury apply also to damages for the anguish arising from an offense against liberty, honour or the domestic peace or from another comparable offense. The Court held that since A broke into E's apartment, E was entitled to damages arising from offense against domestic peace which could be seen causing anguish. The Court ruled that A had to pay damages for anguish in the amount of 500 Euros.
VaaHO:2006:16 Court of Appeal of Vaasa (2006)
The issue here was whether a partner's experience of domestic violence during her former relationships could be seen as a mitigating circumstance in connection with the partner's manslaughter of her new partner. A (female) had killed B (male) by making a deadly strike with a kitchen knife. Before the strike A had flailed the knife in a way which caused several marks on B's body. A and B were arguing on the night of the stabbing. A claimed that B had never before been violent towards A, but in A's former relationships A had experienced domestic violence. The District Court found that the fact that there was a plastic bag behind the living room sofa containing knives collected from the house could suggest that there was a threat of violence. It found that there were some indications of justifiable defense and sentenced A to prison for 8 years 6 months for manslaughter. The Court of Appeal held that B had attacked A unlawfully, causing A the need for self-defense. However, it found that the use of a knife in the situation was not justifiable, as A did not receive any grave wounds except for bruises. The Court found that A was guilty of excessive self-defense. According to Chapter 20 Section 3 of the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"), if the manslaughter, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the offense, the motives of the offender or other related circumstances, when assessed as a whole, is to be deemed committed under mitigating circumstances, the offender shall be sentenced for killing to imprisonment for at least four and at most ten years. The Finnish government proposal (94/1993) for the Criminal Code states that these kind of exceptional circumstances can be present when a wife has been constantly terrorized with violence by her husband and she kills him. The Court held that A had a traumatic background and had experienced domestic violence but that there had not been, according to A, any previous violence by B towards A. The Court did not consider this an exceptional circumstance. A was sentenced to five years in prison for manslaughter committed as excessive self-defense.
W.N. v. The State Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (Hoogste Hof van Appèl van Suid Afrika) (2008)
The appellant, a minor, was sentenced to 10 years for the rape of a fellow classmate and appeals his sentence on the grounds that it was too excessive. The lower court sentenced the appellant-defendant to direct imprisonment rather than probation after hearing testimony about the appellant's unrepentant nature and lack of parental supervision. The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that correctional supervision would have lacked the appropriate punitive impact demanded by the offense and deterrent effect.
Die appêlant, 'n minderjarige, is tot 10 jaar gevonnis vir die verkragting van 'n mede-klasmaat enappelleer sy vonnis op grond daarvan dat dit te buitensporig was.. Die laer hof het die appêllant-verweerder tot direkte gevangenisstraf eerder as proeftydperk gevonnis nadat hy getuienis aangehoor het oor die onbekwame aard van die appellant en die gebrek aan ouerlike toesig. Die hoogste hof van appèl het die beslissing bekragtig en gevind dat korrektiewe toesig die toepaslike strafversagtende impak sou hê as afskrikmiddel-effek vereis word.
State v. Engelbrecht High Court of South Africa (Hooggeregshof van Suid Afrika) (2003)
In determining sentencing for a woman convicted of murdering her spouse, expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is more relevant to the sentencing decision than to the assessment of the legality of the defendant's actions. The court reviewed a line of cases involving women convicted of murdering their abusive partners. Although the court cited a variety of mitigating factors that should be considered (e.g., the sustained nature of the abusive conduct, the presence of children in the home,etc.), it held that foremost is the actual effect sustained domestic violence has on women. As a result, the court found expert testimony confirming that the defendant suffered form the syndrome to be a "substantial and compelling" reason to suspend the defendant's sentence.
By die bepaling van vonnisoplegging vir 'n vrou wat skuldig bevind is aan die moord op haar eggenoot, is kundige getuienis rakende die mishandelende vroue sindroom meer relevant op die vonnisoplegging as die beoordeling van die wettigheid van die verweerder se optrede. Die hof het 'n reeks sake ondersoek waar vroue skuldig bevind is aan die moord op hul geweldadige eggenote. Alhoewel die hof 'n verskeidenheid versagtende faktore noem wat in ag geneem moet word (soos die volgehoue aard van die misbruik, die teenwoordigheid van kinders in die huis, ens.), het hy beslis dat die belangrikste effek is, is die gevolg wat huishoudelike geweld op vroue het. As gevolg hiervan het die hof genoegsame getuienis gevind wat bevestig dat die verweerder gely het aan die sindroom gevind as 'n "wesenlike en dwingende" rede om die vonnis van die verweerder op te skort.
State v. Ferreira and Others Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika) (2004)
The appellant, convicted of hiring two workers to kill her abusive husband, argued for a reduced sentence. The court held that a lesser sentence is permitted only when there are "truly convincing" circumstances or where a life sentence is disproportionate or unjust. Expert testimony regarding battering and its effects showed how her behavior fit a well-known pattern for abused women. The court found this testimony convincing and held that the appellant's use of third parties to kill her husband did not invalidate her claim to be a victim of battering. Additionally, the court held that appellant's failure to testify should have no effect on her credibility. The court reduced her sentence but declined to acquit the appellant because of the premeditated nature of the act.
Die appellant, wat skuldig bevind is aan die huur van twee werkers om haar geweldadige man dood te maak, het aangevoer vir 'n verlaagde vonnis. Die hof het beslis dat 'n verlaagde vonnis slegs toegelaat word as daar 'werklik oortuigende' omstandighede is, of as 'n lewenslange vonnis buite verhouding of onregverdig is. 'n Getuienis van kundiges rakende die geweld en die gevolge daarvan het getoon hoe haar gedrag pas by 'n bekende patroon vir mishandelde vroue. Die hof het bevind dat hierdie getuienis oortuigend was en het bevind dat die applikant se gebruik van derde partye om haar man te vermoor nie die feit ongeldig gemaak dat sy ‘n slagoffer van geweld is nie. Verder het die hof beslis dat haar versuim om te getuig geen effek op haar geloofwaardigheid moes hê nie. Die hof het haar vonnis verminder, maar het geweier om die applikant vry te laat weens die voorbedagte aard van die handeling.
State. v. Mahomotsa Supreme Court of Appeal (Hoogste hof van Appèl) (2002)
The accused was charged and convicted on two separate counts of rape for raping two 15-year-old girls more than once and sentenced to six years imprisonment for the first count and 10 years imprisonment for the second. On appeal, the defense argued that the sentence was too severe because of mitigating circumstances, specifically that the victims did not suffer serious physical or psychological injuries and that both victims had previously been sexually active. The Court dismissed the appeal and held that the sentences were, in fact, too lenient, especially as the victims' previous sexual history was irrelevant and also that the extent of harm to the victims matters less because rape is a basic violation of dignity. The sentence was increased to 8 years for the first count and 12 years for the second.
Die beskuldigdes is op twee afsonderlike aanklagtes van verkragting aangekla en skuldig bevind vir die verkragting van twee 15-jarige meisies meer as een keer en gevonnis tot ses jaar gevangenisstraf op die eerste en tien jaar gevangenisstraf op die tweede. Op appèl het die verdediging gesê dat die vonnis te ernstig was weens versagtende omstandighede deurdat die slagoffers nie ernstige liggaamlike of sielkundige beserings opgedoen het nie en dat albei die slagoffers voorheen seksueel aktief was. Die hof het die appèl van die hand gewys en beslis dat die vonnisse in werklikheid te versagtend was, veral omdat die vorige seksuele geskiedenis van die slagoffers nie van belang was nie en dat die skade aan die slagoffers minder belangrik is omdat verkragting 'n basiese waardigheidskending is. Die vonnis is verhoog tot 8 jaar vir die eerste en 12 jaar vir die tweede.
R v. Mkhatshwa Supreme Court of Swaziland (2007)
The appellant was convicted of raping his 12 year old daughter and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment. The Court upheld the sentence in light of the heinous nature of rape as a crime and the importance of society sending a message of severe condemnation of the crime.
Republic v. Mzungu High Court of Malawi (2007)
The appellant was charged with defilement for having unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 13 years of age. The trial court convicted him of indecent assault because there was no penetration. He appealed his conviction for indecent assault because it was not included in the original charge. He also argued that his sentence was excessive. The Court dismissed the appeal of the conviction on the grounds that where the evidence is sufficient to sustain the lesser charge of indecent assault but may not be sufficient for defilement, the accused may be convicted of the lesser crime even when it was not included in the original charge. However, the Court upheld the appeal of the sentence and lowered it, despite of the fact that women and girls need to be protected, taking into account the mitigating factor of the appellant's youth.
Republic v. Peter High Court of Malawi (2008)
The appellant was found guilty of defiling a girl under 13 years of age and appealed on the grounds that the sentence is excessive and that his taking care of his grandparents should be considered as a mitigating factor. The complainant had since been diagnosed with a sexually transmitted infection and medical examinations revealed multiple instances of sexual abuse. The appellant testified that neither he nor his wife had a sexually transmitted infection, but the Court did not find this claim persuasive because neither of them had been tested (neither took the initiative to be tested and the government could not force them to be tested). The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the sentence, considering the harm done to the complainant in infecting her with a sexually transmitted infection.
Achoki v. Republic Court of Appeal of Kenya at Kisumu (2011)
The appellant was charged with three criminal violations in connection with his and his coconspirators' robbery of the complainant and corresponding violence: (1) aggravated robbery with violence, (2) rape of the complainant's niece during the robbery, and (3) possession of suspected stolen property. The trial court found the appellant guilty on all counts, but the first count was reduced to simple robbery. The trial court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment for robbery, ten years imprisonment for rape, and 12 months for handling suspected stole goods, to be served concurrently. Without citing a specific reason for reducing the aggravated robbery with violence charge, the trial magistrate noted that the complainant testified that she was not injured in the robbery. The appellant first appealed to the High Court, which found the appeal had no merit and that the appellant was guilty of aggravated robbery with violence. The High Court vacated the conviction and 10-year sentence for simple robbery and imposed the death sentence for robbery with violence. In this appeal to the Court of Appeal (Kisumu), the appellant raised four concerns: (1) whether he was improperly identified as the robber and rapist because the attack took place at night when it was dark, (2) whether the first appellate court properly re-evaluated the evidence, (3) whether the High Court's substitution of simple robbery with aggravated robbery with violence was proper, and (4) whether the State was required to file a cross-appeal to entitle the High Court to substitute the simple robbery conviction with aggravated robbery with violence. The High Court documents show that the appellant was warned more than once and that at the earliest opportunity the State Counsel would seek to increase the sentence to capital robbery, but the appellant decided to proceed with the appeal. Quoting its precedent, the lower courts' records, and the Criminal Procedure Code Sec. 354, the Court of Appeal rejected all aspects of the appeal and upheld the death sentence for robbery with violence.
Mulundi v. Republic Court of Appeal of Kenya at Machakos (2005)
The appellant was convicted of defilement of a girl under the age of 14 years and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with ten strokes of the cane. The appellant appealed his conviction and the sentence as being excessive for a first offense. The Court dismissed the appeal of the conviction as the complainant identified the appellant and medical evidence is no longer necessary to convict an accused if the evidence was sufficiently cogent. The "defilement" conviction was substituted with rape and the appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.
Chepkwony v. Republic High Court of Kenya at Nakuru (2006)
The appellant was convicted of defilement for having sexual intercourse with the complainant, who was 12 years old at the time. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of proofs, that there was no evidence of violent force, that the complainant was his girlfriend, and that she consented. The prosecution presented evidence of the complainant's physical injuries and the appellant's HIV-positive status. The Court dismissed the appeal because sex with any girl younger than 16 years old is unlawful regardless of consent, and the appellant had not raised the defense that he had a reasonable belief that the girl was above the age of consent. The Court rejected appellant's plea for special consideration because of his alleged HIV status. Instead, the Court cited the appellant's decision to expose a 12-year-old child to HIV/AIDS in its decision to uphold the life sentence.
Ochieng v. Republic High Court of Kenya of Kisii (2008)
The appellant was charged and convicted of defilement and indecent assault of a six-year-old girl. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on the first count and five years imprisonment for the second. He appealed on the grounds of insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction and an excessive sentence. The Court affirmed the convictions because the six-year-old complainant described the incident in detail, the medical evidence was corroborative, and the appellant's abrupt and unexplained disappearance after the incident was also properly considered corroborative evidence. The Court also held that the sentences were not excessive.
Mwaura v. Republic Court of Appeal of Kenya at Nakuru (2007)
The accused was charged with defilement of a girl under the age of 14 years, and was convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. He appealed for leniency on the grounds that he was remorseful, suffering from acute pneumonia and only 17 years of age at the time of the incident. The Court upheld the sentence finding that the sentence of 10 years for defilement of a girl and 5 years for indecent assault is not excessive and no circumstances existed to justify mitigating the sentence.
Rex v. Tauhali and Mashea High Court of Lesotho (1999)
Both of the accused were convicted of raping a 25-year-old woman when each took turns helping the other to rape the complainant. Two women who were with her tried to drive off the accused, but they threw rocks at the women and chased them off. The Court noted that the punishment for rape carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment when there are no mitigating or aggravating factors. Aggravating factors include (1) violence in addition to the violence of the rape, (2) use of a weapon to intimidate or physically harm, and (3) repeated rape. The Court upheld the conviction and overturned the previous sentence of five years each to eight years, finding that gang rape calls for a higher sentence. In its discussion of the elements of rape, the Court noted that if one perpetrator held a woman down while another raped her, then the first would also be guilty of rape. In addition, in contradiction of international standards, the Court stated that women lack the necessary anatomy to commit rape and therefore can only be guilty of rape by assisting a male perpetrator.
Republic v. Makaluni High Court of Malawi (2002)
The accused was convicted of rape and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The sentence was appealed by the judge who reviewed the lower court's decision because the reviewing judge found the sentence inadequate. The Court upheld the sentence, stating that it was not so excessively inadequate as to merit interference and taking note of the factors used in determining sentences for rape offenders: violence used to commit the rape, a repeated rape, a carefully planned rape, whether the defendant has previous convictions for rape or other serious offenses, whether the victim was subjected to any further sexual indignities, whether the victim was very young or very old, and the physical and mental effects upon the victim. The factors to warrant a harsher sentence were not judged to be present in this case, and the sentencing judge's decision was within his discretion.
Makuto v. State Court of Appeal for Botswana at Lobatse (2000)
The appellant appealed his conviction for rape, arguing that the Penal Code sections dealing with rape are discriminatory because they provide increased penalties for a person convicted of rape if they are found to be HIV-positive. The Court held that the relevant provisions of the Penal Code apply when the convicted person was HIV-positive at the time he committed the rape and that it is therefore a reasonable provision in order to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS.
State. v. Matlho Court of Appeal of Botswana (2008)
The appellant challenged the sentence for rape under the sections of the Penal Code that set forth mandatory minimum sentences for rape charges depending on circumstances such as the perpetrator's use of violence or the perpetrator's status as being HIV positive. Section 142(5) of the Penal Code prohibits a sentence for rape from running concurrently with any other offense; the sentences must be served consecutively. The appellant was convicted on two counts of rape and sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for each count, resulting in a total of 20 years imprisonment, which he claimed was a violation of the constitutional prohibition on "torture or inhuman or degrading punishment." The Court upheld the conviction, noting that although it was undeniably severe, it was not disproportionate to the offense, especially in light of the increase in the incidence of rape in Botswana and the heinous nature of rape itself.
Sekoto v. Director of Public Prosecutions Court of Appeal of Botswana at Lobatse (2007)
The appellant appeals his conviction for the murder of his live-in girlfriend and his sentence of 12 years imprisonment. The Court upheld the sentence, noting the increasing incidence in Botswana of former lovers killing their partners and opining that the courts should impose appropriately stiff sentences as a deterrent.
Reports
Evaluation Report: Ireland, Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2022)
The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA)’s report on Ireland concerns how Ireland prevents and prosecutes human trafficking. The report demonstrated that the total number of presumed trafficking victims in Ireland fell from 103 in 2017 to 44 in 2021. According to GRETA, sexual exploitation remains the primary form of exploitation in Ireland, but the number of people trafficked for labour exploitation in sectors including fishing, farming, construction, catering, and domestic work grew over the same period. However, GRETA noted that these figures may underestimate the situation in Ireland, partly due to the persisting limitations of the existing procedures for identifying victims. These limitations include the fact that the Human Trafficking Investigation and Coordination Unite of An Garda Síochána (Ireland’s police force) is the sole competent authority tasked with identifying the victims of human trafficking, and the obligation to speak with An Garda Síochána may discourage self-identification, according to the report. Highlighting certain areas where underreporting is likely, GRETA found that trafficking for labour exploitation remains under-recognised and under-reported, and trafficking for criminal exploitation is an area where victims are often not recognised as such. Nevertheless, the report notes a number of positive developments since GRETA’s last evaluation of Ireland in 2017. These include the establishment of a human trafficking stakeholders forum in 2020 (bringing together relevant state departments, agencies and civil society organisations) and the designation of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission as National Rapporteur for human trafficking. In sum, GRETA’s report urged the authorities in Ireland to take further action against human trafficking, notably by improving the prosecution of human traffickers and providing specialised shelters and compensation for victims. GRETA also urged the Irish authorities to adopt finalise a National Referral Mechanism, which ensures that different agencies are involved in identifying victims of all types of trafficking, and to provide trafficking victims with specialised assistance. Furthermore, GRETA noted that the number of investigations into human trafficking has been decreasing over the years, notes the report, and the number of prosecutions and convictions is very low. For instance, there have been no convictions for trafficking for labour exploitation in Ireland, despite the increasing number of identified suspected cases.
Legislation
Marital rape is a crime under the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act deletes the word “unlawful” from the statutory definition of rape (‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ without consent, as set forth in the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981). The amended definition of rape therefore does not exclude ‘lawful’ sexual intercourse (i.e., between married persons). The 1990 Act also explicitly abolished ‘any rule of law by virtue of which a husband cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife’ (Section 5). Section 4 defines rape as any penetration (however slight) of the anus or mouth by the penis or of the vagina by any object held or manipulated by another person, providing for a punishment on conviction of up to life imprisonment (Section 4). Section 7 of the Act also deals with the corroboration rule in the case of sexual offences. In particular, the judge is no longer required to give the jury a corroboration warning, but such warning is not prohibited.
The 1989 Act prohibits incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation, race, religion, or nationality. The prohibition includes the publishing and distributing of written materials and visual images, inciting speech and behavior, and activities in private residences. It criminalizes various means of disseminating and/or promoting materials, words, or actions that are threatening, abusive, or insulting, and intended or likely to stir up hatred (Section 2). The prohibitions do not apply to fair and accurate reports of proceedings in the Oireachtas (Irish parliament) or before a court or tribunal exercising a judicial function (Section 5). Gender discrimination outside of sexual orientation is not addressed in this law.
The 1996 Act targets sex tourism. It provides that, where an Irish citizen or a person “ordinarily resident” in Ireland (a) commits an act in another country involving a child (person under the age of 17), and (b) the act constitutes an offence under the law of that country and would constitute an offence in Ireland, then the person will be guilty of the offense under Irish law (Section 2(2)). Other offences include attempted offences (Section 2(3)); procuring, aiding or abetting, and conspiring in an offence (Sections 2(4)–2(6)); transporting persons to enable such offences (Section 3); and publishing information likely to promote offenses (Sections 4). The Act also provides for offenses committed by corporate bodies (Section 5). Penalties are up to a maximum of a £10,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment on conviction on indictment, or up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction (Section 6).
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 gave effect to European Council Directive No. 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. It also amended certain other legislation, including the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (available here), the Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1995, the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here), the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here), and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. The Act provides for offences relating to sexual acts with protected persons and relating to payment for sexual activity with sex workers, offensive conduct of a sexual nature and harassment of victims of sexual offences. The Act defines ‘sexual exploitation’ in relation to a child and specifies the elements that would constitute a sexual offence against a child, including performing sexual acts in front of a child and prostitution of a child. Generally, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 broaden the scope of criminal acts in relation to children, such as the prohibition of causing a child to watch sexual activity (Section 6), meeting a child for the purposes of sexual exploitation (Section 7), and the use of information and communication technology to facilitate the sexual exploitation of a child (Section 8). The Act also criminalizes the purchase of sexual services and prohibits sexual activity with a protected person, as defined by the Act. The Act creates a distinction related to the commission of a sexual act with a child under 17 years of age and with a child under 15 years of age, with a conviction on indictment for the former offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of up to 7 years (unless the person is in authority, in which case they may be sentenced for up to 15 years) (Section 17), and with a conviction on indictment for the latter offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of life (Section 16). Importantly, Section 48 of the Act reforms the law in relation to consent to sexual acts. In particular, it states that a person does not consent to a sexual act if, inter alia, they permits the act to take place or submits to it because of the application, threat or fear of use of force against them, if they are asleep, if they are incapable of consenting because of intoxication, or if they are mistaken as to the nature and purpose of the act or the identity of the person involved. The Act also clarifies that consent can be withdrawn at any time and that lack of physical resistance does not, of itself, constitute consent (Section 48). Finally, Section 46 allows a court to issue a “Harassment order” against a person when imposing a sentence for a sexual offence or at any time before the convicted person is released from prison.
The 1998 Act prohibits trafficking of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) amended the 1998 Act’s provisions related to child trafficking and sexual exploitation (Section 3) and the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2013 (available here) expanded the definition of labour exploitation and aggravating factors. The 1998 Act also criminalizes allowing a child to be used for child pornography (Section 4). A person found guilty on indictment of this offence faces up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Section 5 has been substituted by Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here), which prohibits the production, distribution, and possession, inter alia, of child pornography. Persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 14 years’ imprisonment (Section 5, as amended). Section 6, as amended, prohibits the possession of child pornography; persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here) also inserts Section 5A, prohibiting, inter alia, causing, inciting, compelling, coercing, recruiting, inviting, or inducing of a child to participate in a pornographic performance or the gaining from such participation.
Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (2013)
The Human Trafficking Amendment Act amends the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) and the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here). The Act of 2008 defined human trafficking and exploitation for the purposes of trafficking. It also contains specific provisions for the trafficking of children. The Human Trafficking Amendment Act of 2013 amends the 2008 Act by (a) expanding the definitions of “labour exploitation” to include forced begging and of “exploitation” to include forced participation in criminal acts for profit (in line with the EU Human Trafficking Directive) and (b) adding aggravating factors (e.g., where a public official trafficks for sexual or labor exploitation).
The 2008 Act, which amends the 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act (available here) among other legislation, defines trafficking as when a person, in relation to another person, “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbours the person, or (i) transfers the person to, (ii) places the person in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the person to, another person, (b) causes a person to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of a person or takes a person— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the person with accommodation or employment” (Section 1). Exploitation includes labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, or exploitation consisting of the removal of one or more of the organs of a person. Labour exploitation includes subjecting the person to forced labour, forcing him or her to render services to another, or enslavement or similar servitude. Sexual exploitation includes production of pornography depicting the person alone or with others, causing the person to engage in sexual activity for the purpose of the production of pornography, prostitution of the person, or otherwise causing the person to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 1). The Act contains specific provisions regarding trafficking of a child (a person under the age of 18), which were further amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here). Trafficking a child for exploitation is an offense, as is selling or offering to sell a child, or purchasing or offering to purchase a child (Sections 2 and 3). There is an additional definition of “trafficks” in relation to a child, meaning that a person “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbors the child, or— (i) transfers the child to, (ii) places the child in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the child to, another person, (b) causes the child to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of the child or takes the child— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the child with accommodation or employment” (Section 3). There is also separate definition of “sexual exploitation” in relation to a child, and includes inviting, inducing, or coercing a child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography, or inviting, inducing, or coercing the child to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 3). The offences of exploitation and sexual exploitation in relation to children are subject to penalties specified in sections 2 and 3; a court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. Penalties for trafficking of persons other than children are specified in Section 4; the court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. The Act also explicitly provides for penalties where an accused is found guilty of attempt, incitement, or conspiracy in relation to the offences under the Act. Soliciting or importuning for purposes of prostitution of trafficked persons, or benefiting from such activities, is also an offence subject to specified penalties (Section 5), as are offences committed by corporate bodies (Section 6). Jurisdiction includes extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., where a person commits an act in relation to an Irish citizen in a place other than the State that, if done in the State, would constitute one of certain enumerated offenses). The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (available here) further amends these provisions, in particular with expanded definitions of labour exploitation and aggravating factors.
Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Act (2020)
The Act focuses on the non-consensual distribution of explicit images, inter alia. Section 2 makes it an offence to distribute, publish, or threaten to distribute or publish an intimate image with (i) intent to harm or (ii) being reckless as to whether harm is caused. Section 1 defines “distribute” and “publish” as being distributed or published to the public or a section of the public. Section 1 further defines an “intimate image” in broad terms, encompassing a photographic, film, video, or digital representation, and includes nude, non-nude, or sexual images. “Harm” includes psychological harm (Section 1). A person found guilty of an offence under Section 2 is subject to a Class A fine (up to €5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment if tried summarily, or a fine and/or up to seven years’ imprisonment if convicted on indictment. Section 3 makes it an offence to record, distribute, or publish intimate images without consent. A person found guilty of such an offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (up to €5,000), and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment. Section 4 makes it an offence to distribute, publish, or send threatening or grossly offensive communications. A person found guilty of an offence under Section 2 is subject to a Class A fine (up to €5,000) and/or up to six months’ imprisonment if tried summarily, or a fine and/or up to two years’ imprisonment if convicted on indictment. Section 7 provides that summary proceedings for an offence under the Act may be instituted within two years from the date on which the offence was committed.
Article 267 of the Penal Code provides for a punishment of rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor) for anyone who rapes a woman, which shall be permanent if the perpetrator is a “Specified Perpetrator, meaning an ancestor of the victim, other person responsible for her upbringing or having power over her, or a paid servant of the victim or the perpetrator . Article 267 does not address rape of men. Article 268, however, is gender-neutral. It prescribes three to seven years of rigorous imprisonment with hard labor for indecent assault of a person by force or threat, or an attempt to do so. The punishment for indecent assault may increase if (i) the victim was less than 16 years old, or (ii) the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator. The punishment for indecent assault increases to permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor when a Special Perpetrator indecently assaults a person under 16 years old. Finally, Article 269 provides that anyone who indecently assaults a minor under 18 years of age without force or punishment is subject to imprisonment. If the victim was less than seven years of age or the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator, the penalty is rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. Article 290 provides that kidnapping a woman is punished with permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. If the kidnapper also rapes the woman, the sentence is death. English translation available here.
Article 260 of the Penal Code provides that whoever willfully causes an abortion by beating or other violent injuries shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor per Article 13) (“Rigorous Imprisonment”). Those who provide medicine or other means of inducing abortion, with or without the consent of the pregnant woman, are subject to imprisonment (Article 261). It is also a crime for women to have an abortion using medicines or other means (Article 262). Any doctor, surgeon, pharmacist, or midwife who provides an abortion is subject to rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. However, attempted abortion is not a punishable offense (Article 264). English translation available here.
Law No. 10 of the Year 2021 (2021)
Law No. 10 of the Year 2021 amends the Penal Code to provide increased punishments for anyone who engages in female genital mutilation ("FGM"), which punishments range from a minimum of five years to a maximum of 20 years and depend on two factors: (a) whether the perpetrator is a licensed medical practitioner and (b) the extent of the harm inflicted on the woman or girl. Individuals who request or encourage FGM are also subject to imprisonment under this law.
The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). In part, these amendments increased the punishment for an illegal abortion (meaning that it was conducted by a person who had no special medical education; or forcing an abortion without voluntary consent, which is punishable by a fine of 50-100 tax-free minimum incomes, community service of 100-240 hours, correctional labor for up to two years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or imprisonment for the same term. The amendments criminalized forcing an abortion and forced sterilization without consent. Rape (i.e., sexual acts involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration using the genitals or any other item, without voluntary consent) is punishable with imprisonment for three to five years and sexual violence (nonconsensual, non-penetrative sexual assault) is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.
У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни, що містять положення Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), ухваленої у 2011 році. Внаслідок цих змін статтю 134 Кримінального кодексу України, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту (проведення аборту особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти; примус до проведення аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої), було змінено, в частині посилення відповідальності за це небезпечне злочинне діяння (тобто тепер незаконний аборт карається штрафом від 50 до 100 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадськими роботами на строк від 100 до 240 годин, або виправними роботами за на строк до двох років, або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк). Також криміналізовано примус до аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої, а також примусову стерилізацію без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи. Змінено статті, які передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за зґвалтування та сексуальне насильство. Зокрема, зґвалтування (тобто вчинення статевих дій, пов’язаних із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло іншої особи за допомогою статевих органів або будь-якого іншого предмета без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до п’яти років, а також сексуальне насильство (не пов'язане з проникненням в тіло іншої особи без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк до п'яти років. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.
The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). As a result of these amendments, new dangerous acts were criminalized. For example, Article 151-2 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by providing criminal liability for forced marriage. Forced marriage (meaning coercing a person to marry, to continue a forcible marriage, to enter into cohabitation without marriage, to continue cohabitation, or to move to a territory other than that in which they reside, regardless of citizenship) is punishable by arrest for a term of up to six months, by restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by imprisonment for the same term. Article 126-1 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code by providing criminal liability for domestic violence. Domestic violence (meaning intentional systematic physical, psychological, or economic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or another person with whom an offender has had a family or close relationship) is punishable by community service of up to 150-240 hours, or arrest for up to six months, restriction of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. A new chapter, “Restrictions,” established that, in the interests of domestic violence victims, the convicted person might be (i) banned from living with a person who suffered from domestic violence or (ii) restricted in communications with their child if the child was a victim or observer of domestic violence. In addition, these amendments provide criminal liability for failure to comply with restrictive measures, which is punishment with arrest for up to six months or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, in consideration of attending circumstances.
У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни з метою закріплення положень Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), прийнятої у 2011 році. У результаті цих змін нові суспільно небезпечні діяння були криміналізовані. Наприклад, особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України доповнено статтею 151-2, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за примушення до шлюбу. Примусовий шлюб (тобто примушування особи до вступу в шлюб або до продовження примусово укладеного шлюбу, або до вступу у співжиття без укладання шлюбу, або до продовження такого співжиття, або спонукання з цією метою особи до переміщення на територію іншої держави, ніж та, в якій вона проживає (там «проживає» означає постійне місце проживання в певному місці, не обов’язково пов’язане з громадянством) карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Також у 2017 році особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України було доповнено статтею 126-1, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за домашнє насильство. Домашнє насильство (тобто умисне систематичне вчинення фізичного, психологічного або економічного насильства щодо подружжя чи колишнього подружжя або іншої особи, з якою винний перебуває (перебував) у сімейних або близьких відносинах, що призводить до фізичних або психологічних страждань, розладів здоров’я, втрати працездатності, емоційної залежності або погіршення якості життя потерпілої особи) караються громадськими роботами на строк від 150 до 240 годин, або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. Додано новий розділ «Обмежувальні заходи». Встановлено, що в інтересах потерпілого від злочину, пов'язаного з домашнім насильством, на засудженого можуть бути покладені такі обов'язки: заборона перебувати в спільному місці проживання з жертвою; обмеження спілкування з дитиною у разі вчинення насильства в сім'ї щодо дитини або в її присутності; крім того, ці зміни передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за невиконання обмежувальних заходів (покарання у вигляді арешту на строк до шести місяців або обмеження волі на строк до двох років). Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.
Article 3901 provides criminal liability for (i) intentional failure to comply with the restrictive measures applicable to perpetrators of domestic violence (for example, prohibition on cohabitation with a person who has suffered from domestic violence, restriction of communication with the child in the event that domestic violence is committed against the child or in their presence, etc.); (ii) intentional failure to comply with restrictive instructions; or (iii) intended evasion of a court-mandated offender treatment program. A person who commits these socially dangerous culpable acts shall be punished by arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to two years.
Стаття 3901 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за (i) умисне недотримання обмежувальних заходів, які застосовуються до винних у домашньому насильстві (наприклад, заборона спільного проживання з особою, яка постраждала від домашнього насильства, обмеження спілкування з дитиною у випадку, якщо домашнє насильство вчинене щодо дитини або в її присутності тощо); (ii) умисне невиконання обмежувальних приписів; або (iii) умисне ухилення від проходження програми для кривдників особою, щодо якої такі заходи застосовані судом. Особа, яка вчинила ці суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років.
Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and also procuring people for sex work in brothels, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and procurement, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 303 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine prohibits engaging a person in prostitution or compulsion to engage in prostitution, involving deceit, blackmail or vulnerable state of a person, with imposition of violence or threat of violence, or pimping. If breached, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of three to five years. Under this Article, pimping shall mean any action of a person committed for the purpose of engaging another person in prostitution.
Статтею 302 Кримінального кодексу України передбачено, що створення або утримання місць розпусти, а також звідництво для розпусти караються штрафом від 1000 до 2000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років. Статтею 303 Кримінального кодексу України забороняється втягнення особи в заняття проституцією або примушування її до зайняття проституцією з використанням обману, шантажу чи уразливого стану цієї особи, або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, або сутенерство. У разі вчинення дій, що криміналізовані цією статтею, передбачено покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від трьох до п'яти років. Відповідно до цієї статті під сутенерством слід розуміти дії особи по забезпеченню заняття проституцією іншою особою.
Article 3012 states that involving a minor in: (i) conducting an entertainment show of a sexual nature (i.e., public display in any form of products of sexual nature or stage actions including acts of sexual nature), including with the use of information and telecommunication systems or technologies, or (ii) attending such a show, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. If the act involved forcing a minor to participate in such a show through deception, blackmail, exploiting a vulnerable condition, or the use of threat of violence, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of seven to ten years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years.
Стаття 3012 визначає, що залучення неповнолітнього до: (I) проведення видовищного заходу сексуального характеру (тобто публічного показу у будь-якій формі продукції сексуального характеру або сценічних дій, метою яких є втілення сексуальних дій.), у тому числі з використання інформаційно-телекомунікаційних систем або технологій, або (II) відвідування видовищного заходу сексуального характеру, караються позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до семи років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю. терміном до трьох років. Якщо діяння полягало в примушуванні неповнолітнього до участі в такому заході, шляхом обману, шантажу, уразливого стану особи або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, винний карається позбавленням волі на строк від семи до десяти років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років.
The Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 300 prohibits the importation, manufacture or distribution of works that promulgate violence and cruelty, racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination. Importation into Ukraine for sale or distribution purposes, or manufacture, storage, transportation or other movement for the same purposes, or sale or distribution of works (and also compelling others to participate in the creation of such works) that promulgate discrimination, among other things, are criminalized by Article 300. These dangerous culpable acts shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-4,000 tax-free minimum incomes, or arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years. Committing the same actions with regard to motion pictures and video films that promulgate discrimination, and also selling works that promulgate discrimination, to minors or distribution of such works among minors are as aggravating circumstances.
Ввезення в Україну творів, що пропагують, серед іншого, дискримінацію, з метою збуту чи розповсюдження або їх виготовлення, зберігання, перевезення чи інше переміщення з тією самою метою або їх збут чи розповсюдження (а також примушування до участі в їх створенні) криміналізовано статтею 300. Ці небезпечні винні дії караються штрафом від 1000 до 4000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років. Ті самі дії щодо кіно- та відеопродукції, що пропагують дискримінацію, а також збут такої продукції неповнолітнім чи розповсюдження серед них творів, що пропагують дискримінацію є кваліфікуючою ознакою цього злочину, що обтяжує покарання.
Article 155 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that an adult who commits acts of sexual nature associated with the vaginal, anal, or oral penetration into the body of a person under the age of 16, using genitals, another body part, or any item, shall be punished by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same term. If such acts are committed by close relatives or family members, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim; or if they are associated with the provision of monetary or other remuneration to the victim or a third party or with a promise of such remuneration; or where they have caused infertility or any other grave consequences, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Article 156 provides criminal liability for debauched actions committed against a person under 16 years of age. This dangerous culpable act shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years or imprisonment for the same term. If the same acts committed against a child or committed by family members or close relatives, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Harassment of a child for sexual purposes is criminalized by the Article 1561. Harassment under this article means proposal of a meeting made by an adult to a person under the age of 16, for the purpose of committing any acts of sexual nature or debauched acts, after which at least one action was taken to ensure that meeting will take place.
Стаття 155 Кримінального кодексу України визначає, що повнолітня особа, яка вчинила дії сексуального характеру, пов’язані із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло особи, яка не досягла шістнадцятирічного віку, з використанням геніталій, іншого органу чи частини тіла або будь-якого предмета, карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. У випадку, якщо ті самі дії, вчинені близькими родичами або членами сім’ї, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілої особи або піклування про неї, або якщо вони поєднані з наданням грошової чи іншої винагороди потерпілій особі чи третій особі або з обіцянкою такої винагороди, або якщо вони спричинили безплідність чи інші тяжкі наслідки, злочинець карається позбавленням волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Стаття 156 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за розпусні дії, вчинені щодо особи, яка не досягла 16 років. Це суспільно небезпечне винне діяння карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Якщо ті самі дії вчинені щодо малолітньої особи або вчинені членами сім’ї чи близькими родичами, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілого або піклування про нього, винний підлягає покаранню у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Домагання дитини для сексуальних цілей криміналізовано статтею 1561. Домагання за цією статтею означає пропозицію зустрічі, зроблену повнолітньою особою, особі, яка не досягла 16 років з метою вчинення стосовно неї будь-яких дій сексуального характеру або розпусних дій, у разі якщо після такої пропозиції було вчинено хоча б одну дію, спрямовану на те, щоб така зустріч відбулася.
Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides criminal liability for trafficking in human beings, as well as recruitment, movement, concealment, transfer, or receipt of a person committed for the purpose of exploitation, coercion, abduction, fraud, blackmail, material, or other dependence of the victim, their vulnerable condition or bribery of a third-party controlling victim, to obtain consent for their exploitation. A person who commits such socially dangerous acts shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years. Article 149 defines exploitation of a human being as including, among other things, all forms of the sexual exploitation, forcing someone to work in the pornography industry, forced pregnancy or forced termination of pregnancy, forced marriage, etc. The Article also provides an explanation of a person's “vulnerable state” (i.e., physical or mental properties or external circumstances, that eliminate or limit the ability to realize their acts (omission) or to control them, to take independent decisions, to resist the violent or other unlawful actions, the coincidence of difficult personal, family, or other circumstances).
Стаття 149 Кримінального кодексу України передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за торгівлю людьми, а так само вербування, переміщення, переховування, передачу або одержання людини, вчинені з метою експлуатації, з використанням примусу, викрадення, обману, шантажу, матеріальної чи іншої залежності потерпілого, його уразливого стану або підкупу третьої особи, яка контролює потерпілого, для отримання згоди на його експлуатацію. Особа, яка вчинила вищезгадані суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до восьми років. Згідно примітки до цієї статті під експлуатацією людини, серед іншого, розуміються всі форми сексуальної експлуатації, використання в порнобізнесі, примусову вагітність або примусове переривання вагітності, примусове одруження тощо. У примітці також надається визначення поняття "уразливий стан особи" (тобто це зумовлений фізичними чи психічними властивостями або зовнішніми обставинами стан особи, який позбавляє або обмежує її здатність усвідомлювати свої дії (бездіяльність) або керувати ними, приймати за своєю волею самостійні рішення, чинити опір насильницьким чи іншим незаконним діям, збіг тяжких особистих, сімейних або інших обставин).
Ley 4788 de 2012 en contra del tráfico de personas de diciembre 13, 2012 (2012)
This law prevents and punishes human trafficking perpetrated in Paraguayan territory and abroad, in any of its forms. It also protects and assists victims by strengthening public actions as a response against this crime. The law criminalizes with eight years of imprisonment any conduct intended to capture or transport victims with the purposes of sexual exploitation, slavery, or organ trafficking. The years of imprisonment could increase when aggravating circumstances are present. In case of conviction, the law also allows courts to set any compensation for the victim, at the expense of the convicted.
Esta ley previene y sanciona la trata de personas perpetrada en el territorio paraguayo y en el exterior, en cualquiera de sus formas. También protege y asiste a las víctimas fortaleciendo las acciones públicas como respuesta a este delito. La ley tipifica con ocho años de prisión cualquier conducta tendiente a la captura o transporte de víctimas con fines de explotación sexual, esclavitud o tráfico de órganos. Los años de prisión podrán aumentar cuando concurran circunstancias agravantes. En caso de condena, la ley también permite que los tribunales fijen alguna indemnización para la víctima, a expensas del condenado.
The Penal Code includes the follow aggravating circumstances if a crime involves discrimination on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, sexual orientation, sexual harassment, belief or religion, political or ideological convictions, social ideological convictions, social status or origin, or any other form of discrimination.
O Código Penal inclui as seguintes circunstâncias agravantes: se o crime envolve discriminação com base em raça, cor, etnia, local de nascença, sexo, orientação sexual, assédio sexual, crença ou religião, convicção política ou ideológica, convicção ideológica social, status social ou origem, ou qualquer outra forma de discriminação.
Articles 154-A and B, 159, and 160 ban harassment (sentencing to up to three years in prison), forced marriage (sentencing to up to five years in prison), slavery (imprisonment from 5-15 years), and human trafficking (imprisonment from 3-10 years), respectively. Article 169 punishes the economic exploitation of prostitution by third parties, even though prostitution itself is not a crime in Portugal.
Lei n. 24/2019: Parte Especial, Título Um, Capítulo Sete, Seção Um (2019)
This section states crimes against sexual freedom, including the conditions under which sexual encounters violate a woman’s safety and the punishments thereafter. Anyone who engages in sexual activity without the woman’s consent by means of violence or physical intimidation, even if an act of artificial procreation, is subject to two to eight years in prison. Those who have sexual encounters with minors face imprisonment of 16-20 years. Anyone who takes advantage of a hierarchical position in a workplace to constrain someone to obtain sexual advantage is punished with imprisonment up to two years and a fine.
Essa seção estabelece os crimes contra a Liberdade sexual, incluindo as condições nas quais os encontros sexuais violam a segurança da mulher e as punições referentes. Aquele que inicia atividade sexual sem o consentimento da mulher por meio de violência ou intimidação física, ainda que seja um ato de procriação artificial, está sujeito a pena de dois a oito anos de prisão. Aquele que mantém encontros sexuais com menores encaram uma prisão de 16-20 anos. Aquele que tira proveito da sua posição hierárquica em um ambiente professional para constranger alguém para obter vantagem sexual é punido com prisão de até dois anos e multa.
Lei n. 24/2019: Special Part, Title One, Chapter One, Section One, Article 160 (2019)
Article 160 increases the penalty for murder to 20-24 years in prison if the crime was motivated by racial, religious, or political hatred, or generated by color, ethnic, or national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the victim.
O artigo 160 aumentou a pena para o crime de homicídio para 20-24 anos de prisão se o crime for motivado por ódio racial, religioso, ou político, ou gerado pela cor, etnia, ou origem nacional, sexo, orientação sexual, ou identidade de gênero da vítima.
Law No. 350-3 “on Countering Human Trafficking” (Amended 2014) (2014)
Law No. 350-3 defines human trafficking and sets out measures to prevent human trafficking and related crimes. These include identifying victims of trafficking, educating, and providing information to citizens on related issues. The law further sets out measures for the protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, including ensuring their safety, providing temporary accommodation, legal, medical, and psychological assistance, among others. The law provides that persons guilty of trafficking in persons or related crimes are punishable in accordance with the legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus and the victim's "unwillingness or inability" to change his or her "anti-social behavior" caused by the trafficking does not eliminate or mitigate the offender's liability.\
Art. 343 prohibits the production and distribution of pornographic materials or items of a pornographic nature depicting minors, which is punishable by correctional work for up to two years, administrative arrest, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, and by a term of up to eight years in case of aggravating circumstances.
Criminal Code Article 199 (Violation of Labor Legislation) (1999)
Art. 199 prohibits the unjustified refusal to hire or the unlawful firing of a person, including a woman for reasons related to her pregnancy. This crime is punishable by a prohibition to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities, correctional labor, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.
Criminal Code Article 190 (Violation of the Equality of Citizens) (1999)
Art. 190 prohibits intentional violation or restriction of rights and freedoms, or the establishment of advantages for citizens based on, for example, gender resulting in substantial harm to the rights, liberties, and lawful interests of citizens. This crime is punishable with a fine, correctional labor, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term up to two years, as well as restrictions to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities.
Criminal Code Articles 139 (Murder), 154 (Torture), and 291 (Taking a Person Hostage) (1999)
For several crimes set out in the Criminal Code, knowing commission against a pregnant woman is an aggravating circumstance that increases the sentence. Murdering a pregnant woman is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8 to 12 years, life imprisonment, or the death sentence under Art. 139. Torture of a pregnant woman is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of one to three years or imprisonment for a term of one to five years under Art. 154. Taking a pregnant woman hostage is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 6 to 12 years under Art. 291.
Art. 181 defines trafficking in persons as the “recruiting, transporting, transferring, harboring, or receiving a person” for the purposes of exploitation by deception, abuse of trust, or use of violence, or threat of such violence. Trafficking in persons is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years and for a term of up to 15 years if committed in aggravating circumstances, such as, knowingly against a pregnant woman or a minor, or with the removal of the person outside of the country, among others. Art. 181 also notes that “exploitation” means the illegal coercion of a person to work or provide services, for example, sexual acts and surrogacy when the victim, for reasons beyond his or her control cannot refuse to perform such work or services. Art. 1811 criminalizes the use of slave labor and other forms of exploitation. In the absence of signs of criminal behavior described in Art. 180, the crime is punishable by imprisonment for a term of two to five years, with a fine, but for a term of up to 12 years if committed in aggravating circumstances, such as knowingly against a pregnant woman or minor. Arts. 182-185 criminalize kidnapping, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and coercion. Art. 186 prohibits threats of murder, infliction of grievous bodily harm, or destruction of property if there was reason to fear fulfillment of the threats. An Art. 186 crime is punishable by community service, fines, correctional labor, or restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to two years.
Criminal Code Chapter 20: Crimes Against Sexual Inviolability or Sexual Freedom (1999)
Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.
Lei Nº 11.340 "Lei Maria da Penha": Título VII Disposições Finais (2006)
The Maria da Penha Act alters the penal procedure code to allow the judge to order preventive custody when there is risk to the physical or psychological integrity of the woman. (Article 42). Article 45 alters the law of criminal enforcement to allow the judge to determine the obligatory attendance of the aggressor in recovery and re-education programs. The Act orders the creation of special courts for domestic and family violence against women with civil and penal competence to address family issues derived from violence against women. Article 43 amends the Penal Code by including violence against women as an aggravating factor. Article 44 imposes the penalty sentences ranging from three months to three years of detention to domestic violence. If domestic violence is committed against a woman with special needs, the sentence will be increased by 1/3.
A Lei Maria da Penha alterou o Código de Processo Penal para permitir a que juiz decrete prisão preventiva quando há risco à integridade física ou psicológica da mulher (artigo 42). O artigo 45 altera a Lei de Execuções Penais permitindo que o juiz determine o comparecimento obrigatório do agressor a programas de recuperação e reeducação. A LMP prevê a criação de Juizados contra Violência Doméstica e Familiar contra Mulher, com jurisdição civil e penal para tratar sobre assuntos cíveis e criminais. Por fim, o artigo 43 emenda o Código Penal para incluir a violência contra mulheres no rol de circunstância agravantes, enquanto o artigo 44 estabelece pena de 3 meses a 3 anos de detenção para lesão corporal contra ascendente, descendente, irmão, cônjuge ou companheiro, ou com quem conviva ou tenha convivido, ou, ainda, prevalecendo-se o agente das relações domésticas, de coabitação ou de hospitalidade. Nos casos de violência doméstica praticada contra pessoas com necessidades especiais, a pena imposta é acrescida de 1/3.
Domestic Violence Act (2014)
The purpose of the Act is to provide protection for victims of domestic violence, to prevent and eliminate violence within domestic relationships, to ensure the safety of children who witness or experience domestic violence, and to enact provisions consistent with Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Act defines domestic violence in detail (See Part 1, Section 4.1.a-c) and allows victims of domestic violence to file for protection orders and allows a court to issue an emergency or ex parte protection order (See Part 2: Protection Orders). The Act also mandates government ministries to enact public awareness programs on violence within families, the collection of data regarding the incidences and frequency of domestic violence to support preventative measures, and training regarding human rights and the equality of women for public officials, health care professionals, and police officers. It also provides for the establishment of support facilities for victims of domestic and gender-based violence. (See Part 3: Prevention and Response). The Act also provides that police personnel while responding to a report of domestic violence sufficiently supported by evidence must undertake to do all things necessary for a court to commence the criminal prosecution of the matter. (See Part 4: Police Powers and Duties, Section 30.) Health care professionals who have provided assistance to victims of domestic violence must advise the victim about counseling and advise the victim to file a report with the police. (See Part 5: Role of Health Care Professionals and Social Service Providers.) Lastly, the Act prescribes that the crime of domestic violence is punishable by six months to three years imprisonment, as well as accompanying monetary fines. Certain circumstances such as repeat offenses, offenses against pregnant women or persons with special needs, domestic violence committed against or witnessed by a child, violence resulting in severe or life-threatening injury, or acts committed with a weapon constitute aggravations resulting in enhanced penalties to offenders. (See Section 6: Offences and Penalties.)
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 was passed in the aftermath of the Nirbhaya case wherein a female student was gang-raped in December 2012. The Act amended several provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and the Criminal Procedure Code. By way of this amendment, several new offenses have been recognized and incorporated into the Indian Penal Code, including acid attack (Section 326 A & B), voyeurism (Section 354C), stalking (Section 354D), attempt to disrobe a woman (Section 354B), sexual harassment (Section 354A), and sexual assault which causes death or injury causing a person to be in persistent vegetative state (Section 376A). The Act also amended the already existing offenses to make them more stringent. Notably, the definition of rape in Section 375 was broadened to include acts in addition to penetration. Also, Section 370 was replaced with Section 370 and 370A. The amended section incorporated the definition of trafficking as provided in the UN Trafficking Protocol while excluding “forced labour.” Also see the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2018 for additional amendments to rape and sexual violence crimes.
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act replaced the Ordinance of the same name which was promulgated in the aftermath of the Kathua Rape case in Jammu & Kashmir region of India in 2018, which involved the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. The Act amended various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and The Code of Criminal Procedure. Notably, the Act increased the minimum punishment for rape from seven years to ten years of rigorous imprisonment which is extendable to life imprisonment. The penalty for rape of a girl under 16 years of age has also been increased to 20 years of imprisonment extendable to life, a significant increase from the original term of 10 years. Rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with imprisonment of minimum 20 years extendable to life or with capital punishment. Lastly, the gang rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with life imprisonment or capital punishment. The Act includes measures related to bail restrictions, speedy trial, and strengthening prosecution.
Any person forcing another person into prostitution is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. If the victim is under 18 years old, the offender is subject to 10-20 years of imprisonment. Human trafficking is defined as the recruitment, moving, transfer or harboring of any person within or across national borders by means of deception, threats, use of force, debt bondage or other means, and using such person in forced labor, prostitution, pornography, or other unlawful acts, or removing body organs of such person, or for other unlawful purposes. The offender is subject to 5-15 years of imprisonment. For victims under 18 years old, any of the above-mentioned acts committed against them is deemed to be human trafficking even if there is no deception, threat, use of force, or debt bondage. When the offender is a “regular” human trafficker or in an organized group, the victims are children, there are two or more victims, the victim is a relative of the offender, or any victim suffers serious injury or becomes an invalid or insane, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment. If a victim becomes disabled, infected with HIV, or died, the offender is subject to life imprisonment. Fines for human trafficking range from 10 million to 1 billion kip. If the victim is a woman, provisions of the Law on the Development and Protection of Women may be applicable too.
Rape is defined as using force, armed threats, drugs, or other means to coerce sexual intercourse with a woman against her will (where such woman is not the offender’s spouse), and is subject to three to five years of imprisonment. When the victim is between 15 to 18 years old, or is the offender’s dependent or patient, the offender is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. When the victim is under 15 years old, the offender committed battery, or the rape resulted the victim’s disability or caused the victim’s death, the offender is subject to 7-15 years of imprisonment. When the victim is also murdered, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment, and may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death penalty. Violators are also subject to fines ranging from 5 million to 70 million kip. Attempted rape is also punishable. "Marital rape" through use of force or threats is also punishable by article 252 ("Sexual Intercourse by Force with a Female Spouse"), but separately and differently from other rape offenses. Violators of article 252 may face three months to one year imprisonment or re-education without imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 3 million kip. If the rape of a female spouse results in serious injury, the penalties increase to one to five years in prison and a fine of 1 million to 5 million kip. While article 248 includes male victims of rape, article 252's prohibition on marital rape only applies to female spouses. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.
ປະມວນກົດໝາຍອາຍາ ມາດຕາ 201 (Penal Code article 201: unlawful abortion) (2017)
Anyone caught performing an abortion is subject to two to five years of imprisonment and a fine of 5 million to 15 million kip. Any woman caught performing her own abortion or arranging to have her own abortion done is subject to three months to one year of imprisonment and a fine of 3 million to 10 million kip. If the offender is in the habitual practice of performing abortions, they are subject to five to seven years imprisonment and a fine of 7 million to 20 million kip. The Penal Code also punishes attempted abortions. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.
ປະມວນກົດໝາຍອາຍາ ມາດຕາ 224 ການ ຈຳ ແນກຕໍ່ແມ່ຍິງ (Penal Code article 224: discrimination against women) (2017)
Discrimination against women or restriction of women’s participation in any political, economic, socio-cultural or family activity based on gender reasons is subject to one to three years of imprisonment. Violators are subject to “public criticism,” “re-education without deprivation of liberty,” or imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of 3 million to 10 million kip. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.
ประมวลกฎหมายอาญา Penal Code B.E. 2499, Chapter 3 (Abortion) (1956)
Section 301 states that any woman, causing herself an abortion or allowing another person to procure an abortion for herself, shall be liable to imprisonment up to a term of three years or a fine not exceeding 60,000 Baht. Section 302 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman with her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine up to 20,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 303 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman without her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years or a fine up to 40,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 305 exempts those under Sections 301 or 302 from the offense if the abortion was carried out be a medical practitioner on medical grounds or the woman is younger than 15 years and the pregnancy resulted from rape or fetuses with fatal abnormalities. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled on 19 February 2020 that existing laws on abortion (Sections 301 and 305) conflict with Thailand’s 2017 Constitution as they fail to hold men responsible for illegal abortions. It remains unclear how the provisions will be amended; the ruling gives the government 360 days for the amendments and does not immediately change the law. English translation available from the ILO through External Link.
Female genital mutilation is punishable as a form of child abuse under sections 300-304, 307, and 308 of the Criminal Code. Such abuse carries a maximum sentence of 12 years or a maximum fine of 76,000 euros. Parents who perform the circumcision themselves on their own daughter or on a child over whom they exercise parental authority or whom they care for or raise, may serve a one-third increase in their prison sentence, per section 304(1). Parents and custodians are also punishable if they allow and/or support the procedure to be performed, order it, pay for it, provide the means for it and/or assist the circumciser during the circumcision, as these acts are considered soliciting, abetting or co-perpetration under Dutch criminal law. Though FGM is not specifically mentioned in these sections, the General Provisions Section 5(3°) explicitly includes FGM in these Title XX-XXI provisions. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)
Several sections of the Criminal Code (in particular, sections 242-243) penalize rape, including spousal rape, and domestic violence. Penalties include imprisonment not exceeding 12 years, a fine not exceeding 78,000 euros ($93,600), or both. For cases involving violence against a spouse, the penalty for various forms of abuse can be increased by one-third. Section 244 and 245 of the Criminal Code penalize statutory rape. Under section 244, in cases where the victim is younger than 12, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed 12 years. In cases where the victim is 12-16 years of age, under section 245, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed eight years. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)
Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículos 142, 170 (delitos contra mujeres embarazadas) (1984)
A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.
La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.
Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículos 85-88 (Aborto) (1984)
Abortion is a criminal offense unless there are no other means with which to save the life or health of the pregnant woman, the woman is mentally ill or otherwise challenged, or her pregnancy is the result of sexual assault. Those who perform abortions with the consent of the woman are liable to imprisonment for one to four years, or up to six years if the woman does not survive. Performing an abortion without the consent of the woman is punishable by three to ten years in prison, or up to 15 years if the woman does not survive. In addition to these prison sentences, doctors, surgeons, midwives, and pharmacists who assist or perform an abortion may be disqualified from practicing their profession for twice the period of imprisonment. A person who unintentionally causes an abortion through acts of violence is liable for six months to two years imprisonment. Finally, a woman who causes or consents to an abortion may be sentenced to one to four years imprisonment. An unsuccessful abortion attempt is not a punishable offense, so women who do so should be able to seek medical attention without penalty. (Note: The government of Argentina is voting on legalizing abortion as of December 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)
El aborto es un delito penal a menos que no existan otros medios con los que salvar la vida o la salud de la mujer embarazada, la mujer tenga una enfermedad mental o sufra algún otro problema, o su embarazo sea el resultado de una agresión sexual. Quienes practican abortos con el consentimiento de la mujer pueden ser castigados con una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años, o hasta seis años si la mujer no sobrevive. Realizar un aborto sin el consentimiento de la mujer se castiga con tres a diez años de prisión, o hasta 15 años si la mujer no sobrevive. Además de estas penas de prisión, los médicos, cirujanos, parteras y farmacéuticos que ayuden o practiquen un aborto pueden ser inhabilitados para ejercer su profesión por el doble del período de prisión. Una persona que provoque involuntariamente un aborto mediante actos de violencia puede ser sancionada con una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años. Finalmente, una mujer que provoque o consienta en un aborto puede ser condenada a una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años. Un intento de aborto fallido no es un delito punible, por lo que las mujeres que lo hagan deberían poder buscar atención médica sin sanción. (Nota: El gobierno de Argentina está votando sobre la legalización del aborto a diciembre de 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)
A man who kills a woman through an act of gender violence is liable for life imprisonment ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").
Un hombre que mata a una mujer mediante un acto de violencia de género es condenado a cadena perpetua ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").
Section 268(1) provides that everyone commits an aggravated assault who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant. Section 268(3) clarifies that “wound” or “maim” includes to excise, infibulate, or mutilate, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a person except where it is performed by a qualified medical practitioner for the benefit of the physical health of the person or the person is over 18 years of age and there is no resulting bodily harm. No consent to excise, infibulate, or mutilate, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a person is otherwise possible. Aggravated assault is punishable as an indictable offence and punishment is a prison sentence not exceeding 14 years.
Penal Law (Title 26) (1978)
Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).
The Domestic Abuse Act (Scotland) of 2018 came into force on April 1, 2019. It modifies and expands upon portions of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act of 1995. The act expands the definition of domestic abuse to include psychological abuse and coercive and controlling behavior. It criminalizes both psychological and physical harm directed to a partner or an ex-partner. Section 11.2 defines a “partner” as a spouse or civil partner, a person with whom one lives as a spouse, or a person with whom one is in an “intimate personal relationship.” Section 2 defines abuse as “violent, threatening, or intimidating” behavior that may consist of controlling a victim’s daily activities, causing the victim to become subordinate or dependent on the perpetrator, isolating the victim from friends or family, depriving or restricting a victim’s actions, or frightening, humiliating, degrading, or otherwise punishing the victim. Section 3 contains an extraterritoriality clause covering such conduct occurring partly or wholly outside the country, and thus the abusive behavior need not take place within the United Kingdom. Section 5 creates a is the only UK legislation with a specific statutory sentencing aggravation for the harm that can be caused to children growing up in an environment in which domestic abuse takes place. Section 2.2.n., likewise, includes a victim’s child under the age of 18 as a potential additional victim of abuse. Section 5.3 clarifies that the aggravation can be applied both in cases in which abusive behavior is directed at a child, and in scenarios in which a child “sees or hears, or is present during, an incident of behavior that A directs at B as part of the course of behavior.” The Domestic Abuse Act has been lauded by women’s rights organizations as a “welcome change” that “should increase the opportunity [for victims] to obtain protection and seek justice through the criminal justice system."
On June 21, 2018, the NSW Parliament passed the Act to supplement existing criminal legislation both at the NSW (e.g., Crimes Act 1900 and Human Tissue Act 1983) and Commonwealth levels (e.g., the Criminal Code Act 1995). The Act defines “modern slavery” as “any conduct involving the use of any form of slavery, servitude or forced labour to exploit children or other persons taking place in the supply chains of government agencies or non-government agencies.” The Act provides for an Anti-slavery Commissioner and establishes a Modern Slavery Committee.
Division 10A concerns sexual servitude, which is defined as “the condition of a person who provides sexual services and who, because of the use of force or threats is not free to cease providing sexual services, or is not free to leave the place or area where the person provides sexual services.” Section 80D provides for up to 15 years’ imprisonment for any person causing (willfully or recklessly) or attempting to cause sexual servitude (and up to 20 years if the victim is under 18 or cognitively impaired). Section 80E provides for up to 15 years for any person conducting a business involving the sexual servitude of others, or who knows about, or is reckless as to, sexual servitude (and up to 19 years if the victim is under 18 or cognitively impaired).
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act (New South Wales)
The Act aims to prevent, ensure accountability for, and apply standards set by the United Nations and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women to domestic violence. It aims to fulfill these objectives by “empowering courts to make apprehended domestic violence orders to protect people from domestic violence, intimidation (including harassment) and stalking” (§ 9(2)(a)). Intimidation is defined as: “conduct amounting to harassment or molestation of the person,” “an approach made to the person by any means (including by telephone, telephone text messaging, e-mailing, and other technologically assisted means) that causes the person to fear for his or her safety,” or “any conduct that causes a reasonable apprehension of injury to a person or to a person with whom he or she has a domestic relationship, or of violence or damage to any person or property” (§ 7(1)). Stalking is defined as following, watching, frequenting the vicinity of or approaching a person’s place of residence, business or work, or any place that a person frequents for the purposes of any social or leisure activity (§ 8(1)). The Act (at Parts 3 and 4) gives courts the authority to issue orders relating to apprehended domestic or personal violence. The Act provides that a “person who stalks or intimidates another person with the intention of causing the other person to fear physical or mental harm” may be punished with up to five years imprisonment (§ 13(1)). A person who “knowingly contravenes a prohibition or restriction specified in an apprehended violence order made against the person” may be punished with up to two years imprisonment (§ 14(1)).
NSW, much like the rest of Australia, suffers from high incidents of domestic violence. Across Australia, one in three women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence perpetrated by someone known to them, one in five women have been stalked during their lifetime, and on average one woman is killed every week by a current or former partner. Aboriginal women and girls are 35 times more likely than the wider female population to be hospitalised due to family violence. In 2016, the NSW Minister for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, launched the ‘NSW Domestic Family Violence Blueprint for Reform 2016-2021: Safer Lives for Women, Men and Children’ setting out actions to reform the domestic violence system in NSW over a five-year period (the blueprint is the first of its kind in Australia). The NSW Government has allocated AUD 350 million in the 2017/18 budget over a four-year period to fund the effort. (http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_pages/Domestic-Violence.aspx; https://www.whiteribbon.org.au/understand-domestic-violence/facts-violence-women/domestic-violence-statistics/; http://www.domesticviolence.nsw.gov.au/home)
Division 10 of the Act prohibits and defines sexual violence against adults and children. A person consents to sexual intercourse if the person freely and voluntarily agrees (§ 61HE(2)). As provided in section 61HE(3), a perpetrator is deemed to know that the other person does not consent if they have actual knowledge, are reckless as to consent, or had no reasonable belief that the other person consented. In determining consent, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances, including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents, but not including any self-induced intoxication of the person. There can be no consent if the person is a minor, unconscious or asleep, cognitively incapacitated, under duress, or unlawfully detained.
Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.
España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.
Brottsbalk (Criminal Code) (1962)
The Swedish Penal Code includes regulations that defines and prohibits various sexually and/or physically motivated crimes against people. The penalty for kidnapping with intent to injure a person, to force a person into service or to practice extortion is imprisonment for at least four years and at most eighteen years, or for life. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is six years. The penalty for human trafficking is imprisonment for 2-10 years. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is four years. If a crime is in violation of liberty and peace or a sexual offense and it was committed by a man against a woman with whom he had a close intimate relationship (marriage or cohabitation), then the man will be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and imprisoned for at least nine months and at most six years, as opposed to being sentenced for each individual crime committed. This crime was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code in 1998 and the construction of it is unique because several individual criminal offences together can constitute a gross crime. Perpetrators of rape shall be imprisoned for at least two and at most six years. If the rape is considered less aggravated, the sentence drops to at most four years. In the event the rape is “gross”, the sentence is extended to at most 10 years. The penalty for sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age (or an act comparable to sexual intercourse) is at least two and at most six years. If the crime is “gross”, the penalty is extended to at least five years and at most ten years. The penalty for sexual coercion is at most two years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, if the sexual coercion is “gross”, the sentence is extended from at least six months to at most six years. The penalty for intercourse with an offspring is imprisonment for at most two years and for intercourse with a sibling is at most one year. The penalties for crimes of exploitation of a child for sexual posing, purchase of a sexual ct from a child and sexual molestation are sentencing to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Except for gross exploitation of a child for sexual posing where the sentence is at least six months and at most six years imprisonment. The penalty for purchase of sexual service is a fine or imprisonment for at most one year. Purchase of sexual service has occurred when a person obtains a temporary sexual relation in return for payment. This also applies if the payment was promised or given by another person. Selling sexual services in Sweden is not criminalized. The penalty for someone who promotes or improperly financially exploits a person’s engagement in temporary sexual relations in return for payment (procuring) is at most four years. In the event the procuring is “gross”, the sentence is 2-10 years. As of 2018, the Penal Code defines rape as any sex without consent, either with words or clear actions. Before the amendment, crimes of rape required the intent to rape someone through violence or threats, or that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Furthermore, the 2018 sex crime reform of the Swedish Penal Code introduced criminal liability for negligent rape (Chapter 6 Section 1a) and negligent sexual abuse (Chapter 6 Section 3). Gross negligence is required for liability under the new regulations, rather than intention, as required for regular rape and sexual abuse in Chapter 6 Section 1 and 2. The penalty for negligent rape or negligent sexual abuse is at most four years.
The Criminal Code defines and criminalizes domestic violence under Article 194, which is the main legislation providing for domestic violence prosecution. Domestic violence is defined as the “use of violence, threat of attacks against life or body, insolent or ruthless behaviour [that] endangers the tranquility, physical integrity or mental condition of a member of his family.” The definition of “family member” does not include ex-spouses or unmarried partners who do not live together or have children. The penalties for domestic violence under the Criminal Code are fines or imprisonment for up to 15 years. In 2017, new crimes for stalking (Art. 138a) and sexual harassment (Art. 182a) were added to the Criminal Code. Additionally, the minimum statutory sentence for rape was increased from three years to five years. In 2019, amendments to the Criminal code introduced life imprisonment without conditional release for those who commit crimes of rape or murder of children, pregnant women, or disabled persons. New crimes for stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage were also introduced. (Unofficial English translation available here.)
Kodi Penal i Republikës së Kosovës (Penal Code of the Republic of Kosovo) (2018)
Pursuant to Article 143, one who commits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, knowing such offense is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, shall be punished by imprisonment of at least 15 years for committing crimes against humanity. Article 145 states that one who commits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 10 years for the commission of war crimes. Similarly, Article 147 punishes the same war crimes as Article 145 in conflicts of a non-international character. Articles 163 – 166 criminalize human trafficking, slavery, and related offenses including smuggling migrants and destroying victims’ identification papers. Penalties for violations of these articles include fines and imprisonment from between 1 – 12 years. Articles 179-180 prohibit sterilization without consent and female genital mutilation. The Criminal Code also punishes sexual violence including rape (Article 227), sexual harassment (Article 183), sexual assault (Article 228), and sex trafficking and forced prostitution (Articles 229, 234). Finally, Articles 239 and 248 contain gender-neutral bans on forced and early marriage and domestic violence, respectively. (Unofficial English version available here.)
This law defines, prohibits, and facilitates the treatment of perpetrators of domestic violence through a system of protection orders. The law stipulates family relationship to exist among persons beyond spouses and parent/child. It includes people who are/were engaged, in an extra-marital union, or co-habitating in a common household, and recognizes domestic violence to include abuses such as causing fear, insults, derogative behavior, and non-consensual sex. The law contemplates various protection measures that can be ordered by the courts, such as those prohibiting the approach or harassment of the victim, mandating medical treatment for substance abuse, and authorizing accompaniment by a police officer. A petition for a protection order or emergency protection order can be submitted by not only the victim and his/her representatives, but also by NGOs. The courts are required to render a decision within 15 days of receipt of a petition for protection order, and within 24 hours after the submission of a petition for emergency protection order. A protection order or emergency protection order shall be issued under the Law where the court suspects the perpetrator shall unavoidably risk the health, safety, or well-being of the protected party. A decision regarding a protection order or emergency protection order may be appealed, but the filing of the appeal does not stay the execution of the order. The Law further provides temporary emergency protection orders, petitions for which can be submitted to the police outside the courts’ working hours, which expire at the end of the next court working day. The police may issue a temporary emergency protection order if the perpetrator poses an immediate threat to the safety, healthy, or well-being of the protected party and the issuance of the order is necessary to protect against such a threat. A violation of a protection order, emergency protection order, or temporary emergency protection order is punishable by a fine of 200 to 2,000 Euros, or imprisonment of up to six months. (Unofficial English version available here.)
In 1998, the Penal Code Act was amended to make the offence of rape gender-neutral and to move away from a phallus-specific definition. The Amendment introduced a minimum sentence of 10 years to a maximum term of life imprisonment and made bail unavailable to persons accused of the offense. The amendment also made mandatory HIV testing for persons convicted of rape, and in the case wherein rape was accompanied by violence or the rapist was unaware of his or her HIV+ status, a minimum sentence of 15 years with corporal punishment was introduced. For cases wherein the convicted person was aware of his or her HIV status, the minimum sentence was set at 20 years imprisonment with corporal punishment. Excerpts of amended language available here.
Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) (2009)
This Act prescribes measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons with particular regard to victims who are women and children, and aims to assist victims of trafficking and facilitating efficient investigation of cases of trafficking. The offence of trafficking is committed if a person recruits, transports, transfer, harbors or receives another person within Jamaica, from Jamaica to another country, or from another country to Jamaica. A person found guilty of an offence in terms of the Act is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years.
Esta ley prescribe medidas para prevenir y combatir la trata de personas con especial atención a las víctimas que son mujeres y niños, y tiene como objetivo ayudar a las víctimas de la trata y facilitar la investigación eficaz de los casos de trata. El delito de trata se comete si una persona recluta, transporta, traslada, alberga o recibe a otra persona dentro de Jamaica, de Jamaica a otro país o de otro país a Jamaica. Una persona declarada culpable de este delito en los términos de la ley puede ser sancionada con una multa o con una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años.
This Act prohibits the employment of women in night work save in certain circumstances. Night work is recognized in the Act as “work in an industrial undertaking during the night.” The total hours of employment of women for both day and night work shall not exceed 10 hours in a 24 hour period. To ensure compliance with the Act and that no exploitation of women occurs, the Act provides for powers of inspection in industrial undertakings, and where it is found that an industrial undertaking obstructs any inspection or is guilty of an offence under this Act, it will be liable to a fine for summary conviction and in a default of payment thereof, imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. If a proprietor or manager of an industrial undertaking is found to be in contravention of the provisions of the Act, such person will be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.
Esta ley prohíbe el empleo de mujeres en el trabajo nocturno, salvo en determinadas circunstancias. El trabajo nocturno se reconoce en la ley como "trabajo en una empresa industrial durante la noche." El total de horas de empleo de las mujeres, tanto de día como de noche, no excederá de 10 horas en un período de 24 horas. Para asegurar el cumplimiento de la ley y que no se produzca ninguna explotación de mujeres, la ley establece poderes de inspección en las empresas industriales, y cuando se determine que una empresa industrial obstruye cualquier inspección o es culpable de un delito en virtud de esta ley, será sancionable con multa por condena sumaria y en su defecto de pago, pena privativa de la libertad de hasta tres meses. Si un propietario o gerente de una empresa industrial se encuentra en contravención de las disposiciones de la ley, esa persona será condenada a prisión por un período máximo de seis meses.
The Child Pornography (Prevention) Act prohibits the production, distribution, importation, exportation or possession of child pornography and the use of children for pornography A “Child” is a male or a female person under the age of 18 years. Child pornography constitutes any visual representation, any audio recording or written material depicting engagement of a child in sexual activity or depicts body parts of child for sexual purposes, or depicts a child subject to torture, cruelty, or physical abuse of a sexual context. A person who has custody of, charge or care of a child and knowingly causes or incites the involvement of a child in the production of child pornography commits an offence and will be liable for a fine or to imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 15 years. The production or distribution of child pornography carries a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years. Possession of child pornography carries a penalty of a fine or imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 8 years. The receipt of any financial benefit from any offence in terms of the act carries a penalty of a fine or imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 20 years. The act preserves the identity of the victims, thereby preventing any disclosure in relation to the victim. Any person that publishes information in contravention of the act shall be liable for a fine not exceeding one million dollars or imprisonment for a maximum period of 12 months.
La Ley (de prevención) de la pornografía infantil prohíbe la producción, distribución, importación, exportación o posesión de pornografía infantil y el uso de niños para la pornografía. Un "niño" es un hombre o una mujer menor de 18 años. La pornografía infantil constituye cualquier representación visual, cualquier grabación de audio o material escrito que represente la participación de un niño en una actividad sexual o que muestre partes del cuerpo de un niño con fines sexuales, o que represente a un niño sujeto a tortura, crueldad o abuso físico de un contexto sexual. Una persona que tiene la custodia, el cargo o el cuidado de un niño y, a sabiendas, causa o incita a la participación de un niño en la producción de pornografía infantil, comete un delito y será responsable de una multa o de prisión (o ambas) por un período máximo a 15 años. La producción o distribución de pornografía infantil conlleva una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años. La posesión de pornografía infantil conlleva una pena de multa o encarcelamiento (o ambos) por un período no superior a 8 años. La recepción de cualquier beneficio económico de cualquier delito en términos del acto conlleva una pena de multa o prisión (o ambas) por un período no superior a 20 años. El acto preserva la identidad de las víctimas, impidiendo así cualquier revelación en relación con la víctima. Toda persona que publique información en contravención a la ley será responsable de una multa que no exceda de un millón de dólares o pena de prisión por un período máximo de 12 meses.
Sexual Offences Act of 2011 (2009)
The Sexual Offences Act specifically outlaws many sex-based crimes, including rape, sexual assault, marital rape, sexual touching or interference, inducing or encouraging the violation of a child, indecent assault, violation of persons suffering from mental or physical disabilities, forcible abduction, procuration, unlawful detention with the intent to have sexual intercourse, and living on earnings of prostitution. It also amended certain laws and standards regarding consent. It abolished the common law presumption that a boy under fourteen years of age could not commit rape, and further noted that consent is “immaterial” in any offences involving a child. The Act restricts evidence that can be brought at rape trials, specifically preventing the complainant from being asked about his or her sexual history. It preserves the possibility of anonymity for persons bringing claims under the Sexual Offences Act. Finally, it creates a sex offender registry and mandates registration for persons convicted of sexual offences.
El Decreto de Ley de Delitos Sexuales prohíbe específicamente muchos delitos basados en el sexo, incluyendo la violación, la agresión sexual, la violación conyugal, el contacto o la interferencia sexual, la inducción o el fomento de la violación de un niño, la agresión indecente, la violación de personas que padecen discapacidades mentales o físicas, el secuestro forzoso, procuración, detención ilegal con la intención de tener relaciones sexuales y vivir de las ganancias de la prostitución. También modificó ciertas leyes y normas relativas al consentimiento. Abolió la presunción de derecho consuetudinario de que un niño menor de catorce años no podía cometer una violación y señaló además que el consentimiento es "inmaterial" en cualquier delito que involucre a un niño. La ley restringe las pruebas que pueden presentarse en los juicios por violación, específicamente evitando que se le pregunte al denunciante sobre su historial sexual. Preserva la posibilidad de mantener el anonimato para las personas que presenten demandas en virtud de la Ley de delitos sexuales. Por último, crea un registro de delincuentes sexuales y ordena el registro de personas condenadas por delitos sexuales.
The Domestic Violence Act (“DVA”), originally enacted in 1996 and amended in 2004, aims to provide protections for women and children domestic violence situations. It gives courts the power to grant protection and occupation orders. Applications for such orders can be brought by the victim or, in the case of a child, a parent, guardian, constable, or social worker can bring an application on the child’s behalf. The DVA sets forth the limitations imposed by protective orders, and it states courts can grant such an order if “it is satisfied that” the individual against whom the order is sought used or threatened to use violence, mental or physical, against the person seeking the order. Even without that showing, the court can grant a protective order if it finds the order necessary for the protection of the person “having regard to all circumstances.” The court can grant protection and occupation orders on an ex parte basis if the court deems it necessary. Punishment for violating an order is a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months, or both.
Section 51 of the Act provides for certain mandatory sentences and sentencing guidelines which a regional court or high court may impose and consider for, inter alia, rape and compelled rape (minimum sentences may be reduced for compelling and substantial circumstances). The Act specifically provides that when considering imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape, a court must not consider the following circumstances as constituting compelling circumstances to deviate from the minimum sentencing guidelines: the complainant’s sexual history, lack of physical injury, culture or religious beliefs of accused or any relationship of the parties prior to assault.
Kriminele Wet Wysigings Wet 105 (1997)
Seksuele geweld en verkragting
Artikel 51 van die Wet bepaal vir sekere verpligte vonnisse en vonnisriglyne wat 'n streekhof of hooggeregshof mag oplê en oorweeg vir, onder andere, verkragting en dwangverkragting (minimum vonnise kan verminder word vir dwingende en wesinglikke omstandighede Die Wet bepaal spesifiek dat ‘n hof nie die volgende omstandighede as dwangende omstandighede moet oorweeg om ‘n vonnis vir die misdryf van verkragting op te le nie, maar moet afwyk van die minimum riglyne vir vonnis oplegging: die seksuele geskiedenis van die klaer, ‘n gebrek aan liggaamlike besering, kultuur of godsdienstige oortuigings van beskuldigdes of enige verhouding van die partye voor aanranding.
This statute makes it illegal to harass or to knowingly and repeatedly follow another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Under the statute, stalking is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Virginia law prohibits that any person, except law enforcement officers acting in the capacity of the official duties, and registered private investigators acting in the course of their legitimate business, who on more than one occasion engages in conduct with the intent to place, or when that person knows or reasonably should know that the conduct places another person in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to that other person or to that other person’s family or household member is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. If the person contacts or follows or attempts to contact or follow the person after being given actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed, such actions are a prima facie evidence that the person intended to place that other person, or reasonably should have known that the other person was placed, in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to himself or a family or household member.
Article 144-A bans female genital mutilation and imposes a prison sentence of 2-10 years. Article 145 imposes greater penalties for offenses against physical integrity and female genital mutilation if the crime is committed, among other special circumstances, against the current or former spouse or a person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender; if the victim is pregnant; or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Article 118 provides that the statute of limitations on crimes of sexual violence and female genital mutilation against minors do not expire until the victim is at least 23 years old. Article 152 establishes the crime of domestic violence, punishable with imprisonment from 1-5 years. The crime consists of mental or physical abuse, including mistreatment, corporal punishment and sexual offenses, inflicted once or repeatedly on the following victims (1) a current or former spouse; (2) a person with whom the perpetrator has or had a relationship akin to a spousal relationship; (3) a parent of the perpetrator’s child; (4) a person who is incapable to defend him/herself due to age, disability, pregnancy, illness or economic dependency to the perpetrator. In addition, under Article 152, (1) the minimum imprisonment penalty is increased from one to two years if the perpetrator publicizes the victim’s personal information or any other private information (including information stored on audio or video) via Internet or other means available; (2) the perpetrator may be prohibited of having contact with the victim; (3) the perpetrator may be prohibited from being granted a gun license; (4) the perpetrator may lose parenting rights for up to 10 years. Also, Article 152 imposes a sentence of 2-8 years imprisonment if the domestic violence results in serious physical injury, which increases to imprisonment to 3-10 years if the domestic violence results in death.
O artigo 114 proíbe a realização de mutilação genital feminina, impondo pena de prisão de dois a 10 anos. O artigo 145 estabelece penas maiores aos crimes de ofensa contra a integridade física e mutilação genital feminina, se o crime for cometido, dentre outras circunstâncias, contra cônjuge ou ex-cônjuge ou contra pessoa no qual o agente tenha estabelecido um relacionamento romântico, independente do gênero ou do sexo, se a vítima estiver grávida ou se o crime for cometido em razão do gênero, orientação sexual ou identidade de gênero da vítima. O artigo 118 estabelece que os crimes contra a liberdade e autodeterminação sexual de menores, bem como no crime de mutilação genital feminina sendo a vítima menor, o procedimento criminal não se extingue, por efeito da prescrição, antes de o ofendido perfazer 23 anos. O artigo 152 versa sobre o crime de violência doméstica, punível com prisão de um a cinco anos. O crime consiste em abuso mental ou físico, incluindo maus-tratos, castigos corporais e ofensas sexuais, infligidos uma ou várias vezes às seguintes vítimas (1) atual ou ex-cônjuge; (2) uma pessoa com a qual o agente tem ou teve uma relação semelhante a uma relação conjugal; (3) um dos pais do filho do agente; (4) uma pessoa incapaz de se defender devido à idade, deficiência, gravidez, doença ou dependência econômica do agente. Além disso, nos termos do artigo 152, (1) a pena mínima de prisão é aumentada de um para dois anos se o agente divulgar as informações pessoais da vítima ou qualquer outra informação privada (inclusive informações armazenadas em áudio ou vídeo) via Internet ou outros meios disponíveis; (2) o agente pode ser proibido de entrar em contato com a vítima; (3) o agente pode ser proibido de receber uma licença de porte de arma; (4) o agente pode perder os direitos parentais por até 10 anos. Além disso, o Artigo 152 pune com prisão de dois a oito anos caso a violência doméstica resulte em sérios danos físicos e pune com prisão de três a dez anos se a violência doméstica resultar em morte.
This law criminalizes the act of human trafficking and sets out minimum and maximum sentencing standards (up to 15 years) for its various permutations, such as in assisting or abetting such a crime. It also states that Indonesia will cooperate with regional and international authorities in order to thwart any actions relating to human trafficking and sexual exploitation.
Peraturan ini mengkriminalisasikan tindak pidana perdagangan orang dan menetapkan standar hukuman minimum dan maksimum (maksimal 15 tahun) untuk berbagai bentuknya, seperti dalam membantu dan bersengkongkol tindak pidana tersebut. Peraturan juga menyatakan bahwa Indonesia akan bekerja sama dengan otoritas regional dan internasional untuk menggagalkan setiap tindakan yang berkaitan dengan perdagangan manusia dan eksploitasi seksual.
Trafficking in Persons Act (2005)
This act defines human trafficking and provides punishment for and methods of preventing human trafficking. §1.100-§1.102 of the act define human trafficking as including recruitment, transportation, and retention of a person by force or coercion for the purpose of slavery, forced labor, keeping a person in a state of servitude, prostitution, other commercial sexual exploitation, and removal of human organs. §3 provides that a person that commits trafficking must pay restitution to the victim. §7 provides that the Court shall sentence a person convicted of human trafficking to prison for at least one year, and that the offender can be sentenced to prison for longer periods under different situations. §8 provides that the fact that the victim was old enough to consent to sex shall not serve as a defense to the human trafficking offense. While §9 provides that the victim is immune from the prostitution or other criminal offenses caused by human trafficking. Art. II, §1 provides that the President shall implement a National Plan to prevent human trafficking and shall appoint members to a task force on implementation, which shall be led by the Minister of Labor. The Law also provides that a victim has a right to restitution including damages to compensate for costs of medical treatment, rehabilitation, transportation costs, lost income, legal fees, and general compensation for distress and pain as well as any other loss suffered. Compensation is paid by the defendant directly to the victim upon conviction. The right to restitution is not affected by the victim returning to his or her home country or by the victim not being present in Liberia. Section 9 provides immunity to any immigration offence that may have been committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Additionally, under Section 8, the Law confirms that consent to sex is not a valid defence to trafficking when violence is used to commit the crime. The Law also imposes corporate liability on international transport companies that fail to verify that passengers in company vehicles which enter other countries have the requisite travel documentation. A company may be fined for failing to comply. Additionally, a company that knowingly facilitates trafficking is liable for the cost of accommodating and providing meals to the victim and any dependent.
The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) adopted in 2011. As a result of these amendments, forced marriage (i.e. forcing a person to marry or to continue being in a forced marriage, or to enter into a cohabitation without official registration of marriage, or to continue such cohabitation) is punishable by restraint of liberty for up to three years or imprisonment for the same period and domestic violence (i.e. deliberate systematic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in family or intimate relationship, leading to physical or psychological suffering, disorder of health, disability, emotional dependence) is punishable with a sentence of public work for up to 240 hours, detention for up to six months, restraint of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. In addition, the amendments: (i) introduce new crimes, such as “illegal abortion or sterilization” (i.e., performed by a person without medical education or without consent of the victim) which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years; (ii) establish punishment for rape of a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in a family or intimate relationship (imprisonment for up to 10 years); and (iii) increase punishment for sexual violence to up to 15 years, if such acts resulted in serious consequences.
This legislation introduces the concept of “domestic violence,” which is defined as act (or omission) of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence (intentional deprivation of housing, food, clothing, other property, funds or documents or the ability to use them; leaving without care; hampering the receipt of necessary treatment or rehabilitation services; prohibition of, or compulsion to, work; prohibition of studies; and other offenses of an economic nature) committed within a family or between relatives, or between spouses or ex-spouses, former or current spouses, or other persons who have lived together as a family, irrespective of whether the person who committed domestic violence lives (or lived) together with the victim, as well as a threat of similar actions. The Act contains a series of governmental steps aimed at combatting domestic violence and improving the status of victims of domestic violence, which includes that the Ukrainian government (i) maintain a unified state register of cases of domestic violence and sex-based violence; (ii) establish a domestic violence call center; (iii) adopt immediate injunctions with respect to domestic violence offenders; (iv) provide free legal, medical, social, and psychological assistance to all victims in all cases of domestic violence; and (v) reimburse inflicted harm and damage to the victim’s physical and psychological health. The Act, through amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses Act and the Criminal Code, makes domestic violence or sex-based violence without grave consequences punishable by a fine in the amount of 20 non-taxable minimal income wages or public works for up to 30 - 40 hours or administrative detention for up to 10 days. If such actions are repeated within a year, the punishment is increased up to 40 non-taxable minimal income wages, public works for a period of up to 60 hours, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days. Domestic violence or sex-based violence that results in grave consequences is punishable by public works for up to 240 hours or detention for up to six months or imprisonment for up to two years.
Закон України «Про захист від насильства в сім’ї» (далі – «Закон») вводить поняття «домашнє насильство», яке визначається як діяння (дії або бездіяльність) фізичного, сексуального, психологічного або економічного насильства, що вчиняються в сім’ї чи в межах місця проживання або між родичами, або між колишнім чи теперішнім подружжям, або між іншими особами, які спільно проживають (проживали) однією сім’єю, але не перебувають (не перебували) у родинних відносинах чи у шлюбі між собою, незалежно від того, чи проживає (проживала) особа, яка вчинила домашнє насильство, у тому самому місці, що й постраждала особа, а також погрози вчинення таких діянь. (Економічне насильство - форма домашнього насильства, що включає умисне позбавлення житла, їжі, одягу, іншого майна, коштів чи документів або можливості користуватися ними, залишення без догляду чи піклування, перешкоджання в отриманні необхідних послуг з лікування чи реабілітації, заборону працювати, примушування до праці, заборону навчатися та інші правопорушення економічного характеру). Закон містить низку заходів, спрямованих на боротьбу з домашнім насильством та покращення статусу жертв домашнього насильства, серед яких, зокрема, ведення урядом України Єдиного державного реєстру випадків домашнього насильства та сексуального насильства та створення відповідного кол-центру, прийняття невідкладних заходів щодо винних у домашньому насильстві, надання безоплатної правової допомоги всім потерпілим у всіх випадках домашнього насильства, безоплатної медичної, соціальної та психологічної допомоги, відшкодування завданої шкоди. Кодексом України про адміністративні правопорушення передбачено відповідальність за домашнє насильство (без тяжких наслідків) у вигляді штрафу в розмірі двадцяти неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадські роботи на строк до від 30 до 40 годин або адміністративний арешт на строк до 10 семи діб. Кримінальний Кодекс передбачає відповідальність за домашнє насильство (яке спричинило тяжкі наслідки)у вигляді громадських робіт на строк до 240 годин або арешту на строк до 6 місяців, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. У разі повторного вчинення подібних дій протягом року передбачається посилення покарання: штраф до 40 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян, громадські роботи на строк до 60 годин або адміністративний арешт на строк до 15 діб.
Article 147 of the Islamic Penal Code specifies that the age of maturity triggering criminal responsibility is 15 Islamic lunar calendar years for boys, but only nine Islamic lunar calendar years for girls. This signifies that young girls can be charged as criminally responsible adults in Iran before they reach the age of puberty. Articles 237-239 forbid same-sex kissing and touching, which will be punished by 31-74 lashes. Female genital touching (musaheqeh) is punished by 100 lashes. Article 225 mandates the death penalty for adultery (zina), which international commentators have noted is disproportionately applied to women (e.g., UN Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women report: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/A-68-340.pdf). Article 199 describes the number and gender of witnesses needed to prove various crimes; no crimes may be proven with female witnesses alone and any female witness requires corroboration of a man and another woman. (Full Persian version of the Penal Code available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103202)
International Case Law
Valiulienė prieš Lietuvą (Valiuliene v. Lithuania) European Court of Human Rights (2013)
The applicant suffered continuous mental and physical abuse by her partner. She brought a complaint to the court, which was forwarded to the public prosecutor, after which the investigations were discontinued on multiple occasions. When the applicant tried to start a new request, it was refused because of the statute of limitations. The ECtHR ruled that the criminal investigation into the acts of violence was ineffective and breached Article 3 of the Convention, which dictates that no one should be “subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The applicant was awarded non-pecuniary damages.
Pareiškėja patyrė nuolatinį psichinį ir fizinį smurtą nuo savo partnerio. Ji pateikė teismui skundą, kuris buvo perduotas prokurorui, tačiau tyrimas buvo nutrauktas kelis kartus. Kai pareiškėja bandė pateikti naują prašymą, jis buvo atmestas dėl senaties termino. EŽTT nusprendė, kad baudžiamasis tyrimas dėl smurto veiksmų buvo neveiksmingas ir pažeidė Konvencijos 3 straipsnį, kuris diktuoja, kad niekas neturėtų būti „kankinamas ir nepatirtų nežmoniško ar žeminančio elgesio ar baudimo“. Pareiškėjai priteista neturtinė žala. Vertimas lietuvių kalba: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175424
Saadia Ali v. Tunisia CAT Committee (2008)
Saadia Ali, a dual French/Tunisian citizen, was attempting to obtain an official document from the court of first instance in Tunis when she was taken into custody, stripped of her clothing, and beaten by a prison guard in front of fifty male prisoners for verbally criticizing a Tunisian public official. Upon regaining consciousness, Ali was given a summary trial without due process and a suspended sentence of three months imprisonment for attacking a public official. Ali’s lawyer initiated a complaint with the office of the State prosecutor, which rejected the complaint without further explanation. In her complaint to the Committee Against Torture, Ali alleged violations of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT), and cited violations of internationally recognized standards on the administration of justice and articles 25 and 26 of Tunisia’s Code of Criminal Procedure. The Committee held that Tunisia’s actions towards Ali were tantamount to torture and violated articles 1, 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Convention. The deliberate infliction of severe pain and suffering upon Ali by Tunisian public officials constituted torture under article 1 and cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment within the meaning of article 16. The Committee also held that the State’s dismissal of the complaint and delay in investigating Ali’s case established a violation of articles 12 and 13, under which a State has the obligation to promptly investigate allegations of torture. The State’s failure to act on the complaint and immediately launch an investigation equated to a breach of the State’s obligations under article 14 to provide redress to victims of torture in the form of restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.