Women and Justice: Keywords

Section 144 of the Crimes Act 1961 “provides for the prosecution of New Zealanders for conduct which, if it had occurred in New Zealand, would be contrary to specified provisions of the Crimes Act involving sexual offending against children and young people.” The appellant, a New Zealander, was found guilty of a sex crime against a child. The crime was committed in Russia and the other offender in the case was a Russian man. At issue on appeal was whether the aforementioned law allowed for “the prosecution of a New Zealander (being LM) on the basis of party liability for “offending” where the principal “offender” is not a New Zealander.” The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant was in fact liable as a principal and noting that a miscarriage of justice had not occurred. Furthermore, the Court stated that a “wrong decision” regarding party liability “does not warrant the allowing of the appeal.”

The claimant was born in Somalia and left the country when her home was destroyed and four men attempted to rape her. The claimant sought residence in the Netherlands as a refugee under Immigration Act 2000. She argued that women in Central and Southern Somalia were systematically exposed to inhuman treatment. The claimant submitted reports that abuse and rape of women, by civilians and armed groups, was frequent, and that displaced women were particularly vulnerable during their flight. Gang rape was widespread, and victims (including young girls and boys) were selected at random. Further, rape is almost never prosecuted and the victims are discriminated against because they are seen as “unclean.” The report further stated that women in Somalia do not have access to justice and receive no protection from authorities. Human Rights Watch and UN reports also described women as suffering the brunt of abuse and repression cultivated by al-Shabaab’s decrees, including forced marriage, female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and gender-based violence. The District Court opined that women are in a vulnerable position in Central and Southern Somalia and, therefore, run the risk of suffering violence and human rights violations, and cannot obtain effective protection. They are therefore a group worthy of protection from inhuman treatment and torture.

The issue here was whether violation of official duty of a doctor was considered sexual abuse under the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"). A was the working doctor when B went for a breast ultrasonography. A had touched B's breast with bare hands and complemented her on her breasts. A had also massaged gel on the breasts with his hands and several times touched B's breasts. A had also, after getting permission from B, suckled the breasts in order to get excretion. The District Court and the Court of Appeal held that the procedure was not appropriate but did not amount to sexual abuse. The questionbefore the Supreme Court was whether the procedure had a sexual purpose. According to Chapter 20 Section 5(1) of the Criminal Code, a person who abuses his or her position and entices another into engaging in sexual intercourse or another sexual act or submitting to such an act should be sentenced for sexual abuse. The Court held that the procedures that A performed deviated from established and medically recommended practice. As a whole the procedure was done in a way that strongly indicated the purpose of sexual arousal or satisfaction. The fact that B had reacted only afterwards was not significant. The Court held that doctor and patient are not in an equal position and the fact that a patient agrees to a medical examination does not imply that the patient would give up her sexual self-determination. The Court saw that A had misused his position as a doctor and found A guilty of sexual abuse and violation of an official duty in accordance with Chapter 40 Section 9(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court found that this was only a single incident towards a consenting adult and sentenced A to pay 80 days-fine and damages to B of 1,200 Euros.

A male schoolteacher was accused of sexually abusing one of his female students, a third-grader, and was removed from his job pending the outcome of his trial. He filed a constitutional challenge to his removal, arguing that it violated his due process right to a presumption of innocence, as enumerated in Article 2 of the Peruvian Political Constitution. The court of first instance agreed with the teacher, ordering the school system to reinstate him. The school system argued that the Law of Teachers ("Ley de Profesorado") allows for termination of a teacher without a conviction. The Constitutional Tribunal held that while professionals normally cannot be removed from a job until proven guilty, the interest of protecting minor children outweighed the interest of the teacher in this case. The Court held that the teacher's removal was consistent with Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 2 of the Interamerican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, as well as numerous other Peruvian laws.

A high school teenage girl from an impoverished neighborhood consented to undergo job training as a receptionist at the appellant's escort agency. She alleged that during her training, the appellant held her against her will, and raped and sexually assaulted her. The appellant argued that his conviction should be overturned because the victim had consented. The court dismissed the kidnapping charges, but upheld the rape and sexual assault charges. The court acknowledged that although the victim consented to parts of the training (i.e. wearing lingerie and taking up residence at the employer's compound), she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the appellant. The court also noted that because of the appellant's age (twice that of the victim) and his promise of employment, he exercised a dominant position over the victim that made it difficult for her to refuse his advances.

'n Tienermeisie op hoërskool uit 'n verarmde woonbuurt het toegestem dat sy as ontvangsdame by die escort-agentskap van die appellant werksopleiding sal kry.. Sy beweer dat appellant haar tydens haar opleiding teen haar wil vasgehou het, en haar verkrag en seksueel aangerand het. Die appellant het aangevoer dat sy skuldigbevinding omgekeer moet word omdat die slagoffer toestemming gegee het. Die hof het die aanklagte van ontvoering van die hand gewys, maar die aanklagte van verkragting en seksuele aanranding bevestig. Die hof het erken dat hoewel die slagoffer toestemming gegee het vir dele van die opleiding (d.w.s. om onderklere aan te trek en in die werkgewer se verblyf in te woon), sy nie tot seksuele omgang met die appellant toestem het nie. Die hof het ook opgemerk dat weens die ouderdom van die appellant (twee keer die van die slagoffer) en sy belofte vir indiensneming ,'n dominante posisie oor die slagoffer uitgeoefen het, wat dit vir haar moeilik gemaak het om sy aanvoeringe te weier.

The petitioner, convicted of having sexual intercourse with a minor in exchange for payment, filed a lawsuit in the Seoul Administrative Court against the Commission on Youth Protection ("Commission"), requesting that the Commission revoke its decision to publicly disclose the petitioner's identity (name, age, birthdate, vocation and address, with summary of the crime). The Administrative Court thereafter filed a request to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review of the provisions of the Juvenile Sex Protection Act ("the Act"). The Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Act which required the Commission to disclose the personal information (name, age, occupation, address) of the sex offenders convicted of purchasing sex from minors, is constitutional. The Court held that the Act intends to effect crime prevention, and to protect minors from sexual offenses, "thereby protecting their human rights and helping them to grow up to be sound members of society."

In this public interest litigation, the case at issue concerned six women who were sexually assaulted and raped on a commuter train. The Court set out new requirements for police dealing with rape victims, including that victims be provided with legal representation, informing the victim of all her rights before questioning her, and protecting her anonymity during trial. The court also ordered that the criminal compensation board consider the totality of the circumstances, ranging from the emotional pain of the act itself to medical costs and emotional pain associated with any child that might result from the rape when setting out compensation to be paid.

Charges were brought against defendant for allegedly sexually abusing his 14-year old daughter for a period of 30 days while they were in Argentina. The lower court found defendant guilty of aggravated rape, in violation of Article 308-2 and 310-2 of the Penal Code. Upon defendant's appeal, the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the victim's testimony coupled with that of the defendant's brother, who witnessed and first reported the rape, was sufficient evidence to convict the plaintiff.

Se presentaron cargos contra el acusado por presuntamente abusar sexualmente de su hija de 14 años durante un período de 30 días mientras se encontraban en Argentina. El tribunal de primera instancia declaró al acusado culpable de violación agravada, específicamente, en violación de los Artículos 308-2 y 310-2 del Código Penal. Tras la apelación del acusado, el Tribunal confirmó el fallo del tribunal inferior, sosteniendo que el testimonio de la víctima junto con el del hermano del acusado, que presenció y denunció por primera vez la violación, era prueba suficiente para condenar al demandante.

Appellant appealed his indictment for aggravated rape, assault, and torture and acts of barbarism against his wife, arguing that marriage creates a presumption of consent to sexual relations between spouses. The Court found that such a presumption is not conclusive and that Section 332 of the Penal Code, which defines rape as "[a]ny act of sexual penetration, whatever its nature, committed against another person by violence, constraint, threat or surprise," does not exclude the possibility of rape within a marital relationship where there is a lack of consent. Furthermore, the same reasoning applies to sexual abuse other than penetration. The Court thus recognized that rape and other sexual abuse can take place within a marital relationship.

L'appelant a été inculpé pour viol aggravé, agression, torture, et actes de barbarism contre sa femme. Il a fail appel, faisant valoir que le fait d’être marié cré une présomption de consentement aux relations sexuelles entre époux. La cour a trouvé qu’une telle présomption n’est pas concluante et que l’article 332 de la code pénale, qui précise que le viol est n’importe quel acte de penetration commis contre une autre personne par violence, constaint, menace, ou surprise, n’exclus pas la possibilité de viol dans les limites d’un marriage s’il n’y a pas de consentement. De plus, la même raisonnement applique aux types d’abus sexuel autres que la pénetration.