Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Doe”) filed a lawsuit under a pseudonym and alleged 23 causes of action including human trafficking, sexual battery, forced labor and involuntary servitude against Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Penzato. Mrs. Penzato had offered Doe $1,500 per month, free room and board, and transportation to the United States in exchange for child care and housekeeping services. Doe accepted the offer and moved to San Francisco, California. Doe alleged that during her employment Defendants physically assaulted her, sexually molested her, threatened her with cancellation of her visa, and abused or exploited her in various other ways. She eventually left the Penzatos’ household and moved to a transitional housing residence for female victims of violence. Doe filed a motion for a protective order and requested permission to proceed with the lawsuit under a pseudonym. Doe argued that this was necessary to avoid additional psychological trauma due to the sensitive and personal nature of her claims. Further, she argued that the use of a pseudonym would help maintain the safety and anonymity of her fellow transitional housing residents. Defendants argued that because they were publically accused of sexual abuse, human trafficking, and forced labor, Doe should also be publicly exposed. Defendants also argued that they would be prejudiced by the extra effort they would have to take to keep her identity a secret. The court granted Doe’s motion and allowed her to proceed under a pseudonym, holding that Doe’s need to remain anonymous outweighed Defendants’ arguments and the public’s interest in knowing her identity. The court noted the strong interest in protecting sexual assault victims’ identities—to encourage them to report the assaults without fear of being stigmatized as a sexual assault victim.
Women and Justice: Keywords
Rowland was charged in a one-count indictment with possession of a firearm and ammunition after former conviction of a felony. One of the former convictions was sexual battery. The district court determined that the felony of sexual battery under Oklahoma law constituted a crime of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and, as such, could be used to enhance his felon in possession of a firearm sentence. Rowland appealed his conviction, specifically contesting the characterization of his prior conviction for sexual battery as premised upon conduct constituting a crime of violence. On appeal, the circuit court noted that Oklahoma’s sexual battery statute presupposed lack of consent, which implicated serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The court then went on to explain that physical injury need not be a certainty for a crime to pose a serious risk of physical injury; the possibility that a crime may be completed without injury is irrelevant to the determination of whether it constitutes a crime of violence which can be used to increase a base offense level for firearms offense conviction. Under this analysis, the court held that sexual battery, under Oklahoma law, implicates a concomitant serious risk of physical injury, and therefore Rowland’s sexual battery conviction was a “crime of violence” that could be used to enhance his sentence.