Uganda

Uganda allows for customary law to govern many situations, but the Succession Act restricts their applicability in inheritance cases. It enshrines women’s right to inherit from husbands, but also privileges men because 1) the property of a married woman who dies intestate automatically will go to her spouse, unlike a man who dies intestate; 2) the matrimonial home will go to the legal heir, the determination of which prioritizes male relatives; 3) a widow (or widows in polygamous marriages, who must share) may only inherit 15% of her husband’s estate; and 4) maintenance and occupancy rights of widows terminate if they remarry.

Original Act (1906)

The Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act of 2009 (the “PTPA”) defines and prohibits human trafficking and aggravated trafficking. The PTPA mandates punishment for trafficking in persons, trafficking in children, using the labor of a trafficked person, promoting trafficking, attempts to traffic persons, and aiding and abetting trafficking. The PTPA also provides for the protection of and non-discrimination against trafficked persons, including that they not be held liable for any crimes committed as a direct result of the trafficking, that survivors be provided with legal advice throughout the proceedings, and that survivors shall be provided with medical care or social services. The sentences for trafficking in persons, aggravated trafficking, and trafficking in children are, respectively, fifteen years imprisonment, life imprisonment, and death.

The Land Act, after amendments, protects a spouse’s occupancy of family land and requires their consent for any transaction involving the land on which they live or use for sustenance, but does not provide for automatic co-ownership between spouses. Any decision that unconstitutionally disfavors the property rights of women and children is invalid. The Act also requires that land management mechanisms have at least 1/3 female members.

2004 Amendments (spousal rights added)

2010 Amendments

The Employment (Sexual Harassment) Regulations of 2012 (the “ESH Regulations”) define, prohibit, and provide punishments for sexual harassment in the workplace. The ESH Regulations were produced by the Directorate of Labour pursuant to the powers conferred by the Employment Act of 2006 (sec. 7, 97(1)). The Regulations require employers with more than 25 employees to institute measures to prevent sexual harassment, including a written sexual harassment policy, providing the written policy to all employees with a copy, posting the policy in a public area, conducting regular trainings, and designating a “gender sensitive” person to handle sexual harassment complaints. The Regulations also provide reporting guidelines, prohibition of retaliation, and appeals processes. The penalty for sexual harassment is a fine not to exceed six currency points (a currency point is 20,000 USH) and/or imprisonment not to exceed three months.

The Domestic Violence Act of 2010 (the “DVA”) defines and prohibits domestic violence. The penalty for domestic violence is imprisonment not to exceed two years or the payment of a fine not to exceed forty-eight currency points, or both. At the Court’s discretion, the perpetrator may also have to provide monetary compensation to the victim. Romantic and other familial relationships are “domestic,” and marriage is expressly not required. Domestic violence complaints may be brought before local council courts (“LC courts”) pursuant to the procedures outlined in the DVA, which require that the LC refer the matter to the police and local magistrate court if the perpetrator is a repeat offender, the perpetrator is likely to continue to harm the victim, and the LC court’s opinion is that police and magistrate court involvement is warranted. LC courts must also inform the police and magistrate if there are children involved in the domestic relationship. Appeals and other procedural details about LC court proceedings can be found in the Local Council Act of 2006. In complaints made to police officers, survivors have the right to give their statement to an officer of the same sex. The DVA requires that magistrate courts follow the Family and Children Court Rules (from the Children Act of 2006) in domestic violence cases. Finally, the DVA sets parameters for interim and permanent protection orders. The DVA and the Penal Code do not criminalize a husband’s rape of his wife, or so-called “marital rape.” A proposed bill, the Domestic Relations Bill of 2003, would criminalize such actions, but Parliament has repeatedly declined to pass it.

Here, the Court held that failure to register a customary marriage did not necessarily invalidate it and that one can be considered customarily married as soon as the customary ceremonies of a tribe have been performed.

Here, Justice Lydia Mugambe held that Mulago National Referral Hospital’s negligence and the resulting disappearance of the couple’s baby amounted to psychological torture for the parents and violated their rights to health and access to information. Specifically, Justice Mugambe held that a woman’s inability to access sufficient antenatal care demonstrates a failure on the part of the State to fulfill its obligations under the right to health. The decision outlines Uganda’s obligations under international law to devote special attention and resources to women whose circumstances make them vulnerable.

Here, the Court held that government officials violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff by illegally raiding plaintiff’s home without a search warrant, seizing plaintiff’s documents related to her work as an advocate for the human rights of LGBTQ persons, and illegally arresting a guest present at plaintiff’s home during the raid. Later, at the police station, plaintiff’s guest was forcibly undressed and fondled to “determine” her sex. The Court held that plaintiff and plaintiff’s guest were treated in an inhuman and degrading manner amounting to sexual harassment and indecent assault.

The three defendants were indicted for the murder of Nabwire Harriet and Nakamate Gaita, an infant. August 27, 2002, the family received an anonymous letter telling them to leave their house, which they reported to authorities. The next night, the defendants poured petrol through the window and set the house on fire. Defendant Seruga hired the other two defendants to burn the house because they believed they family was practicing witchcraft. The defendants were seen together the night of the fire and heard discussing how they committed the crime afterwards. After their arrest, the defendants confessed to working together to set the fire, which they recanted at arraignment. The trial court found them guilty and sentenced the three to death, but vacated the second death sentences for the second victim because an execution cannot be carried out twice.

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a baby girl and was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. Appellant was a relative of the child and was known as a teacher of Christianity. Appellant requested a more lenient sentence of 10 years. The Court of Appeals ruled against Appellant and increased his sentence to 25 years, citing the policy consideration that, despite the fact that defilement can be punishable by death, individuals still continue to defile babies. Thus, the court used this case as an opportunity to send a message to society that “violating the rights of child females must stop.”

The petitioner requests a divorce from the respondent and money to care for the parties’ daughter, for whom the petitioner is the sole caregiver. The parties were married in July 2008 in Uganda and then moved to Woburn, Massachusetts, USA. The respondent husband physically abused his wife, especially when intoxicated. During the time they lived together, the respondent usually slept in the sitting room. For three years they lived apart, but were reconciled by relatives. During the reconciliation, the parties had a daughter. The respondent was never involved in caring for the child and eventually left the family home to live with his mother 45 minutes away. The petitioner returned to Uganda where she is the sole parent and provider for her daughter. The court granted the request for a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The court explained that the best interests of the child control all determinations relating to children. The court granted the petitioner custody of the daughter and $400 (USD or the USh equivalent) per month from the respondent for their daughter’s maintenance.

The appellant was convicted of having carnal knowledge of a person against the order of nature (i.e., homosexual sex acts, in this case anal sexual intercourse) in violation of section 145 of the Penal Code Act. On appeal, appellant’s counsel emphasized the State offered no evidence of penetration, that corroboration is necessary in cases of sexual offenses, and the compromised credibility of several material prosecution witnesses, including a complainant. Four years before the trial when he was 17 or 18, the complainant testified that he went to the Appellant’s home for a party, which never happened. Instead, the Appellant gave the complainant a glass of wine and the complainant blacked out. The next thing he remembered was anal bleeding and seeing the defendant entering the room. The complainant testified that he was too ashamed to ask what happened. The following day went to the doctor, who told the complainant that it seemed that he had been sodomized and gave him medication. The appellate judge agreed with the trial judge that this did not amount to direct evidence of a sexual act. Four years later in 2013, the complainant told Reverend Solomon Male about the assault after hearing him on the radio. The police then searched the appellant’s home where they found chloroform, which the complainant was not examined for at his 2009 doctor’s appointment. Both the trial and appellate judges noted that the fact that the complainant did not tell any of his housemates about his bleeding or assault at the time cast doubt on his account. While medical evidence is not required for sexual assault cases, the court here was concerned that it found no evidence at all of sexual assault. The Court found that the trial judge erred in finding that the complainant’s failure to report the assault in 2009 was “a natural reaction” as a result of shame, especially because no psychologist or behavioral specialist testified at trial. The appellate court quashed the defendant’s conviction and sentence after finding that the prosecution failed to prove the first element of the offense, penetration, beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court also mentioned a key witness’, Pastor Solomon Male’s, publication of “malicious information of sodomy” against Ugandan pastor Robert Kayanja, which is a reference to an incident in which a boy who had accused Kayanja of sodomy withdrew his accusations and said that Male and several of his colleagues paid him and other boys to accuse the minister. In that case, Male and his clergy colleagues were convicted of conspiring to destroy Kayanja’s name and professional reputation.

The complainant was carrying a bag of maize on the back of her bicycle. When the bag fell off, the defendant and two of his colleagues offered to help. Two then raped her and the third stole her bicycle. They fled when a friend of the complainant came up the road on his motorcycle. The victim recognized her attackers and identified them to the police. She also went to the hospital for a medical examination. The defendant denied the charges and claimed never to have seen the victim before court proceedings began. The trial court found credible the complainant and the prosecution’s other corroborating witnesses, which included the complainant's male friend who found her immediately after the rapes, local council members, and police. The Court made clear that the lack of medical evidence was not dispositive. As a first time offender who had served over three years awaiting trial, the Court sentenced the defendant to an additional 18 months imprisonment.

The trial court sentenced the 25-year-old Appellant to 17 years in prison after finding him guilty of raping a 70-year-old widow from a neighboring village. The trial court rejected the defense that he was not in her village at the time of the rape. The trial court found that in November 1998 the Appellant broke into the home of the victim, who confronted him with a panga (machete). While raping her after disarming her, the victim called out and the Appellant, worried about being caught, fled with her panga. The police found the panga in his home the next day and he was arrested. The Appellant contested his sentence, arguing that it was manifestly harsh because he has a wife, two children, and two young brothers to care for. The State contended that the sentence was appropriate because of the victim’s age and family circumstances. The standard for appellate court interference is a sentence that is “manifestly excessive or low in view of the circumstances of the case.” The Court noted that the crime of rape, particularly the rape of “grandmothers,” is prevalent in the area and very serious. The Court held “[t]he appellant raped an old lady. That was bad. However, considering all the circumstances of the case, we think that a sentence of 17 years imprisonment was manifestly so excessive as to cause a miscarriage of justice” and reduced the sentence to seven years.

Members of Freedom and Roam Uganda (“FARUG”) sued the Attorney General and Minister of Ethics and Integrity Simon Lokodo for violating their constitutional rights to freedom of assembly, right to participate in peaceful civil society activity, and right to equal treatment before the law. In February 2012, Minister Lokodo personally appeared at and ordered closed down a FARUG-hosted “project planning, advocacy, human rights, leadership, and business skills” workshop in 2012 on the grounds that the workshop was an “illegal gathering of [h]omosexuals.” The respondents argued that Uganda Penal Code (sec. 148) prohibits homosexual acts, which includes the prohibition of direct or indirect encouragement, incitement, and conspiracy to commit the offense. Citing the Uganda Penal Code, Constitution of Uganda, and African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Court held that individual human rights are not absolute and may be restricted in the public interest as long as the restrictions do not amount to political persecution. Calling the workshops “a pretext for human rights advocacy to promote homosexual acts which are prohibited by the Ugandan laws,” the Court rejected Applicants’ freedom of expression arguments because their activities constituted “offenses against morality” and “prejudicial to the public interest.” In response to Applicants’ use of international human rights law, the Court held that Uganda’s “different laws and moral values” require different definitions and protections of the public interest than those cited in precedent from the UN, South Africa, the European Court of Human Rights, Hong Kong, etc. The Court also rejected the suit against the Minister of Ethics and Integrity in his individual capacity because he was acting in his official capacity, meaning the Attorney General was the only proper respondent.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and aggravated child trafficking for transporting minor girls, who were promised supermarket jobs in Uganda, from Rwanda to Uganda for the purposes of forced unpaid household labor and prostitution. The accused pleaded not guilty and maintained that she transported the girls to Uganda with their parents’ permission for a holiday. The Court found her guilty of the charges related to two of the girls, but found that one of the girls was over the age of majority (19 years old). The Court sentenced the accused to two concurrent terms of imprisonment: eight years for aggravated child trafficking and five years for trafficking in persons.

The accused is charged with murdering his wife with a hoe. The couple’s son lived nearby and heard his parents fighting. He interrupted his parents’ fight and tried to stop it, but the accused grabbed a hoe and struck his wife in the head, which killed her. The accused denied his son’s testimony and said his wife was attacked while out with him. The Court found the son’s testimony credible and rejected the accused’s statements. The Court sentenced the accused to 40 years imprisonment.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of murdering his wife after an hours-long fight. Medical evidence showed that the victim died of blunt force trauma and “increased incranial pressure.” Family members and friends testified to witnesses numerous instances of the accused committed violence against the victim. Explaining that domestic violence is one of the most pressing societal problems in Uganda today, the judge sentenced the defendant to 30 years imprisonment.

The accused pleaded not guilty to aggravated defilement for performing a sexual act with his 15-year-old daughter. The judge found the accused guilty despite his denial because of DNA testing of the victim’s twin children, the testimony of the victim, and the testimony of a social worker. In dicta before sentencing, the judge stated that African traditions must be upheld and American and European abhorrent practices like sodomy and homosexuality must be avoided. The judge added that even these cultures reject incest. Then the judge sentenced the defendant to 25 years, including four years subtracted for remand served.

The trial court found the appellant guilty of attempted murder for splashing acid on the female complainant. The appellant allegedly knocked on the victim’s door on July 28, 2001, and splashed “a corrosive substance.” The trial court relied on testimony from a security guard and the victim, who knew her attacker from school. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in confirming the life imprisonment sentence. The Court, after reviewing the testimony identifying the appellant, her motive, and the “vulnerable parts of the victim’s body” that were burned, found that the life sentence was reasonable for the “outrageously despicable and sadistic act.”

The defendant paid for his girlfriend’s abortion and hospital expenses for the ensuing complications, after which the girlfriend’s mother discovered their sexual relationship. The mother reported to the police that the defendant had sexual intercourse with her 17-year-old daughter, a violation of section 129(1) of the Penal Code Act Revised Laws of Uganda. The Court found that the prosecutor did not prove the girl’s age beyond a reasonable doubt because they did not provide a birth certificate and the alleged victim believed and had previously stated that she was 19 years old.

Appellant was convicted of defilement of a four-year-old girl. The victim was sent to a well to fetch water for her family. On the victim’s way to the well, appellant grabbed the victim, threw her to the ground, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. He then fled but was later arrested. At trial, appellant denied the charges and claimed that the victim’s father had framed him. The trial court rejected his claim and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. On appeal, appellant requested a sentence reduction from 14 years to eight years. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the 14-year sentence was not inappropriate or excessive, and that, in light of the circumstances, there was no reason to reduce the sentence.

Petitioners challenged the tribal practice of female genital mutilation and argued that it is inconsistent with the Ugandan Constitution. They argued that the practice is cruel, inhuman, and degrading, and endangers the right to life and privacy under the Constitution. The two issues before the court were whether the petition raised any matter for constitutional interpretation and whether the practice of female genital mutilation should be declared as null and void under the constitution. At trial, petitioners produced unchallenged affidavits supporting the fact that female genital mutilation was practiced crudely, wantonly, and without anesthesia, causing permanent damage and trauma to the victim, including incontinence, paralysis, and even death. The court first held that the petition did raise serious questions for constitutional interpretation. Second, the court held that, while the Constitution protects free exercise of cultural or religious custom, such exercise must not infringe on human dignity or the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Thus, the court held that female genital mutilation was inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, and thus declared the custom void.

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The deceased, a 16-year-old girl, lived with her mother and brother. For approximately a year, the deceased would sneak out and have sexual intercourse with appellant, a married man who lived approximately 200 meters away from the deceased. A week before the incident, the deceased told her mother that appellant had impregnated her. This greatly displeased her mother, and she reported this to LCs officials. On the night of the incident, the deceased’s mother noticed appellant at her residence before appellant and the deceased left for the night. The next morning, the deceased was found lying by the side of the road about one mile from her home. She was in critical condition and had severe acid burns. Unable to speak, she wrote her information on a piece of paper, including her name and the name of the person who brought her to her location (appellant). She died later that day, and a medical examiner found the cause of death to be severe burns and pulmonary edema. Appellant was later arrested and convicted. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the conviction rested on weak circumstantial evidence and that his alibi deserved re-evaluation. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled against appellant. They found that the case against appellant relied on the credibility of the deceased’s mother and brother, who, due to proximity and prior acquaintance, knew appellant very well. The court also found that the fact that the deceased’s mother was pursuing actions against appellant gave him a motive for the murder, so as to avoid a possible defilement charge. In sum, the court held that there was ample evidence to convict appellant over his alibi and hence dismissed the appeal.

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a baby girl and was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. Appellant was a relative of the child and was known as a teacher of Christianity. Appellant requested a more lenient sentence of 10 years. The Court of Appeals ruled against Appellant and increased his sentence to 25 years, citing the policy consideration that, despite the fact that defilement can be punishable by death, individuals still continue to defile babies. Thus, the court used this case as an opportunity to send a message to society that “violating the rights of child females must stop.”