Women and Justice: Topics: Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Legislation

Кодекс законів про працю України № 322-VIII 1971, статті 63, 176-177: заборона надурочних робіт для жінок, а також пільги вагітним і жінкам, які мають дітей (Labor Code, arts. 63, 176-177: overtime work rules for pregnant women, women with young children) (1971)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 63 of the Code of Labor Laws prohibits overtime work for pregnant women and women with children under the age of three. This rule is meant to protect women, but at the same time it makes them vulnerable to discrimination. The direct application of this rule violates women's right to freely choose their work, restricts women's access to jobs for which additional payment is provided (for example, under the hourly payment system, overtime work is paid at doubled hourly rate), and can also inhibit women’s career and professional growth. In addition, such a prohibition leads to the unofficial, unsanctioned employment of women in such types of work, which leads to women lacking legal protection and adequate wages. Articles 176-177 determine that women are not allowed to work on nights or weekends. These articles also prohibit employers from sending pregnant women and women with children under three on business trips. Women with children aged three to fourteen, or children with disabilities cannot work overtime, and they cannot be sent on business trips without their consent. These rules also apply to men with children, but only if they are raising them without a mother permanently or long-term (for example, the mother is receiving long-term medical care). This approach discriminates against both men and women, and further reinforces stereotypes that child care is exclusively a woman's duty. For violations of these prohibitions, the Code of Labor Laws provides for fining the employer the amount of the minimum wage for each such violation (currently 6,700 hryvnias).

Статтею 63 Кодексу законів про працю забороняється надурочна робота вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Це правило покликане захистити жінок, але водночас воно робить їх уразливими до дискримінації. Пряме застосування цієї норми порушує право жінок на вільний вибір роботи, обмежує доступ жінок до робіт, за які передбачена додаткова оплата праці (наприклад, за погодинної системи оплати праці понаднормова праця оплачується у подвійному розмірі годинної ставки), а також може перешкоджати. кар'єрному і професійному росту жінки. Крім того, така заборона призводить до неофіційного незаконного працевлаштування жінок на такі види робіт, що призводить до того, що жінки не мають правового захисту та належної оплати праці. Статті 176-177 визначають, що жінки не можуть працювати у нічний час та у вихідні дні. Ці статті також забороняють роботодавцям направляти у відрядження вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Жінки, які мають дітей віком від трьох до чотирнадцяти років або дітей-інвалідів, не можуть працювати понаднормово, а також направлятися у відрядження без їх згоди. Ці правила поширюються і на чоловіків, які мають дітей, але тільки в тому випадку, якщо вони виховують їх постійно або тривалий час без матері (наприклад, мати перебуває на тривалому лікуванні). Такий підхід дискримінує як чоловіків, так і жінок і ще більше зміцнює стереотипи про те, що догляд за дітьми є виключно жіночим обов’язком. За порушення цих заборон Кодексом законів про працю передбачено накладення штрафу на роботодавця в розмірі мінімальної заробітної плати за кожне таке порушення (зараз це 6700 гривень).



Кодекс законів про працю України № 322-VIII 1971, статті 56, 60(1)-60(2): неповний робочий день та дистанційна робота жінок (Labor Code, arts. 56, 60(1)-60(2): part-time and remote work for women) (1971)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 56 of the Labor Code stipulates the employer's obligation to set part-time working hours for certain categories of employees, including (i) pregnant women; (ii) women with children under the age of 14 and/or a child with a disability; (iii) women caring for a sick family member. The scope of their labor rights is not limited; such women still have the right to a full-time vacation and social benefits. For part-time work days, a person is paid in proportion to the time worked. Article 60-1 provides for the right of pregnant women and women with children to choose to work from home. At the same time, a woman can work from home only if: (i) it is possible, taking into account the nature of the work they performed and (ii) employer has the appropriate resources and means to do so.

Стаття 56 Кодексу законів про працю України передбачає обов’язок роботодавця встановлювати неповний робочий час для окремих категорій працівників, у тому числі (I) для вагітних жінок; (II) жінок, які мають дітей віком до 14 років та/або дитину з інвалідністю; (III) жінок, які доглядають за хворим членом сім'ї. Обсяг їх трудових прав не обмежений; такі жінки зберігають право на повну відпустку та соціальні виплати. За неповний робочий день робота особа оплачується пропорційно відпрацьованому часу. Стаття 601 передбачає право вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей, вибирати роботу вдома. Водночас жінка може працювати вдома, лише якщо: (I) це можливо з урахуванням характеру виконуваної роботи та (II) роботодавець має для цього відповідні ресурси та засоби.



Сімейний кодекс України №2947-III 2002, Статті 49, 50, 123, 136: право на материнство, право на батьківство та використання репродуктивних технологій (Family Code of Ukraine, arts. 49, 50, 123, 126: right to maternity, paternity, reproductive technology) (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Divorce and dissolution of marriage

Articles 49, 50 of the Family Code of Ukraine refer the right to maternity and the right to parentage to the personal non-property rights of spouses. The term “maternity” means women’s legally guaranteed right to reproductive opportunity on (i.e., to give birth to children, raise them). The core of this personal non-property right is the wife's authority to decide whether or not to have a child. In addition, these articles establish that a woman's reluctance to have a child or her inability to conceive a child can be grounds for the dissolution of marriage. The same consequences entail if a man's refuses to, or his cannot, have a child. Such rules of the family legislation on the reason for the dissolution of marriage due to the wife's or husband's unwillingness or inability to have children restrict the freedom of behavior of women and men in marriage and violate the right to reproductive freedom. Article 123 establishes that if a married couple produce an embryo that is carried by a surrogate, then, the spouses are deemed the parents of the child. Similarly, the spouses are recognized as the parents when the wife gives birth to a child via implantation of an embryo that is not biologically hers. Article 136 of the Family Code of Ukraine allows a person legally registered as a child’s father to contest that registration, and thus his legal responsibilities as a parent to that child, if he believes or knows that he is not the child’s biological father. An analysis of court practice indicates that, as evidence of the lack of a parent-child relationship, the court accepts testimony of witnesses and results of forensic genetic examination.

Статтями 49, 50 Сімейного кодексу України право на материнство та право на батьківство віднесено до особистих немайнових прав подружжя. Термін "материнство" означає гарантоване законом право жінки на репродуктивну можливість (тобто народжувати дітей, виховувати їх). Ядром цього особистого немайнового права є правомочності дружини вирішувати питання про народження чи ненародження дитини. Крім цього, ці статті встановлюють, що підставою для розірвання шлюбу може бути небажання жінки мати дитину або її нездатність зачати дитину. Такі ж наслідки виникають, якщо чоловік відмовляється або не може мати дитину. Такі норми сімейного законодавства про підстави розірвання шлюбу через небажання чи нездатність дружини чи чоловіка мати дітей обмежують свободу поведінки жінки та чоловіка у шлюбі та порушують право на репродуктивну свободу. Статтею 123 встановлено, що, якщо у подружжя зароджується ембріон, виношуваний сурогатною матір'ю, то батьками дитини визнається подружжя. Так само, подружжя визнається батьками, коли дружина народжує дитину, шляхом перенесення в її організм ембріона, який їй біологічно не належить. Стаття 136 Сімейного кодексу України дозволяє особі, яка в установленому законом порядку записана батьком дитини, оскаржити таку реєстрацію, а отже, і свої обов’язки як батька щодо цієї дитини, якщо вона вважає або знає, що не є біологічним батьком дитини. Аналіз судової практики вказує на те, що як доказ відсутності зв’язку між батьком та дитиною суд приймає показання свідків та результати судово-генетичної експертизи.



Наказ Міністерства охорони здоров`я України "Про затвердження Порядку надання комплексної медичної допомоги вагітній жінці під час небажаної вагітності, форм первинної облікової документації та інструкцій щодо їх заповнення" № 423 2013 (Pregnancy care) (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Procedure establishes a list of measures and services for the prevention of an unintended pregnancy, abortion procedures, and the prevention of post-operative complications. In Ukraine, artificial termination of pregnancy is permissible at the woman's request up to 12 weeks. From 12-22 weeks, pregnancy can be terminated only under a number of conditions specified in the legislation, for example, if the pregnancy occurred as a result of rape or, the woman became disabled during pregnancy. For a violation of these rules, the doctor may be held criminally liable for illegal abortion (Article 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). Currently, there are certain problems in the regulation of abortions of minor girls in Ukraine. In particular, the Procedure states that a girl who has reached the age of 14 can independently apply to a hospital to provide her with an abortion, without consent of her parents. However, this rule creates a conflict in Ukraine’s abortion laws because: (i) the Civil Code of Ukraine provides the right of the child's legal representatives to information about the child's state of health; (ii) other legislative acts of Ukraine determine that the patient's informed consent is valid after receiving full information about his health, and such information can be obtained only from the age of 18. Under these rules, the abortion of a minor girl without consent and informing her parents is considered illegal. Based on the analysis of these rules, it can be concluded that Ukraine belongs to the category of states where abortions are allowed at the request of a woman (according to the principle 'my body is my own'). This means that in order to access an abortion service, a woman only has to go to the appropriate health care facility. However, there are certain conditions when such a service is permissible.

Порядок встановлює перелік заходів і послуг із запобігання небажаній вагітності, процедур переривання вагітності та запобігання післяопераційних ускладнень. В Україні дозволено штучне переривання вагітності за бажанням жінки до 12 тижнів. Після 12 до 22 тижнів вагітність може бути перервана лише за наявності певних умов, визначених законодавством, наприклад, якщо вагітність настала внаслідок зґвалтування або жінка під час вагітності стала інвалідом. За порушення цих правил лікар може бути притягнутий до кримінальної відповідальності за незаконне проведення аборту (ст. 134 Кримінального кодексу України). Наразі в Україні існують певні проблеми щодо регулювання абортів неповнолітніх дівчат. Зокрема, у Порядку зазначено, що дівчина, яка досягла 14 років, може самостійно звернутися до лікарні для проведення їй аборту без згоди батьків. Однак ця норма створює суперечності в законодавстві України про аборти, оскільки: (I) Цивільний кодекс України передбачає право законних представників дитини на інформацію про стан здоров’я дитини; (II) іншими законодавчими актами України визначено, що інформована згода пацієнта є правомірною після отримання повної інформації про стан його здоров’я, і така інформація може бути отримана лише з 18 років. Згідно з цими правилами аборт неповнолітньої дівчини без згоди та повідомлення її батьків вважається незаконним. Виходячи з аналізу цих норм, можна зробити висновок, що Україна належить до категорії держав, де дозволені аборти за бажанням жінки (за принципом "моє тіло — моє"). Це означає, що для того, щоб отримати послугу аборту, жінці достатньо звернутися до відповідного медичного закладу. Однак є певні умови, коли така послуга дозволена.



Civil Registration Act 2019 (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Civil Registration Act 2019 made technical amendments to the Civil Registration Act of 2004, the purposes of which were to facilitate legislation to provide for registration of the birth of donor-conceived children, and to enable both partners in a same-sex female relationship to have their details recorded in such registrations. Specifically, Section 10 provides for the recording of a ‘parent’s’ details and any parent may so register although the options of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are still available.



Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, LGBTIQ

The Act provides for parentage in case of donor-assisted human reproduction (“DAHR”) (Part 2), issues relating to DAHR facilities (including acquisition of gametes by operators) (Part 3), and amendments to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Part 4), Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Status of Children Act 1987, Family Law Act 1995, and among other legislation, to reflect rights and responsibilities of spouses or civil partners of biological parents and to take into account DAHR situations. The Act provides that a child born as a result of a DAHR procedure shall have as parents the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, provided that the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant have consented to the latter being a parent to the child (Section 5). When construed as the parents of the child, the mother and any other parent, as the case may be, shall have all parental rights and duties in respect of the child (Section 5(3)). The donor of a gamete or embryo used in a DAHR procedure is not the parent of the child nor do they have any parental rights or duties in respect of the child (Section 5(5) and Section 5(6)). A person can only consent to providing a gamete for use in a DAHR procedure where they have attained the age of 18, have received the necessary information pursuant to the Act, and made a declaration pursuant to the Act (Section 6). An intending mother and her partner must be over the age of 21 to consent to parentage (Sections 9, 11).



قانون العقوبات (Penal Code) (1960)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender-based violence in general, Honor crimes (or honour crimes), Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Articles 97-98 and 340-341 relate to who may benefit from more lenient sentences for “honour crimes,” such as a person who has witnessed his or her spouse committing adultery. However, Article 345 now excludes honor crimes where the victim is under 15 from qualifying as a mitigating circumstance as enumerated in Articles 97 and 98. Further, Article 308, which allowed a rapist to avoid punishment if they married their victim, was removed in the same 2017 amendment. Article 292 criminalizes intercourse with a woman, other than the man's wife, without her consent through either the means of coercion, threat, or deception. The punishment for such an action is at least 15 years’ imprisonment. This is extended under Article 293 to those women who are unable to resist sexual advances due to a physical or mental disability. In Article 294, a person who has intercourse with a girl of 15-17 years of age will be subject to 7 years temporary hard labor. If the victim is between 12 - 15 years, the minimum penalty will be 15 years. Article 304 provides a minimum standard of six months to three years imprisonment for those persons who “deflower virgins” of 18 years after promising to marry them in addition to compensation. Article 305 and 306 provides that anyone who commits sexual harassment or any type of sexual gesture with a child of under 18 (male or female), or over 18 without consent, is penalized. Article 314 provides that caretakers who permit a child between 6-16 to frequent brothels is penalized for imprisonment for a period of 6 years or with a fine of 20 (JD). Articles 309-318 prohibit prostitution, running a brothel, forcing a woman into prostitution, exposing a child to a brothel, renting a house for brothel, living off of a woman’s sex work. Article 323 punishes whomever aborts a woman's pregnancy without her consent with labor penalties for 10 years, and more than 10 years if the abortion leads to the woman’s death. Abortion remains illegal, but obtaining an abortion “to preserve honor” is a mitigating factor.

توضح المواد 97-98 والمواد 340-341 من يمكن أن يستفيد من العقوبات المخففة لجرائم الشرف مثل الشخص الذي فوجئ بزوجته بجريمة الزنا. بينما بينت المادة 345 أن العقوبات المخففة لا تشمل من هم دون 15 عام. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه تم حذف المادة 308 التي كانت تسمح للمغتصب بأن يتزوج الضحية. ومنعت المادة 292 مواقعة أنثى بغير رضاها سواء بالتهديد أو بالإكراه أو بالحيلة أو الخداع، وتكون العقوبة 15 سنة فأكثر. كما تمتد ذات العقوبة إلى الأنثى التي لا تستطيع المقاومة بسبب ضعف نفسي أو عقلي أو جسدي. كما أشارت المادة 294 إلى أن كل شخص واقع أنثى ما بين 15-17 سنة عوقب بالأشغال المؤقتة لمدة لا تقل عن 7 سنوات، أما إذا كان يقل عمره عن 15 سنة فتمتد عقوبة الأشغال إلى 15 سنة كحد أدنى. ووضحت المادة 304 أن كل شخص قام بخداع بكرًا يبلغ عمرها 18 عام فأكثر بوعده لها بالزاوج ففض بكارتها أو تسبب في حملها يعاقب بالحبس من 6 أشهر على 3 سنوات، بالإضاقة إلى ضمان بكارتها. ذكرت كل من المادتين 305 و306 أنه يعاقب كل شخص قام بفعل جنسي أو أي إيحاء يدل على ذلك لشخص لم يتم 18 من عمره أو أكمل 18 من عمره لكن لو يؤخذ برضاه. كما أشارت المادة 314 أن كل من عوهد إليه بالعناية بولد يتراوح عمره ما بين 6-16 سنة، وسمح له بالاقامة في بيت بغاء أو التردد عليه، يعاقب بالحبس حتى 6 أشهر أو بغرامة حتى 20 دولار. أما اامواد 309-318 فقد جاءت لتمنع الدعارة، والمادة 323 أشارت إلى أنه من أقدم بأي وسيلة كان على اجهاض امرأة، فيعاقب بالحبس لمدة لا تزيد على 10 سنوات، وأكثر من 10 سنوات إذا سبب ذلك الإجهاض وفاة. الإجهاض لا يزال غير قانوني، ولكن لو أرادت المرأة أن تقوم بالإجهاض للحفاظ على الشرف هو عامل مؤثر.



Penal Code (Law No. 58 of the Year 1937 Promulgating the Penal Code) (with amendments through 2018): Articles 260-264 (Abortion) (1937)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Article 260 of the Penal Code provides that whoever willfully causes an abortion by beating or other violent injuries shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor per Article 13) (“Rigorous Imprisonment”). Those who provide medicine or other means of inducing abortion, with or without the consent of the pregnant woman, are subject to imprisonment (Article 261). It is also a crime for women to have an abortion using medicines or other means (Article 262). Any doctor, surgeon, pharmacist, or midwife who provides an abortion is subject to rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. However, attempted abortion is not a punishable offense (Article 264). English translation available here.



Про внесення змін до Кримінального та Кримінального процесуального кодексів України з метою реалізації положень Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з цими явищами (No. 2227-VII) (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, International law, Sexual violence and rape

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). In part, these amendments increased the punishment for an illegal abortion (meaning that it was conducted by a person who had no special medical education; or forcing an abortion without voluntary consent, which is punishable by a fine of 50-100 tax-free minimum incomes, community service of 100-240 hours, correctional labor for up to two years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or imprisonment for the same term. The amendments criminalized forcing an abortion and forced sterilization without consent. Rape (i.e., sexual acts involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration using the genitals or any other item, without voluntary consent) is punishable with imprisonment for three to five years and sexual violence (nonconsensual, non-penetrative sexual assault) is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни, що містять положення Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), ухваленої у 2011 році. Внаслідок цих змін статтю 134 Кримінального кодексу України, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту (проведення аборту особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти; примус до проведення аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої), було змінено, в частині посилення відповідальності за це небезпечне злочинне діяння (тобто тепер незаконний аборт карається штрафом від 50 до 100 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадськими роботами на строк від 100 до 240 годин, або виправними роботами за на строк до двох років, або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк). Також криміналізовано примус до аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої, а також примусову стерилізацію без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи. Змінено статті, які передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за зґвалтування та сексуальне насильство. Зокрема, зґвалтування (тобто вчинення статевих дій, пов’язаних із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло іншої особи за допомогою статевих органів або будь-якого іншого предмета без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до п’яти років, а також сексуальне насильство (не пов'язане з проникненням в тіло іншої особи без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк до п'яти років. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.



Ley 599 de julio 24, 2000 (Código Penal Colombiano) (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

This law serves as the basis for the Colombian Criminal Code, it enumerates conducts that constitute crimes and their sanctions. The code sets forth several gender-related crimes. Article 104A criminalizes femicide, meaning the killing of women because they are female. Article 123 sanctions people who forcibly terminate a pregnancy. Article 187 prohibits forcing in-vitro treatments on women against their will. Article 229 regulates domestic violence offenses. Articles 208 and following criminalize rape and establish aggravating circumstances including, among others, if the victim is under 14 years old, if the victim is incapable of defending him or herself, if the abuser used violence and if the abuse was held within the household. Article 116 A prohibits the use of chemical agents or corrosive substances that cause injuries or harm when they come into contact with human tissue. Finally, for some crimes, the code treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victim is a woman. Law 1719 of June 18, 2014 modified and expanded these provisions.

Esta ley que contiene el Código Penal colombiano enumera las conductas que constituyen delitos y sus sanciones. El código establece varios delitos relacionados con el género. El artículo 104A tipifica como delito el feminicidio, es decir, el asesinato de mujeres solo por el hecho de ser mujeres. El artículo 123 sanciona a las personas que obligan a la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo. El artículo 187 prohíbe realizar tratamientos in vitro a mujeres en contra de su voluntad. El artículo 229 regula el delito de violencia doméstica. Los artículos 208 y siguientes tipifican como delito la violación y establecen circunstancias agravantes que incluyen, entre otras, que la víctima sea menor de 14 años, que sea incapaz de defenderse por sí misma, si el abusador usó violencia y si el abuso se llevó a cabo dentro del hogar. El artículo 116 A prohíbe el uso de agentes químicos o sustancias corrosivas que causen lesiones o daños cuando entren en contacto con tejidos humanos. Finalmente, para algunos delitos, el código trata como circunstancia agravante el hecho de que la víctima sea mujer. La Ley 1719 de junio 18, 2014 modificó y amplió algunas de estas disposiciones.



Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The 2018 Act permits (i) abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy by a medical practitioner who has a certified, reasonable good-faith opinion that the pregnancy has not exceeded 12 weeks (Section 12); (ii) where two medical practitioners have a good-faith opinion that that there is a risk to the life, or of serious harm to the health, of the pregnant woman, that the fetus has not yet reached viability, and that it is appropriate to carry out the termination of pregnancy to avert these risks (Section 9), or that there is a condition affecting the fetus that is likely to lead to the death of the fetus either before, or within 28 days of, birth (Section 11); or (iii) where a single medical practitioner has a good-faith opinion that there is an immediate risk to the life, or serious harm to the health, of the pregnant woman and that it is immediately necessary to terminate the pregnancy in order to avoid that risk (Section 10). The Act also makes certain services, like medical surgery and midwifery, available to women without charge for the purpose of terminating a pregnancy in accordance with Sections 9, 10, 11, or 12. Under the Act, it is an offense for anyone other than the pregnant woman herself to intentionally terminate a pregnancy, or supply the means for doing so, other than in accordance with the Act, or to aid or abet such an offense (Section 23(4)). Penalties for offenses include fines and imprisonment up to 14 years (Section 23); there are also provisions for offenses committed by a corporate body (Section 24). The 2018 Act also repeals the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013.



Sveikatos apsaugos ministro įsakymas Nr. V-941 „Dėl Sveikatos ir lytiškumo ugdymo bei rengimo šeimai bendrosios programos patvirtinimo“ (Minister of Health Decree No. V-941) (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, LGBTIQ

The Ministry of Education encourages the integration of sex education into the content of subject curricula and non-formal education. This leaves considerable discretion to schools and teachers in presenting the topic. Moreover, the program aims to prepare for “the creation of marriage and a harmonious family,” seeking to encourage the association of sexuality expression with “fertility and the possibility of having children in the future.” The decree dictates that it is not permissible to present the use of birth control as an equivalent alternative to abstinence. Furthermore, there is no ascertainable mention of LGBTIQ inclusivity in the curriculum.

Švietimo ministerija skatina lytinio švietimo integravimą į dalykinių programų ir neformaliojo švietimo turinį. Tai palieka didelę savo nuožiūrą mokykloms ir mokytojams pristatant šią temą. Be to, šia programa siekiama parengti „santuokos ir darnios šeimos kūrimui“ ir skatinti seksualumo išraiškos siejimą su „vaisingumu ir galimybe turėti vaikų ateityje“. Įsakyme taip pat nurodoma, kad kontracepcijos naudojimo negalima pateikti kaip lygiavertės alternatyvos abstinencijai. Be to, nėra aiškiai paminėtas LGBTIQ temų įtraukimas į mokymo programą.



Nr. 50 „Dėl nėštumo nutraukimo operacijos atlikimo tvarkos“, Lietuvos Respublikos sveikatos apsaugos ministerijos (No. 50 "On the Termination of Pregnancy Operation Procedure,” Decree of the Minister of Health) (1994)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Decree dictates that pregnancy can only be terminated up until 12 weeks. After that, abortion is allowed only when there is a risk to the woman's life or health.

Įstatymas numato, kad nėštumas gali būti nutrauktas tik iki 12 savaičių. Ilgesnis laikotarpis leidžiamas tik tada, kai kyla pavojus asmens gyvybei ar sveikatai.



Baudžiamasis Kodeksas (Criminal Code) (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Female infanticide and feticide, Femicide, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Under the Criminal Code, rape is defined quite narrowly as “sexual intercourse against a person’s will with the use or threat of physical violence present or deprivation of possibility of resistance.” There is also no mention of rape in marriage. To hold a person liable for rape, which is punished by imprisonment for up to seven years, the victim or their representative must file a complaint. However, in the case of rape (i) by a group of accomplices or (ii) of a minor or a young child, the term of imprisonment can be longer, and complaint filing is not needed. Further, sexual assault is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to seven years, sexual abuse is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to three years, and sexual harassment is punished by a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest. However, Lithuania is one of the few European Union states to have not yet criminalized stalking. Trafficking in Human Beings is punished by imprisonment from two to ten years. Infanticide is punished by arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. In the case of illegal abortion, as defined in Decree No. 50 of the Minister of Health “On the Termination of Pregnancy Operation Procedure,” the doctor and assisting persons are liable. Finally, the Code recognizes acts committed to express hatred towards persons due to their, amongst other characteristics, gender and sexual orientation, to be an aggravating circumstance. English translation available here.

Pagal baudžiamąjį kodeksą išžaginimas gana siaurai apibrėžiamas kaip lytiniai santykiai prieš asmens valią „panaudojant fizinį smurtą ar grasinant tuoj pat jį panaudoti, ar kitaip atimant galimybę priešintis, ar pasinaudojant bejėgiška nukentėjusio asmens būkle”. Apie išprievartavimą santuokoje neužsimenama. Laikyti asmenį atsakingu už išžaginimą, kuris baudžiamas laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, auka ar jų atstovas turi pateikti skundą. Tačiau tuo atveju, kai išžaginama (i) bendrininkų grupės arba (ii) nepilnametį vaiką, laisvės atėmimo bausmė gali būti ilgesnė ir skundo padavimo nereikia. Už seksualinę prievartą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, už seksualinį smurtą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki trejų metų, o už seksualinį priekabiavimą baudžiama bauda, laisvės apribojimu arba areštu. Lietuva yra viena iš nedaugelio Europos Sąjungos valstybių, kuri dar nėra kriminalizavusi persekiojimo. Už prekybą žmonėmis baudžiama laisvės atėmimu nuo dvejų iki dešimties metų. Už nužudymą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki penkerių metų. Neteisėto aborto atveju, kaip apibrėžta sveikatos apsaugos ministro įsakyme Nr. 50 „Dėl nėštumo operacijos procedūros nutraukimo“, atsako gydytojas ir pagalbą teikiantys asmenys. Galiausiai kodekse pripažįstama, kad veiksmai, kuriais siekiama išreikšti neapykantą asmenims dėl jų, įskaitant kitų savybių, lyties ir seksualinės orientacijos, yra sunkinanti aplinkybė.



Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) Abtreibung §§ 96-98: Abtreibung (Penal Code Articles 96-98: Abortion) (1974)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Generally, the person performing the abortion and the pregnant woman who consents to the procedure are criminally liable pursuant to Section 96. Under Section 97 the abortion is not punishable, if (i) the abortion is performed by a doctor during the first three months of the pregnancy and after prior consultation with a doctor; (ii) the abortion is necessary to prevent a serious risk to life or serious danger to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or if there is a serious risk that the child will be seriously mentally or physically damaged, or if the pregnant woman was younger than 14 years old at the time of the impregnation, and in all such cases the abortion is performed by a doctor; or (iii) the abortion is performed to save the pregnant woman from an immediate, unavoidable danger to life and in circumstances where medical assistance cannot be obtained in time. Section 98 states that a person who terminates a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant woman is liable to a term of imprisonment of up to three years. If such an act results in the death of the pregnant woman, the term of imprisonment varies between six months and five years. The abovementioned does not apply where such acts are performed to save the pregnant woman’s life from an immediate, unavoidable danger or where her consent cannot be obtained in time.

Grundsätzlich ist die Person, die die Abtreibung durchführt, wie auch die Frau, die der Prozedur zustimmt strafbar nach § 96. Nach § 97 ist die Abtreibung nicht strafbewährt, wenn (i) sie von einem Arzt während der ersten drei Monate der Schwangerschaft und nach einer vorherigen Beratungssitzung mit einem Arzt durchgeführt wurde; (ii) die Abtreibung notwendig ist, um ein ernstzunehmendes Risiko für das Leben oder die physische oder mentale Gesundheit der schwangeren Frau zu vermeiden, oder wenn ein ernstes Risiko besteht, dass das Kind ernsthafte mentale oder körperliche Schäden haben wird, oder wenn die Schwangere jünger als 14 Jahre alt ist im Zeitpunkt der Befruchtung, und – in all diesen Fällen – die Abtreibung von einem Arzt durchgeführt wird; oder (iii) die Abtreibung durchgeführt wird, um die Schwangere von einer unmittelbaren, unvermeidbaren Lebensgefahr zu retten und die Umstände keine rechtzeitige medizinische Versorgung zulassen. Gemäß § 98 ist eine Person mit bis zu drei Jahren Gefängnis zu bestrafen, wenn sie eine Schwangerschaft ohne die Einwilligung der Schwangeren beendet. Sollte diese Handlung zu dem Tod der Schwangeren führen, ist die Gefängnisstrafe zwischen 6 Monaten und fünf Jahren. Dies findet allerdings keine Anwendung, wenn solche Handlungen vorgenommen wurden, um die schwangere Frau von unmittelbaren, unvermeidbaren Lebensgefahren zu retten oder in Situationen, in denen die Einwilligung der Frau nicht rechtzeitig eingeholt werden konnte.



Mutter-Kind-Pass-Verordnung (MuKiPassV) (Mother and Child Passport Regulation) (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

This regulation aims to ensure that pregnant women and their children have access to necessary basic medical care by tracking medical examinations received with a so-called mother-and-child-passport issued by the Federal Ministry of Health. Basic medical care includes, at least, five medical examinations of the pregnant woman and nine examinations of the child until the child reaches the age of 62 months. The regulation specifies contents, time intervals, and the information that should be included in the mother-and-child-passport. According to Sec. 8, a failure to abide to the time intervals has no consequences for state child allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld), as long as the mother is not responsible for the failure.

Diese Verordnung zielt auf die Sicherstellung des Zugangs von Schwangeren und deren Kindern zu notwendigen medizinischen Grundbetreuung, indem die empfangenen medizinischen Leistungen mit einem so-genannten Mutter-Kind-Pass verfolgt werden. Dieser wird von dem Bundesgesundheitsministerium ausgestellt. Grundbetreuung beinhaltet mindestens fünf medizinische Untersuchungen der schwangeren Frau und weitere neun Untersuchungen des Kindes, bis dieses das Alter von 62 Monaten erreicht. Diese Verordnung spezifiziert den Inhalt und die Zeitintervalle zwischen den Untersuchungen, sowie die Informationen, die in dem Mutter-Kind-Pass festgehalten werden sollen. Gemäß § 8 hat es keine Auswirkungen auf die Berechnung der Höhe des Kindergeldes, wenn die Frau den Untersuchungen nicht im vorgeschriebenen Zeitpunkt nachkommt, so lange sie das nicht zu vertreten hat.



Gender Equality Act (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual harassment

The Gender Equality Act promotes gender equality for men and women in all parts of society, and seeks to prohibit and provide redress for sex discrimination, harmful practices (including social, cultural, or religious practices that are physically or sexually harmful) and sexual harassment. Under the Act, persons (and the government) are prohibited from treating people less favorably than they would otherwise due to sex. The law defines and criminalizes sexual harassment, including workplace harassment. Moreover, the law places an affirmative obligation on the government to ensure that employers are developing appropriate procedures and policies to respond to and eliminate issues of workplace sexual harassment. The law also ensures equal access to education at all levels regardless of sex, and affirmatively requires the government to provide equal access. Further, the law provides an affirmative right to sexual and reproductive health, including access to health services and the right to choose whether or not to have a child. A Human Rights Commission in Malawi is tasked with the enforcement of this law, including gender-based quotas for membership on Commission. The penalties for violating the Act include large fines and imprisonment of up to five years.



Trafficking in Persons Act (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Trafficking in persons

The Trafficking in Persons Act provides for the prevention and elimination of human trafficking, in addition to establishing the National Coordination Committee against Trafficking in Persons which serves to coordinate and manage related issues in Malawi (the “Committee”). The Act applies to offenses committed at least partly in Malawi (or in contemplation of committing a crime inside Malawi), committed by a citizen of Malawi, or involving the trafficking of a citizen of Malawi. The Committee is responsible for coordinating and overseeing investigations and prosecutions under the Act, as well as formulating policy, educational programming, and recommendations with Malawi on the topic, amongst other responsibilities. The Act provides the Committee with affirmative responsibilities to trafficked persons, including access to adequate health care and shelter, protection from discrimination, and legal support. The Act criminalizes the trafficking of other persons, punishable up to 14 years of imprisonment. The Act provides a list of aggravating factors that can extend the punishment by life imprisonment, including if a trafficked person becomes pregnant or is forced to terminate a pregnancy. There are additional penalties associated with trafficking in children, including a maximum sentence of 21 years imprisonment, as well as for benefiting from exploitation or trafficking and providing support for trafficking offenses. The Act further regulates international transportation organizations, and provides specialized investigatory and judicial mechanisms for the enforcement of the Act.



Código Penal Capítulo II – Seção II: Crimes Contra a Vida Intra-Uterina (Penal Code: Crimes Against Intra-Uterine Life) (2020)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape

Articles 154-158 prohibit 1) anyone, without the pregnant woman’s consent, to provoke or cause a miscarriage; 2) anyone, with the pregnant woman’s consent, to perform or assist with an abortion; and 3) any pregnant woman from, by any means, participating or consenting to an abortion. These three felonies carry sentences of 2-8 years, 1-5 years, and 5 years of imprisonment, respectively. (article 154). Article 155 provides for increased sentences if the abortion harms the woman’s physical integrity or causes death. Exempt from criminal liability are abortions carried out with the pregnant woman’s consent to 1) remove the risk of death or great harm, or 2) the fetus’ life is inviable, or 3) the pregnancy is a result of rape and the abortion is done within the first 16 weeks of the pregnancy. All these circumstances must be verified and reported in writing by a doctor ahead of the interruption (article 156). It is also forbidden to promote services for the interruption of pregnancies and any "propaganda" (articles 157 and 158).

Artigos 154-158 proíbe 1) quem, sem o consentimento da mulher grávida, provocar aborto ou interrupção da gravidez; 2) quem, com o consentimento da mulher grávida, realizer aborto ou ajudá-la a fazer; e 3) a mulher gravida que, de qualquer maneira, participar ou consentir com o aborto. Esses três crimes carregam sentenças de 2-8 anos, 1-5 anos, e 5 anos de encarceramento, respectivamente (artigo 154). O artigo 155 prevê aumento de pena se o aborto lesa a integridade física da mulher ou causa a sua morte. Isentos de responsabilidade criminal são os abortos realizados com o consentimento da mulher, na medida em que 1) remove o risco de morte ou grave lesão, ou 2) a vida do feto é inviável, ou 3) a gravidez é resultado de um estupro e o aborto é feito durante as 16 primeiras semanas de gravidez. Todas essas circunstâncias devem ser verificadas e reportadas por escrito ao médico responsável pela interrupção (artigo 156). Também fica proibido promover serviços para interrupção de gravidez ou qualquer propaganda desse tipo de prática (artigos 157 e 158).



Código Penal: Livro II, Título I - Crimes contra a pessoa: Capítulo II - Crimes contra a vida e vida intra-uterina (Crimes against intra-uterine life) (1995)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape

Under Article 140, abortion is considered a “crime against the intra-uterine life,” and someone who causes an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman may be sentenced from 2-8 years of imprisonment, while the person who performed the abortion and the pregnant woman can be sentence to up to three years of imprisonment. Article 142, however, permits the abortion if performed by a doctor and in the following scenarios: (1) the abortion is the only method to avoid risk of death or grave physical or mental harm to the mother; (2) the abortion is recommended in order to avoid the risk of death or permanent grave physical damage to the mother, up to the 12th week of pregnancy (3) the fetus is at risk of grave illness or malformation, up to the 24th week of pregnancy; (4) the pregnancy was caused by rape or sexual assault, up to the 16th week of pregnancy; (5) by the mother’s choice, up to the 10th week of pregnancy. In cases where the fetus is not viable, abortion can be performed at any time during pregnancy. Any of the conditions above mentioned have to be certified by a doctor, except item 5, case in which the mother has to submit an affidavit to a doctor or clinic stating that her decision was “mindful and responsible.” If the mother is under 16 years old or mentally incapacitated, the consent to perform an abortion has to be provided by the woman’s legal representative (usually parents).

Segundo o artigo 140 do Código Penal Português, o aborto é considerado um "crime contra a vida intrauterina", e quem causar aborto sem o consentimento da grávida pode ser condenado a penas de dois a oito anos de prisão, enquanto quem causar um aborto com o consentimento da grávida, bem como a própria grávida poderá ser condenado a pena de até 3 anos de prisão. A seção 142, entretanto, permite o aborto se realizado por um médico e nas seguintes situações: (1) o aborto é o único método para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico ou mental à mãe; (2) o aborto é recomendado para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico permanente à mãe, até a 12ª semana de gravidez; (3) o feto está em risco de doença grave ou malformação, até a 24ª semana de gravidez; (4) a gravidez foi causada por estupro ou agressão sexual, até a 16ª semana de gravidez; (5) por escolha da mãe, até a 10ª semana de gravidez. Nos casos em que o feto não é viável, o aborto pode ser realizado a qualquer momento durante a gravidez. Qualquer uma das condições acima mencionadas tem que ser certificada por um médico, exceto o item 5, caso em que a mãe tem que apresentar uma declaração juramentada a um médico ou clínica declarando que sua decisão foi "atenta e responsável". No caso de a mãe ser menor de 16 anos ou mentalmente incapacitada, o consentimento para realizar um aborto tem que ser dado por um representante legal da mulher (geralmente os pais).



Lei n. 24/2019: Special Part, Title One, Chapter One, Section Two (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

This section describes the circumstances and consequences for interrupting a woman’s pregnancy, and formalities for non-punishable abortion. Anyone who aborts a child without the woman’s consent can be imprisoned from three months to two years, and up to one year with her consent. A woman who performs an abortion on herself or a health professional who abuses their position to provide an abortion is punishable with imprisonment up to two years. If there are serious physical consequences, such as death, that resulted from the abortion, the person who performed the operation is subject to 8-12 years in prison. Abortion is not punishable, however, when the fetus is inviable or will be born with a serious incurable illness such as HIV or AIDS, the pregnancy is a result of a sexual assault, or the woman opts to do so within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.

Essa seção descreve as circunstâncias e consequências de interromper uma gravidez, e as formalidades para abortos sem punição. Quem aborta uma criança sem o consentimento da mulher pode ter uma pena de três meses a dois anos, e até um ano se tiver o seu consentimento. Uma mulher que realiza um aborto em si mesma ou um professional da saúde que abusa da sua posição para realizar um aborto é punido com prisão de até dois anos. Se alguma consequência física séria acontecer, como a morte resultante do aborto, a pessoa que performou a operação está sujeita a 8-12 anos de prisão. O aborto não é punível, entretanto, quando o feto não é viável ou nascerá com uma doença incurável, como HIV ou AIDS, se a gravidez for resultado de abuso sexual, ou se a mulher optou por realizar o procedimento dentro das 12 primeiras semanas de gravidez.



Diploma Ministerial n. 60/2017 (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The law outlines clinic conditions to perform safe abortions, provisions for post-abortion care, the situations in which abortions can be given, definitions of the different types of pregnancies and abortions, and instructions for how to handle situations in which the woman is incapable of giving a written or verbal consent. Some acceptable abortion circumstances include if the woman’s life or physical health is at risk, the pregnancy is a result of a sexual assault or failed contraceptive, or if the woman has HIV or AIDS. The law also references the ICPD (Conferências de População e Desenvolvimento) in 1994 as well as the UN World Conference in 1993 to define reproductive rights and apply it to Mozambique’s national context. It acknowledges that abortions are an ethical issue in addition to a legal issue, and so does not oblige healthcare professionals who have moral objections to carry out the procedure, except when there is a risk of life for the pregnant woman.

A lei esboça condições clínicas para realização de abortos seguros, disposições para cuidados pós-aborto, situações em que abortos podem ser realizados, definições dos diferentes tipos de gravidezes e abortos, e instruções de como lidar com situações difíceis nas quais a mulher é incapaz de dar consentimento verbal ou escrito. Algumas circunstâncias permitidas de aborto incluem se a vida da mulher ou sua saúde física estão em risco, se a gravidez é resultado de abuso sexual ou de contraceptivo que falhou, ou se a mulher tem HIV ou AIDS. A lei também referencia a ICPD (Conferências de População e Desenvolvimento) em 1994, assim como a Conferência Mundial da ONU em 1993 para definir os direitos reprodutivos e aplicá-los ao contexto nacional de Moçambique. Ela reconhece que abortos são um problema ético em adição a um problema legal, assim não obriga os profissionais da saúde que têm objeções morais a realizar o procedimento, exceto quando há risco de vida para a mulher grávida.



Law No. 80-3 “on Demographic Security” (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

In accordance with Art. 1, all married couples and individuals have the right to freely decide on the number of children, periodicity and time of their birth, and to have the necessary information for such decisions.



Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 1580 (as Amended by Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 23) (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The “social indications” noted in Art. 27 of the Law “on Healthcare” that allow performing an abortion up to the 22nd week of pregnancy are: (1) court decision on deprivation of parental rights regarding another existing child; and (2) pregnancy resulting from rape.



Law No. 2435-XII “on Healthcare” (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Under Art. 26, sterilization of a person may be performed in a State healthcare organization upon the written application of the person who has reached the age of 35 or has at least two children. In case there are “medical indications,” sterilization can be performed with the consent of the person if he or she is an adult, or a parent, guardian, etc., regardless of the age of the person or the number of existing children. Under Art. 27, women have the right independently to decide the issue of motherhood. A woman can terminate her pregnancy (abort) at a State healthcare organization, after consultation with a specialist doctor, if the term of pregnancy is no more than 12 weeks; if there are “social indications” listed in Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 1580 dated 23 October 2008, a woman can terminate her pregnancy if the term of pregnancy is no more than 22 weeks. Pregnancy may be terminated regardless of the term of the pregnancy if there are “medical indications” and the pregnant woman consents to the termination. If the pregnant woman is a minor, abortion may be performed on the same conditions, however, the consent of her legal representative (parent/guardian) is required. Healthcare organizations must provide counselling for women who have applied for an abortion. A doctor may refuse to carry out an abortion if the refusal does not threaten the life or health of the woman and must make arrangements for another specialist doctor to perform the abortion.



Comissão Nacional de Prevenção e Auditoria de Mortes Maternas e Neonatais – Decreto Presidencial Nº 52/12 (National Commission of Audit and Prevention of Deaths of Mothers, Newborns and Infants) (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The President approved the creation of the National Commission of Audit and Prevention of Deaths of Mothers, Newborns and Infants in March 2012. This commission was established to contribute to the reduction of maternal and infant mortality by investigating maternal death, defining appropriate evidence-based interventions and recommending corrective actions. The priorities set out by the commission are to: 1) increase universal access to reproductive health services, namely family planning, prenatal care, and delivery by qualified personnel, and 2) prevention of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

O Presidente aprovou a criação da Comissão Nacional de Prevenção e Auditoria de Mortes Maternas e Neonatais em Março de 2012. Essa comissão foi estabelecida para contribuir com a redução de mortalidade maternal e infantil ao investigar a morte maternal, definindo intervenções apropriadas baseadas em evidências e recomendando ações corretivas. As prioridades estabelecidas pela comissão são para: 1) aumentar o acesso universal a serviços básicos de saúde reprodutiva, nomeadamente planejamento familiar, assistência pré-natal, e parto realizado por pessoa qualificada, e 2) prevenir a transmissão de doenças sexualmente infecciosas, incluindo HIV/AIDS.



Constituição da República Portugal (2005)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The Portuguese Constitution in Article 9 provides that it is the duty of the State to promote equality among men and women. Article 13 provides that no one shall be privileged or discriminated against for birth, gender, race, language, place of origin, religion, political or ideological conditions, social or economic status, or sexual orientation. Article 67 states that, in order to protect the family, the state is particularly charged with respect for individual freedom, guaranteeing the right to family planning by promoting the information and access to the methods and means required therefore, and organizing the legal and technical arrangements that make it possible to exercise motherhood and fatherhood with awareness. Article 68 determines that women have the right to special protection during pregnancy and following childbirth, and working women also have the right to an adequate period of leave from work without loss of remuneration or any privileges. Article 109 establishes that the direct and active participation in political life by men and women is a condition for and a fundamental instrument in the consolidation of the democratic system, and the law must promote both equality in the exercise of civic and political rights and the absence of gender-based discrimination in access to political office.

A Constituição portuguesa, em seu artigo 9º, estabelece que é dever do Estado promover a igualdade entre homens a mulheres. O artigo 13 prevê que ninguém deverá ser privilegiado ou discriminado em razão da ascendência, sexo, raça, língua, território de origem, religião, convicções políticas ou ideológicas, instrução, situação económica, condição social ou orientação sexual. O artigo 67 estabelece que, para proteção da família, o Estado deverá garantir, no respeito da liberdade individual, o direito ao planeamento familiar, promovendo a informação e o acesso aos métodos e aos meios que o assegurem, e organizar as estruturas jurídicas e técnicas que permitam o exercício de uma maternidade e paternidade conscientes. O artigo 67 da Constituição dispõe sobre o direito à proteção especial da mulher durante a gravidez e após o parto, tendo as mulheres trabalhadoras ainda direito a dispensa do trabalho por período adequado, sem perda da retribuição ou de quaisquer regalias. Por fim, o artigo 109 estabelece que a participação direta e ativa de homens e mulheres na vida política constitui condição e instrumento fundamental de consolidação do sistema democrático, devendo a lei promover a igualdade no exercício dos direitos cívicos e políticos e a não discriminação em função do sexo no acesso a cargos políticos.



Lei Federal n. 11.108/2005 (2005)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Law No. 11.108/2005 was enacted to amend existing Law No. 8.080/1990, which regulates the Unified Health System (“SUS”). It included a new chapter providing that pregnant woman shall have the right to an accompanying party to be present during all health services provided by the SUS in connection with labor, birth, and the immediate post-partum period.

A Lei Federal n. 11.108/2005 altera a Lei n. 8.080/1990, para garantir às parturientes o direito à presença de acompanhante durante o trabalho de parto, parto e pós-parto imediato, no âmbito do Sistema Único de Saúde - SUS.



Lei Federal n. 9.029/1995 (1995)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

This law prohibits any discrimination based on sex, origin, race, color, marital status, family status, disability, professional rehabilitation, age, among others, regarding the access to, or maintenance of, the employment relationship. Article 1 prohibits any discriminatory practices for the effect of access to employment (except with respect to minimum age, in order to prevent child labor). Article 2 prohibits any discriminatory practices such as (i) requiring a test, examination, skill, award, attestation, declaration, or any other procedure concerning sterilization or pregnancy, or (ii) the adoption of any measures, at the initiative of the employer that constitute induction or promotion of birth control. These crimes carry sentences of 1-2 years of imprisonment plus imposition of a fine to the employer. Even though the federal law only mentions “sex”, the Brazilian jurisprudence understand that this federal law also prohibits discrimination regarding sexual orientation, gender identity, or appearance.

A lei proíbe qualquer prática discriminatória por motivo de sexo, origem, raça, cor, estado civil, situação familiar, deficiência, reabilitação profissional, idade, entre outros, para acesso ao emprego ou para a sua conservação. O artigo 1º proíbe a discriminação para o efeito do acesso ao emprego (exceto com relação à idade mínima, a fim de evitar o trabalho infantil). O artigo 2 proíbe a adoção de quaisquer práticas discriminatórias, tais como (i) exigir um teste, exame, perícia, prêmio, atestado, declaração, ou qualquer outro procedimento relativo à esterilização ou gravidez, ou (ii) a adoção de quaisquer medidas, por iniciativa do empregador, que constituam indução ou promoção do controle de natalidade, constituindo crimes puníveis com um a dois anos de detenção mais aplicação de multa ao empregador. Embora a lei federal mencione apenas discriminação baseada no "sexo", a jurisprudência brasileira entende que esta lei federal também proíbe a adoção de práticas discriminatórias com relação à orientação sexual, identidade de gênero ou aparência quando do acesso ou manutenção de emprego.



Decreto Federal n. 2.848/1940 – Código Penal brasileiro


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Under the Brazilian Criminal Code, it is illegal to terminate a pregnancy, as well as to kill a child during childbirth, or shortly thereafter. Under Article 124, it is a crime for someone to cause an abortion on themselves or to allow others to cause it, either of which carries a sentence of 1-3 years of imprisonment. Article 125 prohibits anyone from practicing an abortion on a pregnant woman without her consent and imposes a sentence of 3-10 years of imprisonment. Article 126 imposes a 1-4-year prison sentence to anyone who practice an abortion with pregnant woman’s consent. Pursuant to Article 128, a doctor is not punished for performing an abortion if (i) the pregnant woman’s life is at risk, or (ii) the pregnancy resulted from rape. The Brazilian Supreme Court authorized the practice of an abortion on fetus with anencephaly (Claim of non-compliance with fundamental precept - ADPF 54). Under no circumstances is it permissible for someone to cause an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman.

Nos termos do Código Penal brasileiro, é ilegal terminar uma gestação, ou matar um recém-nascido. De acordo com o artigo 124, é crime sujeito à detenção de um a três anos provocar aborto em si mesma ou consentir que outrem lhe provoque. O artigo 125 proíbe a prática de aborto sem o consentimento da gestante, impondo pena de reclusão de três a 10 anos de reclusão. O artigo 126 impõe pena de um a quatro anos de reclusão para quem provoca o aborto com o consentimento da gestante. Nos termos do artigo 128, o médico não será punido ao provocar o aborto nas seguintes situações: (i) se não há outro meio de salvar a vida da gestante; ou (ii) se a gravidez resulta de estupro e o aborto é precedido de consentimento da gestante ou, quando incapaz, de seu representante legal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), quando do julgamento da Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) 54, autorizou interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico. Ainda, sob nenhuma hipótese é permitido provocar o aborto sem o consentimento da gestante.



ປະມວນກົດໝາຍອາຍາ ມາດຕາ 201 (Penal Code article 201: unlawful abortion) (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Anyone caught performing an abortion is subject to two to five years of imprisonment and a fine of 5 million to 15 million kip. Any woman caught performing her own abortion or arranging to have her own abortion done is subject to three months to one year of imprisonment and a fine of 3 million to 10 million kip. If the offender is in the habitual practice of performing abortions, they are subject to five to seven years imprisonment and a fine of 7 million to 20 million kip. The Penal Code also punishes attempted abortions. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.



ประมวลกฎหมายอาญา Penal Code B.E. 2499, Chapter 3 (Abortion) (1956)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Section 301 states that any woman, causing herself an abortion or allowing another person to procure an abortion for herself, shall be liable to imprisonment up to a term of three years or a fine not exceeding 60,000 Baht. Section 302 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman with her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine up to 20,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 303 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman without her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years or a fine up to 40,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 305 exempts those under Sections 301 or 302 from the offense if the abortion was carried out be a medical practitioner on medical grounds or the woman is younger than 15 years and the pregnancy resulted from rape or fetuses with fatal abnormalities. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled on 19 February 2020 that existing laws on abortion (Sections 301 and 305) conflict with Thailand’s 2017 Constitution as they fail to hold men responsible for illegal abortions. It remains unclear how the provisions will be amended; the ruling gives the government 360 days for the amendments and does not immediately change the law. English translation available from the ILO through External Link.



Wetboek van Strafrecht: Titel XIXA Afbreking van zwangerschap (Criminal Code: Title XIXA Termination of pregnancy)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Abortion is legal in the Netherlands when performed by a doctor in an appropriate medical setting as described in the Law on the Termination of Pregnancy. Abortion is criminalized outside these circumstances, and violations carry a penalty of up to four years and six months imprisonment or a fine. A criminal abortion that kills the woman carries a penalty of up to six years in prison or a fine. A criminal abortion performed without the woman's consent carries a penalty of up to 12 years in prison or a fine. A criminal abortion that both kills the woman and is performed without her consent is punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment or a fine. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0024649/2020-07-01)



Wet afbreking zwangerschap (Law on the termination of pregnancy) (1981)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Abortions may be performed up to the 24th week of pregnancy, “the point at which the fetus becomes viable outside the mother’s womb.” The procedure must be carried out by a physician in a hospital or a specially licensed clinic and cannot occur earlier than six days after the woman has consulted the physician. The physician must inform the woman within five days of the consultation whether s/he will perform the requested procedure. The operating doctor must also advise the woman “on the different options available” and “inform her of the medical risks.” Minors (persons under 18 years of age) must have parental consent. The Act does not apply to late-term abortions (i.e., after 24 weeks). The Criminal Code penalizes the killing of a viable fetus. New regulations on late-term abortions were adopted in 2015, clarifying the circumstances, medical and legal, that must be considered before performing a late-term abortion. Late-term abortions are only authorized if they fall under one of two categories: 1) a fetus not expected to survive outside the mother’s body or 2) one with such serious conditions that, even with medical interventions, its chances of survival are small. The fetuses will be reported to a medical committee, which will determine whether the doctor acted with due care and, dependent on the category, send their findings to either the Healthcare Inspectorate (Category 1) or the Board of Procurators General of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Category 2) to see whether further investigation is needed. (Unofficial English translation available here: https://cyber.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Nether.abo.htm)



Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículos 142, 170 (delitos contra mujeres embarazadas) (1984)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender-based violence in general, Trafficking in persons

A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.

La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.



Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículos 85-88 (Aborto) (1984)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Abortion is a criminal offense unless there are no other means with which to save the life or health of the pregnant woman, the woman is mentally ill or otherwise challenged, or her pregnancy is the result of sexual assault. Those who perform abortions with the consent of the woman are liable to imprisonment for one to four years, or up to six years if the woman does not survive. Performing an abortion without the consent of the woman is punishable by three to ten years in prison, or up to 15 years if the woman does not survive. In addition to these prison sentences, doctors, surgeons, midwives, and pharmacists who assist or perform an abortion may be disqualified from practicing their profession for twice the period of imprisonment. A person who unintentionally causes an abortion through acts of violence is liable for six months to two years imprisonment. Finally, a woman who causes or consents to an abortion may be sentenced to one to four years imprisonment. An unsuccessful abortion attempt is not a punishable offense, so women who do so should be able to seek medical attention without penalty. (Note: The government of Argentina is voting on legalizing abortion as of December 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

El aborto es un delito penal a menos que no existan otros medios con los que salvar la vida o la salud de la mujer embarazada, la mujer tenga una enfermedad mental o sufra algún otro problema, o su embarazo sea el resultado de una agresión sexual. Quienes practican abortos con el consentimiento de la mujer pueden ser castigados con una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años, o hasta seis años si la mujer no sobrevive. Realizar un aborto sin el consentimiento de la mujer se castiga con tres a diez años de prisión, o hasta 15 años si la mujer no sobrevive. Además de estas penas de prisión, los médicos, cirujanos, parteras y farmacéuticos que ayuden o practiquen un aborto pueden ser inhabilitados para ejercer su profesión por el doble del período de prisión. Una persona que provoque involuntariamente un aborto mediante actos de violencia puede ser sancionada con una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años. Finalmente, una mujer que provoque o consienta en un aborto puede ser condenada a una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años. Un intento de aborto fallido no es un delito punible, por lo que las mujeres que lo hagan deberían poder buscar atención médica sin sanción. (Nota: El gobierno de Argentina está votando sobre la legalización del aborto a diciembre de 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)



Código Civil y Comercial: Artículos 19-21 (Comienzo de la existencia) (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Article 19 of the Code states that life begins at conception. Article 20 presumes, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that the maximum duration of pregnancy is 300days and the minimum duration is 180 days, excluding the day of birth. Article 21 mandates that the rights and obligations of the person conceived or implanted in the woman are irrevocably acquired if the child is born alive. If the child is not born alive, the person is deemed to have never existed. The presumption is that a person is born alive. (Note: The government of Argentina is voting on legalizing abortion as of December 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

El artículo 19 del Código establece que la vida comienza en la concepción. El artículo 20 presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que la duración máxima del embarazo es de 300 días y la duración mínima de 180 días, excluido el día del nacimiento. El artículo 21 establece que los derechos y obligaciones de la persona concebida o implantada en la mujer se adquieren irrevocablemente si el niño nace vivo. Si el niño no nace vivo, se considera que la persona nunca existió. La presunción es que una persona nace viva. (Nota: El gobierno de Argentina está votando sobre la legalización del aborto a partir de diciembre de 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)



Ley 21.030 (Decriminalization of abortion in three causes) (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Law No. 21,030 amends article 119 of the Sanitary Code to permit the interruption of a pregnancy by a surgeon, with the consent of the woman, for: (i) any risk to the life of the mother; (ii) unfeasibility of the embryo or fetus; and (iii) rape.

La ley numero 21,030 amenda el Articulo 119 del Codigo Sanitario, permitiendo la interrupcion del embarazo por un cirujano, con la autorizacion de la mujer, por: (i) cualquier riesgo a la vida de la madre, (ii) imposibilidad de exito del embrion o feto, y (iii) violacion.



Codigo Penal (Penal Code) (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Articles 342 to 345 relate to abortion as a crime, other than an abortion under any of the conditions established by Law No. 21,030 of 2017. The penalty varies considerably depending on the circumstances and motives for the abortion, including, for example, whether the abortion was performed by the mother or a third party, whether it was done with or without the consent of the mother, or whether it was done to hide any shame (deshonra). Article 390 of the Criminal Code provides that the killing of a woman who is or used to be in a relationship with the murderer is murder (spousal) (femicidio), the penalty for which is imprisonment from 15 years and one day to qualified perpetual imprisonment. Article 400 increases by one degree penalties for crimes committed in the context of domestic or family violence. Article 411 prohibits acts done with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the entry or exit of individuals who perform sex work within or outside the Chilean borders. The penalty is imprisonment from three years and one day to five years, plus a fine. Article 411 also prohibits acts of violence, coercion, or taking advantage of vulnerability of persons in order to obtain the consent of a person to be sexuality exploited, such as in pornography, slavery, or forced labor. The penalty is imprisonment from five years and one day to 15 years, plus a fine.

Los Artículos 342 al 345 regulan aborto como delito, distinto del aborto en cualquiera de las condiciones establecidas por la Ley N ° 21.030 de 2017. La sanción varía considerablemente según las circunstancias y motivos del aborto, incluyendo, por ejemplo, si el el aborto fue realizado por la madre o una tercera persona, ya sea con o sin el consentimiento de la madre, o para ocultar alguna vergüenza (deshonra). El Artículo 390 del Código Penal establece que el homicidio de una mujer que está o solía estar en relación con el asesino es homicidio (conyugal) (femicidio), cuya pena es de prisión de 15 años y un día a prisión perpetua calificada. El Artículo 400 aumenta en un grado las penas por delitos cometidos en el contexto de violencia doméstica o familiar. El Artículo 411 prohíbe los actos realizados con el propósito de promover o facilitar la entrada o salida de personas que realizan trabajo sexual dentro o fuera de las fronteras chilenas. La pena es de prisión de tres años y un día a cinco años, más una multa. El Artículo 411 también prohíbe los actos de violencia, coacción o aprovechamiento de la vulnerabilidad de las personas para obtener el consentimiento de una persona para ser explotada sexualmente, como en la pornografía, la esclavitud o el trabajo forzoso. La pena es de prisión de cinco años y un día a 15 años, más una multa.



Abortion Law Reform Act (NSW) (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

This Act overturned Division 12 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which criminalised obtaining, performing, or otherwise assisting an abortion. Abortion is now legal in New South Wales until 22 weeks of pregnancy. To procure an abortion after 22 weeks, the procedure must be performed in a hospital by a specialist practitioner in consultation with a second practitioner. Medical providers who have conscientious objections to abortion must provide patients with information about where they can receive an abortion.



Penal Law (Title 26) (1978)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, LGBTIQ, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement

Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).



Public Health Amendment (Safe Access to Reproductive Health Clinics) Act (New South Wales) (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Act amends the Public Health Act 2010 No 127. It provides for 150-metre “safe access zones” around reproductive health clinics, which are intended to protect the safety and well-being of people entering and leaving such clinics, including employees. The Act creates offenses punishable with imprisonment for interfering with access to clinics (§ 98C), causing actual or potential distress or anxiety to persons in safe access zones (§ 98D), or for taking/distributing photographs of people in safe access zones (§ 98E). The Act also contains exemptions under § 98F, which states that Act does not prohibit conduct in a religious building, near Parliament House in Macquarie Street, Sydney; or “the carrying out of any survey or opinion poll by or with the authority of a candidate, or the distribution of any handbill or leaflet by or with the authority of a candidate, during the course of a Commonwealth, State or local government election, referendum or plebiscite.” In enacting the Act, NSW joined other Australian states and territories, which had already enacted laws banning the harassment of women seeking abortions.



Abortion Reform Act (Victoria) (2008)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Abortion Law Reform Act allows a registered medical practitioner to terminate a pregnancy (perform an abortion) on a woman who is not more than 24 weeks pregnant. After 24 weeks, an abortion may still be performed if the medical practitioner believes it is appropriate in all the circumstances, and has consulted at least one other registered medical practitioner who reasonably agrees. It also permits the supply or administration of drugs to perform and abortion by a pharmacist or registered nurse in similar situations.



An Act to consolidate the Law Relating to Crimes and Criminal Offenders (Victoria) (2008)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The Crimes Act is the principal Victorian criminal legislation setting out a range of criminal offences and penalties. In relation to gender justice, the Act prohibits sexual violence and rape, stalking, sexual assault, rape, abortion (as amended by the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008) and female genital mutilation. The Act also prohibits attempts and conspiracies to commit these offenses, and sets forth applicable procedures and defenses. The Act previously contained a defense of “defensive homicide,” which was intended to, among other things, assist women who killed an abusive partner in self-defense. However, this defense was abolished in November 2014 on the basis that it was not operating as intended. The penalties for violations of the Act vary, and the principles in the Sentencing Act 1991 apply to sentencing in all courts except the Children’s Court.



Código Criminal de España (última revision en 2015) (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.

España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.



Abortlag (1974: 595 - Abortion law) (1974)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Abortion Act states that a woman may have an abortion up to 18 weeks of pregnancy. An abortion past 18 weeks may be performed if the National Board of Health and Welfare (“NBHF”) (Sw. Socialstyrelsen) approves it due to exceptional grounds. A decision by NBHF regarding an abortion cannot be appealed. NBHF also reviews any cases of denied abortions. Any medical practitioner that disregards the Abortion Act may be fined or imprisoned for a maximum of six months.



Abortion Act (1967)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Abortion Act broadly legalized abortion for up to 28 weeks gestation. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 lowered the gestation limit from 28 to 24 weeks for most cases.



Offenses Against the Person Ordinance (1924)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Section 47A of the ordinance regulates abortion. Abortion is legal in only a few situations: (i) continuing the pregnancy would risk the health of the woman; (ii) there is a substantial risk that the child would be born with a physical or mental abnormality, making it severely handicapped; (iii) the woman is younger than 16 years; or (iv) the woman is the victim of unlawful sexual intercourse. Section 45 forbids bigamy and polygamy.



Criminal Code Act (Tasmania) (1924)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement

The Criminal Code Act 1924 prohibits forced and unauthorized abortions and assaults on pregnant women, sexual violence, stalking, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. The termination of a pregnancy by a person other than a medical practitioner or the pregnant woman herself is a crime at any stage of the pregnancy. Termination carried out without the pregnant woman’s consent is a crime if it is performed intentionally or recklessly, regardless if any other harm is inflicted on the woman. Any person who unlawfully assaults a woman, knowing that woman is pregnant, is guilty of assault on pregnant woman under section 184A of the Act. Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without that person's consent is guilty of rape under section 185 of the Act. “Sexual intercourse” is defined as the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia, anus or mouth by a penis, the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia or anus by another body part or object, or the continuation of either act of penetration. “Consent” means free agreement, and does not include, among other things, if a person does not say or do anything to communicate consent. Additionally, it is a crime to have sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 17 according to section 124 of the Act. A person is guilty of stalking if they, among other things, follow, surveille, threaten, direct abusive acts towards, communicate, send or publish offensive material, or contact another person or a third person, with intent to cause the another person physical or mental harm, including self-harm or extreme humiliation or to be apprehensive or fearful under section 192 of the Act. Under section 170A of the Act, a person commits persistent family violence in relation to another person with whom the person is, or has been, in a family relationship is guilty of persistent family violence when the accused has committed unlawful family violence on at least three occasions. Family violence includes, among other things, acts of physical, psychological and economic abuse, with the specific definitions set out in the Family Violence Act 2004. Under section 178A, any person who performs female genital mutilation on another person is guilty of a crime, regardless of custodial consent. Removing or making arrangements to remove a child from Tasmania with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on the child is also a crime.



Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act (Tasmania) (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Act allows abortion by a medical practitioner up to 16 weeks of pregnancy with the woman’s consent. After 16 weeks, pregnancy may be terminated if two medical practitioners reasonably believe the continuation of pregnancy would involve greater risk to the mother’s physical or mental health than termination. At least one of the medical practitioners must specialize in obstetrics or gynaecology. In assessing the physical or mental health, the practitioners must consider the woman’s physical, psychological, economic, and social circumstances. A medical practitioner is not required to perform an abortion unless it is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman or prevent her serious injury, and a nurse and midwife are required to assist in an emergency. However, a medical practitioner must provide the full range of pregnancy options to a woman. The Act also established “access zones” by criminalising interference, intimidation, recording, and similar behaviour within a radius of 150 meters from abortion clinics.



Nigeria Penal Code Act (1960)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Penal Code applies to the northern states of Nigeria. Section 55(1)(d), subject to customs that have been recognized as lawful, allows a husband to “correct[] his wife” as long as it does not amount to “grievous hurt.” Section 55(2) goes on to state that the correction must be reasonable in kind or degree with regards to the age, physical, and mental conditions of the person being corrected. Grievous hurt is defined in section 241 as “(a) emasculation; (b) permanent deprivation of the sight of an eye, of the hearing of an ear or the power of speech; (c) deprivation of any member or joint; (d) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (e) permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (f) fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; (g) any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” The law concerning abortion is found in sections 232. Referenced in the law as the causing of a miscarriage, abortion is only legal to save the life of the mother. Any person, including the mother, can be guilty of the offense and will be punished with up to 14 years in prison, a fine, or both. Sections 233-235 discuss the causing of a miscarriage intentionally or unintentionally through acts against the mother. These offenses also carry a penalty of imprisonment, fines, or both. Section 282 discusses rape and specifies that sexual intercourse by a man with his wife is not rape if she has gone through puberty. No longer available at External URL. Please contact the Women & Justice Collection for a PDF copy.



Criminal Code Act (1990)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape

The Criminal Code applies to the southern states of Nigeria. The Criminal Code Act distinguishes between the treatment of assault on men and assault on women, with Chapter 29 (Sections 351-356) addressing “Assaults” and Chapter 30 (Sections 357-362) addressing “Assaults on Females: Abduction.” Notably, indecent assault on a man is considered a more serious offense and carries a higher sentence than does indecent assault on a woman. Under Section 353, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults any male person is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three years.” In contrast, under Section 360, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults a woman or girl is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to imprisonment for two years.” Rape is defined in section 257. It is defined as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl, without her consent, or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of harm, or by means of false and fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act, or, in the case of a married woman, by personating her husband.” Abortion is criminalized by sections 228-230. Abortion is defined in Section 228 as an attempt to procure a miscarriage. A mother trying to cause her own miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for seven years, while anyone who administers to her a poison or otherwise induces a woman’s miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for 14 years, and anyone who supplies or obtains any item with the knowledge of its intended use to cause an abortion is liable for imprisonment for three years. Sections 228-230. The laws derive culpability from intent and apply regardless of whether the woman is actually pregnant.



Penal Code Act (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Penal Code prohibits abortion, rape, sexual contact with minors, indecent assault, incest, and bigamy outside of customary law. Abortion is an offence pursuant to the Penal Code Act. Only a registered medical practitioner may terminate a pregnancy if it is necessary to prevent significant harm to the woman’s health, the fetus will be severely disabled, or the woman became pregnant through incest or rape. An adult who has sexual intercourse with a child, defined as under 18 years old, commits an offence and the consent of the child is irrelevant. It shall be defence for this crime if the adult can prove that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe, and did so believe, that the child had attained the age of 18 years.



Penal Code 2014: Lei nº 35/2014 (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Sexual violence and rape

The Code defines certain crimes and their penalties. The Code includes provisions defining and prohibiting sexual assault and domestic violence. The Code legalizes abortions performed within 12 weeks of gestation. The Code also eliminates attenuating circumstances previously associated with the crime of rape, such as the possibility of acquittal in cases where the perpetrator married the victim. In addition, the Code decriminalizes prostitution.



Mutterschutzgesetz (Maternity Protection Act) (1979)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Pregnant employees are prohibited from working during the eight-week period prior to giving birth and the eight-week period after giving birth. During this period, the mother is entitled to receive maternity pay, which is calculated as the employee’s average earnings during the three calendar months prior to the prohibition of work. After the prohibition period, women may take an additional period of parental leave (Karenz) until the child reaches the age of two. During this period, a mother (or father, if he has taken paternity leave, although both parents may not take leave concurrently) will not receive remuneration through her (or his) employer, although the parent taking leave may receive a child allowance through social insurance during this time. Pregnant employees and parents on parental leave may not be terminated from employment during that time and for a period of four weeks after returning to work. The Act also provides regulations for permissible types of work for pregnant women, women who are breastfeeding, and women who have recently given birth (i.e., prohibition of certain physical work and manual labor, handling of chemicals, work where the woman must sit or stand for long periods with no break, etc.) and regulations regarding the times pregnant and breastfeeding employees may work (i.e., must not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., nor Sundays or public holidays).

Schwangeren Angestellten ist das Arbeiten während eines Acht-Wochen-Zeitraums vor der Kindesgeburt und nach der Kindesgeburt untersagt. Während des Zeitraums hat die Mutter einen Anspruch auf das sog. Wochengeld. Die Höhe dessen richtet sich nach dem Durchschnittsgehalt der Angestellten innerhalb der letzten drei Kalendermonate, bevor der Arbeitsuntersagung. Nach dem Zeitraum, in dem die Mutter nicht arbeiten darf, kann sie optional noch weitere Elternzeit, sog. Karenz, in Anspruch nehmen, bis das Kind ein Alter von zwei Jahren erreicht. In der Karenzzeit können Mutter oder Vater, je nachdem wer die Karenz in Anspruch genommen hat (niemals beide gleichzeitig), keine Vergütung von ihrem Arbeitnehmer verlangen, sie erhalten allerdings einen Kindesunterhalt von der Sozialversicherung. Schwangere Angestellte und Eltern in Elternzeit können während dieser Zeit und bis zu vier Wochen nach ihrer Rückkehr nicht gekündigt werden. Das MuSchG enthält darüber hinaus auch Regeln bezüglich der Arbeit, die schwangeren, stillenden und Frauen, die kürzlich gebärt haben, gestattet ist – insbesondere verboten: körperlich besonders anstrengende Arbeit, der Umgang mit Chemikalien, Arbeit, bei der die Frau ohne Pause lange sitzen oder stehen muss, etc. Außerdem enthält das MuSchG Regeln zur Arbeitszeit, die schwangeren und stillenden Angestellten gestattet ist – nicht zwischen 20 Uhr und 6 Uhr; nicht an Sonntagen und staatlichen Feiertagen.



Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz (Reproductive Medicine Act) (1992)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, LGBTIQ

Medically assisted reproduction is available only to married couples, or those in a registered partnership or cohabitation. Further, it is only permitted to the couple if certain difficulties in conceiving exist, such as (i) all other possible or reasonable treatments to induce pregnancy through sexual intercourse are unsuccessful or hopeless; (ii) pregnancy through sexual intercourse would expose the spouse or partner to a serious risk of transmitting a serious infectious disease; (iii) for certain couples where there may be difficulty becoming pregnant or giving birth, or may give birth to a child with a hereditary disease (such as severe, untreatable pain or brain damage, or which would require the child be kept alive through constant use of modern medical technology) due to genetic dispositions. It is also available to a woman living in a registered partnership or cohabitation with another woman. Surrogacy is not permitted in Austria because medically assisted reproduction is only permissible within a marriage or registered partnership or cohabitation, and only the ova and the semen of the spouses, registered partners, or cohabitants may be used. There are two exceptional circumstances in which a third party’s genetic material may be used for medically assisted reproduction: (i) the semen of a third person may be used if the spouse, registered partner or cohabitant is not capable of reproduction, or if the couple is two women in a registered partnership; or (ii) the oocyte of a third person may be used if a woman, younger than 45, whom the pregnancy will be induced is otherwise not able to reproduce.

Medizinisch assistierte Fortpflanzung steht verheirateten Paaren, eingetragenen Partnerschaften oder einer Lebensgemeinschaft zur Verfügung. Außerdem ist es Paaren nur gestattet, wenn sie gewisse Schwierigkeiten bei der Empfängnis haben; dies sind z.B.: (1.) alle oder zumutbare Behandlungen, um eine Schwangerschaft durch Geschlechtsverkehr herbeizuführen, sind erfolglos oder aussichtslos; (2.) der Geschlechtsverkehr ist dem Paar nicht zumutbar, da eine ernsthafte Gefahr der Übertragung einer schweren Infektionskrankheit besteht; (3.) wenn das Paar Schwierigkeiten hat schwanger zu werden oder zu gebären, oder das Kind wegen genetischer Dispositionen mit einer Erbkrankheit geboren würde (so wie ernsthaften, unbehandelbaren Schmerzen oder Gehirnschäden, oder solche die es erforderlich machen, dass das Kind dauerhaft durch moderne Technologie am Leben erhalten würde). Außerdem stehen die Möglichkeiten homosexuellen Frauen offen, die in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft oder Lebensgemeinschaft leben. Nicht erlaubt ist Leihmutterschaft in Österreich, denn medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung ist nur in der Ehe, eingetragenen Partnerschaften und in Lebensgemeinschaften erlaubt. Es gibt zwei Ausnahmen, in denen das genetische Material für eine medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung genutzt werden darf: (1.) Der Samen einer dritten Person darf verwendet werden, wenn der Ehegatte, eingetragene Partner oder Partner in Lebensgemeinschaft nicht der Fortpflanzung fähig ist oder das Paar aus zwei Frauen in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft besteht; (2.) die Eizelle einer dritten Person darf einer Frau eingesetzt werden, wenn diese jünger als 45 Jahre alt ist und auf andere Weise nicht fähig ist, sich fortzupflanzen.



Offences Against the Person Act (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Trafficking in persons

The Offences against the Person Act lists acts recognized in law as punishable offences and details the ways in which the law deals with the offenders under the said acts. Child stealing is recognized as a felony and any person convicted for child stealing shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years. Kidnapping is recognized as a felony and any person convicted shall be liable to imprisonment for life. Attempts to procure abortion (by virtue of the pregnant woman unlawfully administering any substances to terminate her pregnancy by whatsoever means) is recognized as a felony and shall be liable for imprisonment for life. Infanticide (the act by which a woman willfully causes the death of her child under the age of twelve months) is a punishable offence recognized as the offence of manslaughter of a child.

El Decreto de Ley de Delitos contra la Persona enumera los actos reconocidos por la ley como delitos punibles y detalla las formas en que la ley trata a los que la violan en virtud de dichos actos. El robo de niños se reconoce como delito grave y toda persona condenada por robo de niños será encarcelada por un período no superior a siete años. El secuestro se reconoce como delito grave y cualquier persona condenada será condenada a cadena perpetua. Los intentos de obtener un aborto (en virtud de que la mujer embarazada administre ilegalmente cualquier sustancia para interrumpir su embarazo por cualquier medio) se reconocen como un delito grave y serán sancionados con prisión perpetua. El infanticidio (el acto por el cual una mujer causa intencionalmente la muerte de su hijo menor de doce meses) es un delito punible reconocido como el delito de homicidio involuntario de un niño.



Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch/Swiss Penal Code, Articles 118 and 119: Illegal Abortion and Legal Abortion (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Art. 118 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than five years or a monetary penalty for any person who terminates a pregnancy with the consent of the pregnant woman or incites or assists a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy without the requirements of Penal Code Art. 119 being met. Article 118 also provides for (1) imprisonment from one to 10 years for any person who terminates a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant woman, and (2) imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any woman who has her pregnancy terminated or otherwise participates in the termination of her pregnancy following the end of the twelfth week and without the requirements of Penal Code Art. 119 being met. Article 119 provides the requirements for legal abortion. The termination is, in the judgment of a physician, necessary in order to be able to prevent the pregnant woman from sustaining serious physical injury or serious psychological distress. The risk must be greater the more advanced the pregnancy is, or the termination must be performed (1) at the written request of a pregnant woman within 12 weeks of the start of the woman’s last period, (2) by a physician who is licensed to practice his profession, and (3) the woman claims that she is in a state of distress. The physician must have a detailed consultation with the woman prior to the termination and provide her with appropriate counsel. If the woman is incapable of judgment, the consent of her legal representative is required. The statute directs the Swiss Cantons to designate the medical practices and hospitals that fulfill the requirements for the professional conduct of procedures to terminate pregnancy and for the provision of counsel. Unofficial English translation available here.



禁止非医学需要的胎儿性别鉴定和选择性别人工终止妊娠的规定 (Provisions for the Prohibition of Non-Medical Needs for Fetal Sex Determination and Manual Termination of Pregnancy)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Provisions were adopted to implement the basic national policy of family planning, i.e. the “one-child policy” and to keep the sex ratio of the birth population within the normal range. Article 3 prohibits identifying the sex of the fetus for non-medical needs and to manually terminate the pregnancy because of the gender of the fetus, except for approval from the health administrative department or the family planning administrative department. Article 7 provides that if it is necessary for non-medical needs to terminate mid-term pregnancy (more than 14 weeks), an approval and corresponding certificate must be obtained from the family planning administrative department of the county-level people’s government, the sub-district office or the township people’s government. Article 7 further provides that if the fertility service certificate has been obtained and the pregnancy is terminated, the involved person shall be disciplined and educated by the family planning administrative department of the township people’s government, the sub-district office, or the county-level people’s government. The application for another birth shall not be approved until the facts are confirmed.

堕胎与生育权

为了贯彻计划生育基本国策、保证正常男女性别比例,国家卫生和计划生育委员会公布并实施了此规定。第三条规定,除在卫生和计划生育委员会的许可下,禁止任何单位或者个人实施非医学需要的胎儿性别鉴定和选择性别人工终止妊娠。第七条规定,在进行非医学需要下终止十四周以上的妊娠前,必须取得地方人民政府计划生育部门的许可。第七条还规定,如果在取得生育服务证后终止妊娠,当事者需接受人民政府计划生育部门的批评教育。如需申请新的生育服务证,必须经过事实确认。



中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 (Law on Population and Family Planning) (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Law on Population and Family Planning was adopted by the National People’s Congress on December 29, 2001 and amended on December 27, 2015. This law stipulated the national policy popularly known as the “one-child” policy. It was amended in 2015 to allow and encourage each couple to have two children. Before the amendment, Article 18 provided that the State encourages citizens to marry and bear a child at a later age, and advocates one child for each couple, except in certain conditions prescribed by laws and regulations. As a result of the amendment, Article 18 provides that the State encourages citizens to have two children. Before the amendment, Article 27 provided that couples who bear only one child voluntarily shall be issued the Honor Certificate and enjoy the awards for parents of only one child. Article 41 provides that a citizen who bears children in violation of Article 18 shall pay the social upbringing fines according to law.

堕胎与生育权

本法规于2001年12月29日通过,于2015年12月27日修正。此法规规定了众所周知的“一孩政策”。此法规为了鼓励一对夫妻可以生育两个子女于2015年进行了修正。在修正前,法规的第十八条阐明了国家鼓励晚婚晚育,并在除特定法规下要求一对夫妻生育一个子女。在修正后,第十八条鼓励每对夫妻生育两个子女。修正前,第二十八条规定只生育一个子女的夫妻,国家发给《独生子女光荣证》并享受独生子女父母奖励。第四十一条规定,不符合本法第十八条生育的公民,应依法缴纳社会抚养费。



中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法 (Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests) (2005)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests was adopted by the National People’s Congress on April 3, 1999 and amended on August 28, 2005. This Law stipulates that women have equal rights with men “in all aspects of political, economic, cultural, social and family life.” It also establishes the State’s responsibility to prevent domestic violence. Article 1 provides that “this Law is formulated to protect women’s lawful rights and interests, promote equality between men and women and allow full pay to women’s role in socialist modernization.” Article 7 provides that “[t]he All-China Women’s Federation and women’s federations at various levels shall, in accordance with the laws and charter of the All-China Women’s Federation,” uphold women’s rights and protect the rights and interests of women. Article 12 provides that the State shall “actively train and select female cadres” and “pay attention to the training and selection of female cadres of minority nationalities.” Article 23 provides that “[w]ith the exception of the special types of work or post unsuitable to women, no unit may, in employing staff and workers, refuse to employ women because of sex or raise the employment standards for women.” Article 23 also provides that “[t]he labor (employment) contract or service agreement shall not contain restrictions on her matrimony and child-bearing.” Articles 24 and 25 stipulate equal pay and equal opportunity for promotion for men and women. Article 26 provides that all units shall “protect women’s safety and health during their work or physical labor, and shall not assign them any work or physical labor not suitable to women,” and that “[w]omen shall be under special protection during menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period and nursing period.” Article 27 provides that “[n]o entity may, for the reason of matrimony, pregnancy, maternity leave or breast-feeding, decrease a female employee’s wage, dismiss her or unilaterally terminate the labor (employment) contract or service agreement.” Article 45 prohibits husbands from applying for a divorce “within one year after childbearing or within 6 months after termination of pregnancy” of a woman. Article 46 prohibits domestic violence. Article 51 provides that “[w]omen have the right to child-bearing in accordance with relevant regulations of the state as well as the freedom not to bear any child.”

堕胎与生育权、家庭暴力、性别歧视、财产与继承权

1992年4月3日,全国人民代表大会通过了中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法并于2005年8月28日对此法进行了修正。本法规定妇女在政治的、经济的、文化的、社会的和家庭的生活等各方面享有同男子平等的权利。本法规定了国家预防和制止家庭暴力的责任。第一条阐述了“为了保障妇女的合法权益,促进男女平等, 充分发挥妇女在社会主义现代化建设中的作用,根据宪法和我国的实际情况,制定本法。”第七条规定,中华全国妇女联合会和地方各级妇女联合会依照法律和中华全国妇女联合会章程,代表和维护各族各界妇女的利益,应做好维护妇女权益的工作。第十二条规定, 国家积极培养和选拔女干部,并有适当数量的妇女担任领导成员, 国家重视培养和选拔少数民族女干部。第二十三条规定,各单位在录用职工时,除不适合妇女的工种或者岗位外,不得以性别为由拒绝录用妇女或者提高 对妇女的录用标准。第十三条还规定,劳动(聘用)合同或者服务协议中不得规定限制女职工结婚、生育的内容。第二十三和二十四条规定了男女同工同酬和晋升、晋级等方面男女平等。第二十六条规定,任何单位均应根据妇女的特点,依法保护妇女在工作和劳动时的安全和健康,不得安排不适合妇女从事的工作和劳动,妇女在经期、孕期、产期、哺乳期受特殊保护。第二十七条规定任何单位不得因结婚、怀孕、产假、哺 乳等情形,降低女职工的工资,辞退女职工,单方解除劳动(聘用)合同或者服务协议。第四十五条规定女方在怀孕期间、分娩后一年内或者终止妊娠后六个月内,男方不得提出离婚。第四十六条禁止家庭暴力。第五十一条规定 妇女有按照国家有关规定生育子女的权利,也有不生育的自由。



Termination of Pregnancy Act (1977)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

if the continuation of the pregnancy is a serious threat to the mother’s health; (iii) if there is a serious risk that, if the child is born, it will suffer from a physical or mental defect that will cause the child to be severely disabled; (iv) where the pregnancy is a result of unlawful intercourse. Unlawful intercourse includes rape (this does not include marital rape), incest and mental handicap. However, a legal abortion can only be performed by a medical practitioner in a designated institution with the written permission of the superintendent of the institution. In cases where the mother’s life is in danger, the superintendent will not give permission until they have two different medical opinions regarding the danger to the mother. In circumstances of rape/incest, the superintendent must give permission after he receives written confirmation from a magistrate that the woman complained about the rape or the incestuous conduct. Contravention of the act by a medical practitioner in terminating a pregnancy or superintendent in providing permission not in accordance with the TPA constitutes an offense for which they could be liable for a fine not exceeding USD 5000, and/or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.



Code of Virginia: Jurisdiction; Consent for Abortion (Va. Code § 16.1–241(W))


Abortion and reproductive health rights

This Virginia law provides the judges of the juvenile and domestic relations district court jurisdiction over petitions filed by a juvenile seeking judicial authorization for a physician to perform an abortion if a minor elects not to seek permission from an authorized person. This statute further specifies that after a hearing, a judge can issue an order authorizing a physician to perform an abortion, without the consent of any authorized person, if the judge finds that (i) the minor is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independent of the wishes of any authorized person, or (ii) the minor is not mature enough or well enough informed to make such decision, but the desired abortion would be in her best interest.



Code of Virginia: Abortion (Va. Code § 18.2 et seq.)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Under Virginia law, it is a Class 4 felony to cause destruction of a unborn child, abortion, or miscarriage through medical procedure, drugs, or other means. There is an exception for physicians who are licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery, to terminate a pregnancy or assist in performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage during the first trimester of pregnancy, among other exceptions. Informed written consent is required for an abortion under Virginia law, subject to civil penalties. It is also a Class 3 misdemeanor to encourage an individual to have an abortion prohibited by Virginia law.



Abortion and Sterilization Act (1975)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization

The Abortion and Sterilization Act (the “Act”) was adopted from South Africa and prohibits abortions, except in extreme circumstances where either: (i) the mother’s life is in danger; (ii) not having an abortion would constitute a serious threat to the mother’s mental health; (iii) there is a serious risk that the child will be born with physical and/or mental defects; or (iv) the child is a product of rape or incest. It also criminalizes performing abortions, except in the circumstances listed above. Finally, the Act states the circumstances in which sterilizations may be performed, including on people incapable of consent.



Alabama Code Title 26. Infants and Incompetents § 26-21-4 (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Since 1987, Alabama has had a judicial bypass law, which allows pregnant minors to obtain a court’s permission to have an abortion without parental consent. In 2014, the Alabama legislature passed House Bill 494 to amend the law. The original judicial bypass statute provided for an ex parte hearing with only the judge, the minor, and her attorney present. The 2014 amendments added to the proceedings parties who are permitted or required to “examine” the minor and represent the interests of the unborn child, the state, and the minor’s parents. It would have also allowed the appointment of a guardian to represent the interests of the fetus. The District Court of the Middle District of Alabama found these amendments unconstitutional and severed them from the judicial bypass law in Reproductive Health Services v. Marshall (2017).



Codice Penal (1930)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The Italian Penal Code prohibits domestic violence (art. 572), female genital mutilation (art. 583), personal injury aggravated by permanent deformation or scarring of the face (art. 583 quinquies), harassment (art. 612 bis), the crime of illicit diffusion of sexually explicit images or videos without the consent of the persons represented (so-called revenge porn) (art. 612 ter). Punishable crimes against a person's freedom also include slavery and forced prostitution (art. 600), human trafficking (art. 601), sexual acts coerced through violence, threats, or abuse of authority (art. 609 bis) and group sexual assault (art. 609 octies). Sexual acts with a minor of 14 year old is always a crime (art. 609 quarter). Aggravating factors in sexual violence are: when the perpetrator is a relative, a parent or a guardian, when the sexual act is committed against a pregnant woman, when the victim is under 18 years old, and when the perpetrator uses a weapon (art. 609 ter). Sexual acts with a minor are not punishable when (1) both parties are minors, (2) the minor is at least 13 years old, and (3) the age difference between the two is no more than four years (art. 609 quater). Moreover, the Italian Penal Code prohibits the crime of coercion or induction into marriage (art. 558 bis) and the violation of the order for removal from the family home and of the prohibition to approach the places frequented by the victim (art. 387 bis). Finally, the Italian Penal Code prohibits crimes against pregnancy. In particular, under article 593-ter, anyone who causes the termination of a pregnancy without the woman’s consent shall be punished by imprisonment from four to eight years. Consent that is extorted by violence or threat, or that is obtained by deceit, shall be considered as not having been given. Aggravating factors in crimes against pregnancy include a woman under 18 years of age.



Código penal (Penal Code) (1999)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Chapter VI of Title 8 (Crimes against Life and Physical Integrity) delineates the circumstances under which abortion is illegal and establishes the penalties performing illegal abortions. Pursuant to Article 267 of the Criminal Code, anyone who, without complying with public health regulations established in respect of abortions, performs an abortion or in any way destroy the embryo, with the consent of the pregnant woman, is subject to a penalty of imprisonment for three months up to one year or a fine of 100 to 300 cuotas. If an abortion is performed (1) for profit, (2) outside of official institutions or (3) by a person that is a physician, such person is subject to an increased punishment of imprisonment for two to five years. Pursuant to Article 268, an individual who purposefully destroys the embryo (a) without using any force or violence on the pregnant woman, but without her consent, is subject to two to five years’ imprisonment or (b) with the use of any force or violence on the pregnant woman, is subject to three to eight years’ imprisonment. If concurrently with the occurrence of (a) or (b), any of the circumstances described in (1), (2) or (3) also exist, the punishment is increased to imprisonment for four to ten years. If a pregnant woman dies as a result of any of the above actions, the offending person is subject to imprisonment for a period of five to twelve years. Articles 270 and 271, respectively, prescribe the punishments for those who, without intending to do so, cause an abortion and for those who prescribe any abortion-inducing substance to destroy the embryo.

Chapter I of Title XI covers crimes against the normal development of sexual relations. Article 298 prescribes a penalty of four to ten years imprisonment for anyone who rapes a woman (either through vaginal intercourse or contra naturam) if during the criminal event any of the following circumstances occurs: (a) use of force or sufficient intimidation in order to achieve the goal or (b) if the victim is in a mentally disturbed state or suffers from temporary insanity, or the victim is deprived of reason or sense for any reason, or unable to resist, or lacks the ability to understand the consequences of her actions or to conform her conduct. Article 298 prescribes a term of imprisonment of 7 to 15 years if (a) the event is carried out with the participation of two or more persons, (b) if the perpetrator dresses up in military uniform or purports to be a public official, in each case, to facilitate consummating the act or (c) if the victim is over 12 and under 14 years of age. Finally, the Article prescribes a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty if (a) the event is carried out by a person who has previously been sanctioned for the same crime, (b) as a result of the act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness, or (c) if the perpetrator knows that he is infected with a sexually transmitted disease. Anyone who rapes a minor who is under 12 years of age will be punished with either a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty, even if none of the circumstances described in the preceding sentence occur. Article 299 of the Criminal Code sanctions individuals guilty of “active” pedophilia. Any person who commits an act of “active” pedophilia using violence or intimidation, or by taking advantage of the fact that the victim is deprived of reason or sense or unable to resist, will be punished with imprisonment for seven to 15 years. Such penalty increases to 15 to 30 years or death if (a) the victim is a minor under 14 years of age, even if the circumstances set forth in the immediately preceding sentence are not present, (b) if, as a consequence of the criminal act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness or (c) if the perpetrator has been previously sanctioned for the same crime.

Article 295 imposes a punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years or a fine of 200 to 500 cuotas, or both, to anyone who discriminates, or promotes or incites, discrimination, against another person, with manifestations in an offensive manner, on account of sex, race, color or national origin, or with actions to obstruct or impede, with motives relating to sex, race, color or national original, the exercise or enjoyment of rights of equality set forth in the Constitution. Any person who spreads ideas based on the superiority of races or racial hatred or commits, or incites, acts of violence against any race or group of people of another color or ethnic origin, shall be subject to the same punishment as indicated above.

El Capítulo VI del Título 8 (Delitos contra la vida y la integridad física) describe las circunstancias bajo las cuales el aborto es ilegal y establece las sanciones por realizar abortos ilegales. En conformidad con el artículo 267 del Código Penal, cualquier persona que, sin cumplir con las normas de salud pública establecidas con respecto a los abortos, realice un aborto o destruya de cualquier modo el embrión, con el consentimiento de la mujer embarazada, está sujeta a una pena de prisión. Por tres meses hasta un año o una multa de 100 a 300 cuotas. Si se realiza un aborto (1) con fines de lucro, (2) fuera de las instituciones oficiales o (3) por una persona que es un médico, dicha persona está sujeta a un aumento de la pena de prisión de dos a cinco años. En conformidad con el Artículo 268, una persona que destruye a propósito el embrión (a) sin usar ninguna fuerza o violencia contra la mujer embarazada, pero sin su consentimiento, está sujeta de dos a cinco años de prisión o (b) con el uso de cualquier fuerza o violencia en la mujer embarazada, está sujeto de tres a ocho años de prisión. Si concurrentemente con la ocurrencia de (a) o (b), cualquiera de las circunstancias descritas en (1), (2) o (3) también existen, el castigo se incrementa a la prisión de cuatro a diez años. Si una mujer embarazada muere como resultado de cualquiera de las acciones anteriores, la persona ofensora está sujeta a prisión por un período de cinco a doce años. Los artículos 270 y 271, respectivamente, prescriben los castigos para aquellos que, sin la intención de hacerlo, causan un aborto y para aquellos que prescriben cualquier sustancia inductora del aborto para destruir el embrión.

El Capítulo I del Título XI cubre los delitos contra el desarrollo normal de las relaciones sexuales. El artículo 298 prescribe una pena de cuatro a diez años de prisión para toda persona que viole a una mujer (ya sea por coito vaginal o contra naturam) si durante el evento criminal ocurre alguna de las siguientes circunstancias: (a) uso de la fuerza o suficiente intimidación para: lograr la meta o (b) si la víctima está en un estado mentalmente perturbado o sufre de locura temporal, o si la víctima está privada de razón o sentido por cualquier razón, o no puede resistirse, o carece de la capacidad de entender las consecuencias de las acciones o para conformar su conducta. El artículo 298 prescribe un período de prisión de 7 a 15 años si (a) el evento se lleva a cabo con la participación de dos o más personas, (b) si el perpetrador se viste de uniforme militar o pretende ser un funcionario público, en en cada caso, para facilitar la consumación del acto o (c) si la víctima es mayor de 12 años y menor de 14 años. Finalmente, el artículo prescribe un período de prisión de 15 a 30 años o la pena de muerte si (a) el evento es llevado a cabo por una persona que ha sido sancionada previamente por el mismo delito, (b) como resultado del acto, la víctima sufre lesiones o enfermedades graves, o (c) si el autor sabe que está infectado con una enfermedad de transmisión sexual. Cualquier persona que viole a un menor de edad menor de 12 años será castigada con una pena de prisión de 15 a 30 años o con la pena de muerte, incluso si no ocurre ninguna de las circunstancias descritas en la oración anterior. El artículo 299 del Código Penal sanciona a las personas culpables de pedofilia "activa". Cualquier persona que cometa un acto de pedofilia "activa" mediante el uso de la violencia o la intimidación, o aprovechando el hecho de que la víctima está privada de razón o sentido o no puede resistir, será castigada con pena de prisión de siete a 15 años. Dicha penalización aumenta a 15 a 30 años o fallece si (a) la víctima es menor de 14 años, incluso si las circunstancias establecidas en la oración inmediatamente anterior no están presentes, (b) si, como consecuencia de la acto criminal, la víctima sufre lesiones graves o enfermedad o (c) si el autor ha sido previamente sancionado por el mismo delito.

El artículo 295 impone una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años o una multa de 200 a 500 cuotas, o ambas, a cualquier persona que discrimine, promueva o incite a la discriminación de otra persona, con manifestaciones de manera ofensiva. , debido al sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, o con acciones para obstruir o impedir, con motivos relacionados con el sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, el ejercicio o disfrute de los derechos de igualdad establecidos en la Constitución. Cualquier persona que difunda ideas basadas en la superioridad de las razas o el odio racial o cometa, o incite, actos de violencia contra cualquier raza o grupo de personas de otro color u origen étnico, estará sujeta al mismo castigo que se indicó anteriormente.



Undang-Undang No. 36 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kesehatan (Law No. 36 of 2009 on Health) (2009)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Article 75(2) of this law prohibits abortion except for the case of medical emergency or rape.

Pasal 75(2) dari peraturan ini melarang aborsi kecuali berdasarkan indikasi kedaruratan medis atau perkosaan.



Penal Code of Indonesia (1999)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

Article 260 punishes spouses who conceal from their spouse a legal barrier to marriage with a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Article 284 punishes adulterous spouses and their partners, regardless of their marital status. The penal code only criminalizes acts of rape outside marriage unless the wife is underage and incurs injuries as a result. Articles 285 prohibits forcing or threatening force a woman to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and punishes violators with a maximum penalty of 12 years. Article 286 punishes sexual intercourse with an unconscious or helpless woman with a maximum of nine years imprisonment. If there is a complaint, Article 287 imposes a maximum sentence of nine years imprisonment for “carnal knowledge” of a girl outside of marriage when the man knows or reasonably should presume that she is less than 15 years of age. Prosecutions are triggered automatically when the girl is less than 12 years of age. Article 288 punishes husbands that have “carnal knowledge” of their wives who “are not yet marriageable” if it results in injury (four years imprisonment), serious injury (eight years), or death (12 years). Article 292 punishes adults that have carnal knowledge of those they know to be or reasonably should know to be minors of the same sex with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Article 293 punishes sexual abuse of a minor with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Incest is punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment pursuant to Article 294. Article 297 prohibits trafficking in woman and boys, which carries a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment. Article 299 imposes a four-year maximum sentence for abortion and provides for a one-third increase in sentencing for professionals (e.g., doctor, midwife) who perform abortions.



Criminal Code (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced and early marriage, LGBTIQ, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Belize Criminal Code defines and criminalizes rape, including marital rape (Sections 46, 71-74); carnal knowledge of female child (Section 47); procuring or attempting to procure a woman (Section 49-50); compulsion of marriage (Section 58); incest by males (Section 62); abortion, miscarriage, and child destruction (Sections 111-12, 127). The Code mandates a minimum sentence of eight years for rape (Section 46), 12 years of carnal knowledge of a female child (Section 47), and a life sentence for habitual sex offenders (Section 48).

Of particular note:

Marital rape under Section 72 requires a showing that the spouses have separated, the marriage is dissolved, an order or injunction has been made, granted or undertaken against the spouse, or that the sexual intercourse was preceded or accompanied by assault and battery. Lack of consent is not enough if the parties are married. The Criminal Code also criminalizes same-sex relationships under Section 53, which criminalizes “carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any person or animal.”Abortion and the aiding of abortion are felonies and carry a prison term of 14 years to imprisonment for life under Section 111. There are limited exceptions under Section 112 if two registered medical practitioners agree that the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother or her family or if the child may be seriously handicapped.


Termination of Pregnancy Law Reform Act of 2017 (Northern Territory) (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Termination of Pregnancy Law Reform Act 2017 (NT) reforms the laws in the Northern Territory relating to terminations of pregnancy by improving access to abortion and abortion drugs, and prohibiting harassing conduct targeted at persons seeking abortion. From July 1 2017, termination was made available in the Northern Territory up to 14 weeks into a pregnancy if a medical practitioner considers the termination to be appropriate having regard to: all relevant medical circumstances; the woman’s current and future physical, psychological and social circumstances; and professional standards and guidelines. For women who are more than 14 weeks but fewer than 23 weeks into the pregnancy, an abortion is permitted if two medical practitioners agree that the termination is appropriate having regard to the same factors. Only terminations necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman are permitted 23 weeks or more into the pregnancy. The Act makes it an offense to engage in harassing conduct in termination facilities or any area that is within 150m of such facilities. The maximum penalty for such an offense is 100 penalty units ($15,500 as of August 2018) or 12 months’ imprisonment.



The Revised Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2004)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender-based violence in general, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

The Ethiopian Criminal Code criminalizes most forms of violence against women and girls including physical violence within marriage or cohabitation (Article 564), Female Genital Mutilation/ Circumcision (Articles 565-6), trafficking women (Article 597), rape (Articles 620-28), prostitution/exploitation of another for financial gain (Article 634), and early marriage (Article 648). The Criminal Code outlaws abortion, except in cases of rape or incest, risk to the life of the mother or fetus, severe or incurable disease or birth defect, a mother who is mentally or physically incapable of raising a child, or “grave and imminent danger” that can only be addressed by terminating the pregnancy.



Social and Economic Development Policy Act (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

This Act provides policies that address the improvement of the quality of life of individuals and the reduction of the growth rate of the population. (§§ 1-3). §7 sets forth that the Ministry of Gender Development and women’s organizations shall implement gender policy to achieve gender equity, specifically, to increase women’s participation in the work force and in political institutions, to protect women’s property rights in statutory law and customary practices, and to prevent various forms of violence against women, including female genital mutilation, early marriage, teenage pregnancy. §5 sets forth that the family planning facilities shall actively involve the participation of women in deciding family size. §10 states that marriage of young girls before 18 years old, and marriage of boys before 21 years old should be discouraged.



HIV Control of the Disease and Related Issues (Amending Title 33) (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The Act regulates sexually transmitted diseases including HIV, provides information for treatment of HIV, and provides punishment for violations. §18.3 of the Act provides that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports shall provide education on the prevention and control of HIV. §18.4-18.5 provide that educating the public regarding HIV and AIDS is part of the national response, and the government shall train all relevant personnel. While §18.7 provides that all employees shall receive the HIV training regarding the prevention and control of HIV and AIDS. Several portions of the act speak to the rights of women and girls specifically. §18.9(a) of the Act notes that when providing HIV and AIDS service to women and girls differences in sex and gender should be considered. §18.9(b) directs the government agencies, when implementing the strategies, policies and programs to address the following issues: protection of the equality of women in private and public life, to address their rights to refuse sex and to access reproductive services independently, to address men’s equal responsibilities in sexual and reproductive health, to increase educational, economic, and employment opportunities to women, to reduce inequalities in laws regarding marital issues, and to protect women’s rights in religious contexts. §18.9(c) covers pregnant women with HIV and grants them the right to marry. The government shall provide them with consultation and information regarding future pregnancy decisions and the protection of future children from HIV. Section 18.9(d) requires the government to implement national education and training to health care providers to reduce HIV infection caused by sexual assault, protect the confidentiality of the HIV test result, report the sexual violence, and assist the investigation of such violence, and to develop and implement education and training for security personnel and prosecuting authorities in conducting investigations and prosecutions about the sexual violence. §18.27 provides that willful transmission of HIV by an infected person who knows his or her HIV test constitutes first degree felony. §18.28 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV status.



Offenses Against the Family, Chapter 16: Penal Law - Title 26 - Liberian Code of Laws Revised (1978)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Under Section 16.1 of the Penal Law, bigamy, and polygamy are illegal unless a legal defense is provided. Such defenses include a defendant’s belief that his or her former spouse is dead. Under Section 16.3, abortion beyond the 24th week of pregnancy is illegal. An abortion is legal if it occurs only after a licensed physician determines there is a substantial risk that continuing the pregnancy would gravely impair the mother’s physical and/or mental health. An abortion may also be justified if the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects or if the pregnancy was the result of illegal intercourse such as rape. Additionally, the abortion must be sanctioned by two physicians who have certified in writing the reasons why the abortion is necessary. The Penal Law also prohibits a woman from carrying out an abortion herself by any means once beyond the 24th week of pregnancy.



The Islamic Penal Code of Iran, Book 5 (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices

Articles 623-624 of Book Five of the Islamic Penal Code of Iran ban abortion and proscribe prison sentences for, respectively, "anyone" and doctors, midwives, and pharmacists. Article 630 of the Iranian Penal Code allows a man who witnesses his wife in the act of having sexual intercourse with another man (zina) to kill both of them if he is certain that his wife is a willing participant. If the husband knows that is wife was the subject of coercion, he is justified in murdering only the other man. Under Article 638 of the Iranian Penal Code, women who appear in public without the Islamic hijab may be sentenced to ten days to two months in prison or fined fifty thousand (USD $1.50) or five hundred thousand Rials (USD $15.00). (Full Persian version: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103202)



Gender Law of 10 May 2007 (2007)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination, Harmful traditional practices, International law, LGBTIQ, Property and inheritance rights, Sexual harassment

The Gender Law of 10 May 2007 combats discrimination between women and men (thereby implementing European Union legislation) and prohibits every form of discrimination based on gender, change of gender, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood. Direct and indirect discrimination, giving orders to discriminate, intimidation and sexual intimidation are all explicitly prohibited. Discrimination is prohibited with regard to access to goods and services, social security, social benefits, membership of professional organizations, and employment relations and conditions. Differences (in terms of access to certain goods or services, or employment conditions) are only allowed if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and if the restrictions are appropriate and necessary to achieve this aim. Differences are also allowed on a temporary basis in the context of positive action to prevent or compensate for gender-related disadvantages. Victims of discrimination can submit a reasoned complaint or take legal action. If the plaintiff has produced facts which indicate that there has been discrimination, the burden of proof is on the defendant to demonstrate that there was no gender-based discrimination.


Domestic Case Law

Cправа №187/1459/15к (Case No. 187/1459/15к) Петриківського районного суду Дніпропетровської області (Petrykivskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The complainant visited the gynecologist for an abortion. In the process, the doctor damaged the complainant’s uterus, bladder, and intestines. The complainant needed surgery to repair the damage and lost the ability to bear children. During the court hearing, the State’s forensic medical examiner found that the doctor did not violate medical protocols. The examiner also found that the doctor's actions did not cause the complainant’s organ damage, and that the accident occurred due to the peculiarities of the complainant’s body. The court of first instance found the doctor not guilty, taking into account the doctor's impressive professional qualifications. The prosecutor filed an appeal, but later refused to continue because of insufficient evidence of the doctor’s guilt. This case is important because it shows the difficulty in gathering evidence in criminal cases related to abortion and the protection of women's reproductive rights. One of the reasons for this is the lack of an independent forensic medical examination in Ukraine, as well as falsification of medical documentation.

Скаржниця звернулася до гінеколога для проведення аборту. При цьому лікар пошкодила скаржниці матку, сечовий міхур і кишечник. Скаржниця потребувала операції, щоб усунути пошкодження, і вона втратила здатність народжувати дітей. Під час судового засідання державна судово-медична експертиза встановила, що лікар не порушував медичних протоколів. Експерт також встановив, що дії лікаря не спричинили ушкодження органів скаржника, а нещасний випадок стався через особливості організму скаржника. Суд першої інстанції визнав лікаря невинним, враховуючи високу професійну кваліфікацію лікаря. Прокурор подав апеляцію, але пізніше відмовилася підтримувати обвинувачення через брак доказів провини лікаря. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки показує складність збору доказів у кримінальних справах щодо абортів та захисту репродуктивних прав жінок. Однією з причин цього є відсутність в Україні незалежної судово-медичної експертизи, а також фальсифікація медичної документації.



Demanda de constitucionalidad, Roa López, Jaramillo Valencia, Abadía Cubillos, Dávila Sáenz and Porras Santillana vs. artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 de la Ley 599/2000 (Código Penal) (Sentencia C-355-06, Expediente: D- 6122, 6123 and 6124) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The case concerned abortion, the right to life, the right to health, and the right to self-determination. The court ruled for the partial decriminalization of abortion and set circumstances under which voluntary termination of pregnancy would be permissible. The Criminal Code previously criminalized voluntary abortion with one to three years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued that the criminalization of abortion violated women’s constitutional rights to life and dignity, physical integrity, equality, liberty, and unhindered development of personality, health, and reproductive self-determination. The Colombian Constitutional Court determined that abortion shall not be considered a crime in any of the following three circumstances: (i) a physician certified that pregnancy could threaten the woman’s health or life; (ii) a physician concluded that the fetus would suffer from serious malformations that could eventually endanger or terminate his life; and (iii) if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or non-consensual artificial insemination, as long as the criminal act was lawfully reported to the competent authorities. The court found that articles 32.7, 122, 123, and 124 were constitutional, subject only to the aforementioned criteria. This case is of paramount importance because it established for the first time the right of women to terminate their pregnancy under the three specific scenarios. The scope of this decision was recently modified under Decision C-055-22 by the Constitutional Court, which has been announced but not yet published as of April 2022. This decision decriminalized voluntary abortion under any circumstances until 24 weeks of pregnancy. Voluntary abortions carried out after week 24 will not be deemed criminal offenses only if they are performed under any of the three events previously recognized by the Constitutional Court in the Decision C-355-06.

El caso se refería al aborto, el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud y el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. La Corte Constitucional falló a favor de la despenalización parcial del aborto y fijó las circunstancias bajo las cuales sería permisible la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Código Penal tipificaba como delito el aborto voluntario con uno a tres años de prisión. Los demandantes argumentaron que la penalización del aborto violaba los derechos constitucionales de las mujeres a la vida y la dignidad, la integridad física, la igualdad, la libertad, el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la salud y la libre determinación reproductiva. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia determinó que el aborto no sería considerado delito en ninguna de las siguientes tres circunstancias: (i) cuando un médico certifique que el embarazo puede poner en peligro la salud o la vida de la mujer; (ii) cuando un médico concluya que el feto sufriría de graves malformaciones que eventualmente podrían poner en peligro o acabar con su vida; y (iii) si el embarazo fue producto de violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, siempre que el hecho delictivo haya sido legalmente denunciado ante las autoridades competentes. El tribunal consideró que los artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 eran constitucionales condicionados a los criterios antes mencionados. Este caso es de suma importancia porque estableció por primera vez el derecho de la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo bajo los tres supuestos específicos. El alcance de esta decisión fue modificado recientemente mediante la Sentencia C-055-22 de la Corte Constitucional. Esta decisión despenalizó el aborto voluntario bajo cualquier circunstancia hasta la semana 24 de embarazo. Los abortos voluntarios practicados después de la semana 24 no serán considerados delitos si se realizan bajo cualquiera de los tres supuestos previamente reconocidos por la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355-06.



B.B. en representación de A.A. (personas protegidas) vs SaludCoop E.P.S. (Sentencia T-388-09 - Acción de Tutela-, Expediente: T-1.569.183) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2009)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

The case concerned women’s sexual and reproductive rights, specifically the right to voluntarily terminate the pregnancy. The court ruled that sexual and reproductive rights, including abortion in certain circumstances, are subject to constitutional protection. A pregnant woman’s husband requested that the health care provider perform a genetic and pathological test on the fetus and the termination of his wife’s pregnancy, based on an alleged diagnosis of malformation, among other complications. The doctor refused upon conscientious objection. The court cited the ruling C-355/06, which referred to the decriminalization of abortion under any of three circumstances: (i) the pregnancy poses a serious risk for the woman life, (ii) the fetus has severe malformations or (iii) the pregnancy was the result of a rape. In this decision, the court also ruled that the physician’s conscientious objection to perform the procedure was inadmissible. Ultimately, specific guidelines were established, so women could freely exercise their right to voluntarily terminate their pregnancy under the authorized scenarios. As such, the court instructed the Superintendent of Health (‘Superintendencia Nacional de Salud’) to adopt a number of measures to ensure that health centers and medical institutions have adequate staff to attend voluntary abortions.

El caso se refería a los derechos sexuales y reproductivos de la mujer, específicamente el derecho a interrumpir voluntariamente el embarazo. La Corte Constitucional indicó que los derechos sexuales y reproductivos, incluido el aborto en determinadas circunstancias, son objeto de protección constitucional. El esposo de una mujer embarazada solicitó a la prestadora de salud la realización de un examen genético y patológico al feto y la interrupción del embarazo de su esposa, con base en un presunto diagnóstico de malformación, entre otras complicaciones. El médico se negó por objeción de conciencia. La Corte Constitucional citó la sentencia C-355/06, que se refería a la despenalización del aborto en cualquiera de estas tres circunstancias: (i) el embarazo presenta un riesgo grave para la vida de la mujer, (ii) el feto presenta malformaciones graves o (iii) el embarazo fue el resultado de una violación. En esta sentencia, la Corte también declaró inadmisible la objeción de conciencia del médico para realizar el procedimiento. En definitiva, se establecieron lineamientos específicos para que las mujeres pudieran ejercer libremente su derecho a interrumpir voluntariamente su embarazo en los supuestos autorizados. Como tal, la Corte instruyó a la Superintendencia Nacional de Salud a adoptar una serie de medidas para garantizar que los centros de salud y las instituciones médicas cuenten con el personal adecuado para atender abortos voluntarios.



Montilla Varela vs Salud Total EPS (Decision T-528-14 - Acción de Tutela; Expediente: T- 4276301) Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

This action concerned couples’ reproductive health rights, specifically related to in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF"). The plaintiff requested protection of his fundamental health and equality rights and his right to have a family, which he considered violated by Salud Total EPS when it refused to carry out an IVF procedure for the plaintiff’s wife. The Constitutional Court held that infertility is considered by the World Health Organization as a reproductive system disease that affects the couple who suffer from it. Thus, the State must adopt affirmative actions tending to include assisted reproduction techniques in the national health system when the couple does not have enough resources to afford it. Failure to do so may result in a violation of the fundamental rights to reproductive health and personal integrity. Thus, the court ruled that Salud Total EPS was obligated to provide the couple with the IVF procedure to protect their reproductive health rights. Furthermore, the court exhorted the Colombian Government and the Health Ministry to evaluate the best mechanism to add IVF treatments to the national mandatory health plan for those people that cannot afford the procedure.

Esta acción se refería a los derechos de salud reproductiva de las parejas, específicamente relacionados con el tratamiento de fecundación in vitro. El demandante solicitó la protección de sus derechos fundamentales de salud e igualdad y su derecho a formar una familia, los cuales consideró vulnerados por parte de Salud Total EPS al negarse a realizar un procedimiento de fecundación in vitro a la pareja del demandante. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que la infertilidad es considerada por la Organización Mundial de la Salud como una enfermedad del sistema reproductivo que afecta a la pareja que la padece. En este sentido, el Estado debe adoptar acciones afirmativas tendientes a incluir las técnicas de reproducción asistida en el sistema nacional de salud cuando la pareja no cuenta con los recursos suficientes para costearlo. El no hacerlo puede resultar en una violación de los derechos fundamentales a la salud reproductiva y la integridad personal. En esta línea, la Corte dictaminó que Salud Total EPS estaba obligada a brindarle a la pareja el procedimiento in vitro para proteger sus derechos de salud reproductiva. Además, la Corte exhortó al Gobierno de Colombia y al Ministerio de Salud a evaluar el mejor mecanismo para incorporar los tratamientos de fecundación in vitro al plan nacional de salud obligatorio para aquellas personas que no pueden costear el procedimiento.



Calderón Barrera vs EPS Coomeva; Rincón Caicedo vs EPS-S Emssanar; Solarte Ortega vs EPS Sura; y Cataño Urrea vs EPS Coomeva Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

(Sentencia T-274-15 - Acción de Tutela; Expedientes acumulados: T-4.492.963; T-4.715.291; T-4.725.592; T-4.734.867)

These cases concerned women’s reproductive health rights, specifically related to in vitro fertilization treatment (“IVF”). The Constitutional Court analyzed four cases where health care providers refused to perform IVF treatments since they were not covered by the mandatory health plan. The court ruled that the right to reproductive health protects the people's right to make free decisions about their sexuality and reproduction and involves the obligation of the Government to provide the necessary resources to make such determination effective. On this note, the court held that a health care company infringes the fundamental rights of a woman with fertility issues by denying authorization for in vitro fertilization treatment. The Colombian Constitutional Court followed the guidelines provided by other judgments held by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) on this note, including the 2012 case Artavia Murillo and others v. Costa Rica. Furthermore, the court affirmed the decision T-528 of 2014, which instructed the Colombian Government to analyze the possibility to adding IVF treatments to the national mandatory health plan.

La Corte analizó varios casos que se referían a los derechos de salud reproductiva de las mujeres, específicamente aquellos relacionados con el tratamiento de fertilización in vitro. La Corte Constitucional analizó cuatro casos en los que los prestadores de servicios de salud se negaron a realizar tratamientos de fecundación in vitro por no estar cubiertos por el plan obligatorio de salud. La Corte dictaminó que el derecho a la salud reproductiva protege la posibilidad de que las personas tomen decisiones libres sobre su sexualidad y reproducción e implica la obligación del Gobierno de proporcionar los recursos necesarios para hacer efectiva tal determinación. En este sentido, la Corte sostuvo que una empresa de atención médica viola los derechos fundamentales de una mujer con problemas de fertilidad al negar la autorización para el tratamiento de fertilización in vitro. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia siguió los lineamientos brindados por otras sentencias proferidas por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos sobre este aspecto, incluyendo el caso Artavia Murillo y otros vs. Costa Rica de 2012. Asimismo, la Corte confirmó la sentencia T-528 de 2014, que instruyó al Gobierno colombiano analizar la posibilidad de incorporar tratamientos de fecundación in vitro al plan nacional obligatorio de salud.



J.M.M. vs Bedoya Rentería (SP2131-2019; Expediente 50963) Corte Suprema de Justicia de Colombia (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Statutory rape or defilement

In this case, the defendant, the mayor of a Colombian town, was convicted of rape and non-consensual abortion. The penalty was 261 months of imprisonment and 20 years of disqualification from exercising political roles in the public sector. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, a minor, against her will and, as a result, she got pregnant. The defendant forced the plaintiff to terminate the pregnancy. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the appellant court omitted at least seven fundamental testimonies. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as some of the testimonies from other witnesses, was inconsistent. The plaintiff declared out-of-court that the defendant raped her and forced her to abort, however, during the appellate trial she testified that the lawsuit was a stratagem designed by her uncle, who was a candidate and political opponent of the defendant, to discredit the defendant. However, the appellate court learned that defendant, in order to obtain an acquittal, extorted, threatened, and attempted to bribe the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, and other witnesses involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Justice found that even though the plaintiff changed her testimony, the other evidence suggested that the defendant was guilty of the charges. Therefore, the Court ultimately upheld the defendant’s conviction.

En este caso, el acusado, alcalde de un pueblo colombiano, fue condenado por acceso carnal violento y aborto no consentido. La pena fue de 261 meses de prisión y 20 años de inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos. El fiscal argumentó que el acusado tuvo varios encuentros sexuales con una víctima menor de edad, en contra de su voluntad y, como consecuencia, quedó embarazada. La víctima fue obligada por el acusado a interrumpir el embarazo. El acusado alegó ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia que la corte de segunda instancia omitió al menos siete testimonios fundamentales para el caso. También afirmó que el testimonio de la víctima, así como algunos de los testimonios de otros testigos, eran inconsistentes. La víctima declaró extrajudicialmente que el acusado la violó y la obligó a abortar, sin embargo, durante el juicio de apelación declaró que la demanda fue una estrategia diseñada por su tío, quien era candidato y opositor político del acusado, para desacreditar al acusado. Sin embargo, la corte de segunda instancia se enteró que el acusado extorsionó, amenazó e intentó sobornar a la víctima, a los familiares de la víctima y a otros testigos involucrados en el caso, con el fin de obtener una absolución. La Corte Suprema de Justicia encontró que, a pesar de que la víctima cambió su testimonio, la evidencia sugería que el acusado era culpable de los cargos que se le imputaban. Por lo tanto, la Corte finalmente confirmó la condena del acusado.



McGee v. Attorney General and Revenue Commissioners Supreme Court of Ireland (1973)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The plaintiff was a mother whose second and third pregnancies were complicated by medical issues and resulted in her suffering from a stroke and temporary paralysis. She was advised that her life would be endangered if she became pregnant again. As such, she sought to obtain contraceptives, but their sale and importation was prohibited by Irish law. The Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the importation, sale or advertising of contraceptives was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s right to privacy in marital affairs, an unenumerated right in the Irish Constitution. Although the Court left undisturbed the then-existing ban on sale of contraceptives in Ireland, the use and importation of contraceptives was not prohibited based on the law’s inconsistency with the Constitution.



Roche v. Roche, Sims Clinic Ltd., and the Attorney General Supreme Court of Ireland (2009)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The issue in this case was whether embryos, having been frozen and stored in a clinic, are “unborn” and thus protected by the right to life under Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland. The applicant-wife brought this suit against her husband, the respondent. The applicant had in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF") and six embryos resulted. Three of the embryos were implanted successfully in the applicant’s uterus and she became pregnant. The remaining three embryos, at issue in the case, were frozen and placed in storage with a clinic. The applicant and her husband separated, after which the applicant requested that the three frozen embryos be released to her to have them implanted. The clinic refused to release them absent consent from the respondent which he refused to provide. The applicant brought the court proceedings to obtain the embryos on constitutional and contractual grounds. The High Court dismissed the case and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. A majority of the Supreme Court held that an embryo is not “unborn” for the purposes of Irish Constitutional law, and that there was no consequential (enforceable) right for the embryos to be released and implanted; Article 40.3.3 only applied after implantation.



Bigelow v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States (1975)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The plaintiff, a newspaper editor, was convicted under a Virginia law making it illegal for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of this law and argued that it violated rights protected by the First Amendment. The Court rejected the Supreme Court of Virginia’s ruling that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment, and further held that the Virginia Law violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.



Griswold v. Connecticut Supreme Court of the United States (1965)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The plaintiffs challenged an 1879 Connecticut law, which banned the use of all drugs, medical devices, or other instruments necessary for contraception, by opening a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut. The Supreme Court found that the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments established a right of marital privacy against state contraception regulations. As a result, the Court held that the Connecticut law violated this constitutionally established right to privacy, so the law was struck down. The Court applied this reasoning, in part, to a case affirming unmarried people's access to contraception in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972).



Eisenstadt v. Baird Supreme Court of the United States (1972)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A Massachusetts statute made it illegal to give “drugs, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of contraception” to any unmarried person. The plaintiff, found guilty of violating the statute, challenged its constitutionality, claiming it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court held that a statute preventing unmarried people from obtaining contraception was unconstitutional. The Court found that unequal access to contraception for married and unmarried people created a suspect class in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy as discussed in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965).



Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. Supreme Court of the United States (1983)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A federal statute established in 1873 prohibited the mailing of unsolicited pamphlets regarding contraceptives. Filing a friend-of-the-court brief, the ACLU challenged the constitutionality of this statute, alleging that it violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. Applying the test regarding commercial speech established in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court found that based on the economic motivation of the sender, the advertising content of the pamphlets, and their reference to a specified product, the mail could be classified as commercial speech. The Court also held that the governmental interest in prohibiting the pamphlets was insufficient as recipients could easily discard the information if they wished.



Nr. 2K-7-102-222/2018 dėl profesinės veiklos neteisėtumo požymių (on the Signs of Professional Activity Illegality) Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court of Lithuania) (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in finding that the appellant’s professional activity of assisting with childbirth at home is prohibited. Instead, it specified that the circumstances of her working without a license and necessary qualifications, such as being a doctor, an obstetrician-gynecologist, or a midwife, made this type of activity illegal.

Aukščiausiasis Teismas nusprendė, kad apeliacinis teismas suklydo konstatuodamas, jog apeliantės profesinė veikla—pagalba gimdyti namuose, yra draudžiama. Vietoj to, Teismas nurodė, kad šio darbo be licencijos ir būtinų kvalifikacijų aplinkybės padarė tokio pobūdžio veiklą neteisėtą. Sveikatos apsaugos ministras 2019 m. patvirtino įsakymą Nr. V-10 dėl gimdymo namuose priežiūros paslaugos teikimo tvarkos aprašo patvirtinimo.



G 16/2013-16, G 44/2013-14 Österreichischer Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law, LGBTIQ

The local court denied the petitioner’s motion to certify the approval of her female partner to conduct in vitro fertilization with a third person’s semen. The regional court denied the appeal. It held that the wording of the Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (FMedG) aims to exclude same-sex parenthood. The Supreme Court decided to bring this question to the attention of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court decided that certain sections of the FMedG were unconstitutional. Referencing the European Court of Human Right’s judgements, the Court stressed that same-sex partnerships can fall under the protection of Article 8 of the EHRC as a family. Even though the legislature has discretion in the implementation of new rules, the FMedG is missing sufficient grounds for a differential treatment of same sex couples and heterosexual couples. The impact of this decision was far-reaching because it made it immediately permissible for lesbian couples to receive sperm donations and reproductive medication. Before this decision, these medical treatments were solely available to heterosexual couples.

Das Amtsgericht lehnte den Antrag der Antragsstellerin ab, die Zustimmung ihres weiblichen Partners zur Durchführung einer In-vitro-Fertilisation mit dem Samen einer dritten Person zu bescheinigen. Das Landgericht wies die Berufung zurück. Es vertrat die Auffassung, dass der Wortlaut des österreichischen Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (FMedG) darauf abziele, gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft auszuschließen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof beschloss, den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof mit dieser Frage zu befassen. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof entschied, dass bestimmte Abschnitte des FMedG verfassungswidrig sind. Unter Verweis auf die Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte betonte das Gericht, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften als Familie unter den Schutz von Artikel 8 der EMRK fallen können. Auch wenn der Gesetzgeber bei der Umsetzung neuer Regelungen einen Ermessensspielraum hat, fehlt es dem FMedG an einer ausreichenden Begründung für eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von gleichgeschlechtlichen und heterosexuellen Paaren. Die Auswirkungen dieser Entscheidung waren weitreichend, da sie es lesbischen Paaren sofort erlaubte, Samenspenden und reproduktionsmedizinische Behandlungen in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vor dieser Entscheidung waren diese medizinischen Behandlungen ausschließlich heterosexuellen Paaren vorbehalten.



Roe v. Wade United States Supreme Court (1973)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The plaintiff discovered she was pregnant and sought an abortion. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion due to a Texas law that criminalized all abortions except those necessary to protect the life of the mother. The plaintiff alleged that the Texas law violated her constitutional right to privacy. The Court invalidated the law, finding that the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment Due Process Clause protects women’s right to privacy and thus their right to choose to have an abortion before the end of the first trimester. The Court further held that after the first trimester but before fetal viability, the State may only impose regulations related to the protection of the mother’s health. However, the Court found that following the viability of the fetus, the State may prohibit abortions except those necessary to protect the mother’s life. This decision was affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.



Ministério Público v. Felizardo Alfredo Cabuco Bengue Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Statutory rape or defilement

The defendant, a nurse, was charged with the crimes of indecent assault and abortion, for which he was sentenced in 2016 to cumulatively serve five years and two months in prison and ordered to pay monetary compensation to the victim, who was his niece. It was established that the defendant and the victim began a relationship when she was 15 years old and, in course of the relationship and while she was still underage, the defendant performed three abortions with the victim’s consent. On one occasion, a member of the family accidentally witnessed the abortion. It was said that the defendant would insert a chirurgical instrument into the victim’s womb and cut out the fetus at the house where they both lived. The defendant denied all accusations against him, including the relationship itself. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant committed the crimes of abortion and indecent assault (i.e., the “harassment of another person by engaging in exhibitionist acts, making sexual advances or coercing that person into contact of a sexual nature that is not consummated”). However, due to the fact that such criminal offenses are, together, punishable with a sentence lower than 12 years in prison, the Supreme Court declared him amnestied and, consequently, extinguished the criminal proceedings against him, without prejudice of the monetary compensation for damages. In 2016, Angola published an amnesty law (Lei nº 11/16) in which it pardoned common crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to 12 years. Although the amnesty law excludes sexual crimes, the crime committed in this case does not fit the exception.

O réu, um enfermeiro, foi acusado de crimes de atentado ao pudor e aborto, pelos quais ele foi sentenciado em 2016 a cumulativamente cumprir cinco anos e dois meses de prisão e ordenado a pagar indenização à vítima, que era sua sobrinha. Foi estabelecido que o réu e a vítima começaram uma relação quando ela tinha 15 anos e, no curso da relação e enquanto ela ainda era menor de idade, o réu realizou três abortos com o consentimento da vítima. Em uma ocasião, um membro da família presenciou acidentalmente o aborto. Foi dito que o réu, dentro da casa em que eles viviam, inseria um instrumento cirúrgico dentro do útero da vítima e retirava o feto. O réu negou todas as acusações contra ele, incluindo a própria relação. O Tribunal Supremo decidiu que o réu cometeu os crimes de aborto e de atentado ao pudor (i.e., o “assédio de outra pessoa ao se envolver em atos exibicionistas, realizando avanços sexuais ou coagindo a pessoa a fazer contato de natureza sexual que não foi consumado”). Porém, dado o fato de que as ofensas criminais são, juntas, puníveis com uma sentença menor que 12 anos de prisão, o Tribunal Supremo declarou ele anistiado e, consequentemente, extinguiu os processos criminais contra ele, sem prejuízo da indenização por danos. Em 2016, Angola publicou uma lei de anistia (Lei nº 11/16) em que perdoou crimes comuns que são puníveis com penas de até 12 anos. Ainda que a lei de anistia excluda crimes sexuais, o crime neste caso não se encaixa nessa exceção.



Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 (Claim of non-compliance with fundamental precept No. 54) Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

In 2004, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) considered a claim brought by the National Trade Union of Health Workers and ANIS (Institute of Bioethics, Human Rights, and Gender) to determine whether terminating a pregnancy in which the fetus suffers from anencephaly (absence of major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp) violates the prohibition on abortion as set forth in Brazil’s Penal Code. On April 12, 2012, the STF rendered an 8-2 decision (with one abstention) that abortion in the circumstance of anencephaly is not a criminal act under the Penal Code. The majority extended a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy to cases of anencephalic fetuses because the fetus does not have the potential for a viable life outside of the womb, and to force a woman to carry such a pregnancy to term is akin to torture. Justice Marco Aurelio and the majority held that to interpret the Penal Code to prohibit such abortions would violate a woman’s constitutional guarantees of human dignity, autonomy, privacy, and the right to health. A woman therefore may seek and receive treatment to terminate the anencephalic pregnancy without risk of criminal prosecution and without judicial involvement.

Em 2004, a Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, quando da análise do Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 formalizada pela Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde – CNTS, determinou que a interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico não viola as proibições de realização de aborto trazidas no Código Penal. Em abri de 2012, o Pleno do STF entendeu, por 8-2 votos (com uma abstenção), pela descriminalização do aborto realizado em razão da anencefalia do feto. A maioria estendeu o direito da mulher de interromper sua gravidez a casos de fetos anencefálicos porque o feto não tem potencial para uma vida viável fora do útero, e forçar uma mulher a levar tal gravidez adiante é semelhante a tortura. O Juiz Marco Aurélio e a maioria dos juízes sustentou que interpretar o Código Penal para proibir tais abortos violaria as garantias constitucionais de dignidade humana, autonomia, privacidade e o direito à saúde da mulher. Assim, a mulher poderá procurar e receber tratamento para interromper a gravidez anencefálica sem risco de processo criminal e sem envolvimento judicial.



Attorney General v. X. and Others Supreme Court of Ireland (1992)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

X was a 14-year-old girl who became pregnant and suicidal after being raped. Her parents tried to take her to England in order to obtain a first-trimester abortion that was illegal in Ireland, but the Attorney General obtained an interim injunction from the High Court restraining the girl and her parents from leaving the country for a period of nine months or from arranging an abortion for her. The family appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution's prohibition on abortion did not prevent a suicidal 14-year-old, pregnant as the result of rape, from obtaining an abortion in Ireland because the suicide was a substantial risk to the life of the pregnant girl. The Court also struck down the injunction prohibiting the girl from leaving the country.



Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd Supreme Court of Canada (1989)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The respondent’s group insurance plan provided weekly benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness. The plan covered pregnant women subject to an exclusion from coverage during the period commencing on the tenth week prior to the expected week of childbirth and extending to six weeks after it (even if the accident or sickness was unrelated to the pregnancy). The appellants, who all became pregnant in 1982, alleged that the differential treatment of pregnancy in the respondent’s plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex contrary to s.6(1) of the Human Rights Act of Manitoba. The Supreme Court ruled that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination and that the respondent had discriminated against the appellants on the basis of sex. It said that bearing children benefits society as a whole and women should not be economically or socially disadvantaged due to childbearing.



Case No. B 10/16 – E.G. in Tenhult v. the Region of Jönköping County Arbetsdomstolen (Swedish Labor Court) (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, International law

A to-be midwife, E.G., was denied jobs for which she had applied at three different obstetrics and gynecology departments. When applying, E.G. said that she could not participate in performing abortions due to her religious beliefs. The court considered whether the region had discriminated against E.G. according to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Swedish Discrimination Act and whether the region had violated E.G’s rights under Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR. The Swedish Labor Court found that the region’s decision not to employ E.G. for the positions she applied to, which included tasks that she had declared that she would not perform, did not constitute direct or indirect discrimination. The Labor Court stated that the region’s criteria – that the applicant could perform all tasks falling within the position, including abortion – was motivated by a legitimate purpose, i.e. good healthcare for the women seeking abortion as defined in the democratically adopted law. The criteria was also found appropriate and necessary to reach the aim of good health care. The Labor Court further deemed that it was E.G’s “professional limitations” and not her opinions regarding abortion that had mattered in the region’s decision not to hire her. Therefore, the Labor Court ruled that region had not committed violations of neither Article 9, 10 or 14 of the ECHR, nor the Swedish Discrimination Act.



Nos. 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, and 2 BvF 5/92 Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Federal Constitutional Court) (1993)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The court held that “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz, also referred to as the German constitution) protects the rights of unborn fetus. In order to protect these rights, the court held that termination of a pregnancy should be viewed as categorically wrong and prohibited by law. The court notes that there may be situations where the rights of the unborn fetus conflict with the rights of the mother (as similarly protected by Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law). In such a case, the court says that the rights of the mother will not be protected because such protection involves the act of “killing” the unborn fetus. The court notes that is “exceptional” circumstances it may be permissible to allow a woman to terminate a pregnancy. The court says that it is up to the legislature to determine what constitutes an exceptional circumstance. The court further holds that it would be permissible for the state to abstain from criminally punishing abortion, so long as the state implemented a counseling system designed to talk women out of terminating a pregnancy. According with the court, termination of a pregnancy will only be considered justified (not illegal) if it is determined upon counseling that there are exceptional circumstances. This case is significant because it demonstrates that, although abortion is still technically illegal in Germany, the state has allowed it to go unpunished in certain circumstances.



AZ: 500DS 501JS 15031/15 (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

In this case a doctor was held criminally liable under section 219a of the Criminal Code for publishing information about abortion services on the her website. The doctor argued that she was not "advertising" abortion (which is prohibited by law under section 219a) but merely providing information on abortions. The court disagreed, holding that the downloadable PDF on the doctor's website that contained information about abortions fell under the prohibited conduct of section 219a. The doctor was required to pay a fine of 6000 Euros (150 euros per day over the course of 40 days).



M.N. v. Republic High Court of Kenya (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The appellant, M.N., was charged with attempt to procure abortion, contrary to Section 158 of the penal code, which provides the “any person who, with intent to procure miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not with child, unlawfully administers to her or causes her to take any poison or other noxious thing, or uses any force of any kind, or uses any other means whatever is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.” Four witnesses testified for the prosecution, including complainant, who was 15 years old, told the court that the appellant, who was her teacher, invited her to his home on several occasions and made advances at her. She also testified that they eventually had sexual intercourse, which led to her pregnancy, and that the appellant provided a “doctor”, who was never arrested or charged, to procure an abortion. The complainant’s grandmother, one of the witnesses, testified that she also observed the “doctor”, but gave a different account of his actions than the complainant’s. The complainant later gave birth to a healthy baby. The appellant denied having a sexual relationship with the complainant and attempting to procure an abortion. The court held that the trial court convicted appellant based on its suspicion that he was responsible for the complainant’s pregnancy and that he provided the “doctor” who attempted to procure an abortion, but that suspicion was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The High Court thus set aside the conviction and sentence.



Clubb v. Edwards (2019)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The appellant challenged section 9(2) of the Tasmanian Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 which prohibits protests that can be seen or heard within 150 meters of an abortion clinic. The appellant was convicted under the Act after standing on a street corner within the protest zone, holding placards with depictions of fetuses and statements about the “right to life.” He sought review of the conviction on the grounds that the law impermissibly burdens the freedom of communications on governmental and political matters, a right implied in the Australian Constitution. The High Court dismissed the appeal unanimously holding that the statute aims to protect the safety, wellbeing, privacy, and dignity of women, and in doing so, adequately balances the right to political communication and protection of those in need of medical assistance. Because the statute is limited in geographical reach and does not discriminate between sources of protest within the protected zone, the burden upon political communication within the Act is minor and proportionate.



The Center for Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD) v. Mulago National Referral Hospital High Court of Uganda (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

Here, Justice Lydia Mugambe held that Mulago National Referral Hospital’s negligence and the resulting disappearance of the couple’s baby amounted to psychological torture for the parents and violated their rights to health and access to information. Specifically, Justice Mugambe held that a woman’s inability to access sufficient antenatal care demonstrates a failure on the part of the State to fulfill its obligations under the right to health. The decision outlines Uganda’s obligations under international law to devote special attention and resources to women whose circumstances make them vulnerable.



G.M.J. v Attorney General Court of Appeal of Botswana (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Here, in a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed a decision by the High Court to dismiss a medical negligence claim raised by a woman who underwent a surgical procedure for the removal of her womb and experienced the leaking of urine after the procedure. Appellant had sought damages from medical negligence and lack of proper post-operative care. The Court’s holding clarifies the law on prescription and medical negligence, which are a prominent method through which women try to access the courts when their reproductive health rights are violated.



J.M. v. Q.F.G. and G.K. Anti-Discrimination Tribunal Queensland (1997)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

The complainant was a woman in an exclusive lesbian relationship for four years. The complainant and her partner wanted to have child but learned that donor insemination in Queensland would not be available for them, so the complainant traveled out of state to seek this treatment. She found the experience to be emotionally and financially draining, so she stopped the treatment. Thus, the complainant decided to try and ask the clinics in Queensland for the donor treatment. She found a clinic at which the respondent was a director. She obtained a referral from her general practitioner and scheduled an appointment with the respondent. At the appointment, the complainant informed the respondent that she was in a long-term lesbian relationship. The respondent’s position was clear that the clinic only provided treatment to heterosexual couples with infertility problems. Nevertheless, he requested blood tests of the complainant which showed that her ovaries were functioning normally and proceeded to give her a form to fill out and sign for herself and her “husband” in order to start the treatment. The complainant asked the respondent if she could fill only the wife part and sign, but he insisted that it should be signed by the husband. Since this was not possible in her case, the respondent refused to provide her with the treatment. The claimant then sought treatment outside Brisbane for a while without success. The claimant had a baby by private donation, ultimately bearing risks of possible HIV infection of the semen. The claimant suffered emotional distress from humiliation and discrimination based on her sexual orientation, in addition she had to defer her university degree for all the time she had to spend traveling to clinics outside Queensland. Subsequently, the claimant filed this claim before the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal seeking compensation from the respondent and his clinic. The respondent argued that there was an agreement with the government on artificial insemination by donation in relation to treatment of infertility, and that treatment is to be provided only to heterosexual couples. The Tribunal confirmed that there was no such agreement in place. The respondent also argued the definition of infertility only describes the incapability of heterosexual couples of conceiving because of medical reasons caused by one or both of them. The Tribunal also refused this limitation of the definition and held that the fact that scientifically two females are incapable of conceiving a child is a medical reason that makes them eligible for the same treatment as any heterosexual couple seeking this treatment. Accordingly, the Tribunal found the act of the respondent to be discriminatory against the complainant because she is a lesbian, which is unlawful under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, and ordered the clinic to pay the claimant a compensation sum for the humiliation and offence she suffered.



Habeas Corpus 124.306 Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) revoked the pretrial detention order issued against staff and patients of a clinic that was alleged to have been performing clandestine abortions. The 2ND Panel of STF found that criminal laws against abortion were unconstitutional with respect to the case in hand, and the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy during the first three months was incompatible with the protection of multiple fundamental rights of women. The decision set an important precedent for the sexual and reproductive rights of women in Brazil. The court also discussed that the criminalization of abortion disproportionately affected women living in poverty who do not have access to private or public abortion clinics. Justice Barroso stated that while the potential life of the fetus is important, the criminalization of abortion before the end of the first three months of pregnancy violated several fundamental rights of women granted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (personal autonomy, physical and mental integrity, sexual and reproductive rights, and gender equality). This decision does not decriminalize abortion in all circumstances, and it is not bidding. This is perhaps a softening of the law regarding abortion in Brazil.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF desconstitui prisão de ofício emitida contra funcionários e donos de clinica de aborto presos em flagrante em razão de suposta prática de aborto clandestinos. A 2ª turma do STF entendeu que as leis criminais contra a prática do aborto são inconstitucionais em relação ao caso em análise, estabelecendo ainda que a criminalização do aborto voluntário durante os 3 (três) primeiros meses de gravidez era incompatível com múltiplos direitos fundamentais garantidos às mulheres. Nesse aspecto, trata-se de um precedente importante para os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos das mulheres no Brasil. Ainda a 2 turma do STF discutiu que a criminalização do aborto afeta, desproporcionalmente, as mulheres pobres que não têm acesso a clínicas privadas ou públicas. Ainda, o Ministro Barroso, relator do caso, estabelece que, enquanto a vida potencial de um feto é importante, a criminalização do aborto realizado dentro dos 3 meses iniciais da gravidez viola diversos direitos fundamentais garantidos constitucionalmente, como a autonomia, o direito à integridade física e mental, os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos, além da igualdade de gênero. Ressalta-se que essa decisão não descriminaliza o aborto em todas as circunstâncias, bem como não vincula o STF a emitir decisões com o mesmo posicionamento, apesar de se tratar de decisão favorável às mulheres no tocante a realização de aborto no Brasil.



Habeas Corpus 143.641 Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

In this case, the 2nd panel of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) issued a landmark ruling that pregnant women, mothers of children up to the age of 12, and mothers with disabled children accused of non-violent crimes should be permitted to await trial under house arrest rather than in detention. Justice Ricardo Lewandowski of the STF granted in this judgment habeas corpus ex officio so that women with children who had been arrested prior to this ruling and have not yet been placed under house arrest are entitled to the benefit.

Tratou-se de Habeas Corpus coletivo impetrado em favor de todas as mulheres presas preventivamente que ostentem a condição de gestantes, de puérperas ou de mães de crianças sob sua responsabilidade, bem como em nome das próprias crianças. O STF concedeu ordem para substituição de prisão preventiva pela domiciliar a todas as mulheres presas, gestantes, puérperas ou mães de crianças e deficientes, enquanto perdurar tal condição, com exceção aos casos de crimes praticados mediante violência ou grave ameaça, contra seus descendentes. O Ministro Ricardo Lewandowski determinou a extensão dos efeitos da decisão a todas as demais mulheres presas, gestantes, puérperas ou mães de crianças e de pessoas com deficiência, bem assim às adolescentes sujeitas a medidas socioeducativas em idêntica situação no território nacional.



Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, Case 0206/2014 Constitutional Tribunal (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, a member of the Bolivian Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of several articles of the Criminal Code on the basis that they discriminated against women. The Court held that some of the challenged articles were unconstitutional and upheld others. On the grounds of gender discrimination, the Court found unconstitutional Article 56, which prevented imprisoned women from being employed outside of prisons while allowing imprisoned men outside employment, and Article 245, which recognized as a defense to the offense of falsifying a birth record the motive of protecting the honor of one’s wife, mother, daughter, or sister. The Court declared unconstitutional the words “fragility” and “dishonor” in Article 258 regarding infanticide also due to gender discrimination, although this did not affect the operation of the offense. The final unconstitutional issue was that Article 250 criminalized an unmarried man abandoning a woman who became pregnant with him, but did not criminalize a married father’s abandonment of his pregnant wife. The Court was unwilling to hold restrictions on abortion unconstitutional. As such, receiving an abortion remains prohibited under Articles 263 and 264, and the performance of abortion is prohibited under Article 269. However, the Court did declare unconstitutional the requirements in Article 266 that a woman inform the police and obtain judicial authorization in order to obtain an abortion in the case of rape or incest (article 266).

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, quien es miembro del Parlamento boliviano, cuestionó la constitucionalidad de varios artículos del Código Penal sobre la base de que eran discriminatorios contra las mujeres. El Tribunal sostuvo que varios de los artículos impugnados eran inconstitucionales: el Artículo 56, que impedía que las mujeres encarceladas fueran empleadas fuera de las cárceles mientras que los hombres encarcelados, por otro lado, podían tener empleo y el Artículo 245, que reconocía la protección del honor de la esposa, la madre, la hija o la hermana de uno como defensa al delito de falsificar un registro de nacimiento. Ambos Artículos se consideraron inconstitucionales sobre la base de la discriminación de género. La Corte declaró que las palabras "fragilidad" y "deshonra" contenidas en el Artículo 258 en asociación con el infanticidio eran inconstitucionales por la misma base, aunque esto no afecta el funcionamiento del delito. Además, la distinción dentro del Artículo 250 que penalizaba el abandono por parte de un padre de una mujer que no es su esposa después de dejarla embarazada pero que no se aplicaba a la esposa de un padre también se consideró inconstitucional. La Corte no estaba dispuesta a mantener las restricciones sobre el aborto como inconstitucionales. Como tal, recibir un aborto sigue prohibido según los Artículos 263 y 264, y el aborto está prohibido según el Artículo 269. Sin embargo, la Corte declaró inconstitucional los requisitos del Artículo 266 de que una mujer informe a la policía y obtenga la autorización judicial para obtener un aborto en caso de violación o incesto (artículo 266).



杨江山、中国人民解放军第四五八医院医疗损害责任纠纷,广东省高级人民法院 (Yang v. China PLA Hospital No. 458) Higher People's Court of Guangdong Province (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Yang sued China PLA Hospital No. 458 for violation of his reproductive rights. The plaintiff alleged that his wife sought an abortion at the defendant-hospital and lied that she was unmarried. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant did not meet its obligation to investigate Peng’s marital status and chose to believe Peng’s lie. The Court held that under Article 51 of the Law on Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, “women have the right to reproduce and not to reproduce under the relevant state regulations.” Therefore, Peng’s right to voluntarily terminate pregnancy is protected by law. Moreover, according to the Supreme People’s Court’s authoritative interpretations of the Marriage Law, “courts should not support husbands’ damage claims based on infringement of their reproductive rights due to their wives’ termination of pregnancy.” Therefore, the defendant’s actions were not unlawful.

堕胎与生育权

原告杨江山诉称中国人民解放军第四五八医院损害了自己的生育权。原告称他的妻子于被告医院进行了终止妊娠手术并谎称自己未婚。原告还称被告没有尽到查清自己妻子婚姻状况的义务并轻信其妻子的谎言。法院认为,根据《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》,妇女有按照国家有关规定生育子女的权利,也有不生育的自由。因此,原告的妻子有自愿终止妊娠的法定权利。另外,根据《最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国婚姻法>若干问题的解释》,夫以妻擅自终止妊娠侵犯其生育权为由请求损害赔偿的,人民法院不予支持。因此,被告无需承担侵权责任。



State v. Banda High Court of Zimbabwe (2001)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The accused took a concoction of herbs with the intent to procure an abortion when she was six months pregnant and buried the fetus. She pled guilty to contravening the Termination of Pregnancy Act, which bans abortions subject to enumerated exceptions. She was sentenced to nine months imprisonment that were suspended on the condition that she complete 305 hours of community service. The issue under review was whether the conviction was proper without medical evidence to prove that the ingested herbal concoction could induce an abortion. It was held that before a person is convicted for abortion it must be proved that the instrument or method used can induce an abortion. Except for a few obvious cases were the conduct of the accused is known to cause abortions, medical evidence must prove that the terminated pregnancy was not spontaneous but induced by the actions of the accused. Here, there was no proof that the herbal concoction was, in fact, capable of inducing an abortion. Therefore a conviction for abortion was an error, accused was guilty solely of attempting abortion.



Mapingure v. Minister of Home Affairs Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Sexual violence and rape

A month after the rape, the appellant’s pregnancy was formally confirmed, she then informed the investigating police officer of her pregnancy who referred her to a public prosecutor. She was told by the prosecutor that she had to wait until the rape trial had been completed to have her pregnancy terminated. At the direction of the police, she returned to the prosecutor’s office four months later and was advised that she required a pregnancy termination order. The prosecutor requested that a magistrate certify the termination. The magistrate said he could not assist because the rape trial had not been completed. She eventually obtained the necessary magisterial certificate nearly six months after the rape, the hospital felt that it was no longer safe to carry out the termination procedure. The appellant carried to full term and gave birth to a child. The applicant brought an action against the Ministers of Home Affairs, Health and Justice for damages for the physical and mental pain, anguish and stress she suffered and care for the child until the child turned 18. The basis of the claim was that the employees of the three Ministries concerned were negligent in their failure to prevent the pregnancy or to expedite its termination. The particulars of negligence were itemized. Her claim was dismissed. The questions for determination on appeal were (i) whether or not the respondents’ employees were negligent in responding to the appellant, (ii) if they were, whether the appellant suffered any actionable harm as a result of such negligence and, (iii) if so, whether the respondents were liable for damages for pain, suffering, and the care of her child. The Supreme Court held, on appeal, that the State was liable for failing to provide the appellant with emergency contraception to prevent the pregnancy and ordered it to pay damages. However, the court dismissed the claim that the State was liable for failing to ensure a timely termination of the pregnancy and in turn that they were liable to pay for the care of the child. The case was referred back to the High Court for a determination of the amount of damages.



Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2003)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

The plaintiff’s employee health benefit plan denied coverage for certain infertility procedures that can only be performed on women, including in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). She sued her employer for unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and state law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer. On the plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit analyzed the issue differently than the district court but ultimately affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that the health plan’s exclusion of coverage for surgical implantation procedures limited its infertility procedures for male and female employees equally and as a result did not amount to unlawful discrimination.



McGlothlin v. Bristol Obstetrics, Gynecology and Family Planning, Inc. Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville (1998)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A mother and daughter sued an abortion provider for having performed an abortion on the minor daughter without first obtaining her parents’ approval, which was in violation of a Tennessee statute. The daughter was 17 years and ten months old at the time. The trial court dismissed the complaint because the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the abortion rights of minors. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, finding that the statute in question violated the privacy rights of minors seeking abortions.



Tennessee Department of Health v. Boyle Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A Tennessee statute required private clinics providing a “substantial number” of abortions to obtain a “certificate of need” from the Health Facilities Commission and a license from the Department of Health. The Department of Health denied a license to the defendants, and then sued to enjoin them from performing abortions. The defendants alleged that the licensing requirement violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions' protection of women’s right to privacy. The Davidson County Chancery Court upheld the statute and enjoined the defendants from performing abortions. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional becauese it placed an undue burden on women's right to privacy.



Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist Supreme Court of Tennessee (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A Tennessee criminal statute required that physicians warn their patients that “abortion in a considerable number of cases constitutes a major surgical procedure,” that second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, and that women wait two days after meeting with a physician to receive an abortion. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of these provisions. The Davidson County Circuit Court struck down as unconstitutional the statutory warning and two-day waiting period as unconstitutional, but allowed the hospitalization requirement. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, finding each requirement constitutional. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that none of the provisions could be deemed constitutional under the proper strict scrutiny framework.



Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island (1982)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

This case struck down provisions of the Rhode Island “Informed Consent for Abortion” Act for failure to demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify its interference with women’s rights to abortion including: (i) a provision that required women be informed of “all medical risks” associated with the abortion procedure, including “psychological risks to the fetus,” as such a provision was unconstitutionally vague; (ii) a provision requiring a woman seeking abortion to give written consent to the procedure at least 24 hours prior to her scheduled operation, as such a provision imposed a legally significant burden on a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, and the state did not demonstrate a compelling state interest necessitating such waiting period. However, the Court upheld a provision requiring that an abortion patient be informed of the “nature of her abortion,” i.e., that the abortion will irreversibly terminate her pregnancy.



Constitutional Right to Life Committee v. Cannon Supreme Court of Rhode Island (1976)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A non-profit corporation filed a claim protesting the validity of a regulation requiring specified facilities, procedures, and personnel whenever a pregnancy is terminated within the geographical boundaries of Rhode Island, arguing that the regulations failed to consider the life of the unborn child. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the regulation did not improperly disregard the life of the unborn child because, as a matter of constitutional law, the only interest that a state may assert in regulating abortion procedures prior to the time of a child’s viability is during the second trimester when the state may regulate abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.



Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas Supreme Court of Texas (1998)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Doctors and clinics sued anti-abortion activist group Operation Rescue for invasion of privacy, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy. Anti-abortion activists planned to picket and obstruct abortion clinics and homes of physicians who worked for the clinics to coincide with the 1992 Republican National Convention. The district court granted a permanent injunction to restrict anti-abortion demonstrations, which prohibited activists from, among other things, demonstrating within specified areas of each clinic. Operation Rescue appealed. Pursuant to free speech principles, the Court held that the injunction must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. The Court upheld the injunction as it related to physicians’ homes, but found the injunction overbroad because it limited peaceful communication within speech-free zones, such as peaceful sidewalk counseling and prayer. The Court modified the injunction, allowing no more than two demonstrators within a zone. These two demonstrators may individually sidewalk counsel patients in a normal speaking voice, but must retreat when the patient or physician verbally indicates that they wish to be alone. Otherwise, the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.



In re: Jane Doe Supreme Court of Texas (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A pregnant minor applied for judicial bypass to have an abortion without notifying her parents. The trial court denied her application, finding that she was neither mature nor well-informed enough to consent to an abortion without parental notification. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Doe showed that she was sufficiently well-informed. The trial court specifically denied Doe’s application because she was allegedly unaware of the intrinsic benefits of alternatives to abortion such as parenting and adoption. The Supreme Court held that even though a minor may not share the court’s views about what the benefits of her alternatives might be, it does not follow that she has not thoughtfully considered her options or acquired sufficient information about them. The Court noted that she had read about abortion, spoken to women who have had abortions, and discussed potential mental effects with a counselor. Moreover, she expressed that she was not ready for parenthood and that keeping the child would prevent her from going to college or having a career. The Supreme Court thus reversed the trial court and granted Doe’s judicial bypass, holding that when a minor has established that she has engaged in a rational and informed decision-making process and concluded that realistic concerns foreclose her alternatives, she cannot be denied the statutory bypass for failing to list general benefits seen by others.



In re Doe Supreme Court of Texas (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Pregnant minor filed an application for judicial bypass to receive an abortion without notifying her parents. The district court did not rule on the application or make findings of fact, but issued a writing that sua sponte concluded that the parental bypass law was unconstitutional. Doe appealed due to uncertainty about the judgment, and the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that because the judge did not issue findings of fact within two business days, her application was deemed granted.



In re: Jane Doe 10 Supreme Court of Texas (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A pregnant minor applied for judicial bypass to have an abortion without notifying her parents. The trial court denied the application on a form, but made no ruling and no findings of fact on one of the bases for judicial bypass—whether notifying her parents would lead to physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor. Under the Texas Family Code, the court was required to issue a ruling and written findings of fact and conclusions of law within two business days after the application was filed. Doe argued that because the trial court did not comply with the Family Code, she was denied a timely and complete judgment, and her application should be deemed granted. The Supreme Court agreed, deeming her application for judicial bypass granted based on possible abuse.



Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas Supreme Court of Texas (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Physicians and clinics sued the Commissioner of Health sued, claiming that Texas Medical Assistance Program’s (“TMAP”) abortion funding restrictions for indigent women violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Rights Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution, and their rights to privacy. TMAP was prohibited from authorizing abortion services without matching federal funds. The relevant federal law, the Hyde Amendment, prevented TMAP from funding abortions unless the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or placed the woman in danger of death. The plaintiffs argued that the restriction constituted sex discrimination because the state funded virtually all medically necessary services for men while refusing to fund abortions that are medically necessary even though the woman is not at risk of death. The Supreme Court held that although any restriction related to abortion would only affect women, TMAP’s restriction was not “on the basis of sex,” but rather due to the nature of abortion as a medical procedure involving potential life, which has no similar treatment method. The Court noted that other than medically necessary abortions, TMAP funded virtually all other medical treatment for women, and funded abortions to the extent that matching federal funds were available. The Court held that the discouragement of abortion through funding restrictions cannot, by itself, be considered purposeful discrimination against women as a class. The Court recognized the state’s interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion and held that the right to choose an abortion does not translate into a state obligation to subsidize abortions. The Court thus held that the funding restrictions did not violate the Texas Constitution, reversing the Court of Appeals and entering judgment for the defendant.



Texas Family Code: Child in Relation to the Family - Limitations of Minority - Notice of and Consent to Abortion (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Texas prohibits pregnant unemancipated minors from obtaining abortions unless the physician performing the abortion gives at least 48 hours actual notice of the appointment, in person or by telephone, to the minor’s parent, managing conservator, or guardian. If the parent or guardian cannot be notified after a reasonable effort, the physician may perform the abortion after giving 48 hours constructive notice by certified mail to the guardian’s last known address. A minor may obtain an abortion without parental notification if the minor receives a court order authorizing the minor to consent (judicial bypass), or if the physician finds a medical emergency, certifies the medical emergency in writing to the Department of State Health Services, and notifies the parent of the medical emergency. If a physician intentionally performs an abortion without complying with this code, the offense is punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000.



Roe v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region Supreme Court of Ohio (2009)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The parents of a minor who received an abortion sued Planned Parenthood, which they alleged had performed the abortion illegally because the clinic did not notify them in advance. The plaintiffs sought the medical records and any reports of abuse relating to minors who had received abortions in the prior 10 years. The defendant refused to produce the records of nonparty patients on the ground of physician-patient privilege. The trial court ordered the defendant to produce the non-party records with identifying information redacted, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling, holding that the medical records of non-party patients were not discoverable.



Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (1997)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The plaintiff-appellant, an abortion clinic, sued the Governor of Ohio, the Attorney General of Ohio, and the prosecuting attorney for Montgomery County, challenging the facial constitutionality of an Ohio law regulating abortions. The district court ruled (i) that the prohibition on dilation and extraction abortions placed substantial, and hence unconstitutional, obstacles in the way of women seeking pre-viability abortions; (ii) that the combination of subjective and objective standards without scienter requirements rendered the “medical emergency” and “medical necessity” exceptions to the abortion prohibitions were unconstitutionally vague; and (iii) that the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions in the law could not be severed. The district court thus struck down the entire law and prohibited its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.



Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2008)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The plaintiff-appellant operated an abortion clinic in Dayton, Ohio. Ohio law required it to be licensed, which in part required it to enter into a written transfer agreement with a Dayton-area hospital. When no hospital would enter into such an agreement with the plaintiff, it sought a waiver of the transfer agreement requirement. Even though the plaintiff had both a back-up group of physicians ready to provide emergency care and a letter from Miami Valley Hospital confirming that it would admit patients in the event of an emergency, the Director of the Ohio Department of Health denied the plaintiff’s request for a waiver and ordered that it immediately close. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and an injunction against the Department of Health’s order. The District Court granted both requests and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were violated, but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for a hearing on the denial of the plaintiff’s application.



The State v. G.I. High Court of Namibia (2007)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The accused was an 18-year-old woman charged with the crime of abortion under the Abortion and Sterilization Act, 2 of 1975 (the “Act”). The Act outlaws abortion and prescribes no minimum sentence for the crime. The accused pleaded guilty and testified that she performed the abortion on herself, which terminated a two-month-long pregnancy. The Court sentenced her to pay N$3,000 or serve two years in prison. On review, the High Court found the sentence to be “completely” disproportionate to the crime. The Judge referred to the Old Authorities and stated that sentences for abortion should be less harsh in cases where a very young fetus is involved. The Judge also found that the accused personal circumstances and the particular circumstances of her trial, including the fact that she was a minor at the time, did not have counsel to represent her, and was not given the opportunity to explain her actions, warranted mitigation of the penalty. Finding that the lower court did not factor in any of these mitigating circumstances, the High Court reduced the sentence to N$300 or three months in prison, which he suspended on the condition that during that period the accused was not convicted of any abortion-related crime.



Hamilton v. Scott Supreme Court of Alabama (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Plaintiff, a mother of a stillborn child, sued physicians and a medical group, alleging that they wrongfully caused the death of her son and caused her emotional distress. The trial court held that a wrongful death action could not be maintained for the death of a fetus before viability. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed this holding, while agreeing with the trial court that Plaintiff could not recover damages for emotional distress. The court concluded that “Alabama’s wrongful-death statute allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child, even when the child dies before reaching viability.” Nonetheless, the court held that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to damages for emotional distress because she did not present evidence that she was within the “zone of danger” and she could not claim a physical injury to herself based on the death of the fetus.



Hicks v. State of Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The defendant was charged with chemical endangerment of a child for ingesting cocaine while pregnant, which resulted in her child testing positive for cocaine at birth. The defendant was convicted after a guilty plea, but challenged her conviction on appeal, arguing that the legislature did not intend for Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute to apply to unborn children. Additionally, she alleged that if the statute applied to unborn children, the law was: (1) bad public policy because it does not protect unborn children and (2) unconstitutionally vague. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Hicks’ claims, relying on an Alabama Court of Appeal decision, Ankrom v. State, 152 So.3d 373 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), in which the court held that the plain language of the statute included an unborn child or viable fetus in the term “child.” The Alabama Supreme Court refused to consider the defendant’s public policy arguments, stating that policy arguments are ill-suited to judicial resolution and should instead be directed at the legislature. Finally, the court concluded that the law was not vague, as it “unambiguously protects all children, born and unborn, from exposure to controlled substances.”



Reproductive Health Services, et al. v. Marshall, et al. United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama Northern Division (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A licensed abortion facility and its owner sued Alabama’s Attorney General and the Montgomery County District Attorney. Among Plaintiffs claims were allegations that the 2014 amendments to Alabama Code Title 26’s judicial bypass law violated the due process rights of minor patients seeking abortions because it failed to provide an adequate judicial bypass by permitting adverse parties and the court to disclose private information about the minor to others. Citing Supreme Court precedent enshrining a minor’s constitutional right to seek an abortion through judicial bypass without outside interference violating her privacy, the court ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and severed the unconstitutional provisions allowing the participation of (1) the district attorney, (2) the minor’s parents, and (3) a guardian ad litem for the fetus from the judicial bypass process.



A.F. re: Self-Satisfying Measure Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Supreme Court of Argentina) (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement

A.F. sought an abortion for her 15-year-old daughter, A.G., whose stepfather raped and impregnated her. The courts of first and second instance rejected A.F.’s petition because Argentina’s criminal code permits abortion in cases of sexual assault of a mentally impaired woman and A.G. is not mentally impaired. The appellate court, however, authorized the abortion, holding that the relevant statute should be read broadly to encompass all pregnancies resulting from sexual assault. Following the abortion, the local guardian ad-litem and family representative (“Tutor Ad-litem y Asesor de Familia e Incapaces”) challenged the appellate court’s decision on the basis that the appellate court’s broader interpretation of the statute violated constitutional protections for the fetus as well as protections found in treaties to which Argentina is a signatory. Despite the abortion having already been performed, the Supreme Court agreed to adjudicate the matter given its importance and affirmed the appellate court’s ruling, noting that (1) certain of the referenced treaties had been expressly amended to permit abortions resulting from sexual assault and (2) any distinction between victims of sexual assault who are mentally impaired in relation to those who are not is irrational and therefore unconstitutional.

A.F. buscó un aborto para su hija de 15 años, A.G., cuyo padrastro la violó y la dejó embarazada. Los tribunales de primera y segunda instancia rechazaron la petición de A.F. porque el código penal de Argentina solo permite el aborto en casos de agresión sexual a una mujer con discapacidad mental y A.G. no tenía discapacidad mental. Sin embargo, la corte de apelaciones autorizó el aborto, sosteniendo que el estatuto relevante debe leerse de manera amplia para abarcar todos los embarazos resultantes de agresión sexual. Tras el aborto, el tutor ad-litem local y el representante de la familia ("Tutor Ad-litem y Asesor de Familia e Incapaces") discutieron la decisión de la corte de apelaciones sobre la base de que la interpretación más amplia del estatuto de la corte de apelaciones violaba las protecciones constitucionales para el feto así como las protecciones que se encuentran en los tratados de los que Argentina es signataria. A pesar de que el aborto ya se había realizado, la Corte Suprema acordó adjudicar el asunto dada su importancia y ratificó el fallo de la corte de apelaciones, señalando que (1) algunos de los tratados referenciados habían sido enmendados expresamente para permitir abortos resultantes de agresión sexual y (2) ) Cualquier distinción entre las víctimas de agresión sexual que padecen deficiencias mentales y las que no lo son es irracional y, por tanto, inconstitucional.



平成16年(受)1748 (2004 (Ju) No. 1748) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The Supreme Court was asked to rule whether a father-child relationship could be legally recognized in the case where a child’s mother became pregnant through in-vitro fertilization with the frozen sperm of a deceased husband who, while he was alive, had consented to the use of the sperm even after his death. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling and declined to recognize the father-child relationship. The Supreme Court considered that the legal framework in Japan concerning parent-child relationships did not anticipate such a relationship between a father and his child who was conceived after his death in light of the fact that, even if the father-child relationship had been legally established, the deceased father would not be in a position to hold parental rights, he would not be able to support his child, and the child could not be an heir of the father for the purposes of inheritance. According to the Supreme Court, such issues need to be addressed by legislation upon analyzing several factors including bioethics, child welfare, and social acceptance. As the country lacks such legislation, the Supreme Court did not find that the father-parent relationship could be established.

本件は、亡夫の妻が冷凍保存していた亡夫の精子を用いて人工受精で妊娠した場合に、亡夫と子の父子関係が法的に認められるべきか否かを最高裁が判断した事案である。最高裁は高裁の判決を破棄し、夫は死後の授精、出産の意思をもっていたが、法律上の親子関係が生じることを想定していないとし、父子関係が認められないとした。また、最高裁は、仮に父子関係が法的に成立していたとしても、その父親は親権者になり得る余地はなく、子を養育、扶養することもできず、子が父の相続人にもなり得ないとした。このように、父子関係が存在するか否かは、生命倫理、子の福祉、社会一般の考え方等多角的な観点から検討を行い、立法によって解決されるべき問題であって、日本にこのような法律がない以上、父子関係の形成は認められないとした。



平成19年(許)47 (2006 (Kyo) No. 47) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2007)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

A Japanese married couple petitioned for a court order that a Japanese local government accept birth registers for twins born from a surrogate mother in Nevada with the ovum and sperm of the Japanese couple. The state of Nevada, pursuant to its state court, had issued birth certificates for the twins, which showed the Japanese couple as their parents. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling that the birth registers need to be accepted. It stated that Article 118 of the Japanese Civil Proceedings Act prescribes that a final judgment made by a foreign court takes effect in Japan only if it satisfies all enumerated conditions, which include that “the foreign court’s ruling and its proceedings are not contrary to public policy in Japan.” The Supreme Court recalled that the Japanese Civil Code stands on the premise that a mother of a child is a woman who conceived and delivered the child and that a mother-child relationship is established through objective factors such as gestation and delivery. According to the Supreme Court, when a parent-child relationship can be legally established is a matter that forms the basis of the country’s legal order, and factors for finding such a relationship must be unequivocal. Thus, the Court found that a mother-child relationship between the twins and the Japanese wife could not be established, given that the Nevada court’s ruling, which recognized a parent-child relationship contrary to Japanese laws, ran against the public policy in Japan. In its statement, the Supreme Court urged the Japanese legislature to address the issues of parent-child relationships and assisted reproductive technology through legislation.

日本人夫婦がその卵子と精子を使い、ネバダ州在住の米国人女性に双子の子らを懐胎・出産させた。その後、夫婦は日本へ帰国し、が自らが双子の父母であると記載した出身届を区長である抗告人が受理するよう裁判所に申し立てた。これに対し、ネバダ州の裁判所は日本人夫婦を両親とする双子の出生証明書をすでに発行していた。最高裁は、出生届を受理する必要があるとした高裁判決を破棄し、日本の民事訴訟法第118条により、外国の裁判所が下した終局判決は、「その判決及び手続が日本の公序良俗に反しないこと」などの条件を満たした場合にのみ、日本で効力を生じるとし、また、日本の民法上、母子関係の成立の前提は懐胎し出産した女性がこの母である、母子関係の成立は懐胎、出産という客観的な事実により当然に成立することが前提であると述べた。最高裁によると、実親子関係の成立は、国における身分法秩序の根幹を成すものであり、その関係の存否の基準は一律でなければならない。したがって、日本の民法が実親子関係を認めていない者の間にその成立を認めたネバダ州の判決は、日本の公序良俗に反するものであるとして、双子と日本人夫婦との間に親子関係は存在しないと最高裁は判断し、同時に、早急に立法による対応を促した。



Resolution U.No. 137/2013 Constitutional Court (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

A legal scholar and four non-governmental organizations filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court of Macedonia for the commencement of a procedure to review the constitutionality of the Law on Termination of Pregnancy ((“Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia”, nos.87/2013, 164/2013 and 144/2014”) (the “LTP”) and its compatibility with international law, on the basis that the LTP created “a possibility of state interference into the right of choice and free decision-making of the women (which was contrary to Article 41 paragraph 1 and Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia)”. Further, the applicants stated that the LTP contravenes Articles 11 paragraph 1, Article 39 paragraph 2 and Article 41 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides that female citizens had sovereignty over themselves, their life, physical integrity and health. The applicants pointed out, inter alia, that the requirement to submit a written request, mandatory counselling, and waiting period were incompatible with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of choice regarding childbirth. In addition, given that those provisions in the LTP did not exist for any other medical intervention, they represented a discrimination against women. All but one of the judges stated that they do not consider the LTP to be problematic and fully rejected the initiative.



M.M. v. Minister of Home Affairs & 2 Others Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law, Sexual violence and rape

This case was brought by the complainant, who was attacked and raped by robbers at her home. She immediately reported the matter to police and requested a medical practitioner to prescribe emergency contraception. The medical practitioner said he required the presence of a police officer to do so. Because she was advised at the police station that the officer who had dealt with her case was not available, the victim returned to the hospital, where she was refused treatment without a police report. The next day she went to the hospital with another police officer and was informed that the prescribed 72 hours had already elapsed. When the complainant was confirmed pregnant, she indicated to the prosecutor that she wanted her pregnancy terminated, but was told that she had to wait until the rape trial had been completed. She finally obtained the necessary magisterial certificate, but when she sought the termination, the hospital matron felt that it was no longer safe to carry out the procedure. After the full term of her pregnancy, the complainant brought an action against the Ministers of Health, Justice and Home Affairs for pain and suffering endured as well as maintenance of the child. The High Court dismissed her claim that the employees of the respondents had been negligent in their failure to prevent the pregnancy, and subsequently to facilitate its termination. She appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which determined the claim by applying the test for negligence, finding the doctor negligent for having failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the pregnancy and the police negligent for failing to timely take the victim to the doctor for her pregnancy to be prevented. The Supreme Court recognized the relevance of regional and international human rights norms and standards, making reference to various provisions relating to the reproductive rights of women in CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol, but held that, pursuant to Constitutional terms, these cannot operate to override or modify domestic laws until they are internalized and transformed into rules of domestic law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that it was the responsibility of the victim of the alleged rape to institute proceedings for the issuance of a magisterial certificate allowing the termination of her pregnancy. Ultimately, the Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal and granted the complainant general damages for pain and suffering arising from failure to prevent her pregnancy. Although conceding that Zimbabwe’s Termination of Pregnancy Act is “ineptly framed and lacks sufficient clarity as to what exactly a victim of rape is required to do when confronted with an unwanted pregnancy,” the Supreme Court dismissed the complainant's claim for damages for pain and suffering beyond the time her pregnancy was confirmed and for the maintenance of her minor child, as the authorities could not be liable for not assisting her to terminate the pregnancy because they do not have any legal duty to initiate and institute court proceedings on her behalf.



Police v. Apelu Supreme Court of Samoa (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

A women inmate at Tafaigata Prison who was two months pregnant asked the defendant to abort the fetus using a duck speculum and uterine sound instrument while she was on weekend parole. Upon returning to the prison and complaining of severe pain, the woman was rushed to the hospital, where she delivered a live, premature female infant. The baby died of respiratory failure as a result of extreme prematurity and neonatal sepsis; the medical report stated that the instruments used by the defendant had infected the victim’s uterus and induced labor. In 2004, she had been sentenced to two and one-half years for the same offense. Although the charges were not prosecuted at the time, they were revisited in 2005 and a year was added to the defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge in the case considered the defendant’s record of recent convictions as aggravating factors. While the maximum sentence for this offence is seven years, the court considered that it warranted a starting point of six and a half years. The only mitigating factor in the defendant’s favor was her guilty plea, which avoided the necessity of a full trial, for which twelve months were deducted from her sentence. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Convention on the Rights of the Child and CEDAW ought to be considered in sentencing. In the course of answering such question in the negative, the judge was clear in relying solely upon national legislation: “This country through its elected representatives namely Parliament has chosen to take a pro-life stand and have legislated against abortion except when it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Parliament having enacted that law, the courts duty is beyond question, it is required to enforce the laws of the land. The rightness, wrongness or morality of such a law is debated in the building next door, not in this one.” The fact that Samoa continues to criminalize abortion after ratifying international conventions evinces clear legislative intent against domesticating CEDAW through specific legislation.



Sentencia TC/0599/15 Constitutional Court (2015)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The foundations “Justicia y Transparencia”, “Transparencia y Democracia” and “Matrimonio Feliz” challenged the constitutionality of Articles 107, 108, 109 and 110 of the Criminal Code Law 550-14. Law 550-14 regulates abortion, including the adjudication of cases of exoneration from criminal liability such as the interruption of pregnancy based on the crimes of rape, incest or malformations of the embryo that may endanger life. The foundations alleged the violation of, among others, Articles 101, 102, 105 and 112 of the Constitution that provide for the process of enacting organic laws (defined as those that regulate fundamental rights), and the violation of Article 37 that provides the inviolability of the right to life from the conception to death. The Criminal Code was approved by a simple majority. However, as it restricts fundamental rights such as the right to freedom, it must be considered as an organic law and therefore, had to be approved by a two-thirds majority. Additionally, only one of the chambers reviewed the executive authority’s observations before the law was approved. Likewise, the foundations argued that admitting exemptions from criminal liability to those who perform abortions was contrary to the Constitution which protects life from conception. The Constitutional Court admitted the action and ruled that Law 550-14 was unconstitutional because it created a new Criminal Code without following the due process necessary for its promulgation.

Las fundaciones “Justicia y Transparencia”, “Transparencia y Democracia” y “Matrimonio Feliz” desafiaron la constitucionalidad de los artículos 107, 108, 109 y 110 de la Ley 550-14 del Código Penal. La Ley 550-14 regula el aborto, incluyendo el fallo de casos que tratan con la absolución de responsabilidad penal, como la interrupción del embarazo por delitos de violación, incesto, u otras malformaciones del embrión que pueden poner en peligro la vida de la madre y del feto. Específicamente, las fundaciones alegaron la violación de, entre otros, los artículos 101, 102, 105 y 112 de la Constitución, los cuáles contemplan el proceso de promulgación de leyes orgánicas (definidas como aquellas que regulan los derechos fundamentales), y además la violación del artículo 37, el cual establece como inviolable el derecho a la vida desde la concepción hasta la muerte. El Código Penal fue aprobado por la mayoría. Sin embargo, como restringe derechos fundamentales como el derecho a la libertad, el Código clasifica como una ley orgánica y, por lo tanto, debe ser aprobada por una mayoría de dos tercios. Además, sólo una de las cámaras tribunales revisó las observaciones dadas por la autoridad ejecutiva antes de que se aprobara la ley. Las fundaciones argumentaron que abstener de responsabilidad penal a quienes realizan abortos era contrario a la Constitución, la cuál protege la vida desde la concepción. La Corte permitió la acción a proceder y declaró que la Ley 550-14 en violación de la Constitucion en base a que creó un nuevo Código Penal sin seguir el procedimiento necesario para su promulgación inicial.



Castles v. Secretary to the Department of Justice Supreme Court of Victoria (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

This case challenged a decision by the Secretary of the Department of Justice to refuse Ms. Castles’ access to in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) treatment, while she was in a low security prison. Prior to her imprisonment for social security fraud, Ms. Castles was undergoing IVF treatment. Although she was sentenced to only 18 months of imprisonment, Ms. Castles was nearing the age at which IVF would no longer be available to her. Ms. Castles sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enable her to continue IVF treatment to conceive a second child with her husband. The question decided by the Supreme Court was whether access to IVF is inherent in the right to respect privacy and family life. The Supreme Court acknowledged that although incarceration necessarily involves a limitation of the right to liberty, it places an additional burden on the State to preserve human dignity. International agreements, including CEDAW and ICESCR, recognize that decisions concerning the number and spacing of children, and access to health services, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health, are an aspect of the inherent dignity of a person that underlies all human rights. The Supreme Court held that the requirement to give proper consideration to human rights required the decision-maker to consider the possible impact of the decision on a person’s human rights, but that this need not be a sophisticated legal exercise. The Supreme Court further ordered the Department of Justice to allow Ms. Castles access to the relevant medical treatment, subject to an assessment of any countervailing security or other concerns on a visit-by-visit basis.



Public Ministry v. Busudu Tina Court of Greater Instance of Bukavu (1995)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Busudu Tina (“the accused”) was prosecuted by the State for having aborted her pregnancy, punishable under Articles 165 and 166 of the Congolese Penal Code. She attempted to abort her pregnancy using different methods, including ingesting quinine, manioc infusion, and a product described as ‘cloveganol’, and admitted to the Tribunal that she had aborted a previous pregnancy in 1991. The Tribunal became aware of the abortion when an acquaintance, worried for the accused’s health, sought assistance despite being sworn to secrecy by the accused. The fetus was hidden in a laundry bag, which found its way to the prosecutor’s office. The Tribunal applied the minimum sentence of five years imprisonment, taking into account as a mitigating factor that she and her husband were estranged after six months of pregnancy. (Available at pages 128-130 on the linked website.)



Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey United States Supreme Court (1992)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

In light of the ruling in Roe v. Wade, which established a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability the plaintiffs challenged various abortion-limiting restrictions in Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act. The act restricted public funding to abortion clinics. It also required women to obtain informed consent, notify their husbands if married, wait 24 hours before proceeding with the surgery, and obtain parental consent if underage. In response, the Supreme Court created a new test that asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” which the Court defined as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Though the Court reaffirmed Roe pursuant to this test, the Court upheld nearly all of the restrictions in Pennsylvania’s state abortion law, including parental notification/consent requirements for minors and limitations on public funding of abortions. However, the Court did find that the statute’s husband notification requirement was unlawful.



In re Doe Court of Appeals of Ohio (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

A juvenile filed an application seeking permission to have an abortion without parental notification, but the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division dismissed the application, finding that the juvenile was not sufficiently mature and well-informed enough to intelligently decide whether to have an abortion. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed and granted her petition. The Court of Appeals determined she was sufficiently mature and well-informed in part due to the following factors: that she was a few months away from turning 18, that she had good grades and planned to attend college in the fall, and that she had been using an oral contraceptive and only became pregnant when she ran out and her prescription expired.



Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State of Ohio Dept. of Health Court of Appeals of Ohio (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

Capital Care is a medical facility that offers abortion services. It had been licensed for years to operate as an ambulatory surgical facility. An Ohio statute was passed that required all abortion providers to have a license from the Director of the Ohio Department of Health, and such licenses required providers to have a written transfer agreement with a local hospital. Capital Care could not obtain a transfer agreement with a local hospital, but had such an agreement with a nearby hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, yet was denied a license. The plaintiff sued in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, claiming this requirement placed an undue burden on women’s access to abortions. The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed that the transfer agreement requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Capital Care.



Decision No. 212 K/Pid.Sus/2011/PN.Pso Poso District Court (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The defendant, a physician, agreed to perform an abortion for a woman who was 20-22 weeks pregnant for Rp. 800,000. The defendant performed the abortion in her own home using a ‘Gastrul Pill’ and was criminally charged for intentionally performing an abortion. The defendant confessed to performing the procedure and did not contest the indictment. The court found that the defendant performed an illegal abortion because the woman did not have a prior examination from a counselor and defendant did not have a certificate endorsed by the minister. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 months imprisonment and a fine of Rp. 10,000,000.00.



Decriminalization of Abortion in Cases of Anencephaly: Claim For Disobeying a Fundamental Constitutional Dispositive No. 54/2004 Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court of Brazil) (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

In 2004, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) considered a claim brought by the National Trade Union of Health Workers and ANIS (Institute of Bioethics, Human Rights, and Gender) to determine whether terminating a pregnancy in which the fetus suffers from anencephaly (absence of major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp) violates the prohibition on abortion as set forth in Brazil’s Penal Code. On April 12, 2012, the STF rendered an 8-2 decision (with one abstention) that abortion in the circumstance of anencephaly is not a criminal act under the Penal Code. The majority extended a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy to cases of anecephalic fetuses because the fetus does not have the potential for a viable life outside of the womb, and to force a woman to carry such a pregnancy to term is akin to torture. Justice Marco Aurelio and the majority held that to interpret the Penal Code to prohibit such abortion would violate a woman’s constitutional guarantees of human dignity, autonomy, privacy, and the right to health. A woman therefore may seek and receive treatment to terminate the anencephalic pregnancy without risk of criminal prosecution and without judicial involvement.

Em 2004, a Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, quando da análise do Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 formalizada pela Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde – CNTS, determinou que a interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico não viola as proibições de realização de aborto trazidas no Código Penal. Em abri de 2012, o Pleno do STF entendeu, por 8-2 votos (com uma abstenção), pela descriminalização do aborto realizado em razão da anencefalia do feto. A maioria estendeu o direito da mulher de interromper sua gravidez a casos de fetos anencefálicos porque o feto não tem potencial para uma vida viável fora do útero, e forçar uma mulher a levar tal gravidez adiante é semelhante a tortura. O Juiz Marco Aurélio e a maioria dos juízes sustentou que interpretar o Código Penal para proibir tais abortos violaria as garantias constitucionais de dignidade humana, autonomia, privacidade e o direito à saúde da mulher. Assim, a mulher poderá procurar e receber tratamento para interromper a gravidez anencefálica sem risco de processo criminal e sem envolvimento judicial.



Nahmani v. Nahmani Supreme Court of Israel (1996)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The parties, a married couple, underwent in-vitro fertilization in Israel for purposes of implanting the fertilized ova in a surrogate mother in the United States. Before the ova could be implanted in a surrogate mother, however, the husband left the wife. The wife applied to the Israeli hospital for release of the fertilized ova, intending to move forward with the surrogacy plan in the United States. The husband opposed the release of the ova. The court held that the husband was estopped from opposing the surrogacy procedure, because he had consented to it and the wife reasonably relied on his consent by going through with the fertilization process. In addition, Jewish heritage is a cornerstone of the Israeli legal system, which values the procreation of children. Several of the justices stated that the right to have children is more important than the right not to have children.



Decision No. 194/06-46 Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization

Mrs. I.G., Mrs. R.H., and Mrs. M.K. (the claimants of Roma ethnicity) were sterilized while giving birth to their children. The claimants initiated criminal proceedings on the grounds of unlawful sterilization, claiming that their consent (or informed consent in the case of R.H.) was not given. Criminal proceedings were stopped by the regional prosecutor with the conclusion that no unlawful act had been committed. The claimants filed a formal complaint against the decision, in part claiming that the investigation did not examine the substantive material issue, the lack of consent to sterilization. This formal complaint was dismissed by the regional prosecutor. The claimants petitioned the Constitutional Court to address the decision to discontinue criminal proceedings by the regional prosecutor; they claimed among other things the breach of their right to private and family life and of their right to privacy. The Constitutional Court held that sterilization was not a “life-saving” procedure, as claimed by the regional prosecutor and the hospital. Therefore, the explanation given by the regional prosecutor for the discontinuation of criminal proceedings on these grounds was unfounded. The Constitutional Court further held that the investigation did not exhaust all possible avenues, and completely ignored the issue of consent. This and the subsequent dismissal of the complaint amounted to inhumane or degrading treatment of the claimants affecting their private and family lives. The Constitutional Court awarded each claimant 50,000 SK (EUR 1,659.70) in damages and ordered the regional prosecutor to re-examine the issue.



Air India v. Nargesh Meerza Supreme Court of India (1981)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination

Air India, a state-owned company, required female flight attendants to retire under three circumstances: (1) upon reaching 35 years of age, (2) upon getting married, or (3) upon first pregnancy. The Court struck the rules down, holding that these requirements constituted official arbitrariness and hostile discrimination.



Reports

Plan Nacional de Salud Sexual y Reproductiva 2014 -2018 (2014)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The 2014-2018 National Strategy promoted strategic objectives such as improving the sexual and reproductive health of the Paraguayan population. This was to be achieved through the development of fair, equitable, and inclusive public policies with a gendered and intercultural focus.

El Plan Nacional 2014-2018 promovió objetivos estratégicos como mejorar la salud sexual y reproductiva de la población paraguaya. Esto se lograría a través del desarrollo de políticas públicas justas, equitativas e incluyentes con enfoque de género e interculturalidad.



International Case Law

L.F. v Ireland, K.O’S. v Ireland, W.M. v Ireland European Court of Human Rights (2020)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

The three applicants in these three cases – L.F. (External URL below), K.O’S. and W.M. – are Irish citizens. Each gave birth to children in three hospitals in Ireland in the 1960s. Each applicant underwent surgical symphysiotomies in the respective hospitals during or in advance of labour. Their cases were among ten applications brought by women to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) who had undergone such a procedure in Ireland around the same time. All three applicants alleged that they had not been informed about the procedure and had not given their full and informed consent. They stated that they had suffered physical and psychological trauma as a result of the procedure. The symphysiotomy procedure was uncommon in Western Europe around the time, but in Ireland, it was revived in the 1940s and continued to be used until the 1980s. Following a 2011 report into the use of the procedure in Ireland, the Minister for Health announced the establishment of an ex gratia payment scheme offering compensation to women who had undergone the procedure between 1940 and 1990. However, some women, including the applicants in these cases, instituted domestic proceedings. In L.F.’s case, the High Court found that, during the time in question, the procedure had been a reasonable though limited option. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court refused L.F. leave to appeal. K.O’S. and W.M. subsequently abandoned their domestic claims. Further, none of the three applicants applied to the ex gratia payment scheme, as they all believed that there was no possibility of any acknowledgment of a breach of their rights. The three women then applied to the ECtHR in 2017, relying on Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatments), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), and 13 (right to an effective remedy of the Convention). The applicants complained that the use of the procedure in Ireland had not been the subject of a Convention-compliant domestic investigation and that, in addition, they had been unable to fully litigate their claims at the domestic level. K.O’S. also complained that the State had failed in its obligation to protect women from inhuman and degrading treatment by allowing symphysiotomies to take place. In 2020, the ECtHR declared that each application was inadmissible. In respect of K.O’S.’s argument, the Court found that she had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as she had not made that complaint before the domestic courts. In respect of the other two applicants, their applications were refused on the grounds that they were manifestly ill-founded.



Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland European Court of Human Rights (1992)


Abortion and reproductive health rights

In a case referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights, the applicants complained of an injunction imposed by the Irish courts to perpetually restrain them from providing certain information to pregnant women concerning abortion facilities outside Ireland. The majority of the Court found the injunction to be over-broad and disproportionate to the aims pursued. It noted that the applicants provided the counseling to pregnant women without advocating or encouraging abortion; and that information on abortion facilities abroad could be obtained from other sources in Ireland, such as magazines and telephone directories. The Court also noted that there was no definite link between the provision of information and the “destruction of unborn life” as contended by the respondent, given that some women who availed of the counseling services elected not to obtain an abortion. As such, the majority of the Court found that the restriction breached the applicants’ right of free expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The continued relevance of this case is affected by subsequent events: first by the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995, which was superseded by the 2018 Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.



The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Stephen Grogan and others Court of Justice of the European Union (1991)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

Pursuant to Article 177 of the European Economic Community treaty (“EEC treaty”), the High Court of Ireland requested a preliminary ruling on (i) whether abortion comes within the definition of “services” in Article 60 of the EEC treaty; (ii) whether a Member State can prohibit the dissemination of information about the identity, location, and means of communication with an abortion clinic in another Member State; and (iii) whether there is a right at Community law level to distribute such information. The underlying case was brought by an anti-abortion NGO against officers of student associations regarding the latter’s distribution of information on abortion clinics in another Member State in Ireland. The Court of Justice held that while medical termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance with the law of the State in which it is carried out, constitutes a “service” within the meaning of Article 60 of the treaty, Article 59’s prohibition of restrictions on the supply of “services” did not apply to the information-dissemination activity of the student associations (which was not done in cooperation with the clinics). The Court reasoned that the link between the dissemination of information with the clinics’ services was too tenuous for the prohibition on distribution of information to be regarded as a “restriction” on the provision of the services. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.



D. v. Ireland European Court of Human Rights (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

The European Court of Human Rights found inadmissible a complaint regarding the unavailability of abortion services for fatal fetal abnormality in Ireland and a question of the compatibility of the constitutional restriction on the availability of abortion in Ireland with Article 8 of the ECHR because the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that the applicant had not availed herself of a legal constitutional remedy which was, in principle, available: declaratory and mandatory orders to obtain a legal abortion. Despite “some uncertainty” with regard to the chances of success, the timing of the proceedings and the guarantees of the confidentiality of the applicant’s identity, the Court found that the applicant could reasonably have been expected to take certain preliminary steps, notably, to take legal advice and seek an urgent in camera hearing before the High Court. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.



A, B and C v. Ireland European Court of Human Rights (2010)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

In this case, the three applicants were Irish residents, but had abortions in the United Kingdom because abortion was unlawful in Ireland. Two of the applicants sought abortions for health and/or wellbeing-related reasons, while the third applicant was unable to establish her eligibility for a lawful abortion in Ireland. The third applicant was in remission for cancer and, due to a lack of information on the impact of the pregnancy on her remission and the effect of her treatment on the pregnancy, sought the abortion because of the risks involved with the pregnancy. The court found that while the European Convention of Human Rights did not confer a right to abortion, the prohibition of abortion in circumstances involving the applicant’s health and/or well-being, and the fact that the third applicant was unable to establish her eligibility came within the scope of the applicants’ right to their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court found no violation of Article 8 with respect to the first and second applicants because the interference with the right was in accordance with Irish law and “moral values deeply embedded in the fabric of society in Ireland”; however, the Court found that the prohibition violated the third applicant’s Article 8 right because there were no “effective and accessible procedures” that would allow the third applicant to establish that she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland. The State therefore had failed to comply with the “positive obligation to secure to the third applicant effective respect for her private life by reason of the absence of any implementing legislative or regulatory regime providing an accessible and effective procedure by which she could have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland.” In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.



Whelan v Ireland (2017)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

In 2017, the Committee (referring back to its decision in Mellet v Ireland), found violations of the same provisions (Articles 7 (freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment), 17 (right to privacy), and 26 (equal protection of the law)) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in a similar factual situation a woman in Ireland, pregnant with a fetus diagnosed with a fatal abnormality, was unable to obtain an abortion in Ireland and had to travel to the UK to do so. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.



Mellet v Ireland United Nations Human Rights Committee (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, International law

The complainant in this case was informed that her fetus was suffering from a fatal fetal abnormality and would die in utero. At the time, she was unable to terminate her pregnancy in Ireland, so she traveled to the UK to obtain an abortion there, returning after 12 hours because she could not afford to stay longer. After returning to Ireland, she had no access to aftercare or counseling. The complainant applied to the UN Human Rights Committee (“the Committee”), claiming that Ireland had violated her rights under Articles 2(1) (freedom from discrimination, including sex-based), 3 (gender equality), 7 (freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment), 17 (right to privacy), 19 (freedom of information, including health-related), and 26 (equal protection of the law) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). The Committee found that because of the unavailability of abortion and other care, Ireland had violated the complainant’s rights under the following ICCPR articles: Art. 7 by denying the complainant reproductive health care and bereavement support, forcing her to continue carrying a dying fetus, compelling her to travel abroad to terminate her pregnancy, and causing her to feel extremely vulnerable, stigmatized, and abandoned; Art. 17 by interfering arbitrarily in the complainant’s right to privacy by denying respect for her physical and psychological integrity and reproductive autonomy; and Art. 27 by discriminating against the complainant for obtaining an abortion because the Irish healthcare system provides bereavement counseling to pregnant women after stillbirth resulting from carrying a fetus with fatal impairments to term, but not to women who terminate such pregnancies. The Committee held that Ireland had to provide the complainant with an effective remedy, including adequate compensation, and had to amend domestic law on the voluntary termination of pregnancy to comply with the ICCPR. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.



I.G. and Others v. Slovakia European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization, International law

Three applicants, all Roma women, alleged that a public hospital sterilized them without their consent and that they were unable to obtain appropriate redress from the Slovakian authorities. Although the Court found that the third applicant’s children lacked standing to continue the proceedings in their mother’s stead, it ruled in favor of the first and second applicants. The first and second applicants argued that they had been denied their right to have a family because the hospital sterilized them without consent. The Court accepted that the first applicant felt debased and humiliated when she learned that she had been sterilized without her or her legal guardians’ prior informed consent. Considering the nature of the sterilization, its circumstances, the applicant’s age, and the fact that she was a member of a vulnerable population group, the Court concluded that the second applicant’s sterilization was also with a violation of the requirement of respect for her human freedom and dignity. The Court’s decision ultimately rested on Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”



K.H. and Others v. Slovakia European Court of Human Rights (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization, International law

The eight applicants in this case were all women of Roma ethnicity. They each suspected they had been sterilized during caesarian section deliveries at two different hospitals. Both hospitals denied the applicants’ requests to obtain copies of their medical records, and the applicants brought actions in different District Courts. The courts ordered the hospitals to allow access to the records and handwritten notes to be taken, but dismissed the request to make photocopies of the records. The Regional Courts both upheld the decision on appeal. The Constitutional Court also upheld the decision of the lower court. Subsequently, the applicants’ legal representatives were permitted to make copies of the applicants’ records due to the passage of the Health Care Act of 2004. Only one applicant did not receive her records and was informed they were lost, but she received a summary of her surgical procedure confirming she had been sterilized. The applicants argued that the hospital’s refusal to allow copies of their medical records violated their Article 8 right to respect for their private and family life. The applicants argued that the State’s prohibition on photocopying medical records prevented them from gathering evidence required for future litigation in violation of their Article 6 right to access a court. The State argued that the Health Care Act of 1994 did not allow legal representatives of applicants to photocopy records, and this prevented potential abuse of records. The European Court of Human Rights found that access to health and reproductive status information was relevant to private and family life under Article 8, and that the burden lay with the refusing party to give compelling reasons for refusal. The Court found the State’s argument was not sufficiently compelling, and that the State had violated the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The Court also found a violation Article 6’s provision of a right to access a court, and awarded the applicants damages.



N.B. v. Slovakia European Court of Human Rights (2012)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization, International law

The applicant was sterilized at age 17 during the birth of her second child. She claimed that she was coerced into signing the authorizations for the sterilization, segregated in the hospital based on her Roma ethnicity, and that the decision to sterilize her was discriminatory. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action against the hospital on the basis that the sterilization was required to save her life and, therefore, did not need consent. On appeal, the Regional Court, found that the sterilization was not required to save her life and valid consent had not been provided as she was a minor and parental consent was required. The Court ordered EUR 1,593 in damages for the applicant. A criminal action and complaint at the Constitutional Court were both dismissed. The applicant argued she had been subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, her private and family life had been negatively impacted, and that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and ethnic origin as there were no anti-discrimination laws effective in Slovakia at the time of her sterilization. The State argued the compensation already awarded was appropriate, as she was 10 days away from the age of majority when she signed the consent documents, the medical staff had acted in good faith, and that she was not permanently infertile as she could pursue in-vitro fertilization or reverse the sterilization through surgery. The European Court of Human Rights held that there was a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and that the State’s failure to provide sufficient legal protections of the reproductive health of Roma women violated Article 8. The Court awarded the applicant damages.



S.F.A. v. Denmark CEDAW Committee (2018)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Female genital mutilation or female genital cutting, Forced and early marriage

S.F.A., a Somali national, applied for asylum in Denmark for herself and her son born in 2013. She was subjected to female genital mutilation as a child and her father wanted to marry her forcibly to an older man. She had a relationship against her family’s wishes with H., became pregnant and had an abortion. Her father learned about the abortion and her brothers threatened to hand her over to Al-Shabaab. She left Somalia and ended up in Italy. H. traveled to Italy, they got married and she became pregnant and H. died. S.F.A. and her baby traveled to Denmark without documents and she applied for asylum. Denmark rejected her asylum application and dismissed her claim. She filed a complaint with CEDAW claiming that, if she and her son were deported to Somalia she would be personally exposed to serious forms of gender-based violence, as defined under articles 2, 12, 15 and 16 of the Convention. The Committee noted that the Danish authorities found that S.F.A.’s account lacked credibility due to factual inconsistencies and lack of substantiation and that they considered the general situation in Somalia. The Committee rejected her claim that the fact she is a single woman constitutes a supplementary risk factor in Somalia, finding that she has several close relatives in Somalia. Based on the record, the Commission deemed the communication inadmissible under article 4(2)(c) of the Optional Protocol, finding that it was not able to conclude that the Danish authorities failed to give sufficient consideration to the application or that consideration of her case suffered from any procedural defect.



Корнейкова та Корнейков проти України (Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine) European Court of Human Rights (Європейський суд з прав людини) (2016)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Custodial violence, International law

The first applicant, who was in the fifth month of pregnancy, was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery. The national court ordered her pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. During her detention, the applicant gave birth to her son, the second applicant. Later, the woman appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to obtain just satisfaction, as she argued that her right under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of torture) was violated during detention. The applicant alleged that she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynecological examination chair. In addition, the woman claimed that the detention conditions were inhuman (due to absence of hot water and bed for child, irregular supply of cold water, etc.). She also complained about her placement in a metal cage during court hearings. In view of the above facts, the Court concluded that the unjustified shackling of the first applicant (during and after childbirth, when she was particularly sensitive) can be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment. Also, the Court drew attention to (i) the woman's physical and psychological suffering, which was caused by the lack of normal nutrition, (ii) improper organization of sanitary and hygiene arrangements, and (iii) the applicant's placement in a metal cage, which is incompatible with the standards of civilized behavior that are the hallmark of a democratic society. Thus, the domestic authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR, deciding in equity, awarded both applicants €22,000. This case is important because it identifies the shortcomings of places of detention within a criminal justice system, which neglects the needs of female prisoners with children and during the pregnancy.

Першу заявницю, яка перебувала на п'ятому місяці вагітності, було затримано міліцією за підозрою у вчиненні розбою. Національний суд обрав заявниці запобіжний захід у вигляді тримання під вартою. Під час перебування під вартою заявниця народила сина, другого заявника. Пізніше жінка звернулася до Європейського суду з прав людини (“ЄСПЛ”) для отримання справедливої сатисфакції, оскільки вона стверджувала, що її право, гарантоване статтею 3 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод (заборона катування) було порушено під час тримання під вартою. Заявниця стверджувала, що вона весь час була прикута наручниками до лікарняного ліжка або до гінекологічного крісла. Крім того, жінка стверджувала, що умови утримання були нелюдськими (через відсутність гарячої води та ліжка для дитини, нерегулярного постачання холодної води тощо). Також вона скаржилась на те, що під час судових засідань її поміщали до металевої клітки. З огляду на вищенаведені факти, Суд дійшов висновку, що невиправдане застосування наручників до першої заявниці (під час і після пологів, коли вона була особливо чутливою) можна кваліфікувати як нелюдське чи таке, що принижує гідність, поводження. Також Суд звернув увагу на (i) фізичні та психологічні страждання жінки, які були спричинені відсутністю нормального харчування, (ii) неналежну організацію санітарних та гігієнічних заходів, а також (iii) поміщення заявниці в металеву клітку, що несумісне зі стандартами цивілізованої поведінки, яка є ознакою демократичного суспільства. Таким чином, національні органи влади не виконали своїх зобов’язань за статтею 3 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод. ЄСПЛ, вирішуючи справу на засадах справедливості, присудив обом заявникам 22 000 євро. Ця справа важлива, оскільки вона визначає недоліки місць ув’язнення в системі кримінального правосуддя, яка нехтує потребами ув’язнених жінок з дітьми та під час вагітності.



Boso v. Italy European Court of Human Rights (2002)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

In 1984, a married Italian woman decided to have an abortion despite her husband’s, the applicant, opposition. The applicant initiated a suit against his wife claiming that the termination deprived him of his right to be a potential father and the unborn child of its right to life. He also challenged the constitutionality of Italian legislation which provided that women could unilaterally decide whether to have an abortion. The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the decision to grant the mother full responsibility on the abortion was logical given the effects of pregnancy, both physical and mental, on pregnant women. The applicant’s appeal to the Venice District Court alleging violations of the Italian Constitution and of the European Convention on Human Rights was also dismissed. The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Cassation, again on constitutional and convention grounds, was similarly dismissed. Finally, the applicant brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court dismissed the complaint, which alleged that the termination of a pregnancy by the applicant’s wife violated the right to life under the Convention and also his rights under Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention, as “manifestly unfounded.”

Nel 1984, la Sig.ra Boso, una cittadina italiana sposata, decideva di abortire nonostante l’opposizione del marito. Il Sig. Boso iniziava un procedimento contro la moglie ritenendo che l’aborto lo avesse privato del diritto a diventare padre e avesse privato il nascituro del diritto alla vita. Il Sig. Boso contestava inoltre la costituzionalità della legge italiana che prevedeva che la donna potesse unilateralmente decidere se abortire. La Corte Costituzionale rigettava il ricorso in quanto riteneva che dare alla madre piena responsabilità sulla possibilità di abortire era logico in quanto è sulla donna incinta che ricadono gli effetti della gravidanza, sia fisici che mentali. L’impugnazione del Sig. Boso di fronte al Tribunale distrettuale di Venezia, nella quale veniva contestata la violazione della Costituzione italiana e della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, veniva rigettata. Anche l’impugnazione di fronte alla Corte di Cassazione, di nuovo basta su violazioni della Costituzione e della Convenzione, veniva respinta. Infine, il Sig. Boso adiva la Corte Europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Quest’ultima rigettava il ricorso nel quale si contestava il fatto che l’aborto da parte della moglie del ricorrente violava il diritto alla vita e i diritti di cui agli articoli 2, 8 e 12 della Convenzione.



Seferovic v. Italy European Court of Human Rights (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

The detention pending deportation of a woman who had recently given birth found to be unlawful and violated Article 5 §1(f) and Article 5 §5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In September 2000, the applicant, a woman from Bosnia and Herzegovina, applied to the Italian authorities for refugee status. The application was not forwarded to the competent commission because it contained formal defects. On September 26, 2003, the applicant gave birth to a child, who died a few days later at the hospital. Then, on November 11, 2003, the police served her with a deportation order and transferred her to a holding center. The European Court of Human Rights declared that the deportation order and the applicant's detention were in breach of Italian immigration law no. 286 of 1998, which provided that her deportation should have been suspended until six months after she had given birth (March 26, 2004), regardless of the fact that the baby had died. In March 2006, the Rome Civil Court granted the applicant refugee status. In addition, by way of just satisfaction, the government was required to pay the applicant 7,500 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage for her unlawful detention as there was no redress available under Italian law.

La detenzione di una donna che aveva da poco partorito, in attesa della sua deportazione, è stata ritenuta illegale e in violazione dell’articolo 5 § 1 (f) e dell’articolo 5 § 5 (diritto alla libertà e alla sicurezza) della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Nel settembre del 2000, la ricorrente, una donna della Bosnia-Erzegovina, richiedeva alle autorità italiane lo status di rifugiato. La richiesta non veniva inoltrata alla commissione competente in quanto conteneva delle irregolarità formali. Il 26 settembre 2003, la ricorrente dava alla luce un figlio, che moriva pochi giorni dopo in ospedale. In seguito, l’11 novembre 2003, la polizia emetteva nei confronti della donna un decreto di espulsione e la trasferiva in un centro di soggiorno temporaneo. La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo dichiarava che il decreto di espulsione e la detenzione fossero stati emessi in violazione della legge italiana n. 286 del 1998, che prevede che l’espulsione avrebbe dovuto essere stata sospesa fino a sei mesi dopo il parto (26 marzo 2004), indipendentemente dal fatto che il figlio fosse morto. Nel marzo 2006, il Tribunale civile di Roma accordava alla Sig.ra Seferovic lo status di rifugiato. Inoltre, come giusta compensazione, poiché la legge italiana non prevedeva alcun risarcimento, al Governo veniva imposto di pagare alla ricorrente 7,500 euro come danno non patrimoniale per la sua detenzione illegale.



International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network (“IPPF EN”) v. Italy European Court of Human Rights (2013)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

The Italian government’s failure to take measures to ameliorate the less favorable treatment suffered by women falling into certain vulnerable categories with respect to access to abortion services was a violation of Article E (prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination) of the Revised European Social Charter (the “Charter”) in conjunction with Article 11 (right to protection of health) of the Charter. IPPF EN complaint stated that the high number of medical personnel electing to be conscientious objectors resulted in the violation of the rights of women to have access to procedures for the termination of pregnancy, thus violating their right to protection of health. The committee found that certain categories of women in Italy are subject to discrimination in the form of impeded access to lawful abortion facilities as a combined effect of their gender, health status, territorial location, and socio-economic status. The committee held that Italian authorities should have adopted the necessary measures to compensate for deficiencies in service provisions caused by health personnel choosing to exercise their right to conscientious objection to performing abortions.

La mancata adozione da parte del governo italiano di misure volte a migliorare il trattamento meno favorevole subito dalle donne che rientrano in determinate categorie vulnerabili in materia di accesso ai servizi di aborto è stata considerata una violazione dell’articolo E (divieto di discriminazione diretta e indiretta) della Carta sociale europea riveduta (la “Carta”) in combinato disposto con l’articolo 11 (diritto alla protezione della salute) della Carta. Il ricorso di IPPF EN sosteneva che l’elevato numero di personale medico che sceglie di essere obiettore di coscienza ha portato alla violazione del diritto delle donne di avere accesso alle procedure per l’interruzione della gravidanza, violando così il loro diritto alla protezione della salute. Il Comitato ritiene che certe categorie di donne siano oggetto di discriminazione nella forma di impedimento all’accesso di centri per l’aborto legali come effetto combinato del loro genere, stato di salute, ubicazione territoriale e stato socio-economico. Il Comitato ritiene che le autorità italiane avrebbero dovuto adottare le misure necessarie per compensare le carenze nelle prestazioni dei servizi causate dal personale sanitario che sceglie di esercitare il proprio diritto all’obiezione di coscienza all’esecuzione degli aborti.



V. C. v. Slovakia European Court of Human Rights (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Forced sterilization, International law

VC, a Roma woman, was forcibly sterilized in a state hospital in Eastern Slovakia during a cesarean section. While she was in the height of labor, hospital staff insisted that she sign a consent form for sterilization, without informing her about what the procedure entailed. She was only told that a future pregnancy could kill her and was pressured to immediately undergo the procedure. VC did not understand what she was agreeing to but fearing for her life, she signed the form. After learning that the sterilization was not medically necessary, VC filed a civil lawsuit in Slovakia. All her petitions were rejected, and she filed a complaint against Slovakia at the ECtHR The Court found a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, i.e. the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to private and family life respectively. The court noted that sterilization is never a lifesaving procedure and cannot be performed without the full and informed consent of the patient even if doctors believe that future pregnancy may pose a risk to the woman. However, it did not address whether such conduct was a violation of the right to non-discrimination (Article 14), thus falling short of addressing the crux of the problem: racial stereotypes. The ruling is the first of its kind issued by the ECHR, and will have the major effect of bringing justice to the potentially thousands of Roma women who were sterilized without their consent in Central and Eastern Europe.



Teixeira v. Brazil CEDAW Committee (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law

An Afro-Brazilian woman suffered a high-risk pregnancy and was repeatedly denied timely care at public health facility, before dying of a digestive hemorrhage following delivery of her stillborn fetus. Her death is not an isolated case; Brazil's maternal mortality rates are disproportionately high for a country of its economic status and the chances of dying in pregnancy and childbirth are greatest among indigenous, low-income, and Afro-descendant women. The husband of the deceased then filed a civil claim for material and moral damages, and twice requested the judicial mechanism of injunctive relief (tutela antecipada), which requests the judge to anticipate the protective effects of a decision. The first request was ignored and the second denied. The mother of the deceased then submitted a complaint to CEDAW Committee, alleging that the Rio de Janeiro State violated her daughter’s right to life and health under the Convention (CEDAW). The State contended that the evidence offered no link between the deceased’s gender and the possible errors committed, and that such errors therefore did not fall within the definition of discrimination set out in the Convention. Upon consideration, the Committee found that the death of the deceased must be regarded as maternal, that the deceased was denied appropriate services in connection with her pregnancy, that the State failed to fulfill its obligations under the Convention pursuant to the right to health, and that the State’s lack of appropriate maternal health services has a differential impact on the right to life of women. The Committee directed the State to take the following steps: compensate the deceased’s family, ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and affordable access to adequate emergency obstetric care, provide adequate professional training for health workers, ensure that private health care facilities comply with national and international standards on reproductive health care, and ensure that sanctions are imposed on health professionals who violate women’s reproductive health rights.

A vítima, uma mulher afro-brasileira que sofria com uma gravidez de risco, foi morta em razão do descaso do sistema público de saúde do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, após diversas negativas de atendimento apropriado a ela, ocasionando sua morte e de seu filho natimorto. Sua morte não se trata de um caso isolado. Com efeito, as taxas de mortalidade de gestantes são desproporcionalmente altas para um país com o status econômico do Brasil. Nesse aspecto, o risco de mortalidade durante a gravidez ou durante o parto é maior entre a população indígena, de baixa renda e afrodescendentes, o que explica o porquê desse caso ser relevante. O marido da vítima entrou com Pedido de Reparação de Danos Morais e Materiais e com dois pedidos de Tutela Antecipada, a fim de antecipar os efeitos da decisão. Contudo, o primeiro pedido de tutela antecipada não foi analisado pelo Judiciário, enquanto o segundo pedido foi negado. Em vista da ineficiência do Poder Judiciário brasileiro, a mão da vítima submeteu uma reclamação ao Comitê da CEDAW, sob o argumento de violação dos direitos à vida e à saúde de sua filha por parte do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. O Estado do Rio de Janeiro, por sua vez, argumentou acerca da inexistência de conexão entre o gênero da vítima e os possíveis erros médicos ocorridos, não sendo aplicável a definição de discriminação estabelecida pela CEDAW. Quando da análise do caso, o Comitê entendeu que: (i) a morte da vítima deveria ser considerada uma “morte materna” evitável, uma vez que foi negado atendimento apropriado relativo à gravidez da vítima; (ii) o Estado do Rio de Janeiro falhou em garantir o direito à saúde no termos da Convenção da CEDAW; e (iii) a ausência de atendimento médico adequado às gestantes por parte do Estado impacta diferentemente no direito à vida das mulheres. O Comitê ainda estabeleceu medidas a serem tomadas pelo Estado do Rio de Janeiro, tais como compensação à família da vítima, garantia do direito da mulher em ter uma gestação segura e atendimento obstétrico adequado, realizar atendimento adequado aos profissionais da saúde, garantir que o atendimento médico atenda o padrão nacional e internacional relativo à saúde reprodutiva, bem como garanta que as penalidades sejam imposta aos profissionais de saúde que violem os direitos reprodutivos das mulheres.



Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2006)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Gender discrimination, International law, Property and inheritance rights

This case involved issues involving the exposure of vulnerable members of indigenous communities, particularly children, pregnant women, and the elderly. A petition was filed against Paraguay on behalf of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, alleging violations of, among other things, the right to fair trial and judicial protection, the right to property and the right to life. The petition noted that these violations placed children, pregnant women and the elderly in particularly vulnerable situations. The Court found Paraguay to be in violation of Articles 1(1), 2, 3, 4(1), 8, 19, 21 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court ordered Paraguay to formally and physically convey to the Sawhoyamaxa their traditional lands, to establish a community development fund, to pay non-pecuniary damages, to provide the Sawhoyamaxa with basic necessities until their lands were restored, to provide the Sawhoyamaxa with the necessary tools for communication to access health authorities, and to domestically enact legislation creating a mechanism for indigenous communities to reclaim their traditional lands.