Women and Justice: Topics: Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

Domestic Case Law

Cправа № 482/297/21 (Case No. 482/297/21) Миколаївського апеляційного суду (Mykolaiv Court of Appeal) (2021)


Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

For years, the appellant lived with his civil wife in the same apartment (in Ukraine, the term 'civil marriage' means cohabitation of a man and a woman without official marriage registration). While intoxicated one evening, he began to accuse his wife of cheating on him with other men and degrading his honor and dignity as a man. After a verbal conflict, the man, decided to kill his wife. In order to cause the most severe physical pain, he purposefully poured sulfuric acid from a bottle on his wife and verbally wished for her death, causing serious chemical burns. In addition, the acid fell on her minor son, which burned him. The court of first instance sentenced the man to eight years imprisonment for attempted murder, as well as causing bodily injury to the wife and her son. Also, the court imposed the obligation on the appellant to pay for the costs of their treatment. The appellant filed an appeal, arguing that the first-instance court wrongly characterized his actions because he did not want to kill his wife, but only cause her bodily injury. The Court of Appeal left the sentence unchanged, citing the following facts: when the appellant poured acid on the victim, he expressed his desire for her death; he poured the acid on her head and face, which are vital organs; and, according to the conclusion of the experts, the man poured most of the acid in the bottle on the victim.

Скаржник роками проживав зі своєю цивільною дружиною в одній квартирі (в Україні термін "цивільний шлюб" означає спільне проживання чоловіка та жінки без офіційної реєстрації шлюбу). Одного вечора, перебуваючи у стані алкогольного сп’яніння, він почав звинувачувати свою дружину в тому, що вона зраджує йому з іншими чоловіками та принижує його честь і гідність як чоловіка. Після словесної сварки чоловік вирішив убити свою дружину. З метою заподіяння сильного фізичного болю, він цілеспрямовано облив дружину сірчаною кислотою з пляшки та на словах побажав їй смерті, спричинивши серйозні хімічні опіки. Крім того, кислота потрапила на її неповнолітнього сина, від чого він отримав опіки. Суд першої інстанції засудив чоловіка до восьми років позбавлення волі за замах на вбивство, а також заподіяння тілесних ушкоджень дружині та її сину. Також суд поклав на скаржника обов'язок оплатити витрати на їх лікування. Скаржник подав апеляцію, вважаючи, що суд першої інстанції неправильно кваліфікував його дії, оскільки він не хотів вбити свою дружину, а лише заподіяти їй тілесні ушкодження. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін, посилаючись на такі факти: коли скаржник облив потерпілу кислотою, він висловив бажання, аби вона померла; він вилив кислоту на її голову та обличчя, які є життєво важливими органами; та, відповідно до висновку експертів, чоловік вилив на потерпілу більшу частину кислоти із пляшки.



Cправа № 135/1530/16-к (Case No.135/1530/16-к) кримінального суду у складі Верховного Суду (Criminal Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2018)


Femicide, Sexual violence and rape

The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that a third party staged the crime scene and placed his property there; sexual intercourse with the first woman was consensual; and the forensic medical examination confirmed that the appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized that the conclusions of the lower courts regarding the appellant’s guilt were based on their careful examination of the evidence (e.g., the appellant’s property near the corpses indicated that he was at the place of the crimes; forensic medical examinations found traces of a man's DNA on the bodies). Accordingly, the Supreme Court left the sentence of life imprisonment unchanged. This decision is important because it demonstrates that serving a prison sentence may not deter persons who commit sex crimes from re-offending after their release from custody.

Cкаржник був засуджений судом першої інстанції за вбивство та зґвалтування однієї жінки, а також вбивство та замах на зґвалтування іншої жінки. Враховуючи те, що чоловік раніше був судимий за аналогічні злочини, суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді довічного позбавлення волі. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін. Адвокат скаржника подав до Верховного Суду касаційну скаргу, в якій просив суд скасувати вирок та закрити кримінальне провадження через недостатність доказів. Зокрема, скаржник стверджував, що третя сторона влаштувала інсценування злочину та розмістила там його майно; статевий акт з першою жінкою був за її згодою; і судово-медична експертиза підтвердила, що скаржник не вступав у статеві зносини з іншою жінкою. Верховний Суд підкреслив, що висновки судів попередніх інстанцій щодо винуватості скаржника ґрунтувалися на ретельному дослідженні доказів (наприклад, майно скаржника поблизу трупів вказувало на те, що він був на місці злочинів; судово-медичні експертизи виявили сліди ДНК чоловіка на тілах). Відповідно, Верховний Суд залишив без змін покарання у вигляді довічного ув'язнення. Це рішення є важливим, оскільки воно демонструє, що відбування покарання не може стримувати осіб, які вчинили сексуальні злочини, від повторного вчинення злочину після звільнення з-під варти.



Ministério Público v. Jonasse Cangahi Mupi Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2019)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The defendant was accused of murdering his wife and sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment, in addition to paying of kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 million kwanzas, i.e. approximately US$ 2,300) to the victim’s family, plus court expenses. The prosecution (Ministério Público) then appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that, in accordance with the court’s own jurisprudence, the compensation amount should be risen to kz. 2.000.00,00, i.e. the equivalent of US$ 3,100. It argued that, as shown by the evidence, the accused had tried to have sexual relations with his wife and, when she declined, beat her in front of their two underage children. When she tried to escape, the defendant stabbed her in the back with a “homemade knife” multiple times, which killed her. The accused fled to the woods, while their nine-year-old daughter went to get help. The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the object used to stab the victim had not been examined, there was no doubt as to the fact that it was used to injure the victim and caused her death. Furthermore, in agreement with the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had undoubtedly committed the crime of which he was accused, noting that he confessed to it during police interrogations. The defendant’s motive was also considered as particularly vile (i.e., as his attempt of sexual intercourse was simply frustrated) and his intent was proven by the predictability of death as a direct consequence of his actions. The appeal was, therefore, granted by the Supreme Court, increasing the compensation amount to the family’s victim to the requested amount.

O réu foi acusado de matar sua esposa e sentenciado a 18 anos de prisão, em adição ao pagamento de kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 milhões de kwanzas, i.e. aproximadamente US$2,300) para a família da vítima, além dos gastos com o tribunal. A acusação (Ministério Público) então apelou para o Tribunal Supremo alegando que, de acordo com a jurisprudência da própria corte, o valor da compensação deve aumentar para kz. 2.000.000,000, i.e. o equivalente a US$3,100. Ele afirmou que, como mostrado pela evidência, o acusado tentou ter relações sexuais com a sua esposa e, quando ela negou, ele bateu nela na frente das suas duas crianças menores de idade. Quando ela tentou escapar, o réu esfaqueou ela nas costas com uma “faca caseira” por múltiplas vezes, o que a matou. O acusado fugiu para a floresta, enquanto a sua filha de nove anos de idade foi buscar ajuda. O Tribunal Supremo raciocinou que, ainda que o objeto usado para esfaquear a vítima não tenha sido examinado, não restou dúvida sobre o fato dele ter sido usado para machucar a vítima e causar a sua morte. Além disso, de acordo com a decisão da corte inferior, o Tribunal Supremo sustentou que o réu sem dúvidas cometeu o crime pelo qual ele foi acusado, já que ele confessou o crime durante interrogações policiais. O motivo do réu também foi considerado particularmente vil (i.e. já que a sua tentativa de relação sexual simplesmente foi frustrada) e a sua intenção foi provada pela previsibilidade da morte como consequência direta das suas ações. A apelação foi, assim, acolhida pelo Tribunal Supremo, aumentando a indenização para a família da vítima para o valor requerido.



Ministério Público v. Joao Bernardo Nelson Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2018)


Femicide

The trial court convicted the accused of one count of murder and sentenced him to 17 years in prison, in addition to financial compensation the victim’s family. The circumstances of the case showed that the accused and the victim were consuming drugs by a local river when, for unrevealed reasons, he pushed her over the stairs which led to the river, at a height of approximately five meters. The victim ended up by the water with bruises on her face and a broken neck, which was stated as the cause of death. Afterwards, the accused took off the victim’s wig and clothes, subsequently burning them. The prosecution argued that his intent was to make it appear as though the victim had suffered sexual assault. There was no autopsy and the evidence was based on 1) the death certificate, 2) photographs, and 3) eye-witnesses who saw both individuals together on that day. The accused confessed during interrogation, but denied the charges during trial. On appeal, the accused argued for a lower sentence. However, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision. The penalty for murder was increased due to the following circumstances: (i) surprise, (ii) deserted place, and (iii) superiority by reason of gender, under Article 34 of the 1982 Penal Code.

O tribunal de julgamento condenou o acusado por homicídio e sentenciou ele a 17 anos de prisão, em adição a indenização à família da vítima. As circunstâncias do caso mostraram que o acusado e a vítima estavam consumindo drogas perto do rio local quando, por razões não reveladas, ele a empurrou das escadas que levava ao rio, de uma altura de aproximadamente cinco metros. A vítima acabou dentro da água com machucados no rosto e pescoço quebrado, que foi a causa declarada da morte. Após, o acusado retirou a peruca e as roupas da vítima, subsequentemente queimando-as. A acusação argumentou que sua intenção era de fazer parecer com que a vítima tivesse sofrido agressão sexual. Não houve autópsia e a evidência foi baseada em 1) certidão de óbito, 2) fotografias, e 3) testemunhas que viram ambos os indivíduos juntos naquele dia. O réu confessou durante a interrogação, mas negou as acusações durante o julgamento. Na apelação, o acusado pleiteou uma sentença menor. Entretanto, o Tribunal Supremo manteve a decisão da corte inferior. A penalidade por homicídio foi aumentada pelas seguintes circunstâncias: (i) surpresa, (ii) lugar deserto, e (iii) superioridade por razão de gênero, sob o Artigo 34 do Código Penal de 1982.



Ministerio Público v. Cesar Rebolledo Espina (Case Nº 3885-2018) Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (2018)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for the attempted murder of his spouse, and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the lower court erred by (1) failing to consider the facts as exposed by the appellant, (2) failing to take into account that the wounds suffered by the victim were not deadly, (3) refusing to consider the “voluntary and timely abandonment of the act”, (4) failing to set out its reasoning in reaching its conclusions as to the events and the injuries suffered by the victim, and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Trial Court considered witness testimony and set out the facts underlying the decision, which were sufficient to uphold the decision and sentence. It also found that the fact that the wounds suffered by the victim were not fatal was not inconsistent with the crime charged. Finally, it upheld the Trial Court’s determination that the appellant did not voluntarily “abandon[…] the act”, but instead was interrupted by the victim fleeing and seeking assistance from her neighbors, which were independent of the appellant’s actions. Therefore, the appellant never ended his attempt to commit the murder. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. (External Link leads to the website for the Chilean Judicial System. The case is available by searching for the case number.)

El recurrente fue declarado culpable y condenado a siete años de prisión por el intento de asesinato de su cónyuge, y la condena fue confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelación. En la apelación, el apelante alegó que el tribunal inferior incurrió en error al (1) no considerar los hechos expuestos por el apelante, (2) no tener en cuenta que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no eran mortales, (3) negarse a considerar el “abandono voluntario y oportuno del acto,” (4) no exponer su razonamiento para llegar a sus conclusiones sobre los hechos y las lesiones sufridas por la víctima, y ​​(5) imponer una pena excesiva. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia y determinó que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró el testimonio de los testigos y expuso los hechos subyacentes a la decisión, que fueron suficientes para confirmar la decisión y la sentencia. Asimismo, concluyó que el hecho de que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no fueran mortales no contradecía el delito imputado. Finalmente, confirmó la determinación del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de que el recurrente no “abandonó […] el acto” voluntariamente, sino que fue interrumpido por la víctima que huyó y solicitó la asistencia de sus vecinos, quienes ayudaron, y no fue el recurrente quien detuvo el acto por si mismo. Por tanto, el recurrente nunca puso fin a su intento de cometer el asesinato. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial chileno. El caso está disponible buscando el número de caso).



R. v. Barton Supreme Court of Canada (2019)


Femicide

The accused was charged with first degree murder of an Indigenous woman who was sex worker. The deceased was found in his hotel room. The cause of death was found to be loss of blood due to an 11cm wound in the victim’s vagina. In its opening address, the prosecution referred to the deceased as a “prostitute” and discussed how she and the accused had struck up a working relationship the night before her death. In addition, without ordering a separate hearing or considering the relevance of the evidence as is required pursuant to section 276 of the Criminal Code (evidence of complainant’s sexual history), the trial judge allowed the accused to testify at length about his previous sexual activity with the deceased. The jury acquitted the accused, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on first degree murder. In the Supreme Court, the majority agreed that a new trial should be ordered, but on the lesser charge of unlawful act manslaughter. This was because the trial judge’s mistakes in not considering the relevance of evidence did not affect the decision on murder. The Supreme Court said that defences to sexual assault cannot rely on things that support myths about women and consent. The first myth being that a woman’s consent to previous sexual activity means she consents to the current act in question and the second myth being that such women might not tell the truth.



Williams v. Republic of Liberia Supreme Court of Liberia (2014)


Femicide, Statutory rape or defilement

The appellants were charged with the murder of a 13-year-old girl. The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the prosecutor proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The victim was found hanging by rope in the appellants’ bathroom and died the same day in the hospital. The appellants brought the victim to the hospital prior to her death. Evidence showed that she had bruises on the left and right side of her neck, and she had sexual intercourse prior to her death. The grand jury indicted the appellants in the circuit Court. The Judge granted the appellants’ motion for bail. In the trial, the appellants produced multiple witnesses to testify that they were in the same house when the incident occurred. The prosecutors had two autopsy reports proving that the victim’s death was caused by sexual abuse or homicide. The Circuit Judge convicted the appellants for murder and sentenced them to death by hanging. The appellants filed a petition for the writ of certiorari for a crime not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that in the case of murder, the prosecutors are required to overcome the presumption of innocence. Here, the government failed to establish each element of the crime of murder, specifically, the government failed to prove that each of the appellants choked the victim to death, failed to prove that each of the appellants hanged her body in the bathroom in their house, and failed to prove the missing belt, which was used to tie the victim belonged to the appellants. The Supreme Court also explained that the government failed to produce the DNA specimens from the victim to test after taking the appellants’ DNA for testing, and could not produce any evidence that linked the hanging to the appellants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment for the lower court to reconsider.



Director of Public Prosecutions v. Paulino Supreme Court of Victoria at Melbourne: Criminal Division (2017)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The defendant had been found guilty of murdering his estranged wife in her home. This decision concerned his sentence. The court noted that “family violence” or “gender-based violence” are not separate crimes, but instead categorical descriptions of the relevant crime (here, murder), and that standard sentencing principles apply. The court condemned “family violence in the strongest possible terms” and stressed that general deterrence, denunciation, and just punishment were strong sentencing considerations. In accordance with the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the court considered factors such as the gravity of the offense of murder, the premeditated nature of the offense, as well as the trauma that the victim’s death had imposed upon her family members and friends. The court also gave weight to the fact that a family-violence intervention order had been in place for the victim’s safety, and that the defendant showed no remorse and maintained his innocence. The court discussed the approach adopted by the police and the courts in relation to family violence, and noted that the evolution of society’s values in relation to the treatment of women must be taken into account in sentencing. The court sentenced the defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment (without parole-eligibility for 25 years).



Republic v. Orero High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Nairobi Law Courts) (2008)


Femicide, Sexual harassment, Stalking

The defendant was charged with murder by stabbing the deceased woman. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused had stalked the deceased for days, at school and at home, and he had threatened to kill the deceased. Four days before the murder, the deceased, her father, and her brother visited the home of the defendant and his brother, with whom the defendant lived, about the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. Witnesses testified that the defendant became angry at the accusations and falsely accused the deceased of following him. After, the defendant’s brother agreed, as the defendant’s guardian, to stop the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. At the murder scene, a road near the entrance to the deceased’s school, the police recovered the murder weapon, a bloody knife. After the murder, the defendant attempted suicide and was taken to a hospital where doctors found photographs of the deceased and a note indicating that the accused had pledged himself to commit suicide and to cause the death of the deceased at the same time. Based on the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.



A.L.F., Case No. 90-C-2014 Sala de lo Penal de la Corte Supreme de Justicia (Penal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

This case is a cassation appeal from a lower court judgment. The judge found the defendant guilty of attempted femicide in violation of Article 45 of the Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. In the underlying case, the defendant rammed the plaintiff, his ex-girlfriend, with his car against the wall twice, causing her grave injuries. A court of appeals upheld the trial court’s verdict on the basis that (1) the LEIV was the appropriate law to apply (ins the Penal Code) and (2) there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant had the mental state required for a conviction of attempted femicide. The defendant further appealed the verdict to the cassation court on the grounds that the LEIV is innapplicable in that it regulates acts that are already regulated by the Penal Code, which conflicts with it Article 478. Additionally, he argues that Article 45 of the LEIV states that it is indeed a double regulation of the Penal Code and may not substitute it. He concludes his appeal by arguing that as per §1 of the Penal Code, it is the exclusive form of criminal regulation, which should have been applied. The court upheld the lower court’s rulings on the basis that the decision to charge the defendant under the LEIV (as opposed to the Penal Code) was based on a determination of the specific facts, and not as a matter of law. The court added that the appeal was based on theory of the law rather than on specific law-to-facts application. Furthermore, the defendant did not argue the specific facts, which, in his opinion, made the statute inapplicable to his case. The sentence was upheld.

Este caso es la apelación de la sentencia del tribunal inferior. El juez declaró al acusado culpable de intento de femicidio, en violación del Artículo 45 de la Ley Integral Especial para una Vida Libre de Violencia para la Mujer ("LEIV") y lo sentenció a 10 años en prisión. En el caso subyacente, el acusado embistió a la demandante, su ex novia, con su automóvil contra la pared dos veces, causándole graves heridas. Un tribunal de apelaciones confirmó el veredicto del tribunal de primera instancia sobre la base de que (1) el LEIV era la ley apropiada para aplicar (en el Código Penal) y (2) había pruebas suficientes para demostrar que el acusado tenía el estado mental requerido para una condena por intento de femicidio. El acusado apeló una vez mas el veredicto ante el tribunal de casación, alegando que el LEIV no era la ley aplicable, ya que regula actos que ya están regulados por el Código Penal, lo cual hace que entre en conflicto con el artículo 478. Además, el acusado argumenta que el artículo 45 de la LEIV se establece a si mismo como una doble regulación del Código Penal y no puede sustituirlo. Concluye su apelación argumentando que, según §1 del Código Penal, es la forma exclusiva de regulación penal, que debería haberse aplicado. El tribunal afirmó las decisiones del tribunal inferior sobre la base de que la decisión de acusar al acusado bajo el LEIV (en oposición al Código Penal) se basó en una determinación de los hechos específicos, y no como una cuestión de derecho legal. El tribunal agregó que la apelación se basó en la teoría de la ley y no en la aplicación específica de la ley a los hechos. Además, el acusado no argumentó los hechos específicos, lo que, en su opinión, hizo que la ley no fuera aplicable a su caso. La sentencia fue afirmada.

Appellate Court decision (271-2013, Camara de Segunda Instancia de la Tercera Deccion de Oriente) available here: http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/DocumentosBoveda/D/1/2010-2019/2014/02/B6F78.PDF

Trial Court decision (262-2013, Tribunal de Sentencia de Union) available here: http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/busqueda/showFile.php?bd=1&data=DocumentosBoveda%2FD%2F1%2F2010-2019%2F2013%2F11%2FB7B6F.PDF&number=752495&fecha=12/11/2013&numero=262-2013&cesta=0&singlePage=false



Republic v. Ratemo High Court of Kenya (2018)


Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The accused appeared at his former girlfriend’s kitchen window from outside and poured an acid-like substance on her. The substance was later determined to be sulfuric acid. The victim suffered first and second degree burns over 60% of her body, which resulted in a complication in the form of pneumonia in both lungs and caused her death. The court found that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the accused of murder. The court decided not to impose the death penalty and instead sentenced the accused to 15 years imprisonment because he was a first-time offender, it was an “offence of passion”, he was 22 years old, and he had a one-month-old child.



AP-Ki. Nr. 192/2010 Gjykata Supreme e Kosovës (Supreme Court of Kosovo) (2010)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The defendant husband held enduring suspicions that the late victim, his wife, was involved in an extramarital affair, and required her to seek permission to leave their home without his or their children’s accompaniment. The victim one day attempted to leave the house without the defendant’s permission, resulting in an argument in which he shot and killed her. The defendant was charged with Aggravated Murder under Article 147 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the offense is Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress (Art. 148) rather than Aggravated Murder, because he at the time of the shooting had reacted to the victim’s insult and did not act out of jealousy. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and ruled that the court of first instance correctly qualified the crime as Aggravated Murder rather than Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress. The court reasoned that the offense of Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress did not apply because Article 148 requires that the mental distress happen through no fault of the accused, whereas in this case the victim’s insult was a reaction to the defendant’s previous false accusations, personal offenses, and even physical mistreatment. The tribunal further held that the court of first instance correctly found that the defendant had killed his wife for base motives as required for Aggravated Murder under Article 147, explaining that the defendant did not only kill his wife out of jealousy, but also because she had “dared” to attempt to leave the house without his permission. This reaction demonstrates the defendant’s belief that he was entitled to decide his wife’s right to exist, a “ruthlessly selfish concept” that showed “utmost disrespect for the natural right of another human being to live and is as such a base motive.” Accordingly, the sentence was appropriate. (Also available in English.)



KI 41/12 Gjykata Kushtetuese (Constitutional Court) (2013)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, International law

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)



Sentencia nº 358 de Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Número de Expediente: C16-208) Tribunal Supremo de Justicia - Sala de Casación Penal (Venezuela Supreme Court of Justice - Criminal Appeal Chamber) (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The Court ratified the decision made by the Second Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the State of Amazonas by which the lower court declared the accused guilty of criminal violence, instead of a frustrated femicide attempt, as per the plaintiff complaint. The victim declared to the competent authorities that she was in her bed when her husband came to the house to spend time with his children. However, once inside the house, he started to hit her. During the fight he tried to kill her using a pillow. The victim’s brother arrived to the house just at the moment that the defendant was asphyxiating the victim. The victim’s brother pushed the man away from her, saving her life. In the reasoning for its decision, the Court considered that, even though all the evidence that the plaintiff presented to the lower court seemed to be sufficient to determine that the crime committed was in fact “frustrated femicide attempt,” the Court could not change the lower court’s decision and admit the frustrated femicide attempt because the attorney representing the plaintiff did not include in the file of its appeal petition the evidence necessary for such categorization.



R. v. Hunter Supreme Court of Queensland (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The appellant and the victim were married for 37 years. On 6 May 2010, the victim was struck at least 15 times on the head, face, and forearm with severe force, causing her death. When police arrived, they found the victim’s body doused in petrol in the garage near her car.. Police found the appellant lying on the floor in the lounge room in the house with a head injury and had a letter opener sticking out of his right hand. The appellant was taken to hospital and later interviewed by the doctors and police. The appellant told police that he got out of bed, walked into the lounge room, and was hit on the head by a man wearing a stocking over his head. Throughout this interview and later investigations by the police, the appellant maintained that there was an intruder who entered the house, assaulted him, and then killed his wife. At trial, the Crown’s case against the appellant included several pieces of circumstantial evidence: the victim was covered by appellant’s clothing, someone attempted to clean up the blood with towels, the victim was doused in petrol but not ignited, indicating that someone tried to destroy DNA, the footprints around the victim’s body matched footwear commonly worn by appellant, the appellant’s DNA was on a bloody metal bar found near the victim’s body, the metal bar appeared to come from the household, blood in and around the house matched victim’s and appellants, appellant had dried, flaky blood on him, the appellant gave inconsistent accounts of the events, appellant lied to officials, and appellant had the motive to kill her because he had financial difficulties and was the beneficiary of her life insurance. In light of the evidence, the appellant was convicted of murdering the victim.The appellant filed an appeal on the grounds that the trial judge erred in (i) directing the jury that they could use appellant’s lie in relation to the murder weapon belonging to him as implied admission of his guilt; (ii) directing the jury that they could use appellant’s lie about owning footwear similar to that which left footprints around the victim’s body as implied admission of his guilt; (iii) admitting the lack of reaction from the appellant when learning of his wife’s death as evidence of his guilt; (iv) failing to direct the jury in relation to evidence that the appellant did not ask how his wife died; (v) misdirecting the jury in relation to motive; and, (vi) failing to direct the jury in relation to evidence of DNA analysis. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in jury instructions or admissions.



Munda v. Western Australia High Court of Australia (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

This domestic violence case involved an appeal against a sentencing decision. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five years and seven months imprisonment for the manslaughter of his spouse after a history of domestic violence against his wife and other family members. The trial court considered the defendant's circumstances of disadvantage – that he was an Aboriginal man and grew up in an environment that normalized violence and alcohol abuse – as mitigating factors. In the first appeal, the prosecution successfully argued that the sentence was manifestly inadequate, and the Court of Appeal increased the sentence to seven years and nine months. The defendant then appealed to the High Court of Australia, arguing that there were insufficient grounds for the Court of Appeal to interfere with the original sentence and ignore the mitigating factors considered in the original judgment, in particular his social disadvantage. The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the first appellate court gave proper weight to the defendant’s social disadvantages and acted properly within its discretion in the resentencing.



丛艳青故意杀人案,中华人民共和国最高人民法院 (People's Procuratorate of Baoding City Hebei Province v. Cong) China Supreme People's Court (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for stabbing his wife (Cui) and mother-in-law (Zhao) to death, which was upheld by the Supreme People’s Court. Cui had previously filed for divorce. On October 4, 2012, the defendant got into an argument with Zhao and Cui. The defendant chased Zhao out of the house and stabbed her to death. The defendant then caught up with Cui, who had run to a neighbor’s house for help, and stabbed her to death. The Supreme People’s Court affirmed the lower courts’ finding that the defendant was guilty of unlawfully depriving others of their lives, which constituted intentional homicide. The Supreme People’s Court upheld the death penalty, holding that the defendant’s killing method was cruel and the consequences were particularly serious, and thus the death penalty was the appropriate sentence according to the law.

家庭暴力、杀害妇女

被告人因捅刺其妻子及岳母致二人死亡,被河北省保定市中级人民法院认定犯故意杀人罪,判处死刑。最高人民法院核准了河北省高级人民法院维持第一审对被告人丛艳青以故意杀人罪判处死刑,剥夺政治权利终身的刑事裁定。被告人妻子崔某甲曾起诉离婚。2012年10月4日,被告人与其妻子和岳母发生争执。被告人追逐其岳母至屋外并持刀将其捅刺至死。被告人妻子跑至邻居家求救,被告人追至邻居家家门前胡同内,持尖刀捅刺其妻子数下,致其死亡。最高法院认为,被告人,故意非法剥夺他人生命,其行为构成故意杀人罪。犯罪手段残忍,情节、后果特别严重,应依法惩处。



The State v. Dausab High Court of Namibia (2018)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The accused was convicted of pre-meditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after stabbing his girlfriend (“the victim”) 27 times and locking her in a room until she bled to death. Prior to murdering the victim, the accused sent her a text message describing how he would kill her. At trial, the court determined the crime was aggravated by the fact that the accused had a direct intention of murdering his girlfriend and did so in a domestic setting. In imposing a sentence, the court took into account retribution, prevention of crime, deterrence and reformation. The court further found that the accused did not care about the victim’s right to life, but rather his own wellbeing, that he “played victim,” and that he showed no remorse. The judge stated that it “is high time that men in relationships with women should understand that once a woman tells them that they are no longer interested in continuing with the relationship, she means just that and her views and feelings should be understood and respected.”



Gawaxab v. The State High Court of Namibia (2018)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment

The accused was charged with assaulting and murdering a woman. At trial, the accused filed an application for his discharge at the close of the prosecution’s case, arguing that the prosecution failed to make a case requiring the accused to answer. According to prosecution evidence, after buying alcohol and drinking it with a group of women he did not know, including the deceased, an argument began because the accused stated that he could have sex with all the women. The driver stopped the car when the accused hit the deceased with a bottle. The accused continued to beat the woman outside of the car and the others drove away in fear for their lives to report the attack the police. Upon their return to the scene, they found and picked up the deceased, who was running down the road after escaping the accused. She later passed away from her injuries. At trial, prosecutors presented several eye-witnesses to testify against the accused, as well as direct and circumstantial evidence to support their case. The accused argued that the eye-witnesses had been intoxicated at the time of the assault and therefore their testimony was unreliable. He also argued that the prosecutors failed to meet their burden to convict him. However, the court agreed with the prosecution and refused to discharge the accused, finding that the prosecution’s evidence presented a prima facie case that the accused was legally obliged to answer.



The State v. Swartz High Court of Namibia (2018)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Female infanticide and feticide, Femicide

The accused stabbed and murdered a pregnant minor girl with whom he was in a relationship when he was approximately 18 and she was 15 years old. Their relationship was one filled with domestic abuse and violence. He was convicted of murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. He was also convicted of assault for unlawfully and intentionally threatening to kill the deceased’s grandmother, thereby causing her to believe that the accused intended, and had the means, to carry out his threat.



Causa Nº 4.792/13 Ex Juzgado de Instrucción Formal Quinta Nominación (2014)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Defendant Mr. H.R.A was convicted of aggravated homicide based on his prior ties and relationship with the victim, Ms. N.A. (his partner), whom he murdered with a gun. Mr. H.RA. was sentenced to life in prison pursuant to Law No. 26,791, Article 80, which provides that “[l]ife imprisonment or confinement shall be imposed upon a person that murders an ascendant, descendent, spouse or ex-spouse or a person that kills another with whom he or she maintains a relationship, irrespective of whether they maintained a joint household.” The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it violates principles of equal protection because it does not afford (or it is not clear that the statute affords) equal protection to similarly situated homosexual couples. In rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the court notes (1) Supreme Court precedent making clear that holding legislation unconstitutional is a grave act that should be taken as a last resort and when it is clear that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional, and (2) the legislation in question sought to introduce as aggravating circumstances factors that had previously been ignored, extending the definition of the concept of “family” to include different family realities.

El acusado, el Sr. H.R.A fue condenado por homicidio con acciones agravadas debido a sus vínculos anteriores y su relación con la víctima, la Sra. N.A. (su pareja), a quien asesinó con un arma. El Sr. H.RA. fue condenado a cadena perpetua con conformidad con la Ley Nº 26.791, Artículo 80, que dispone que “se impondrá la reclusión o el encarcelamiento a una persona que asesine a un ascendiente, descendiente, cónyuge o ex cónyuge o una persona que asesine” otro con quien él o ella mantiene una relación, independientemente de si mantuvieron un hogar conjunto ”. El acusado impugnó la constitucionalidad de la ley, argumentando que violaba los principios de protección igualitaria porque no permite (o no está claro si el el estatuto otorga igual protección a las parejas homosexuales en situación similar). Al rechazar la impugnación del acusado, el tribunal señala (1) el Tribunal Supremo precedente, dejando en claro que mantener la legislación inconstitucional es un acto grave que debe tomarse como último recurso y solamente cuando está claro que la legislación es claramente inconstitucional, y cuando (2) la legislación en cuestión buscaba introducir como circunstancias agravantes factores que anteriormente se habían ignorado, extendiendo la definición del concepto de "familia" para incluir diferentes realidades familiares.



A., R.H. and other v. E.N. M Seguridad – P.F.A. and others Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contenciosos Administrativo Federal (National Appeals Court for Federal Administrative Litigation) (2011)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The plaintiff daughters, R.H. and V.C., filed suit against the State government and certain police officials requesting damages for the loss of the lives of their mother, Mrs. S., and father, Mr. A. The day after her decision to flee her home together with her daughters and reside with other family members, Mrs. S. filed a civil proceeding against Mr. A. for domestic violence. Mr. A. was prohibited from approaching Mrs. S. and his daughters, and Mrs. S. obtained permission to remove her and her daughters’ personal belongings from their previous home while escorted by police officers. While accompanied by police officers and her sister to remove the belongings, Mr. A. killed Mrs. S. with a knife and subsequently committed suicide. In finding for the daughters in the case of Mrs. S., the appellate court identified the following factors in support of its finding: (1) the existence of a real and immediate risk that threatened the rights of Mrs. S. and her daughters that had the potential to materialize immediately and which was expressly referenced by the Office of Domestic Violence, (2) the risk related to a specific threat against a woman and was therefore particular, (3) the State knew of the risk or should have reasonably known of the risk and (4) the State could have reasonably prevented and avoided the materialization of the risk.

Las hijas de la demandante, RH y VC, presentaron una demanda contra el gobierno del estado y ciertos oficiales de policía que solicitaron daños por la pérdida de la vida de su madre, la Sra. S. y el padre, el Sr. A. El día después de su decisión de huir de la casa junto con sus hijas, la Sra. S. presentó un proceso civil contra el Sr. A. por violencia doméstica. Al Sr. A. se le prohibió acercarse a la Sra. S. y a sus hijas, y la Sra. S. obtuvo permiso para retirar a ella y las pertenencias personales de sus hijas de su hogar anterior mientras estaba escoltada por agentes de policía. Mientras estaba acompañada por oficiales de policía y su hermana para retirar las pertenencias, el Sr. A. mató a la Sra. S. con un cuchillo y posteriormente se suicidó. Al encontrar a las hijas en el caso de la Sra. S., la corte de apelaciones identificó los siguientes factores que respaldan su descubrimiento: (1) la existencia de un riesgo real e inmediato que amenazaba los derechos de la Sra. S. y sus hijas que tenía el potencial de materializarse de inmediato y que la Oficina de Violencia Doméstica hacía referencia expresamente, (2) el riesgo relacionado con una amenaza específica contra una mujer y, por lo tanto, era particular, (3) el Estado sabía del riesgo o debería haberlo hecho razonablemente conocido del riesgo y (4) el Estado podría haber prevenido y evitado razonablemente la materialización del riesgo.



Sentenza N. 10959/2016 Corte di Cassazione: Sezioni Unite (Supreme Court: Joint Sections) (2016)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual harassment, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement

The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the applicability of certain procedural rules, confirmed the main international definitions of violence within relationships. Particularly, the local court dismissed the case against a man charged with the crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, without giving any notice of the motion to dismiss to the person injured by the crime in accordance with Article 408 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The injured person appealed the decision of the local court and requested that the Italian Supreme Court declare the dismissal of the case null and void. In deciding the procedural issue at hand, the Italian Supreme Court pointed out that the Italian criminal law has drawn the definitions of gender violence and violence against women mainly from international law provisions, which are directly enforced in the system pursuant to Article 117 of the Constitution. In this decision the Italian Supreme Court gave all the definitions of violence within gender relationships in consideration of international conventions and specifically European law, and concluded that such definitions, even if not directly included in domestic regulations, “are fully part of our national system through international law and are therefore enforceable.” According to this interpretation, the definitions of gender violence given by the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence are directly applicable in the Italian legal framework. On this basis, the Court ruled that notice of dismissal of the case must always be served on the person injured by crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, as those provisions relate to the gender violence notion set forth under the international and EU provisions applicable in the Italian legal framework.

La Corte di Cassazione, in una decisione riguardo all’applicabilità di alcune regole procedurali, ha confermato l’applicabilità delle principali definizioni internazionali in tema di violenza di genere. In particolare, il Tribunale ha archiviato un caso contro un uomo accusato di aver commesso i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, senza aver dato avviso della richiesta di archiviazione alla parte offesa secondo quanto disposto dall’articolo 408 del codice di procedura penale italiano. Il difensore della persona offesa ricorreva per cassazione e chiedeva alla Corte di Cassazione di dichiarare nullo il provvedimento di archiviazione. Nel decidere la questione procedurale, la Corte di Cassazione evidenziava che il diritto penale italiano ha tratto le definizioni di violenza di genere e violenza contro le donne principalmente dalle disposizioni di diritto internazionale, che sono direttamente applicabili nel sistema ai sensi dell’articolo 117 della Costituzione. In questa decisione la Corte di Cassazione ha fornito tutte le definizioni di violenza di genere in considerazione delle convenzioni internazionali e in particolare del diritto europeo, e ha concluso che tali definizioni, anche se non direttamente incluse nelle normative nazionali, “per il tramite del diritto internazionale sono entrate a far parte dell’ordinamento e influiscono sull’applicazione del diritto”. Secondo questa interpretazione, le definizioni di violenza di genere previste dalla Convenzione di Istanbul sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica sono direttamente applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano. Sulla base di ciò, la Cassazione ha ritenuto che l’avviso della richiesta di archiviazione debba sempre essere notificato alla persona offesa nel caso in cui si proceda per i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, in quanto queste disposizioni si riferiscono alla nozione di violenza di genere sancita dalle disposizioni internazionali e comunitarie applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano.



Lawrence v. The Queen Court of Appeal of Belize (2018)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The appellant was convicted of the murder of his romantic partner of eight years and was sentenced to life in prison. On the night of the murder, the appellant first beat his partner in front of her three children. One of children called the police to report the beating, but the police failed to respond to the residence. Following the beating, the appellant left the house, but returned an hour later, broke into the house, and stabbed his partner to death. The appellant then drove his partner to the hospital where he was subsequently arrested. At the appellant' trial, testimony revealed that the appellant was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the killing and had a history of domestic violence. The first issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge gave adequate instructions on the potential for intoxication to be taken into account when deciding whether there was an intent to kill for the purposes of the appellant’s defense. The Court of Appeal found that such instructions given by the trial judge were adequate. The next issue decided by the Court of Appeal was whether new evidence from a forensic psychiatrist based on a single interview with the appellant regarding the appellant’s mental health necessitated a new trial. The Court of Appeal found the new evidence to be less than credible, but exercised discretion to substitute the original conviction of murder to a conviction of manslaughter and reduced the appellant’s sentence to 18 years. In reducing the sentence, the Court of Appeal began with the range of sentences for murder applicable a street fight (being 15 to 20 years), although acknowledged that the instant case differed in that it was a “vicious attack on an unarmed victim.” Taking into account appellant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia, the Court of Appeal began with a 15-year sentence and then added three years to reflect the aggravating factors of “the choice of weapon, the number of stab wounds, the presence of the children and the previous violence he inflicted on the deceased about an hour before the fatal incident” to arrive at the 18 year sentence ordered.



Toopah v. Republic of Liberia Supreme Court of Liberia (1974)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide

The defendant appealed a homicide conviction for the shooting of his wife, arguing that the killing resulted from his discovery of her adultery and could, therefore, only amount to manslaughter. In a charge of homicide, the law requires a showing of malice (i.e., a murder committed with premeditation). Implied malice (i.e., murder committed in the “heat of passion;” without premeditation) is nullified by sufficient provocation. The court found that his contention of provocation was unsupported and that his testimony was contradicted by witnesses’ testimony, which indicated that he routinely beat his wife and threatened her life. On the day of the shooting, he took the rifle home without permission and he called his wife to return home prior to shooting her. No evidence showed that his wife was committing adultery. Thus, the Court upheld the conviction, refusing to consider provocation as a mitigating circumstance and finding that the murder was premeditated because the evidence proved express malice.



Femicide (Docket 1a/LIV/2016 (10a.)) First Collegiate Tribunal of the Twenty-Seventh Circuit (2016)


Femicide, Gender discrimination

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Mexican Supreme Court has determined that in order to determine whether a law is discriminatory a court must evaluate the following: (i) whether the purpose of such law is objective and not contrary to the Constitution; (ii) the means; (iii) that the purpose of the law and the means are proportional. The Mexican Supreme Court has determined that the state legislator can develop any mechanism to protect human rights. Therefore, given that femicide, as a felony, is designed to protect a disadvantaged segment of the population, any special treatment inherent to this felony cannot be interpreted as contrary to the human right to equality.

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son relevantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. El Tribunal Supremo de México ha determinado que para determinar si una ley es discriminatoria, un tribunal debe evaluar lo siguiente: (i) si el propósito de dicha ley es objetivo y no contrario a la Constitución; (ii) los medios para enforzarla; (iii) que el propósito de la ley y los medios sean proporcionales. La Corte Suprema de México ha determinado que el legislador estatal puede desarrollar cualquier mecanismo para proteger los derechos humanos. Por lo tanto, dado que el femicidio, como delito grave, está diseñado para proteger a un segmento desfavorecido de la población, cualquier tratamiento especial inherente a este delito grave no puede interpretarse como contrario al derecho humano a la igualdad.



TC/0003/17 Constitutional Court (2017)


Femicide, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, International law, Sexual violence and rape

Due to the increase of femicide crimes in the Dominican society, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the termination of violence against women in all its forms as it is a violation of the Constitution. The proclamation was made in commemoration of the murder of Mirabal, Minerva, Patria and María Teresa, political opponents of the regime of Rafael Trujillo, and in accordance with the international agreements executed in defense of women's rights, as well as the laws issued against gender violence, sexual violence and femicide.

Debido al aumento de los delitos de femicidio en la sociedad dominicana, el Tribunal Constitucional proclamó el cese de la violencia contra la mujer en todas sus formas, incluyéndolo como una forma de violación de la Constitución. Dicha proclamación se realizó en conmemoración del asesinato de Mirabal, Minerva, Patria, y María Teresa, quienes fueron opositores políticos del régimen de Rafael Trujillo. La proclamación está en conformidad con los acuerdos internacionales celebrados en defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y con las leyes emitidas contra la violencia basada en género sexual, violencia sexual en sí, y femicidio.



Mandla Mlondlozi Mendlula v. Rex Supreme Court of Swaziland (2013)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

Appellant was convicted of murdering his girlfriend and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Appellant appealed that the sentence was too harsh and severe and that it induced a sense of shock. Appellant presented mitigating factors that he was married with four minor children to support, the sole breadwinner, a first offender, and deserved to be given a second chance in life. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after considering the interest of society, the seriousness of the offense, the fact that the crime was premeditated, and the fact that the killing was gruesome and brutal. The Supreme Court further stated that sentence was fair “particularly in the upsurge in the killing of women as well as the need to impose deterrent sentences which would provide the safeguard against this onslaught.”



Somiso Mbhamali v. Rex Supreme Court of Swaziland (2013)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

Appellant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for the murder of his elderly aunt and appealed for 10 years of his sentence to be suspended because the appellant believed the victim was a witch and could kill him with the power of witchcraft. The Supreme Court upheld the original sentence and held that a perpetrator’s belief in witchcraft is not a mitigating factor when computing an appropriate sentence for murder. While a genuine belief in witchcraft could be treated as an extenuating circumstance in certain instances, murder committed because of a belief in witchcraft would not be mitigated by the belief.



Zhao Fei, Yang Fang v. Cao Yin, Cao Chaoran, Luo Shihui etc. Hechuan District Court, Chongqing (2014)


Sexual violence and rape, Femicide

In 2012, the deceased respondent, Cao Yin cheated the deceased victim, Zhao Jing, to a Tap Water Company for interview, and arranged Zhao to start to “work”. On the next day, Cao tied Zhao up and brought her to the duty office of the company, forcing her to have sex with him. After that, afraid of being caught, Cao killed Zhao. Cao was caught finally by the police. In 2013, Cao was sentenced to death by First Intermediate Court of Chongqing. The judgment has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Chongqing and Supreme Court of PRC. Cao has been executed. The plaintiff alleged that after Cao Yin’s death, his successors first in order shall be responsible for the damages caused. The plaintiff also sues against the Tap Water Company for their lack of due diligence. The court finds that, among the four respondents, all of whom are the successors first in order of Cao Yin, Cao Chaoran and Luo Shihui clearly quit their right of inheritance. Therefore, only the other two are responsible.


Weheliye v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs Federal Court of Australia (2001)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

A citizen of Somalia sought a protection order on the basis that she feared persecution due to her status as young, a Somali and a woman. The application asserted that she had been sentenced to death by stoning for adultery in Somalia. The Refugee Review Tribunal denied the application, finding the applicant not credible and holding that neither married nor divorced Somalia women constituted a protected group. The court held that the Tribunal erred because it did not examine whether the law against adultery was applied and administered in Somalia in a discriminatory manner.



Najar v. State of Israel Supreme Court of Israel (2005)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Harmful traditional practices, Honor crimes (or honour crimes)

The appellant, a Bedouin man, was convicted for murder with malice aforethought for killing his sister after she insisted that she would travel to Egypt alone. The appellant claimed that his charge should be reduced as the killing was the result of provocation. He further argued that the court should take into account that he was defending his family honor, as it was unacceptable in Bedouin culture for unmarried women to travel alone. The court ruled that no argument of “family honor” as a motive for killing someone will be allowed by a court in Israel. The human dignity of the victim and the sanctity of life take precedence over family honor.



Republic v. Elvan S/O Cyprian Luvindu High Court of Tanzania (2005)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, International law

The accused physically assaulted his romantic partner, with whom he lived, and drunkenly hit and kicked her to death. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but asked for sentencing leniency on the grounds that he was in remand for four years, served part of his sentence, and had dependents. The Court emphasized that this offence was committed “in the course of domestic violence” and made note of the Republic’s commitment to CEDAW and the eradication of violence against women. The accused was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.



Her Majesty the Queen v. Shafia Ontario Superior Court of Justice (2012)


Femicide, Honor crimes (or honour crimes)

Mohammad Shafia, his second wife, and his son were convicted of the June 2009 murders of his three teenaged daughters and his first wife. Their bodies were found submerged inside a car in a canal near Kingston, Ontario. The Shafia family was originally from Kabul, Afghanistan, fled to Dubai before moving to Australia, and then finally moving to Montreal, Canada in 2007. The three defendants were found guilty of four counts of first degree murder and each sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility in 25 years. The prosecutor argued that the murders were honor killings – because the three Shafia daughters had shamed the family by adopting Western lifestyles and the two older daughters had boyfriends, and because his first wife wanted a divorce and supported the three girls in their pursuit of western lifestyles. The Crown sought to admit expert trial testimony relating to the relationship between culture, religion, patriarchy and violence against women in the Middle East, Eastern Asia and around the world, specifically as to honor killing. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice held the topic of honor killing was properly the subject of expert opinion evidence, finding the presentation of expert evidence respecting culture to be routinely admitted in Canadian trial courts and the concepts of honor, family and gender dynamics within Middle Eastern and East Asian communities to be knowledge outside the scope of a typical Canadian jury. Specific questions to the expert mirroring the facts of the case were not allowed; only generic questions relating to circumstances where honor killings might take place were allowed.



S. v. Abraham Alfeus High Court of Namibia. Main Division, Windhoek (2013)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

Abraham Alfeus was convicted of murder with direct intent after admitting to shooting his intimate partner twice with a shotgun. The presiding judge, Naomi Shivute, read the ruling citing provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, Act 4 of 2003 and sentenced Alfeus to 30 years in prison. In the ruling Shivute stressed a need for stiffer sentences in response to extremely high levels of domestic violence against women and children in Namibia; including that it was a matter of protecting the constitutional right for human dignity, the rights of the victim, and in the interest of society generally. The judge’s ruling was meant to deter future domestic violence offenders and is an important precedent in Namibia where domestic violence runs rampant but is rarely prosecuted.



S.P. and G.M. v. State Bacau Court of Appeal (1995)


Femicide

The accused raped the victim at the exit of a bar and then decided to take her to their common domicile and continue raping her. On the road, when the victim threatened to report their acts to the police, they decided to murder her. To this end the accused chained the victim and drowned her after hitting her in the head with a rock. The accused were convicted, in first instance, of qualified murder, felony murder, rape, and unlawful personal sequester. Following the appeal of the accused, the Bacau Court of Appeal found that the death of the victim was not the result of the rape and that the accused should have been convicted for murder and qualified murder with the application of the legal provisions regarding aggravating circumstances resulting from committing the crime by two or more persons. (full text decision on file with the Avon Global Center)



Perdomo v. Holder United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2010)


Femicide

In 1991 Lesly Yajayra Perdomo (“Perdomo”), a citizen and native of Guatemala, joined her mother in the United States. In April 2003 the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged her as removable because she unlawfully entered the United States in 1991. Perdomo conceded removability but requested asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. Perdomo sought asylum because of her fear of future persecution as a member of a particular social group of “women in Guatemala between the ages of fourteen and forty.” Perdomo explained she was fearful because of: (1) the large number of women killed in Guatemala; (2) the failure of the Guatemalan government to respond appropriately; and (3) the lack of explanation for the killings. The immigration judge denied Perdomo’s requests. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) affirmed the denials and rejected the particular social group definition, “women in Guatemala between the ages of fourteen and forty” and Perdomo’s revised group definition, “all women in Guatemala,” as too broad to qualify for protection. The Ninth Circuit granted Perdomo’s petition for review and held that prior case law established that, “women in a particular country, regardless of ethnicity or clan membership, could form a particular social group.” The court noted that the size and breadth of the group, “all women in Guatemala,” did not preclude it from qualifying as a protected social group and that the BIA erred when it held to the contrary. The court remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether “all women in Guatemala” is a particular social group and, if so, whether Perdomo qualified for asylum.



CEHAT v. Union of India Supreme Court of India (2001)


Female infanticide and feticide, Femicide, Harmful traditional practices

In this public interest litigation, an NGO that works on health issues challenged the government's failure to adequately address the issue of anti-girl child sex selection and the enforcement of the laws prohibiting prenatal sex identification. The Court ordered the government to respond with what it planned to do to address the problem.



Legislation

Ley 599 de julio 24, 2000 (Código Penal Colombiano) (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Acid violence, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

This law serves as the basis for the Colombian Criminal Code, it enumerates conducts that constitute crimes and their sanctions. The code sets forth several gender-related crimes. Article 104A criminalizes femicide, meaning the killing of women because they are female. Article 123 sanctions people who forcibly terminate a pregnancy. Article 187 prohibits forcing in-vitro treatments on women against their will. Article 229 regulates domestic violence offenses. Articles 208 and following criminalize rape and establish aggravating circumstances including, among others, if the victim is under 14 years old, if the victim is incapable of defending him or herself, if the abuser used violence and if the abuse was held within the household. Article 116 A prohibits the use of chemical agents or corrosive substances that cause injuries or harm when they come into contact with human tissue. Finally, for some crimes, the code treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victim is a woman. Law 1719 of June 18, 2014 modified and expanded these provisions.

Esta ley que contiene el Código Penal colombiano enumera las conductas que constituyen delitos y sus sanciones. El código establece varios delitos relacionados con el género. El artículo 104A tipifica como delito el feminicidio, es decir, el asesinato de mujeres solo por el hecho de ser mujeres. El artículo 123 sanciona a las personas que obligan a la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo. El artículo 187 prohíbe realizar tratamientos in vitro a mujeres en contra de su voluntad. El artículo 229 regula el delito de violencia doméstica. Los artículos 208 y siguientes tipifican como delito la violación y establecen circunstancias agravantes que incluyen, entre otras, que la víctima sea menor de 14 años, que sea incapaz de defenderse por sí misma, si el abusador usó violencia y si el abuso se llevó a cabo dentro del hogar. El artículo 116 A prohíbe el uso de agentes químicos o sustancias corrosivas que causen lesiones o daños cuando entren en contacto con tejidos humanos. Finalmente, para algunos delitos, el código trata como circunstancia agravante el hecho de que la víctima sea mujer. La Ley 1719 de junio 18, 2014 modificó y amplió algunas de estas disposiciones.



Baudžiamasis Kodeksas (Criminal Code) (2000)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Female infanticide and feticide, Femicide, Sexual violence and rape, Stalking, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Under the Criminal Code, rape is defined quite narrowly as “sexual intercourse against a person’s will with the use or threat of physical violence present or deprivation of possibility of resistance.” There is also no mention of rape in marriage. To hold a person liable for rape, which is punished by imprisonment for up to seven years, the victim or their representative must file a complaint. However, in the case of rape (i) by a group of accomplices or (ii) of a minor or a young child, the term of imprisonment can be longer, and complaint filing is not needed. Further, sexual assault is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to seven years, sexual abuse is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to three years, and sexual harassment is punished by a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest. However, Lithuania is one of the few European Union states to have not yet criminalized stalking. Trafficking in Human Beings is punished by imprisonment from two to ten years. Infanticide is punished by arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. In the case of illegal abortion, as defined in Decree No. 50 of the Minister of Health “On the Termination of Pregnancy Operation Procedure,” the doctor and assisting persons are liable. Finally, the Code recognizes acts committed to express hatred towards persons due to their, amongst other characteristics, gender and sexual orientation, to be an aggravating circumstance. English translation available here.

Pagal baudžiamąjį kodeksą išžaginimas gana siaurai apibrėžiamas kaip lytiniai santykiai prieš asmens valią „panaudojant fizinį smurtą ar grasinant tuoj pat jį panaudoti, ar kitaip atimant galimybę priešintis, ar pasinaudojant bejėgiška nukentėjusio asmens būkle”. Apie išprievartavimą santuokoje neužsimenama. Laikyti asmenį atsakingu už išžaginimą, kuris baudžiamas laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, auka ar jų atstovas turi pateikti skundą. Tačiau tuo atveju, kai išžaginama (i) bendrininkų grupės arba (ii) nepilnametį vaiką, laisvės atėmimo bausmė gali būti ilgesnė ir skundo padavimo nereikia. Už seksualinę prievartą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, už seksualinį smurtą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki trejų metų, o už seksualinį priekabiavimą baudžiama bauda, laisvės apribojimu arba areštu. Lietuva yra viena iš nedaugelio Europos Sąjungos valstybių, kuri dar nėra kriminalizavusi persekiojimo. Už prekybą žmonėmis baudžiama laisvės atėmimu nuo dvejų iki dešimties metų. Už nužudymą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki penkerių metų. Neteisėto aborto atveju, kaip apibrėžta sveikatos apsaugos ministro įsakyme Nr. 50 „Dėl nėštumo operacijos procedūros nutraukimo“, atsako gydytojas ir pagalbą teikiantys asmenys. Galiausiai kodekse pripažįstama, kad veiksmai, kuriais siekiama išreikšti neapykantą asmenims dėl jų, įskaitant kitų savybių, lyties ir seksualinės orientacijos, yra sunkinanti aplinkybė.



Código Penal: Livro II, Título I – Crimes contra a pessoa: Capítulo I– Crimes contra a vida (Crimes against life) (2005)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

Article 132 of the Portuguese Penal Code imposes a more severe penalty (imprisonment from 12 to 25 years) for the crime of qualified homicide (“homicídio qualificado”), if, among other special circumstances, the victim is the current or former spouse or person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender, if the victim is pregnant or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

O artigo 132 do Código Penal português impõe uma pena mais severa (de 12 a 25 anos de prisão) aos crimes de homicídio qualificado, se, além de outras circunstâncias especiais, o crime for praticado: (i) contra cônjuge, ex-cônjuge, pessoa de outro ou do mesmo sexo com quem o agente mantenha ou tenha mantido uma relação de namoro ou uma relação semelhante à de conjuges, ainda que sem coabitação; (ii) contra mulher gestante; e (iii) em razão de sexo, orientação sexual ou pela identidade de gênero da vítima.



Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículo 80 (1984)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general

A man who kills a woman through an act of gender violence is liable for life imprisonment ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").

Un hombre que mata a una mujer mediante un acto de violencia de género es condenado a cadena perpetua ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").



Codigo Penal (Penal Code) (2011)


Abortion and reproductive health rights, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Sexual violence and rape, Statutory rape or defilement, Trafficking in persons

Articles 342 to 345 relate to abortion as a crime, other than an abortion under any of the conditions established by Law No. 21,030 of 2017. The penalty varies considerably depending on the circumstances and motives for the abortion, including, for example, whether the abortion was performed by the mother or a third party, whether it was done with or without the consent of the mother, or whether it was done to hide any shame (deshonra). Article 390 of the Criminal Code provides that the killing of a woman who is or used to be in a relationship with the murderer is murder (spousal) (femicidio), the penalty for which is imprisonment from 15 years and one day to qualified perpetual imprisonment. Article 400 increases by one degree penalties for crimes committed in the context of domestic or family violence. Article 411 prohibits acts done with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the entry or exit of individuals who perform sex work within or outside the Chilean borders. The penalty is imprisonment from three years and one day to five years, plus a fine. Article 411 also prohibits acts of violence, coercion, or taking advantage of vulnerability of persons in order to obtain the consent of a person to be sexuality exploited, such as in pornography, slavery, or forced labor. The penalty is imprisonment from five years and one day to 15 years, plus a fine.

Los Artículos 342 al 345 regulan aborto como delito, distinto del aborto en cualquiera de las condiciones establecidas por la Ley N ° 21.030 de 2017. La sanción varía considerablemente según las circunstancias y motivos del aborto, incluyendo, por ejemplo, si el el aborto fue realizado por la madre o una tercera persona, ya sea con o sin el consentimiento de la madre, o para ocultar alguna vergüenza (deshonra). El Artículo 390 del Código Penal establece que el homicidio de una mujer que está o solía estar en relación con el asesino es homicidio (conyugal) (femicidio), cuya pena es de prisión de 15 años y un día a prisión perpetua calificada. El Artículo 400 aumenta en un grado las penas por delitos cometidos en el contexto de violencia doméstica o familiar. El Artículo 411 prohíbe los actos realizados con el propósito de promover o facilitar la entrada o salida de personas que realizan trabajo sexual dentro o fuera de las fronteras chilenas. La pena es de prisión de tres años y un día a cinco años, más una multa. El Artículo 411 también prohíbe los actos de violencia, coacción o aprovechamiento de la vulnerabilidad de las personas para obtener el consentimiento de una persona para ser explotada sexualmente, como en la pornografía, la esclavitud o el trabajo forzoso. La pena es de prisión de cinco años y un día a 15 años, más una multa.



Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres, Decreto Nº 520 (Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women, Decree No. 520) (2010)


Employment discrimination, Femicide, Gender discrimination, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual harassment, Trafficking in persons

The Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) establishes a framework for prosecuting and preventing acts of violence against women, and for providing assistance and support for victims of gender-based violence. The law establishes 11 new crimes that aim to sanction various aspects of gender-based violence in various forms: physical (femicide, aggravated femicide, obstruction of justice, induced or assisted suicide); psychological (inducement and promotion of sex acts through electronic media; unlawful dissemination of information, dissemination of pornography); economic (breach of duty of economic assistance, theft of birthright, theft of profits of economic activity); and speech (violent speech against women). Rape is prosecuted through the Penal Code. The Salvadorean Institute for the Advancement of Women (Instituto Salvadoreno para el Desarollo de la Mujer) (“ISDEMU”) is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the law and with establishing women’s shelters and other programs designed to help victims of domestic and gender-based violence.

La Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV) establece una avenida para enjuiciar y prevenir actos de violencia contra las mujeres, y para brindar asistencia y apoyo a víctimas que hayan sufrido violencia por razón de género. La ley establece 11 nuevos delitos que tienen como objetivo sancionar varios aspectos de la violencia de género en diversas formas: física (femicidio, femicidio agravado, obstrucción de la justicia, suicidio inducido o asistido); psicológica (inducción y promoción de actos sexuales a través de medios electrónicos; difusión ilegal de información, difusión de pornografía); económica (incumplimiento del deber de asistencia económica, robo de derechos de nacimiento, robo de beneficios de la actividad económica); y discurso (discurso violento contra la mujer). La violación es procesada por el Código Penal, el cual es el código penal criminal. El Instituto Salvadoreño para el Adelanto de la Mujer ("ISDEMU") tiene la tarea de supervisar la implementación de la ley y establecer refugios para mujeres asi como otros programas diseñados para ayudar a las víctimas de violencia doméstica y de violencia en base de género.



Lei Federal n. 13.104/2015 (“Lei do Feminicídio”) (2015)


Female infanticide and feticide, Femicide

On March 9, 2015, Brazil’s existing Penal Code was amended to criminalize femicide, with sentencing ranging from twelve to thirty years of imprisonment. The new legislation defined femicide as a sex-based homicide committed against women, with the involvement of domestic violence, discrimination or contempt for women. The crime is aggravated if the victim is a pregnant woman, a woman within the first three months of maternity, a girl under the age of fourteen years or a woman over sixty years of age. Besides amending the existing criminal code, the new legislation also amended Law no. 8.072/1990, adding femicide to the list of heinous crimes.

Em março de 2015, o Código Penal brasileiro foi emendado para criminalizar o feminicídio, impondo penas de 12 a 30 anos de reclusão. A nova lei definiu feminicídio como homicídio em razão da condição do sexo feminicídio, seja no âmbito da violência doméstica ou em virtude de menosprezo ou discriminação à condição da mulher. Além disso, o Código Penal também foi alterado para aumentar em 1/3 da pena, na hipótese de o feminicídio ser praticado contra gestante ou após 3 meses da realização do parto, contra pessoa menor de 14 anos ou maior de 60 anos, contra pessoa com deficiência ou na presença de ascendente ou descendente da vítima.



Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court International Criminal Court (1998)


Femicide, Forced and early marriage, Forced sterilization, Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Sexual violence and rape, Trafficking in persons

The intention behind the Rome Statute of 2002 (“Rome Statute” or “Statute”) in establishing the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern and to end impunity. The Rome Statute is significant in being the first international criminal law instrument that recognises forms of sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and enforced sterilization, as distinct war crimes. This legal instrument is also novel in prescribing gender-based crimes as the basis of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during armed conflicts. In particular, the Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over gender-based crimes if they constitute acts of genocide. In this case the crimes, such as rape, can be an integral part of the destruction inflicted upon the targeted groups and may be charged as genocide. The Prosecutor must further apply and interpret the Statute in line with internationally recognised human rights, including women’s human rights and gender equality. The States Parties should also consider the need to appoint judges with legal expertise on violence against women or children.



International Case Law

Yildirim gg. Österreich [C/39/D/6/2005] CEDAW Committee (UNO-Frauenrechtsausschuss) (2007)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, Harmful traditional practices, International law

The decedent sought to divorce her husband who threatened to kill her and her children if she ever initiated divorce proceedings. In response to the decedent’s numerous reports of assault and dangerous criminal threats, the Austrian police issued an expulsion and prohibition-to-return order against her husband. The police also recommended that her husband be detained, but the Vienna Public Prosecutor twice denied the request. The decedent appealed to the Vienna Intervention Center (“VIC”) after her husband repeatedly came to her workplace to harass and threaten her; the VIC asked the police to pay more attention to the decedent’s case. When the decedent finally filed a petition for divorce at the Vienna District Court of Hernals, her husband followed her home from work and fatally stabbed her. The complaint stated that the State’s action violated Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) because the Austrian criminal justice system negatively impacts women through the public prosecutors’ failure to treat cases of domestic violence seriously. The complaint also stated that the failure of judicial officials and law enforcement to collect data and maintain statistics on domestic violence instances denied the decedent the enjoyment of her human rights in violation of Article 2 and 3 of CEDAW on eliminating laws, regulations, and customs that adversely effect women. Finally, the complaint stated a violation of Article 5 of CEDAW on eliminating social and cultural attitudes towards women in the State’s continual treatment of domestic violence as a social or domestic problem rather than a serious crime. The Committee held that the Austrian police force’s failure to detain the decedent’s estranged husband was in breach of the State’s due diligence obligation to protect the decedent, noting that a perpetrator’s rights cannot superseded women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity. The Committee also took note of the correlation between lenient attitudes towards women’s cultural subordination and domestic violence. Although Austria prosecuted the decedent’s husband to the fullest extent for her death, the Committee found violations of Articles 2 and 3 upon which they recommended that Austria strengthen its implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Prevention against Violence within the Family, and ensure enhanced coordination between police and judicial officers to protect women victims of gender-based violence.

Die Verstorbene wollte sich von ihrem Ehemann scheiden lassen. Dieser drohte ihr, dass er sie und die Kinder umbringen würde, sollte sie jemals ein förmliches Scheidungsverfahren anstrengen. Als Reaktion auf die zahlreichen Anzeigen der Verstorbenen von Übergriffen und gefährlichen Drohungen erließ die österreichische Polizei einen Wohnungsverweis und ein Rückkehrverbot gegen den Ehemann. Die Polizei hat außerdem empfohlen, den Ehemann festzunehmen, allerdings hat die Staatsanwaltschaft Wien dies zweimal zurückgewiesen. Die Verstorbene hat die Wiener Interventionsstelle gegen Gewalt in der Familie („Interventionsstelle“) angerufen, nachdem der Ehemann wiederholt auf ihrer Arbeitsstelle erschien, um sie zu belästigen und zu bedrohen; die Interventionsstelle ersuchte die Polizei, der Angelegenheit um die Verstorbene mehr Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Letztlich beantragte die Verstorbene die Scheidung bei dem Bezirksgericht Hernals in Wien. Kurz darauf folgte der Ehemann seiner Frau von der Arbeit nach Hause und erstach sie. Die Beschwerde bringt vor, dass das staatliche Verhalten eine Verletzung von Artikel 1 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention darstelle. Das Wiener Strafsystem wirkt sich negativ auf Frauen aus, indem die Staatsanwaltschaft versagt, Fälle von häuslicher Gewalt ernst zu nehmen. Weiterhin geht aus der Beschwerde hervor, dass das Unterlassen der Gerichtsbediensteten und Staatsanwaltschaft, Daten zu sammeln, und Statistiken über häusliche Gewalt zu führen, der Verstorbenen das Recht nahm, ihre Menschenrechte wahrzunehmen. Dies stelle eine Verletzung von Artikel 2 und 3 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention dar, die eine Vernichtung von Gesetzen, Richtlinien und sonstigen Gewohnheiten, die Frauen negativ beeinflussen, verlangen. Zuletzt meinen die Beschwerdeführer, eine Verletzung von Artikel 5 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention liege vor. Hiernach obliegt dem Staat eine Pflicht, soziale und kulturelle Vorurteile zu überkommen, um häusliche Gewalt gegenüber Frauen als ernstzunehmende Straftat zu erkennen, und nicht weiterhin als rein soziales oder häusliches Problem abzutun. Der Ausschuss stellte fest, dass das Unterlassen der österreichischen Polizei, den Ehemann festzunehmen, die staatliche Schutzpflicht gegenüber der Verstorbenen verletzte. Hierbei betonte er, dass die Rechte des Straftäters nicht schwerer wiegen können als die Menschenrechte der Frau auf Leben und psychische sowie physische Unversehrtheit. Der Ausschuss hat darüber hinaus auf die Korrelation zwischen der kulturellen Unterwerfung einer Frau und häuslicher Gewalt hingewiesen. Obwohl die Staatsanwaltschaft den Ehemann wegen der Tötung der Verstorbenen mit allen rechtlichen Mitteln verfolgte, befand der Ausschuss, dass der Staat seine Pflichten aus Artikel 2 und 3 der UN-Frauenrechtskonvention verletzte. Der Ausschuss empfahl daher, dass Österreich die Durchsetzung und Überwachung der Einhaltung des Bundesgesetzes zum Schutz vor Gewalt in der Familie verbessert, eine verbessere Koordinierung von Polizeiarbeit und Staatsanwaltschaft sicherstellt, um Frauen vor Gewalt zu schützen.



Goekce v. Austria (Goekce gg. Österreich) [C/39/D/5/2005] CEDAW Committee (2007)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, Femicide, International law

The decedent’s husband shot and killed her in front of their two daughters in 2002. Before her death, the decedent had obtained three expulsion and prohibition-to-return orders against her husband in response to repeated episodes of domestic violence. The Vienna Public Prosecutor denied police requests to detain the decedent’s husband, and stopped the prosecution against him on the basis of insufficient grounds two days before the murder. Police reports show that the law enforcement failed to respond in a timely fashion to the dispute that resulted in the decedent’s murder. The decedent’s heirs brought this complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on behalf of the decedent. The complaint argued that Austria’s Federal Act for the Protection against Violence within the Family provided ineffective protection for victims of repeated, severe spousal abuse, and that women are disproportionately affected by the State’s failure to prosecute and take seriously reports of domestic violence. The Committee found that although Austria has established a comprehensive model to address domestic violence, State actors must investigate reports of this crime with due diligence to effectively provide redress and protection. The Committee concluded that the police knew or should have known that the decedent was in serious danger, and were therefore responsible for failing to exercise due diligence in protecting her. By allowing the perpetrator’s rights to supersede the decedent’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity, Austrian law enforcement violated its obligations to end gender discrimination through the modification or enactment of appropriate legislation under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), and its Article 3 obligation to guarantee women’s exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedom on a basis of equality with men. Particularly, the Committee recommended that Austria strengthen its implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Protection against Violence within the Family, respond to complaints of domestic violence with due diligence, and provide adequate sanctions for failure to do so.

Der Ehemann erschoss die Verstorbene vor den Augen der beiden Töchter im Jahre 2002. Vor ihrem Tod hat die Verstorbene in Reaktion auf wiederholte Ausbrüche von häuslicher Gewalt bereits dreimal ein Hausverbot und ein Rückkehrverbot gegen ihren Ehemann erwirkt. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Wien wies das Ersuchen der Polizei, den Ehemann festzunehmen, wiederholt zurück. Zwei Tage vor der Tötung hat die Staatsanwaltschaft die Strafverfolgung mangels ausreichender Beweislage eingestellt. Aus den Polizeiberichten ergibt sich, dass die Strafverfolgung versagt hat, zeitgemäß auf die Gefahrenlage, aus der sich die Tötung ergeben hat, zu reagieren. Die Beschwerde wurde von den Erben der Verstorbenen in ihrem Namen angestrengt und vor den Frauenrechtsausschuss der UNO gebracht. Hierin argumentieren die Erben, dass das Bundesgesetz zum Schutz vor Gewalt in der Familie keinen ausreichenden Schutz für Opfer von wiederholter, ernstzunehmender häuslicher Gewalt bietet und Frauen das Versagen der staatlichen Strafverfolgung dessen überproportional oft erfahren.



Reports

National Strategic Plan on Gender-based Violence & Femicide (2020)


Femicide, Gender-based violence in general, LGBTIQ

The South African government released a National Strategic Plan (“NSP”) in response to the 2018 Summit on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide. The Summit identified key interventions and developed strategies regarding gender-based violence and other challenges women and children face in South Africa. The NSP was published as a framework to recognize and affirm the challenges and rights identified at the Summit. The vision of the NSP is “A South Africa free from gender-based violence directed at women, children and LGBTQIA+ persons” and is enacted through six key pillars: 1. accountability, coordination and leadership; 2. prevention and rebuilding social cohesion; 3. justice, safety, and protection; 4. response, care, support, and healing; 5. economic power; and 6. research and information management. The NSP lists specific general strategies and defines the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders to accelerate, advance, and realize the vision and outcomes of the NSP. The NSP outlines the specific short-and long-term goals and which stakeholder is responsible for specific targets under each pillar. It also provides a brief history of gender-based violence and femicide in South Africa, as well as a summary of relevant legislation in South Africa.



Avon Global Center 2010 Women and Justice Conference Report (2011)


Femicide, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general

In 2010, the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice held a conference in Washington, DC to discuss advances and obstacles to securing justice for women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas.



Guatemala's 8 Law: Progress Against Impunity? (2010)


Femicide

Guatemala Human Rights Commission releases report one year after Guatemalan Law Against 8 passed.

La Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala publicó un reporte un año después de que la Ley 8 pasara.