Women and Justice: Topics: Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Forced and early marriage, Sexual violence and rape

The National action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 'Women, peace, security' for the period until 2025 was developed, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine 'On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men', as well as Ukraine's international obligations in the field of human rights. This document aims to address: women's participation in decision-making; combating gender-based violence and sexual violence related to armed conflict, etc. As a problem that needs to be solved in Ukraine, this document defines women's vulnerability to the negative consequences of armed conflict. In particular, according to official statistics, the majority of internally displaced persons, unemployed internally displaced persons, etc., are women. In addition, the analyzed document contains the results of the study on violence 'Women's Well-being and Security' conducted by the OSCE in 2019, according to which 67% of Ukrainian women (who have suffered from violence), they have been subjected to physical, psychological, or sexual violence by the time they are 15 years old. The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine is the executive body responsible for the implementation of the National action plan. This document includes the following strategic goals: ensuring the protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence (during armed conflict and peacetime); ensuring the process of post-conflict recovery; development and implementation of the transitional justice system based on the principles of ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men, etc. In addition, the National Plan includes the obligation of the Ministry of Social Policy to publish an annual report on its implementation for public discussion on its official website. But, at the same time, the website of this body contains the latest report for 2020 only.

Національний план дій розроблено відповідно до Закону України "Про забезпечення рівних прав та можливостей жінок і чоловіків", а також міжнародних зобов’язань України у сфері прав людини. Цей документ спрямований на забезпечення: участі жінок у прийнятті рішень; боротьби із ґендерно зумовленим насильством та сексуальним насильством, пов’язаним зі збройним конфліктом тощо. Як проблему, що потребує вирішення в Україні, цей документ визначає вразливість жінок до негативних наслідків збройного конфлікту. Зокрема, згідно з офіційною статистикою, більшість внутрішньо переміщених осіб, безробітних внутрішньо переміщених осіб тощо становлять жінки. Крім цього, аналізований документ містить результати дослідження з питань насильства "Жіноче благополуччя та безпека", проведеного ОБСЄ у 2019 році, згідно з яким 67% українських жінок (які постраждали від насильства) зазнавали фізичного, психологічного чи сексуального насильства у віці до 15 років. Органом виконавчої влади, відповідальним за реалізацію Національного плану дій, є Міністерство соціальної політики України. Цей документ містить такі стратегічні цілі: забезпечення захисту жінок від сексуального та ґендерно зумовленого насильства (під час збройного конфлікту та мирний час); забезпечення процесу постконфліктного відновлення; розвиток та впровадження системи правосуддя перехідного періоду, що заснована на принципах забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків, тощо. Крім того, Національний план містить обов’язок Міністерства соціальної політики публікувати щорічний звіт про його виконання для громадськості. обговорення на офіційному сайті. Але, при цьому, на сайті цього органу розміщено останній звіт лише за 2020 рік.

Marital rape is a crime under the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act deletes the word “unlawful” from the statutory definition of rape (‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ without consent, as set forth in the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981). The amended definition of rape therefore does not exclude ‘lawful’ sexual intercourse (i.e., between married persons). The 1990 Act also explicitly abolished ‘any rule of law by virtue of which a husband cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife’ (Section 5). Section 4 defines rape as any penetration (however slight) of the anus or mouth by the penis or of the vagina by any object held or manipulated by another person, providing for a punishment on conviction of up to life imprisonment (Section 4). Section 7 of the Act also deals with the corroboration rule in the case of sexual offences. In particular, the judge is no longer required to give the jury a corroboration warning, but such warning is not prohibited.

The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 gave effect to European Council Directive No. 2011/93/EU of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. It also amended certain other legislation, including the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (available here), the Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1995, the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here), the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here), and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. The Act provides for offences relating to sexual acts with protected persons and relating to payment for sexual activity with sex workers, offensive conduct of a sexual nature and harassment of victims of sexual offences. The Act defines ‘sexual exploitation’ in relation to a child and specifies the elements that would constitute a sexual offence against a child, including performing sexual acts in front of a child and prostitution of a child. Generally, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 broaden the scope of criminal acts in relation to children, such as the prohibition of causing a child to watch sexual activity (Section 6), meeting a child for the purposes of sexual exploitation (Section 7), and the use of information and communication technology to facilitate the sexual exploitation of a child (Section 8). The Act also criminalizes the purchase of sexual services and prohibits sexual activity with a protected person, as defined by the Act. The Act creates a distinction related to the commission of a sexual act with a child under 17 years of age and with a child under 15 years of age, with a conviction on indictment for the former offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of up to 7 years (unless the person is in authority, in which case they may be sentenced for up to 15 years) (Section 17), and with a conviction on indictment for the latter offence resulting in a term of imprisonment of life (Section 16). Importantly, Section 48 of the Act reforms the law in relation to consent to sexual acts. In particular, it states that a person does not consent to a sexual act if, inter alia, they permits the act to take place or submits to it because of the application, threat or fear of use of force against them, if they are asleep, if they are incapable of consenting because of intoxication, or if they are mistaken as to the nature and purpose of the act or the identity of the person involved. The Act also clarifies that consent can be withdrawn at any time and that lack of physical resistance does not, of itself, constitute consent (Section 48). Finally, Section 46 allows a court to issue a “Harassment order” against a person when imposing a sentence for a sexual offence or at any time before the convicted person is released from prison.

The 1998 Act prohibits trafficking of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) amended the 1998 Act’s provisions related to child trafficking and sexual exploitation (Section 3) and the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2013 (available here) expanded the definition of labour exploitation and aggravating factors. The 1998 Act also criminalizes allowing a child to be used for child pornography (Section 4). A person found guilty on indictment of this offence faces up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Section 5 has been substituted by Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here), which prohibits the production, distribution, and possession, inter alia, of child pornography. Persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 14 years’ imprisonment (Section 5, as amended). Section 6, as amended, prohibits the possession of child pornography; persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here) also inserts Section 5A, prohibiting, inter alia, causing, inciting, compelling, coercing, recruiting, inviting, or inducing of a child to participate in a pornographic performance or the gaining from such participation.

The 2008 Act, which amends the 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act (available here) among other legislation, defines trafficking as when a person, in relation to another person, “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbours the person, or (i) transfers the person to, (ii) places the person in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the person to, another person, (b) causes a person to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of a person or takes a person— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the person with accommodation or employment” (Section 1). Exploitation includes labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, or exploitation consisting of the removal of one or more of the organs of a person. Labour exploitation includes subjecting the person to forced labour, forcing him or her to render services to another, or enslavement or similar servitude. Sexual exploitation includes production of pornography depicting the person alone or with others, causing the person to engage in sexual activity for the purpose of the production of pornography, prostitution of the person, or otherwise causing the person to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 1). The Act contains specific provisions regarding trafficking of a child (a person under the age of 18), which were further amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here). Trafficking a child for exploitation is an offense, as is selling or offering to sell a child, or purchasing or offering to purchase a child (Sections 2 and 3). There is an additional definition of “trafficks” in relation to a child, meaning that a person “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbors the child, or— (i) transfers the child to, (ii) places the child in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the child to, another person, (b) causes the child to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of the child or takes the child— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the child with accommodation or employment” (Section 3). There is also separate definition of “sexual exploitation” in relation to a child, and includes inviting, inducing, or coercing a child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography, or inviting, inducing, or coercing the child to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 3). The offences of exploitation and sexual exploitation in relation to children are subject to penalties specified in sections 2 and 3; a court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. Penalties for trafficking of persons other than children are specified in Section 4; the court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. The Act also explicitly provides for penalties where an accused is found guilty of attempt, incitement, or conspiracy in relation to the offences under the Act. Soliciting or importuning for purposes of prostitution of trafficked persons, or benefiting from such activities, is also an offence subject to specified penalties (Section 5), as are offences committed by corporate bodies (Section 6). Jurisdiction includes extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., where a person commits an act in relation to an Irish citizen in a place other than the State that, if done in the State, would constitute one of certain enumerated offenses). The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (available here) further amends these provisions, in particular with expanded definitions of labour exploitation and aggravating factors.

Article 267 of the Penal Code provides for a punishment of rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor) for anyone who rapes a woman, which shall be permanent if the perpetrator is a “Specified Perpetrator, meaning an ancestor of the victim, other person responsible for her upbringing or having power over her, or a paid servant of the victim or the perpetrator . Article 267 does not address rape of men. Article 268, however, is gender-neutral. It prescribes three to seven years of rigorous imprisonment with hard labor for indecent assault of a person by force or threat, or an attempt to do so. The punishment for indecent assault may increase if (i) the victim was less than 16 years old, or (ii) the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator. The punishment for indecent assault increases to permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor when a Special Perpetrator indecently assaults a person under 16 years old. Finally, Article 269 provides that anyone who indecently assaults a minor under 18 years of age without force or punishment is subject to imprisonment. If the victim was less than seven years of age or the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator, the penalty is rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. Article 290 provides that kidnapping a woman is punished with permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. If the kidnapper also rapes the woman, the sentence is death. English translation available here.

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). In part, these amendments increased the punishment for an illegal abortion (meaning that it was conducted by a person who had no special medical education; or forcing an abortion without voluntary consent, which is punishable by a fine of 50-100 tax-free minimum incomes, community service of 100-240 hours, correctional labor for up to two years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or imprisonment for the same term. The amendments criminalized forcing an abortion and forced sterilization without consent. Rape (i.e., sexual acts involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration using the genitals or any other item, without voluntary consent) is punishable with imprisonment for three to five years and sexual violence (nonconsensual, non-penetrative sexual assault) is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни, що містять положення Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), ухваленої у 2011 році. Внаслідок цих змін статтю 134 Кримінального кодексу України, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту (проведення аборту особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти; примус до проведення аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої), було змінено, в частині посилення відповідальності за це небезпечне злочинне діяння (тобто тепер незаконний аборт карається штрафом від 50 до 100 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадськими роботами на строк від 100 до 240 годин, або виправними роботами за на строк до двох років, або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк). Також криміналізовано примус до аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої, а також примусову стерилізацію без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи. Змінено статті, які передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за зґвалтування та сексуальне насильство. Зокрема, зґвалтування (тобто вчинення статевих дій, пов’язаних із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло іншої особи за допомогою статевих органів або будь-якого іншого предмета без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до п’яти років, а також сексуальне насильство (не пов'язане з проникненням в тіло іншої особи без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк до п'яти років. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.

Article 155 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that an adult who commits acts of sexual nature associated with the vaginal, anal, or oral penetration into the body of a person under the age of 16, using genitals, another body part, or any item, shall be punished by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same term. If such acts are committed by close relatives or family members, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim; or if they are associated with the provision of monetary or other remuneration to the victim or a third party or with a promise of such remuneration; or where they have caused infertility or any other grave consequences, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Article 156 provides criminal liability for debauched actions committed against a person under 16 years of age. This dangerous culpable act shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years or imprisonment for the same term. If the same acts committed against a child or committed by family members or close relatives, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Harassment of a child for sexual purposes is criminalized by the Article 1561. Harassment under this article means proposal of a meeting made by an adult to a person under the age of 16, for the purpose of committing any acts of sexual nature or debauched acts, after which at least one action was taken to ensure that meeting will take place.

Стаття 155 Кримінального кодексу України визначає, що повнолітня особа, яка вчинила дії сексуального характеру, пов’язані із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло особи, яка не досягла шістнадцятирічного віку, з використанням геніталій, іншого органу чи частини тіла або будь-якого предмета, карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. У випадку, якщо ті самі дії, вчинені близькими родичами або членами сім’ї, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілої особи або піклування про неї, або якщо вони поєднані з наданням грошової чи іншої винагороди потерпілій особі чи третій особі або з обіцянкою такої винагороди, або якщо вони спричинили безплідність чи інші тяжкі наслідки, злочинець карається позбавленням волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Стаття 156 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за розпусні дії, вчинені щодо особи, яка не досягла 16 років. Це суспільно небезпечне винне діяння карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Якщо ті самі дії вчинені щодо малолітньої особи або вчинені членами сім’ї чи близькими родичами, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілого або піклування про нього, винний підлягає покаранню у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Домагання дитини для сексуальних цілей криміналізовано статтею 1561. Домагання за цією статтею означає пропозицію зустрічі, зроблену повнолітньою особою, особі, яка не досягла 16 років з метою вчинення стосовно неї будь-яких дій сексуального характеру або розпусних дій, у разі якщо після такої пропозиції було вчинено хоча б одну дію, спрямовану на те, щоб така зустріч відбулася.

This law amends Paraguay’s Criminal Code and establishes (among other things) penalties for (i) sexual harassment, article 133; (ii) domestic violence, article 229; (iii) sexual coercion, including sexual abuse without intercourse, article 128; (iv) human trafficking, article 129; (v) sexual abuse of defenseless victims, article 130; and (vi) sexual abuse of persons held in custody, children under 14, and/or persons under guardianship –articles 130, 131, 135, 136, 137 and 230.

Esta ley modifica el Código Penal de Paraguay y establece, entre otras, penas por (i) acoso sexual, artículo 133; (ii) violencia intrafamiliar, artículo 229; (iii) coacción sexual, incluido el abuso sexual sin penetración, artículo 128; (iv) trata de personas, artículo 129; (v) abuso sexual de víctimas indefensas, artículo 130; y (vi) abuso sexual de personas privadas de libertad, menores de 14 años y/o personas bajo tutela –artículos 130, 131, 135, 136, 137 y 230.

This law modified some articles of Law 599 from 2000 and 906 from 2004, and adopted measures that expanded access to justice for victims of sexual violence, especially for those who experienced it during the armed conflict. As such, it stated the conduct and behaviors that amount to sexual violence crimes and the way they must be judicialized. Furthermore, it established that victims of sexual violence have the right to receive comprehensive compensation and reparation upon their individualized the damages.

Esta ley modificó algunos artículos de la Ley 599 de 2000 y 906 de 2004, y adoptó medidas que ampliaron el acceso a la justicia de las víctimas de violencia sexual, especialmente de aquellas que la vivieron durante el conflicto armado. En tal sentido, señaló las conductas y comportamientos que constituyen delitos de violencia sexual y la forma en que deben ser judicializados. Asimismo, estableció que las víctimas de violencia sexual tienen derecho a recibir una indemnización y reparación integral sobre la base de los daños y perjuicios individualizados.

Section 201 states that a person who coerces another person, by force, deprivation of personal liberty, or by threat to life, to perform or tolerate sexual intercourse, or a sexual act equivalent to sexual intercourse, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 2-10 years. If the act causes serious bodily harm or pregnancy of the raped person, or if the act places the raped person in a state of agony for a prolonged period of time or humiliates that person in an extraordinary way, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 5-15 years. If the act results in the death of the raped person, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 10 to 20 years or by life imprisonment. Section 202 punishes other forms of sexual violence involving coercion by force or threat of violence with a term of imprisonment of six months to five years.

Nach § 201 wird mit Freiheitsstrafe von 2 bis 10 Jahren bestraft, wer eine andere Person mit Gewalt, unter Entziehung der persönlichen Freiheit oder durch Drohung mit dem Leben dazu nötigt, den Geschlechtsverkehr oder eine dem Geschlechtsverkehr gleichgestellte sexuelle Handlung vorzunehmen oder zu dulden. Führt die Tat zu einer schweren Körperverletzung oder zu einer Schwangerschaft der vergewaltigten Person oder versetzt sie die vergewaltigte Person für längere Zeit in einen Zustand der Agonie oder demütigt sie in außergewöhnlicher Weise, so wird der Täter mit Freiheitsstrafe von 5 bis 15 Jahren bestraft. Führt die Tat zum Tod der vergewaltigten Person, so wird der Täter mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von 10 bis 20 Jahren oder mit lebenslänglicher Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. Andere Formen der sexuellen Gewalt, die eine Nötigung durch Gewalt oder die Drohung mit Gewalt beinhalten, werden nach § 202 mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft.

In recognition of the inherent dignity and worth of each human, Article 12 requires that the State and all persons recognize and protect human rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups, and minorities. All persons have equal status before the law. Limitations of rights are only justifiable insofar as they ensure peaceful human interaction in the context of an open and democratic society. Article 13 requires the State to actively promote the welfare and development of the people by affirmatively adopting legislation and policies to achieve gender equality. This requires: (i) women’s full participation in all spheres of society with opportunities equal to men; (ii) the implementation of nondiscrimination principles and other measures; and (iii) the implementation of policies addressing domestic violence, personal security, maternity benefits, economic exploitation, and rights to property, among other relevant social issues. Article 22 mandates that all members of a family shall enjoy equal respect and shall be protected under law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation. No person shall be forced to enter into any marriage, and no person over the age of 18 can be prevented from entering into marriage. All provisions of this section apply to civil, customary, and other forms of marriage. Article 24 specifically guarantees that women are entitled to full and equal protection of law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender or marital status. This includes the following rights: (i) equal rights under civil law, including equal capacity in the realms of contracts, property, custody, decision-making regarding children, and acquisition and retaining of citizenship and nationality; and (ii) upon the dissolution of marriage, entitlement to fair disposition of jointly held property and to fair maintenance. Further, any laws that discriminate against women are invalid and legislation must affirmatively be passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women. This affirmative requirement particularly applies to practices of: sexual abuse, harassment, or violence; discrimination in work, business, or public affairs; and deprivation of property (inherited or otherwise). Article 30 provides that, while all persons have a right to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development, women in particular shall be given special consideration in regards to this right. The State must take all necessary measures for the realization of this right, including reforms aimed to eradicate social injustice and inequality. Other gender-related provisions include: the prohibition of torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 19); Article 20’s ban on all forms of discrimination; the right to education for all people (Article 25); Article 27’s prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor; and Article 31’s requirement that all persons are entitled to fair wages and equal remuneration for equal value work without discrimination of any kind, especially on the basis of gender.

The promotion or facilitation of prostitution involve taking advantage of the victim’s economic necessity or vulnerability or coerce the victim by means of violence, threat or fraud pursuant to article 189, and it is punished with a sentence of 1-8 years of imprisonment. If the facilitation or coercion to prostitution is made in a foreign country, the crime committed falls within article 190, i.e. human sexual trafficking, which command a higher sentencing of up to 10 years in prison. The promotion or facilitation of the prostitution of minors under 18 years old is prohibited by article 195. Under the same article and incurring in the same penalties is the individual who repeatedly practices sexual acts with a minor. Here, if the agent coerces, threatens, acts with violence, has the intent of monetary gains, if the minor has diminished psychological capacity, or if the minor is under the age of 14, the maximum penalty increases to 15 years. The act of soliciting by means of paying the minor is punished under article 197 with up to three years of imprisonment, whilst if penetration was involved the penalty increases to five years (in case another more severe penalty pursuant to another article is not applicable).

A promoção ou facilitação da prostituição envolve tirar vantage da necessidade econômica ou vulnerabilidade da vítima ou coerção da vítima por meio de violência, ameaça ou fraude nos termos do artigo 189, e é punido com 1-8 anos de encarceramento. Se a facilitação ou coerção à prostituição é feita em outro país, o crime cometido recai no previsto pelo artigo 190, i.e. tráfico sexual humano, que tem uma sentença maior de até 10 anos de prisão. A promoção ou facilitação de prostituição de menores de 18 anos é proibida pelo artigo 195. Sob o mesmo artigo e incorrendo na mesma pena está o indivíduo que repetidamente realiza atos sexuais com menor. Aqui, se o agente coage, ameaça, age com violência, tem a intenção de ganho financeiro, se o menor tem capacidade psicológica diminuída, ou se é menor de 14 anos de idade, a penalidade máxima aumenta para 15 anos. O ato de solicitar por meio do pagamento ao menor é punido sob o artigo 197 com até três anos de encarceramento, enquanto se houver penetração envolvida a penalidade aumenta cinco anos (no caso de outra penalidade mais severa relacionada a outro artigo não for aplicável).

Articles 154-158 prohibit 1) anyone, without the pregnant woman’s consent, to provoke or cause a miscarriage; 2) anyone, with the pregnant woman’s consent, to perform or assist with an abortion; and 3) any pregnant woman from, by any means, participating or consenting to an abortion. These three felonies carry sentences of 2-8 years, 1-5 years, and 5 years of imprisonment, respectively. (article 154). Article 155 provides for increased sentences if the abortion harms the woman’s physical integrity or causes death. Exempt from criminal liability are abortions carried out with the pregnant woman’s consent to 1) remove the risk of death or great harm, or 2) the fetus’ life is inviable, or 3) the pregnancy is a result of rape and the abortion is done within the first 16 weeks of the pregnancy. All these circumstances must be verified and reported in writing by a doctor ahead of the interruption (article 156). It is also forbidden to promote services for the interruption of pregnancies and any "propaganda" (articles 157 and 158).

Artigos 154-158 proíbe 1) quem, sem o consentimento da mulher grávida, provocar aborto ou interrupção da gravidez; 2) quem, com o consentimento da mulher grávida, realizer aborto ou ajudá-la a fazer; e 3) a mulher gravida que, de qualquer maneira, participar ou consentir com o aborto. Esses três crimes carregam sentenças de 2-8 anos, 1-5 anos, e 5 anos de encarceramento, respectivamente (artigo 154). O artigo 155 prevê aumento de pena se o aborto lesa a integridade física da mulher ou causa a sua morte. Isentos de responsabilidade criminal são os abortos realizados com o consentimento da mulher, na medida em que 1) remove o risco de morte ou grave lesão, ou 2) a vida do feto é inviável, ou 3) a gravidez é resultado de um estupro e o aborto é feito durante as 16 primeiras semanas de gravidez. Todas essas circunstâncias devem ser verificadas e reportadas por escrito ao médico responsável pela interrupção (artigo 156). Também fica proibido promover serviços para interrupção de gravidez ou qualquer propaganda desse tipo de prática (artigos 157 e 158).

Under Article 140, abortion is considered a “crime against the intra-uterine life,” and someone who causes an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman may be sentenced from 2-8 years of imprisonment, while the person who performed the abortion and the pregnant woman can be sentence to up to three years of imprisonment. Article 142, however, permits the abortion if performed by a doctor and in the following scenarios: (1) the abortion is the only method to avoid risk of death or grave physical or mental harm to the mother; (2) the abortion is recommended in order to avoid the risk of death or permanent grave physical damage to the mother, up to the 12th week of pregnancy (3) the fetus is at risk of grave illness or malformation, up to the 24th week of pregnancy; (4) the pregnancy was caused by rape or sexual assault, up to the 16th week of pregnancy; (5) by the mother’s choice, up to the 10th week of pregnancy. In cases where the fetus is not viable, abortion can be performed at any time during pregnancy. Any of the conditions above mentioned have to be certified by a doctor, except item 5, case in which the mother has to submit an affidavit to a doctor or clinic stating that her decision was “mindful and responsible.” If the mother is under 16 years old or mentally incapacitated, the consent to perform an abortion has to be provided by the woman’s legal representative (usually parents).

Segundo o artigo 140 do Código Penal Português, o aborto é considerado um "crime contra a vida intrauterina", e quem causar aborto sem o consentimento da grávida pode ser condenado a penas de dois a oito anos de prisão, enquanto quem causar um aborto com o consentimento da grávida, bem como a própria grávida poderá ser condenado a pena de até 3 anos de prisão. A seção 142, entretanto, permite o aborto se realizado por um médico e nas seguintes situações: (1) o aborto é o único método para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico ou mental à mãe; (2) o aborto é recomendado para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico permanente à mãe, até a 12ª semana de gravidez; (3) o feto está em risco de doença grave ou malformação, até a 24ª semana de gravidez; (4) a gravidez foi causada por estupro ou agressão sexual, até a 16ª semana de gravidez; (5) por escolha da mãe, até a 10ª semana de gravidez. Nos casos em que o feto não é viável, o aborto pode ser realizado a qualquer momento durante a gravidez. Qualquer uma das condições acima mencionadas tem que ser certificada por um médico, exceto o item 5, caso em que a mãe tem que apresentar uma declaração juramentada a um médico ou clínica declarando que sua decisão foi "atenta e responsável". No caso de a mãe ser menor de 16 anos ou mentalmente incapacitada, o consentimento para realizar um aborto tem que ser dado por um representante legal da mulher (geralmente os pais).

This section states crimes against sexual freedom, including the conditions under which sexual encounters violate a woman’s safety and the punishments thereafter. Anyone who engages in sexual activity without the woman’s consent by means of violence or physical intimidation, even if an act of artificial procreation, is subject to two to eight years in prison. Those who have sexual encounters with minors face imprisonment of 16-20 years. Anyone who takes advantage of a hierarchical position in a workplace to constrain someone to obtain sexual advantage is punished with imprisonment up to two years and a fine.

Essa seção estabelece os crimes contra a Liberdade sexual, incluindo as condições nas quais os encontros sexuais violam a segurança da mulher e as punições referentes. Aquele que inicia atividade sexual sem o consentimento da mulher por meio de violência ou intimidação física, ainda que seja um ato de procriação artificial, está sujeito a pena de dois a oito anos de prisão. Aquele que mantém encontros sexuais com menores encaram uma prisão de 16-20 anos. Aquele que tira proveito da sua posição hierárquica em um ambiente professional para constranger alguém para obter vantagem sexual é punido com prisão de até dois anos e multa.

The “social indications” noted in Art. 27 of the Law “on Healthcare” that allow performing an abortion up to the 22nd week of pregnancy are: (1) court decision on deprivation of parental rights regarding another existing child; and (2) pregnancy resulting from rape.

Law No. 350-3 defines human trafficking and sets out measures to prevent human trafficking and related crimes. These include identifying victims of trafficking, educating, and providing information to citizens on related issues. The law further sets out measures for the protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, including ensuring their safety, providing temporary accommodation, legal, medical, and psychological assistance, among others. The law provides that persons guilty of trafficking in persons or related crimes are punishable in accordance with the legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus and the victim's "unwillingness or inability" to change his or her "anti-social behavior" caused by the trafficking does not eliminate or mitigate the offender's liability.\

Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.

This Act superseded the Vishakha guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court of India. Before the institution of this Act, a woman facing harassment at the workplace had to lodge a complaint under Section 354 and/or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code, which dealt with, respectively, assault or use of criminal force with the intent to outrage the modesty of a woman and words, gestures, or acts to outrage the modesty of a woman. This act is important because it obligates the employer to provide an environment free of sexual harassment. This is in contrast to the pre-Vishakha guidelines era during which the female employee would have to lodge complaints with the police authorities. Such obligation is a part of the company’s legal compliance and non-compliance triggers significant penalties. The Act defines various terms like ‘sexual harassment,’ ‘aggrieved woman,’ ‘workplace’ etc., which clarify actions covered under the Act. The Act broadly interprets these terms and efforts have been made to cover as many facets of employment as possible. Significantly, the term workplace has been expanded to include remote and telecommuting work. The Act also includes guidelines regarding the filing of complaints, the formation of the inquiry committee, and the process of conducting inquiries. Lastly, the Act also provides safeguards against malicious complaints.

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act replaced the Ordinance of the same name which was promulgated in the aftermath of the Kathua Rape case in Jammu & Kashmir region of India in 2018, which involved the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. The Act amended various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and The Code of Criminal Procedure. Notably, the Act increased the minimum punishment for rape from seven years to ten years of rigorous imprisonment which is extendable to life imprisonment. The penalty for rape of a girl under 16 years of age has also been increased to 20 years of imprisonment extendable to life, a significant increase from the original term of 10 years. Rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with imprisonment of minimum 20 years extendable to life or with capital punishment. Lastly, the gang rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with life imprisonment or capital punishment. The Act includes measures related to bail restrictions, speedy trial, and strengthening prosecution.

Any person forcing another person into prostitution is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. If the victim is under 18 years old, the offender is subject to 10-20 years of imprisonment. Human trafficking is defined as the recruitment, moving, transfer or harboring of any person within or across national borders by means of deception, threats, use of force, debt bondage or other means, and using such person in forced labor, prostitution, pornography, or other unlawful acts, or removing body organs of such person, or for other unlawful purposes. The offender is subject to 5-15 years of imprisonment. For victims under 18 years old, any of the above-mentioned acts committed against them is deemed to be human trafficking even if there is no deception, threat, use of force, or debt bondage. When the offender is a “regular” human trafficker or in an organized group, the victims are children, there are two or more victims, the victim is a relative of the offender, or any victim suffers serious injury or becomes an invalid or insane, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment. If a victim becomes disabled, infected with HIV, or died, the offender is subject to life imprisonment. Fines for human trafficking range from 10 million to 1 billion kip. If the victim is a woman, provisions of the Law on the Development and Protection of Women may be applicable too.

Rape is defined as using force, armed threats, drugs, or other means to coerce sexual intercourse with a woman against her will (where such woman is not the offender’s spouse), and is subject to three to five years of imprisonment. When the victim is between 15 to 18 years old, or is the offender’s dependent or patient, the offender is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. When the victim is under 15 years old, the offender committed battery, or the rape resulted the victim’s disability or caused the victim’s death, the offender is subject to 7-15 years of imprisonment. When the victim is also murdered, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment, and may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death penalty. Violators are also subject to fines ranging from 5 million to 70 million kip. Attempted rape is also punishable. "Marital rape" through use of force or threats is also punishable by article 252 ("Sexual Intercourse by Force with a Female Spouse"), but separately and differently from other rape offenses. Violators of article 252 may face three months to one year imprisonment or re-education without imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 3 million kip. If the rape of a female spouse results in serious injury, the penalties increase to one to five years in prison and a fine of 1 million to 5 million kip. While article 248 includes male victims of rape, article 252's prohibition on marital rape only applies to female spouses. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.

The “Prostitution Act” criminalizes various activities associated with sex work. The criminalized activities include (see Sections 5 to 13): soliciting oneself in a public place, associating with another in a sex work establishment for the purpose of prostitution, advertising oneself or another for the purpose of sex work, procuring a person for the purpose of prostituting that person, a parent who connives in the prostitution of their child who is under the age of 18, being an owner/manager/supervisor in a prostitution establishment or other controller of sex workers in a prostitution establishment, and detaining a person or threatening in any manner to compel engagement in sex work. The Prostitution Act only criminalizes individuals involved with selling sex, but carries no criminalization or consequences for a customer buying it unless the sex worker is under the age of 18. The penalty for involvement in prostitution ranges from a fine up to a term of imprisonment for life depending on the offense committed. A sex worker could be charged with a fine not exceeding 1,000 Baht and imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month. Over the past few years, police have been conducting raids, sometimes violently, on prostitution establishments. It has been noted that those who exploit women in prostitution are rarely prosecuted and women working in the entertainment sector are often presumed guilty and subject to humiliating treatment following arrest. There are also reports to widespread corruption and official complicity in prostitution and trafficking cases.

English translation available here.

Several sections of the Criminal Code (in particular, sections 242-243) penalize rape, including spousal rape, and domestic violence. Penalties include imprisonment not exceeding 12 years, a fine not exceeding 78,000 euros ($93,600), or both. For cases involving violence against a spouse, the penalty for various forms of abuse can be increased by one-third. Section 244 and 245 of the Criminal Code penalize statutory rape. Under section 244, in cases where the victim is younger than 12, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed 12 years. In cases where the victim is 12-16 years of age, under section 245, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed eight years. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)

Law No. 21,030 amends article 119 of the Sanitary Code to permit the interruption of a pregnancy by a surgeon, with the consent of the woman, for: (i) any risk to the life of the mother; (ii) unfeasibility of the embryo or fetus; and (iii) rape.

La ley numero 21,030 amenda el Articulo 119 del Codigo Sanitario, permitiendo la interrupcion del embarazo por un cirujano, con la autorizacion de la mujer, por: (i) cualquier riesgo a la vida de la madre, (ii) imposibilidad de exito del embrion o feto, y (iii) violacion.

The Human Trafficking Act ("the Act") criminalizes the trafficking of persons within and across borders by the use of threat, fraud, and exploitation of vulnerability or by paying to gain consent. Under the Act, induced prostitution, all other forms of sexual exploitation, and slavery all constitute trafficking. The Act mandates that persons with information on trafficking have a duty to inform authorities. Authorities in this case include the police or the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Department of Social Welfare, the Legal Aid Board, or a reputable Civil Society Organization. The Act covers the rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration of trafficked persons, as along with creating a fund for victims. Punishment for trafficking is imprisonment for not less than five years.

Chapter 6 of the Criminal Code outlines various sexual offenses criminalized in Ghana. Rape is criminalized in Sections 97 and 98 and is defined as the "carnal knowledge of a female of sixteen years or above without her consent." Rape is classified as a first-degree felony, and a person convicted of rape shall be imprisoned for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 25 years. Section 99 clarifies that "carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge" is complete upon proof of the least degree of penetration. Statutory rape is outlined in Section 101. It states that a person convicted of having sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years of age, with or without his or her consent, shall be imprisoned for a minimum of seven years and a maximum of 25 years. Similar punishment is outlined in Section 1012 for the defilement of anyone who is considered an "idiot, imbecile or mental patient." It states that a person who has sexual intercourse with a person they know has a mental incapacity commits an offense and shall be imprisoned for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 25 years. Indecent assault is outlined in Section 103. It states that a person commits indecent assault if he or she, without consent, forcibly makes any sexual bodily contact, or sexually violates another person, in any manner not amounting to “carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge.” Indecent assault is a misdemeanor and carries a minimum of six months imprisonment. “Unnatural carnal knowledge” is outlined in Section 104, which states that a person convicted for having ‘unnatural carnal knowledge’ may face different penalties depending on what act he or she commits. "Unnatural carnal knowledge" is defined as sexual intercourse with a person in an unnatural manner or with an animal. Section 104 has been interpreted as prohibiting homosexuality.

Section 276 (Evidence of complainant’s sexual activity), the so called “rape shield law,” was enacted to prevent evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual history being adduced to support an inference that they were more likely to have consented or that they are less believable. The purpose of the law is to protect the integrity of the trial by excluding misleading and irrelevant evidence and to encourage the reporting of such crimes by protecting the privacy of complainants. Such evidence is only admissible in limited circumstances. In determining whether evidence is admissible, a trial judge must consider certain factors as prescribed by section 276 including the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy. Evidence of prior sexual activity is presumptively inadmissible unless, having followed certain procedures, the trial judge rules otherwise.

Criminal Code C-46 provides mechanisms which make is easier for vulnerable persons such as female complainants to give testimony during criminal proceedings. The measures include: ability to give testimony outside the courtroom via closed circuit television or behind a screen; allowing a support person to be present during testimony; requiring some or all members of the public to leave the court room during criminal proceedings; where an accused is self-representing, appointing a lawyer to conduct cross examination; and publication ban to prevent information being released which could identify the victim or witness.

The Domestic Abuse Act (Scotland) of 2018 came into force on April 1, 2019. It modifies and expands upon portions of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act of 1995. The act expands the definition of domestic abuse to include psychological abuse and coercive and controlling behavior. It criminalizes both psychological and physical harm directed to a partner or an ex-partner. Section 11.2 defines a “partner” as a spouse or civil partner, a person with whom one lives as a spouse, or a person with whom one is in an “intimate personal relationship.” Section 2 defines abuse as “violent, threatening, or intimidating” behavior that may consist of controlling a victim’s daily activities, causing the victim to become subordinate or dependent on the perpetrator, isolating the victim from friends or family, depriving or restricting a victim’s actions, or frightening, humiliating, degrading, or otherwise punishing the victim. Section 3 contains an extraterritoriality clause covering such conduct occurring partly or wholly outside the country, and thus the abusive behavior need not take place within the United Kingdom. Section 5 creates a is the only UK legislation with a specific statutory sentencing aggravation for the harm that can be caused to children growing up in an environment in which domestic abuse takes place. Section 2.2.n., likewise, includes a victim’s child under the age of 18 as a potential additional victim of abuse. Section 5.3 clarifies that the aggravation can be applied both in cases in which abusive behavior is directed at a child, and in scenarios in which a child “sees or hears, or is present during, an incident of behavior that A directs at B as part of the course of behavior.” The Domestic Abuse Act has been lauded by women’s rights organizations as a “welcome change” that “should increase the opportunity [for victims] to obtain protection and seek justice through the criminal justice system."

Division 10 of the Act prohibits and defines sexual violence against adults and children. A person consents to sexual intercourse if the person freely and voluntarily agrees (§ 61HE(2)). As provided in section 61HE(3), a perpetrator is deemed to know that the other person does not consent if they have actual knowledge, are reckless as to consent, or had no reasonable belief that the other person consented. In determining consent, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances, including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents, but not including any self-induced intoxication of the person. There can be no consent if the person is a minor, unconscious or asleep, cognitively incapacitated, under duress, or unlawfully detained.

Spain’s 17 autonomous regions have all enacted regional laws aimed at suppressing gender-based violence and promoting gender equality.

Las 17 regiones autónomas de España han promulgado leyes regionales destinadas a suprimir la violencia de género y promover la igualdad entre los géneros.

The Swedish Penal Code includes regulations that defines and prohibits various sexually and/or physically motivated crimes against people. The penalty for kidnapping with intent to injure a person, to force a person into service or to practice extortion is imprisonment for at least four years and at most eighteen years, or for life. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is six years. The penalty for human trafficking is imprisonment for 2-10 years. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is four years. If a crime is in violation of liberty and peace or a sexual offense and it was committed by a man against a woman with whom he had a close intimate relationship (marriage or cohabitation), then the man will be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and imprisoned for at least nine months and at most six years, as opposed to being sentenced for each individual crime committed. This crime was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code in 1998 and the construction of it is unique because several individual criminal offences together can constitute a gross crime. Perpetrators of rape shall be imprisoned for at least two and at most six years. If the rape is considered less aggravated, the sentence drops to at most four years. In the event the rape is “gross”, the sentence is extended to at most 10 years. The penalty for sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age (or an act comparable to sexual intercourse) is at least two and at most six years. If the crime is “gross”, the penalty is extended to at least five years and at most ten years. The penalty for sexual coercion is at most two years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, if the sexual coercion is “gross”, the sentence is extended from at least six months to at most six years. The penalty for intercourse with an offspring is imprisonment for at most two years and for intercourse with a sibling is at most one year. The penalties for crimes of exploitation of a child for sexual posing, purchase of a sexual ct from a child and sexual molestation are sentencing to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Except for gross exploitation of a child for sexual posing where the sentence is at least six months and at most six years imprisonment. The penalty for purchase of sexual service is a fine or imprisonment for at most one year. Purchase of sexual service has occurred when a person obtains a temporary sexual relation in return for payment. This also applies if the payment was promised or given by another person. Selling sexual services in Sweden is not criminalized. The penalty for someone who promotes or improperly financially exploits a person’s engagement in temporary sexual relations in return for payment (procuring) is at most four years. In the event the procuring is “gross”, the sentence is 2-10 years. As of 2018, the Penal Code defines rape as any sex without consent, either with words or clear actions. Before the amendment, crimes of rape required the intent to rape someone through violence or threats, or that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Furthermore, the 2018 sex crime reform of the Swedish Penal Code introduced criminal liability for negligent rape (Chapter 6 Section 1a) and negligent sexual abuse (Chapter 6 Section 3). Gross negligence is required for liability under the new regulations, rather than intention, as required for regular rape and sexual abuse in Chapter 6 Section 1 and 2. The penalty for negligent rape or negligent sexual abuse is at most four years.

The LPDV has a broad definition of domestic violence which includes violence between both cohabiting and non-cohabiting partners. The LPDV is gender-neutral in approach. Police powers include the ability to issue restraining orders and temporary or emergency eviction notices that can be extended by up to 30 days. Violations of such orders carry penalties of up to 60 days in prison. The LPDV also imposes a new duty on the public prosecutor’s office to maintain a central register of domestic violence cases. Victims of domestic violence also have the right to free legal aid.

Pursuant to Article 143, one who commits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, knowing such offense is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, shall be punished by imprisonment of at least 15 years for committing crimes against humanity. Article 145 states that one who commits rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 10 years for the commission of war crimes. Similarly, Article 147 punishes the same war crimes as Article 145 in conflicts of a non-international character. Articles 163 – 166 criminalize human trafficking, slavery, and related offenses including smuggling migrants and destroying victims’ identification papers. Penalties for violations of these articles include fines and imprisonment from between 1 – 12 years. Articles 179-180 prohibit sterilization without consent and female genital mutilation. The Criminal Code also punishes sexual violence including rape (Article 227), sexual harassment (Article 183), sexual assault (Article 228), and sex trafficking and forced prostitution (Articles 229, 234). Finally, Articles 239 and 248 contain gender-neutral bans on forced and early marriage and domestic violence, respectively. (Unofficial English version available here.)

The Sexual Offences Act was created “to reform and consolidate the laws relating to sexual offences.” Part II of the Act sets forth the elements of the offenses of rape and sexual assault and defines the meaning of consent, providing that if a defendant raises “consent” as a defense, “the belief must be objectively reasonable” for the defense to succeed. Part II of the Act also defines various categories of sexual offenses against children. Part III of the Act sets parameters for the investigation of sexual offenses, Part IV of the Act defines procedures to be followed at court, and Part V of the Act governs evidentiary standards. Part IX of the Act deals with the prevention of sexual assault and establishes the National Task Force for the Prevention of Sexual Violence.

The Criminal Code Act 1924 prohibits forced and unauthorized abortions and assaults on pregnant women, sexual violence, stalking, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation. The termination of a pregnancy by a person other than a medical practitioner or the pregnant woman herself is a crime at any stage of the pregnancy. Termination carried out without the pregnant woman’s consent is a crime if it is performed intentionally or recklessly, regardless if any other harm is inflicted on the woman. Any person who unlawfully assaults a woman, knowing that woman is pregnant, is guilty of assault on pregnant woman under section 184A of the Act. Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without that person's consent is guilty of rape under section 185 of the Act. “Sexual intercourse” is defined as the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia, anus or mouth by a penis, the penetration of a person’s vagina, genitalia or anus by another body part or object, or the continuation of either act of penetration. “Consent” means free agreement, and does not include, among other things, if a person does not say or do anything to communicate consent. Additionally, it is a crime to have sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 17 according to section 124 of the Act. A person is guilty of stalking if they, among other things, follow, surveille, threaten, direct abusive acts towards, communicate, send or publish offensive material, or contact another person or a third person, with intent to cause the another person physical or mental harm, including self-harm or extreme humiliation or to be apprehensive or fearful under section 192 of the Act. Under section 170A of the Act, a person commits persistent family violence in relation to another person with whom the person is, or has been, in a family relationship is guilty of persistent family violence when the accused has committed unlawful family violence on at least three occasions. Family violence includes, among other things, acts of physical, psychological and economic abuse, with the specific definitions set out in the Family Violence Act 2004. Under section 178A, any person who performs female genital mutilation on another person is guilty of a crime, regardless of custodial consent. Removing or making arrangements to remove a child from Tasmania with the intention of having female genital mutilation performed on the child is also a crime.

The Gender Equity Education Act (the “GEEA”) aims to encourage respect for gender diversity, eliminate gender discrimination and promote substantive gender equality through education. The GEEA charges the competent authorities (as well as schools) with establishing gender equity education committees whose tasks include drafting regulations and policies, coordinating resources, supervising gender equity-related activities and promoting research and development of curricula, teaching and assessments. Under the GEEA, schools must provide a safe, gender-fair learning environment by respecting, giving due consideration to, and not discriminating against prospective students, students, faculty, and staff of different genders. Schools shall strive towards this objective by taking steps such as integrating gender equity education into their curriculum, providing gender equity education when training new staff members, reporting known incidents of sexual assault, sexual harassment or sexual bullying within 24 hours and promptly handling and investigating such cases. Schools and any principal, faculty or staff member found to be in violation of the GEEA may be subject to a fine. Persons may also be dismissed or discharged from employment.

性別平等教育法（即「GEEA」）旨在鼓勵尊重性別多樣性，消除性別歧視，並透過教育促進實質性別平等。性別平等教育法責成主管機關（以及學校）建立性別平等教育委員會，其任務包括擬定法規和政策，協調資源，監督與性別平等有關的活動，並促進課程、教學和評估的研究及發展。根據性別平等教育法，學校必須透過尊重、適當考慮及不歧視不同性別的潛在學生、學生、教職員工等方式，提供一個安全、性別平等的學習環境。學校應努力實現這一目標，採取的措施包括：將性別平等教育納入課程、在培訓新員工時提供性別平等教育、在24小時之內報告已知的性侵、性騷擾或性霸凌事件，並及時處理和調查此類案件。任何被發現違反性別平等教育法的學校、校長、教職員工可能會被處以罰鍰。該等人員也可能被開除或解聘。

As stated in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act aims to “prohibit[] all forms of violence against persons in private and public life, and provide[] maximum protection and effective remedies for victims and punishment of offenders.” The Act provides general protections against offenses including infliction of physical injury, coercion, offensive conduct, willfully placing a person in fear of physical injury, willfully making false statements against another person, damage to property with intent to cause distress, and deprivation of personal liberty. The Act also provides protections against offenses that affect women disproportionately, including a prohibition of female genital mutilation; forceful ejection from home; forced financial dependence or economic abuse; forced isolation; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; harmful widowhood practices; and spousal battery, among others. Notably, the Act defines the offense of rape in Section 1(1) without an exception for marital rape, which had not traditionally been recognized as an offense (note that the Penal Code Act of 1960 does include an exception for marital rape). The Act provides a procedure for injured parties to apply for a protection order and empowers the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory with jurisdiction to hear and grant applications brought under the Act. As stated in Section 47, the Act is a product of federal legislation enacted in regard to criminal law, a residual matter over which the states have exclusive legislative power pursuant to the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the VAPP Act applies only to the Federal Capital Territory and is not binding law in a state unless adopted by that state.

The Criminal Code applies to the southern states of Nigeria. The Criminal Code Act distinguishes between the treatment of assault on men and assault on women, with Chapter 29 (Sections 351-356) addressing “Assaults” and Chapter 30 (Sections 357-362) addressing “Assaults on Females: Abduction.” Notably, indecent assault on a man is considered a more serious offense and carries a higher sentence than does indecent assault on a woman. Under Section 353, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults any male person is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three years.” In contrast, under Section 360, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults a woman or girl is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to imprisonment for two years.” Rape is defined in section 257. It is defined as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl, without her consent, or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of harm, or by means of false and fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act, or, in the case of a married woman, by personating her husband.” Abortion is criminalized by sections 228-230. Abortion is defined in Section 228 as an attempt to procure a miscarriage. A mother trying to cause her own miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for seven years, while anyone who administers to her a poison or otherwise induces a woman’s miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for 14 years, and anyone who supplies or obtains any item with the knowledge of its intended use to cause an abortion is liable for imprisonment for three years. Sections 228-230. The laws derive culpability from intent and apply regardless of whether the woman is actually pregnant.

The Penal Code prohibits abortion, rape, sexual contact with minors, indecent assault, incest, and bigamy outside of customary law. Abortion is an offence pursuant to the Penal Code Act. Only a registered medical practitioner may terminate a pregnancy if it is necessary to prevent significant harm to the woman’s health, the fetus will be severely disabled, or the woman became pregnant through incest or rape. An adult who has sexual intercourse with a child, defined as under 18 years old, commits an offence and the consent of the child is irrelevant. It shall be defence for this crime if the adult can prove that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe, and did so believe, that the child had attained the age of 18 years.

In 1998, the Penal Code Act was amended to make the offence of rape gender-neutral and to move away from a phallus-specific definition. The Amendment introduced a minimum sentence of 10 years to a maximum term of life imprisonment and made bail unavailable to persons accused of the offense. The amendment also made mandatory HIV testing for persons convicted of rape, and in the case wherein rape was accompanied by violence or the rapist was unaware of his or her HIV+ status, a minimum sentence of 15 years with corporal punishment was introduced. For cases wherein the convicted person was aware of his or her HIV status, the minimum sentence was set at 20 years imprisonment with corporal punishment. Excerpts of amended language available here.

The Code defines certain crimes and their penalties. The Code includes provisions defining and prohibiting sexual assault and domestic violence. The Code legalizes abortions performed within 12 weeks of gestation. The Code also eliminates attenuating circumstances previously associated with the crime of rape, such as the possibility of acquittal in cases where the perpetrator married the victim. In addition, the Code decriminalizes prostitution.

This Act prescribes measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons with particular regard to victims who are women and children, and aims to assist victims of trafficking and facilitating efficient investigation of cases of trafficking. The offence of trafficking is committed if a person recruits, transports, transfer, harbors or receives another person within Jamaica, from Jamaica to another country, or from another country to Jamaica. A person found guilty of an offence in terms of the Act is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years.

Esta ley prescribe medidas para prevenir y combatir la trata de personas con especial atención a las víctimas que son mujeres y niños, y tiene como objetivo ayudar a las víctimas de la trata y facilitar la investigación eficaz de los casos de trata. El delito de trata se comete si una persona recluta, transporta, traslada, alberga o recibe a otra persona dentro de Jamaica, de Jamaica a otro país o de otro país a Jamaica. Una persona declarada culpable de este delito en los términos de la ley puede ser sancionada con una multa o con una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años.

Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act states that proceedings regarding accusations of certain crimes shall be held in camera (privately). These crimes include rape, grievous sexual assault, marital rape, sexual intercourse with a person under age sixteen, indecent adult, or involvement in prostitution.

Provides for a criminal penalty of not less than five years for any person who commits certain specified offenses as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, including (1) assuming and exercising a right of ownership over a person, in particular in the form of trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation or forced labor; and (2) raping a person of the female gender or, after she has been forcibly made pregnant, confining her unlawfully with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, forcing a person to tolerate a sexual act of comparable severity or forcing a person into prostitution or to be sterilized. Unofficial English translation available here.

Provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for, among other things, a person who recruits or causes a minor to participate in a pornographic performance, or for any person who produces, imports, stores, markets, advertises, exhibits, offers, shows, passes on or makes accessible to others or possesses pornography that contains sexual acts involving animals, acts of violence involving adults or non-genuine sexual acts with minors. For pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors, the penalty is imprisonment for not more than five years or a monetary penalty. Criminal penalties are also provided for persons who obtain or produce such pornographic materials for their own use. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 188 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who sexually exploits his or her relationship with a minor over the age of 16 (which is the age threshold for statutory rape under Penal Code Art. 187) who is dependent on him or her due to a relationship arising from the minor's education, care or employment or another form of dependent relationship, or for any person who encourages such a minor to commit a sexual act by exploiting such a relationship. Unofficial English translation available here.

This article provides that a person who is sentenced to a custodial sentence of more than six months or to indefinite incarceration or involuntary commitment for offenses committed during the exercise of a professional activity or organized non-professional activity shall be prohibited from carrying on the exercise when it involves regular contact with any minors for 10 years. The offenses include: statutory rape or other child sexual abuse, rape and sexual coercion, child pornography, encouraging prostitution, and human trafficking. Unofficial English translation available here.

The Act defines and prohibits human trafficking. The PCTP Act adopts a broad definition of human trafficking, namely, that a person is guilty of human trafficking if he or she delivers, recruits, transports, transfers, harbours, sells, exchanges, leases or receives another person, through various means, including the use of force, deception, or coercion, aimed at the person or an immediate family member for the purpose of exploitation. Furthermore, a person who adopts a child, facilitated or secured through legal or illegal means; or concludes a forced marriage with another person, for the purposes of exploitation of that child or person, is guilty of an offence. The PCTP Act criminalizes various acts that constitute or relate to trafficking in persons and imposes harsh penalties, including life imprisonment for trafficking in persons; 15 years’ imprisonment for engaging in conduct that causes a person to enter into debt bondage or benefiting from services of a trafficking victim; and 10 years’ imprisonment for facilitating trafficking. The PCTP Act also provides for severe fines and enables the state to confiscate the assets of traffickers.

Die Wet op Voorkoming en Bestryding van Handel in Persone (2013)

Gedwonge en minderjarige huwelike, seksuele geweld en verkragting, statutêre verkragting of besoedeling, mensehandel​

Die Wet definieer en verbied mensehandel. Die Wet aanvaar ‘n wye definisie van mensehandel, naamlik dat ‘n persoon skuldig is aan mensehandel indien hy of sy betrokke is by die werwing, vervoer, verskuiwing, huisvesting of ontvang van persone of gebruik van dreigemente, geweld of ander vorme van dwang, teen ‘n persoon of familielid met die doel van uitbuiting. Verder, ‘n persoon wat ‘n kind aanneem deur wettig of onwettige middele te gebruik; of ‘n gedwonge troue af te dwing met ‘n ander persoon, met die doel om uitbuiting van die kind of persoon, is skuldig aan ‘n oortreding. Die Wet kriminaliseer verskeie dade wat bestaan uit of verband hou met mensehandel, en dit stel swaar strafmaatrëels daar, insluitend lewenslange tronkstraf vir mensehandel; 15 jaar tronkstraf vir gedrag wat lei tot die skuldigbevinding van ‘n persoon wat betrokke was en voordeel trek uit die dienste van ‘n mensehandel slagoffer; en 10 jaar tronkstraf vir die fasilitering van mensehandel. Die Wet maak ook voorsiening vir strawwe boetes en gee die staat die reg om bates van mensehandelaars te konfiskeer.

The Act was adopted to comprehensively and extensively deal with all sexual offences under a single statute. The act, inter alia, repeals the common law offences of rape and replaces it with an expanded definition of rape applicable to all form of sexual penetration without consent irrespective of gender and repeals other common law offences related to indecent assault and penetration and replaces them with broader statutory offences.

Kriminele Wet (Seksuele Misdrywe en Verwante Aangeleenthede) Wysigings Wet 32 (2007)

Seksuele geweld en verkragting​

Die Wet is aangeneem om alle seksuele misdrywe onder 'n enkele wet volledig en omvattend te hanteer. Die Wet, onder andere, herroep die gemeenregtelike misdrywe van verkragting en vervang dit met 'n uitgebreide definisie van verkragting wat van toepassing is op alle vorme van seksuele penetrasie sonder toestemming, ongeag geslag, en herroep ander gemeenregtelike oortredings wat verband hou met onsedelike aanranding en penetrasie en vervang dit met breër statutêre misdrywe.

The purpose of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read in conjunction with item 23(1) of its sixth schedule. The effect of this is to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment; to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and prohibit hate speech; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Section 8 expands on the provisions of Section 9 by setting out, without limitation, the following specific examples of such prohibited discrimination: (a) gender-based violence; (b) female genital mutilation; (c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; (d) any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child; (e) any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; (f) discrimination on the ground of pregnancy; (g) limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health education and social security; (h) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons; and (i) systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labor. The Act further regulates which party will bear the burden of proof in discrimination cases and further sets out which factors should be taken into account in determining whether discrimination is fair or unfair.

Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie (2000)

Diskriminasie op werksgeleenthede, verminking van vroulike geslagsorgane of sny van vroulike geslagsdele, geslagsdiskriminasie, geslagsgebaseerde geweld in die algemeen, skadelike tradisionele praktyke, regte op erf en erfenis, seksuele geweld en verkragting​

Die doel van die Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie is om uitvoering te gee aan artikel 9 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, in samewerking met artikel 23(1) van die Grondwet se sesde skedule. Die effek hiervan is om onbillike diskriminasie en teistering te voorkom en te verbied; om gelykheid te bevorder en onbillike diskriminasie uit te skakel; om haat-spraak te voorkom en te verbied; en om voorsiening te maak vir aangeleenthede wat daarmee verband hou. Artikel 8 brei die bepalings van Artikel 9 uit, sonder beperking, deur die volgende spesifieke voorbeelde van sodanige verbode diskriminasie uiteen te sit: (a) geslagsbaseerde geweld; (b) geslagtelike verminking van vroulike geslag; (c) die stelsel wat voorkoom dat vrouens familie-eiendom erf; (d) enige praktyk, met inbegrip van tradisionele, gebruiklike of godsdienstige praktyk, wat die waardigheid van vrouens belemmer en die gelykheid tussen vrouens en mans ondermyn, insluitend die ondermyning van die waardigheid en welstand van die meisie-kind; (e) enige beleid of optrede wat vrouens se toegang to grondreg, finansies en ander hulpbronne beperk; (f) diskriminasie op grond van swangerskap; (g) beperking van vrouens se toegang tot maatskaplike dienste of voordele soos gesondheidsopvoeding en sosiale sekuriteit; (h) die weierig van toegang tot geleenthede, insluitende toegang tot dienste of kontraktuele geleenthede vir die lewering van dienste vir oorweging, of versuim om stappe te neem om die behoeftes van sulke persone redelik te voorsien; en (i) sistematies ongelykheid van toegang tot geleenthede van vroue as gevolg van die seksuele verdeling van arbeid. Die Wet reguleer verder watter party die bewyslas in diskriminasiesake sal dra en lê verder uit watter faktore in ag geneem moet word by die bepaling of die diskriminasie billik of onbillik is.

This Virginia law defines rape as sexual intercourse with a complaining witness, or causing a complaining witness to engage in sexual intercourse with any other person, regardless of the existence of a spousal relationship and such act is accomplished (i) against the complaining witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another person; or (ii) through the use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical helplessness; or (iii) with a child under age 13 as the victim.

This Virginia law allows officers to make an arrest without a warrant in certain cases of assault and battery, or stalking, against a family or household member. Instead of a warrant, the arrest must be based on probable cause, the officer’s personal observations, the officer’s investigation, or a reasonable complaint from a witness.

This law makes it a felony to knowingly engage in, or benefit from, knowing participation in recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining by any means another person, intending or knowing that the person will be subjected to forced labor in order to commit a commercial sexual activity. The statute also mandates the creation and composition of a council on human trafficking to provide victims services, analyze human trafficking in Rhode Island, conduct a public awareness campaign, coordinate training on human trafficking prevention and victim services for state and local employees. It creates an affirmative defense to prostitution charges for victims of human trafficking, enumerates aggravating factors, and outlines criminal procedure details.

The Combating of Immoral Practices Act aims to prevent and reduce prostitution and the existence of brothels. The Act imposes a criminal penalty for keeping a brothel of imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or imprisonment and a fine. The Act punishes procuring or attempting to procure any female to have unlawful carnal intercourse with imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. The Act also imposes criminal sentences for offenses related to prostitution and various immoral acts, such as the owner or occupier of a property permitting such acts, living on earnings of prostitution, or enticing someone to commit an immoral act.

The Italian Penal Code prohibits domestic violence (art. 572), female genital mutilation (art. 583), personal injury aggravated by permanent deformation or scarring of the face (art. 583 quinquies), harassment (art. 612 bis), the crime of illicit diffusion of sexually explicit images or videos without the consent of the persons represented (so-called revenge porn) (art. 612 ter). Punishable crimes against a person's freedom also include slavery and forced prostitution (art. 600), human trafficking (art. 601), sexual acts coerced through violence, threats, or abuse of authority (art. 609 bis) and group sexual assault (art. 609 octies). Sexual acts with a minor of 14 year old is always a crime (art. 609 quarter). Aggravating factors in sexual violence are: when the perpetrator is a relative, a parent or a guardian, when the sexual act is committed against a pregnant woman, when the victim is under 18 years old, and when the perpetrator uses a weapon (art. 609 ter). Sexual acts with a minor are not punishable when (1) both parties are minors, (2) the minor is at least 13 years old, and (3) the age difference between the two is no more than four years (art. 609 quater). Moreover, the Italian Penal Code prohibits the crime of coercion or induction into marriage (art. 558 bis) and the violation of the order for removal from the family home and of the prohibition to approach the places frequented by the victim (art. 387 bis). Finally, the Italian Penal Code prohibits crimes against pregnancy. In particular, under article 593-ter, anyone who causes the termination of a pregnancy without the woman’s consent shall be punished by imprisonment from four to eight years. Consent that is extorted by violence or threat, or that is obtained by deceit, shall be considered as not having been given. Aggravating factors in crimes against pregnancy include a woman under 18 years of age.

Woman and Child Service Units (UPPA) handle all cases of violence against women, including human trafficking, domestic violence, sexual violence, and other related crimes. UPPA’s units range from district police levels and up.

Unit Pelayanan Perempuan dan Anak (UPPA) menangani seluruh kasus kekerasan terhadap perempuan, termasuk perdagangan orang, kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, kekerasan seksual, dan kejahatan terkait lainnya. Jangkauan unit UPPA adalah dari tingkat kabupaten hingga di atasnya.

Article 9 defines crimes against humanity to include violent acts such as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or other forms of sexual violence.

The Belize Criminal Code defines and criminalizes rape, including marital rape (Sections 46, 71-74); carnal knowledge of female child (Section 47); procuring or attempting to procure a woman (Section 49-50); compulsion of marriage (Section 58); incest by males (Section 62); abortion, miscarriage, and child destruction (Sections 111-12, 127). The Code mandates a minimum sentence of eight years for rape (Section 46), 12 years of carnal knowledge of a female child (Section 47), and a life sentence for habitual sex offenders (Section 48).

Of particular note:

Section 74 of the Evidence Act governs “[r]estrictions on evidence at trials for rape.” This section provides that when a man is being prosecuted for rape or attempted rape, the “sexual experience of a complainant with a person other than that defendant” is inadmissible. The exception to this rule is if a judge is satisfied that it would be unfair to the defendant to refuse to allow the evidence. Under Section 92(3), a judge has discretion to warn the jury of the “special need for caution” when the prosecution relies only on the testimony of the accuser where a person is “prosecuted for rape, attempted rape, carnal knowledge or any other sexual offence.”

The Ethiopian Criminal Code criminalizes most forms of violence against women and girls including physical violence within marriage or cohabitation (Article 564), Female Genital Mutilation/ Circumcision (Articles 565-6), trafficking women (Article 597), rape (Articles 620-28), prostitution/exploitation of another for financial gain (Article 634), and early marriage (Article 648). The Criminal Code outlaws abortion, except in cases of rape or incest, risk to the life of the mother or fetus, severe or incurable disease or birth defect, a mother who is mentally or physically incapable of raising a child, or “grave and imminent danger” that can only be addressed by terminating the pregnancy.

The Act to Amend the New Penal Code Chapter 14 Section 14.17 and 14.71 (the “Law”) and to address Gang Rape provides the definition for rape, gang rape and the concept of consent. Under Section 1(a)(i) and (ii), a person (male or female) commits rape if they intentionally penetrate the vagina, anus, mouth or any other opening of another person’s body with their penis or a foreign object or any other part of their body without the victim’s consent. Under Section 1(b), rape is committed where the victim is less than 18 years old, provided the perpetrator is above the age of 18 years. Under Section 2, the Law provides that the crime of gang rape has been committed if (i) a person purposefully promotes or facilitates rape (ii) a person agrees with one or more other person(s) to engage in or cause rape as defined in Section 1 above. Additionally, consent is defined as agreeing to sexual intercourse by choice where that person has a) freedom of choice and b) the capacity to make that choice. The Law also provides a number of circumstances where there is a presumption of a lack of consent. These fall into three categories: 1) where violence is used or threatened against the victim; 2) where the victim was unable to communicate to the accused at the time of the act (e.g. because of disability or unconsciousness); 3) where the perpetrator impersonated a person known to the victim in order to induce the victim to consent.

The statute establishes a Sexual Offense Court, Criminal Court “E” that has original jurisdiction over all sexual offense cases. §25.2 provides that the crimes adjudicated in this court include: rape, gang rape, aggravated involuntary sodomy, involuntary and voluntary sodomy, corruption of minors, sexual abuse of wards and sexual assault, and other crimes listed under the “Sexual Offenses” described under Subchapter D of Chapter 14 and 16 of the Penal Law, as well as human trafficking that involves sexual offenses. The law provides procedures to try sexual offense cases. §25.3 provides that cases involving rape shall be tried in camera, and the judge has the authority to seal the names and addresses of the rape victims. §25.7 provides that the cases are to be tried by jury, and §25.8 provides that the final decisions of the Sexual Offenses cases shall be appealed to the Supreme Court of Liberia. §25.10 provides that the President shall nominate a clerk to keep dockets and records of all the cases and provide a monthly summary of the cases to the Supreme Court of Liberia. Additionally, the Law grants these courts the ability to provide interim relief to protect victims. In this respect, the Law specifically refers to the ability of the court to ensure that child victims are placed in protective custody.

Art. 124: A person who seriously injures a female’s genitals can be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison or fined. A person may be punished for causing such injuries abroad if the person is not extradited.

Art. 181a: The statute provides that anyone who coerces someone to marry or register a same-sex partnership by the use of force or threats can be punished by sentence of custody of up to five years. The statute applies even if the marriage occurred outside Switzerland if the person has not been extradited.

Art. 187: A person can be punished by up to five years in custody or a fine for (1) committing a sexual act with a person under 16 years old, (2) inciting a child under 16 to commit a sexual act, or (3) involving a child under 16 in a sexual act.

Art. 190: A person can be sentenced to between 1 and 10 years in custody or a fine for using violence, threats, or psychological pressure to force a female to engage in a sexual act, or for making her incapable of resisting.

Art. 195: A person can be sentenced to 10 years in custody or fined for (1) inducing or encouraging a minor to engage in prostitution for financial gain, (2) inducing a person into prostitution by taking advantage of their dependency, (3) restricting a prostitute’s freedom to act by controlling his or her work as a prostitute, or (4) making a person continue as a prostitute against his or her will.

Art. 198: A person may be fined for offending someone by performing a sexual act in the presence of another who is not expecting it or sexually harassing someone through physical acts or indecent language.

According to Iranian law, the husband is the exclusive holder of the position of “head of the family” (Art. 1105). As such, the husband provides his wife with the cost of maintenance (Art. 1106), “which includes dwelling, clothing, food, furniture, and provision of a servant if the wife is accustomed to have servant or if she needs one because of illness” (Art. 1107) Article 1108 creates a duty on the part of women to satisfy the sexual needs of their husbands at all times. This is the tamkin (submission) requirement of Sharia law. If a wife refuses to fulfill her duties, she may be barred from receiving maintenance payments. The husband determines his wife’s place of residence and thus controls her freedom of movement (Art. 1114). If the dwelling of the wife and husband in the same house involves the risk of bodily or financial injury or that to the dignity of the wife, she can choose a separate dwelling. If the alleged risk is proved, the court will not order her to return to the house of the husband and, so long as she is authorized not to return to the house, her cost of maintenance will be on the charge of her husband (Article 1115). In addition, the husband may prevent his wife from exercising a certain profession if he deems it “incompatible with the family interests or the dignity of himself or his wife” (Art. 1117).

The intention behind the Rome Statute of 2002 (“Rome Statute” or “Statute”) in establishing the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern and to end impunity. The Rome Statute is significant in being the first international criminal law instrument that recognises forms of sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and enforced sterilization, as distinct war crimes. This legal instrument is also novel in prescribing gender-based crimes as the basis of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during armed conflicts. In particular, the Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over gender-based crimes if they constitute acts of genocide. In this case the crimes, such as rape, can be an integral part of the destruction inflicted upon the targeted groups and may be charged as genocide. The Prosecutor must further apply and interpret the Statute in line with internationally recognised human rights, including women’s human rights and gender equality. The States Parties should also consider the need to appoint judges with legal expertise on violence against women or children.

The 2006 amendment to the Congolese Penal Code has the explicitly stated aim of bringing Congolese law relating to sexual violence in line with international standards. The age of minority was raised from 14 to 18, the definition of rape was widened, and new types of sexual assault were criminalised.

The defendant was charged the defilement of the complainant, a 17-year-old girl. In his defence, the accused claimed that he could not get an erection (albeit, apparently, only after the magistrate raised the question himself). During the proceedings, a woman stood up in court and volunteered to ascertain whether the accused could obtain an erection. One week later, the magistrate, prosecutor, court interpreter, accused, complainant, and the woman who had volunteered met in the magistrate’s chambers to witness whether the woman could touch the defendant sexually until he obtained an erection. The magistrate observed, after approximately 30 minutes of sexual contact, that the accused’s “penis got a bit hard but not very hard.” Following a complaint from the complainant’s parent, the High Court was requested to review the conduct of the magistrate to determine the veracity of the complaint. At this point, the magistrate had not reached a verdict. By way of a preliminary conclusion, the High Court noted that “this illegal show seemed to come out of the blue” and found that the manner of investigation into the accused’s ability to obtain an erection was “raised by the magistrate, thereby making the [High] Court conclude that there were extra judicial discussions” between the accused and the magistrate. The Court also expressed serious concern about secondary victimisation, given that the sexual act occurred in the presence of the complainant. The Court then outlined its reasons for arriving at its ultimate decision, focusing on two matters: the existence of bias and judicial stereotyping. Regarding the first issue, the Court cited caselaw from across common law jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights relating to actual or perceived bias. Regarding the second issue, the Court highlighted the significant dangers associated with gender stereotyping on the part of the judiciary. The Court emphasised that judges should be alive to the concerns of victims of sexual offences, specifically that gender stereotypes harm such victims and contribute to further violations of their rights. Presiding officers are obliged to ensure that the courts offer equal access to men and women. In this context, it was emphasised that it matters not only how judges conduct themselves, but also how their conduct could be perceived during a trial. A judicial officer has to be aware of the negative results of displaying condescension toward women in court. In this case, the complainant was concerned about judicial bias, corruption, and/or collusion with the accused. The decision implied that the magistrate’s conduct could have arisen from his bias against, and stereotyping of, the complainant as a complainant in a sexual offence case. The Court highlighted that the judiciary could not condone the perpetuation of “structural gender-based violence, where courts instill fear in women and girls who are victims of sexual offences, using the criminal justice system.” Therefore, in order to create a discrimination-free judicial system that victims can rely on, it is incumbent on the judiciary to remain cognisant of its own biases and stereotypes, especially in the context of victims of sexual offences, and conduct cases in a manner which counteracts such biases and stereotypes. In conclusion, the High Court ordered a retrial under a different magistrate, and that the complainant and her family be provided with the resources needed to ensure her attendance at court. The Court referred (i) the magistrate’s conduct in the trial and (ii) the wider question of gender bias among judicial officers to the Judicial Service Commission. Finally, the Court recommended that the Chief Justice, through the judiciary’s training committee, should develop training programmes to avoid a matter like this re-occurring in the future.

The defendant physically attacked and raped the victim. The court of the first instance found the defendant guilty of rape (part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - after this The Criminal Code) and sentenced him to three years of imprisonment. However, the appellate court released the defendant from serving the sentence and instead imposed a three-year probationary period (Article 75 of the Criminal Code). In accordance with Article 75, the court may decide to release a person from serving a sentence with probation if the maximum sentence for a criminal offense does not exceed five years of imprisonment (the maximum imprisonment for rape is five years). The prosecutor noted that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. The victim demanded actual imprisonment because, as a result of the attack, she developed depression and needed a rehabilitation course with a psychologist. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary, proportionate to the crime, and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The Supreme Court annulled the appellate decision due to the court’s failure to take into account the gravity of the crime and the consequences for the victim. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, ordering that the court apply the law on a more serious criminal offense or increase the punishment. This means that Article 75 (exemption from punishment with the appointment of probation and probationary period) cannot be applied, and instead the punishment should be imposed in accordance with Article 152 (rape): from three to five years in prison. This case is important because it emphasizes the severity of rape, the need for proportionate punishment, and consideration of the consequences for the victim.

Особа 2 напав на Особу 1 та зґвалтував із застосуванням фізичного насильства. Судом першої інстанції Особу 2 було визнано винним у вчиненні зґвалтування (ч. 1 ст. 152 Кримінального Кодексу України - далі КК) та призначено покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 3 роки, але рішенням апеляційного суду Особу 2 було звільнено від відбування призначеного покарання з випробуванням та іспитовим строком тривалістю 3 роки (ст. 75 КК). Прокурор зазначив, що покарання є невідповідним тяжкості злочину; потерпіла вимагала покарання у вигляді реального позбавлення волі, бо внаслідок вчинення злочину щодо неї вона перебуває у стані депресії, проходить курс реабілітації у психолога. Верховний Суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, має бути призначене покарання, необхідне і достатнє для її виправлення і попередження нових злочинів ( 50, 65 КК); виходячи з вказаної мети й принципів справедливості, співмірності та індивідуалізації, покарання повинно бути співмірним характеру вчинених дій та їх небезпечності. Рішення апеляційної інстанції було скасовано, через неврахування тяжкості злочину та наслідків для потерпілої; було призначено новий розгляд справи у зв'язку з необхідністю застосування закону про більш тяжке кримінальне правопорушення або посилення покарання. Ця справа є важливою, бо наголошує на тяжкості згвалтування, необхідності співмірного покарання та урахування наслідків для жертви.

The appellant attacked the victim in the park in an attempt to rape her, but he was noticed by other people and fled the scene of the crime before committing rape. The court of first instance sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for three years. However, the court discharged the appellant from imprisonment and instead put him on probation, with the imposition of certain duties. The appellate court overturned this decision and reinstituted the prison sentence of three years, cancelling the discharge from punishment on probation. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, finding that the court of first instance did not sufficiently consider the degree of public danger of the crime, or that the victim was disabled since childhood, which made her exceptionally vulnerable. Also, the first-instance court did not consider the fact that the appellant did not succeed in raping the victim only because of the intervention of other people who forced the appellant to flee the scene, not because he willingly abandoned the crime. This case is significant because it illustrated how Ukrainian courts should apply the sentencing factors for attempted crimes – (i) the gravity of the offense, (ii) the amount of progress made toward completing the crime, and (iii) the reasons the crime was incomplete – in sexual violence cases.

Скаржник напав на жертву в парку, намагаючись її зґвалтувати, але оскільки його помітили інші люди, він втік з місця злочину, перш ніж вчинити зґвалтування. Суд першої інстанції засудив заявника до трьох років позбавлення волі. Проте, суд звільнив скаржника від відбування покарання, натомість призначив йому випробувальний термін із покладенням певних обов’язків. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення та поновив покарання у вигляді трьох років позбавлення волі, скасувавши звільнення від відбування покарання з випробуванням. Верховний Суд залишив без змін рішення апеляційного суду, встановивши, що суд першої інстанції недостатньо врахував ступінь суспільної небезпеки злочину та те, що потерпіла була інвалідом з дитинства, що робило її особливо вразливою. Крім того, суд першої інстанції не взяв до уваги той факт, що скаржнику не вдалося зґвалтувати жертву лише через втручання інших осіб, які змусили скаржника втекти з місця події, а не через те, що він добровільно відмовився від злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки вона продемонструвала, які обставини мають враховувати українські суди при призначенні покарання за замах на злочин у справах, які стосуються сексуального насильства: (i) тяжкість правопорушення, (ii) ступінь досягнутого на шляху завершення злочину, і (iii) причини, через які злочин не був доведений до кінця злочину.

The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that a third party staged the crime scene and placed his property there; sexual intercourse with the first woman was consensual; and the forensic medical examination confirmed that the appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized that the conclusions of the lower courts regarding the appellant’s guilt were based on their careful examination of the evidence (e.g., the appellant’s property near the corpses indicated that he was at the place of the crimes; forensic medical examinations found traces of a man's DNA on the bodies). Accordingly, the Supreme Court left the sentence of life imprisonment unchanged. This decision is important because it demonstrates that serving a prison sentence may not deter persons who commit sex crimes from re-offending after their release from custody.

Cкаржник був засуджений судом першої інстанції за вбивство та зґвалтування однієї жінки, а також вбивство та замах на зґвалтування іншої жінки. Враховуючи те, що чоловік раніше був судимий за аналогічні злочини, суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді довічного позбавлення волі. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін. Адвокат скаржника подав до Верховного Суду касаційну скаргу, в якій просив суд скасувати вирок та закрити кримінальне провадження через недостатність доказів. Зокрема, скаржник стверджував, що третя сторона влаштувала інсценування злочину та розмістила там його майно; статевий акт з першою жінкою був за її згодою; і судово-медична експертиза підтвердила, що скаржник не вступав у статеві зносини з іншою жінкою. Верховний Суд підкреслив, що висновки судів попередніх інстанцій щодо винуватості скаржника ґрунтувалися на ретельному дослідженні доказів (наприклад, майно скаржника поблизу трупів вказувало на те, що він був на місці злочинів; судово-медичні експертизи виявили сліди ДНК чоловіка на тілах). Відповідно, Верховний Суд залишив без змін покарання у вигляді довічного ув'язнення. Це рішення є важливим, оскільки воно демонструє, що відбування покарання не може стримувати осіб, які вчинили сексуальні злочини, від повторного вчинення злочину після звільнення з-під варти.

The case concerned the breach of constitutional guarantees of due process and the right of defense. The Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Division, ruled in favor of the application of art. 499 Code on Criminal Procedure of 1890, revoking the sentence enacted by the Criminal Court of Appeal 3rd Division and acquitting the defendant. The defendant was accused of sexual abuse and rape of his stepdaughters. The action was brought by the presumptive victims’ aunt. In the trial court, several expert opinions and testimonies supported the aunt’s claim, however, one of the alleged victims argued that she had not been raped but was forced by her aunt to accuse the defendant. From the analysis of the evidence, defendant was convicted by the trial court. The defendant appealed the decision and argued that i) some expert opinions had inconsistencies and underlying defects or omissions, and ii) the trial court omitted the testimony by one of the presumptive victims. The Criminal Court of Appeal 3rd Division upheld the trial court’s decision. Next, the defendant brought an action before the Supreme Court of Justice -Criminal Division-, alleging the procedure was null because of a due process violation. Even though the Supreme Court did not consider the procedure was void because the defendant had the opportunity to defend himself, the Supreme Court revoked the decision made by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court, because there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant. The full decision can be accessed via the External URL to the Supreme Court of Paraguay's website's search engine.

El caso se refería a la vulneración de las garantías constitucionales al debido proceso y al derecho de defensa. La Corte Suprema de Justicia -Sala de lo Penal-, falló a favor de la aplicación del art. 499 Código Procesal Penal de 1890, revocando la sentencia dictada por la Sala Penal de Apelaciones -3ra Sala- y por lo tanto absolviendo al acusado. El acusado fue denunciado por abuso sexual y violación de sus hijastras. La acción fue interpuesta por la tía de las presuntas víctimas. En el tribunal de primera instancia, varios peritajes y testimonios respaldaron la afirmación de la tía, sin embargo, una de las presuntas víctimas argumentó que no había sido violada, sino que fue obligada por su tía a denunciar al acusado. Del análisis de las pruebas, el acusado fue condenado por el tribunal de primera instancia. El imputado apeló la decisión y alegó que i) algunos peritajes presentaban inconsistencias y vicios subyacentes u omisiones y ii) el tribunal de instancia omitió el testimonio de una de las presuntas víctimas. La Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Penal -División 3ra- confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia. A continuación, el imputado interpuso una acción ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia -Sala de lo Penal-, alegando la nulidad del procedimiento por violación al debido proceso. Si bien la Corte Suprema no consideró nulo el procedimiento porque el acusado tuvo la oportunidad de defenderse, la Corte Suprema revocó la decisión tomada por el tribunal de primera instancia y confirmada por el tribunal de apelación, porque no había pruebas suficientes para condenar al acusado

The case concerned women’s sexual and reproductive rights, specifically the right to voluntarily terminate the pregnancy. The court ruled that sexual and reproductive rights, including abortion in certain circumstances, are subject to constitutional protection. A pregnant woman’s husband requested that the health care provider perform a genetic and pathological test on the fetus and the termination of his wife’s pregnancy, based on an alleged diagnosis of malformation, among other complications. The doctor refused upon conscientious objection. The court cited the ruling C-355/06, which referred to the decriminalization of abortion under any of three circumstances: (i) the pregnancy poses a serious risk for the woman life, (ii) the fetus has severe malformations or (iii) the pregnancy was the result of a rape. In this decision, the court also ruled that the physician’s conscientious objection to perform the procedure was inadmissible. Ultimately, specific guidelines were established, so women could freely exercise their right to voluntarily terminate their pregnancy under the authorized scenarios. As such, the court instructed the Superintendent of Health (‘Superintendencia Nacional de Salud’) to adopt a number of measures to ensure that health centers and medical institutions have adequate staff to attend voluntary abortions.

El caso se refería a los derechos sexuales y reproductivos de la mujer, específicamente el derecho a interrumpir voluntariamente el embarazo. La Corte Constitucional indicó que los derechos sexuales y reproductivos, incluido el aborto en determinadas circunstancias, son objeto de protección constitucional. El esposo de una mujer embarazada solicitó a la prestadora de salud la realización de un examen genético y patológico al feto y la interrupción del embarazo de su esposa, con base en un presunto diagnóstico de malformación, entre otras complicaciones. El médico se negó por objeción de conciencia. La Corte Constitucional citó la sentencia C-355/06, que se refería a la despenalización del aborto en cualquiera de estas tres circunstancias: (i) el embarazo presenta un riesgo grave para la vida de la mujer, (ii) el feto presenta malformaciones graves o (iii) el embarazo fue el resultado de una violación. En esta sentencia, la Corte también declaró inadmisible la objeción de conciencia del médico para realizar el procedimiento. En definitiva, se establecieron lineamientos específicos para que las mujeres pudieran ejercer libremente su derecho a interrumpir voluntariamente su embarazo en los supuestos autorizados. Como tal, la Corte instruyó a la Superintendencia Nacional de Salud a adoptar una serie de medidas para garantizar que los centros de salud y las instituciones médicas cuenten con el personal adecuado para atender abortos voluntarios.

The plaintiff, the Child and Family Agency, sought permission to disclose the HIV status of A., a minor teenager living with HIV since birth in the plaintiff’s care, to another minor (B.) who the plaintiff believed had a sexual relationship with A. A. denied having a sexual relationship with B. and refused to consent to the disclosure of his HIV status. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to disclose A.’s status so that B. could obtain testing, medical treatment, and counseling. Citing doctor-patient confidentiality, the High Court refused to order disclosure of A.’s HIV status without his consent. The test applied by the court was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the failure to breach patient confidentiality would create a significant risk of death or very serious harm to an innocent third party. The court concluded that it did not because the plaintiff failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that A. and B. were having unprotected sex. In addition, the court reasoned, if B. was willing to have unprotected sex with A., thereby assuming all the risks associated with unprotected sex, then the “low” risk of HIV infection (due to (i) A. taking anti-retroviral medication, albeit without complete consistency, (ii) A. having an undetectable viral load when tested, and (iii) HIV being a "chronic condition" rather than "a terminal illness") in such circumstances is not such as to justify breaching a patient’s right to confidentiality, which should only be breached in exceptional circumstances. The court repeatedly expressed concerns about "paternalistic" state interference in private matters. Finally, the court emphasized the public interest in HIV-positive people seeking treatment rather than foregoing medical care to avoid potential disclosure of their status or sexual activities.

The applicant alleged that the respondent terminated her employment in violation of Section 57 (1) and (2) of the Employment Act, which respectively require that termination must be for a valid cause and only after the employee has had an opportunity to defend herself. In the course of her testimony, she described systemic racial discrimination, harassment, and sexual assault by her superiors in the workplace. The applicant alleged that women were frequently raped or indecently assaulted, but the employer never punished the perpetrators and there was no mechanism for complaint. The court, recognizing its lack of jurisdiction over the allegations of grave human rights abuses, used its discretionary authority to forward the decision to appropriate institutions, including the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Commission for public enquiries. This case demonstrates a non-judicial pathway for investigation into gender-based issues and the ability of the judiciary to put such efforts into motion.

The Plenum of the Supreme Court explained (i) that rape (Art. 166 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against women only, while violent sexual acts (Art. 167 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against both women and men, and (ii) that the victim’s circumstances, for example previous commission of a crime, lifestyle, or marital relationship to the offender, do not prohibit conviction of the offender for these crimes. The Plenum further held that “violence,” which is one of the conditions for commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall be understood as a physical act against the victim (or relatives of the victim in case of rape). Examples of violence include tearing the victim’s clothes, causing physical pain, beating, strangulation, making the victim take alcohol or drugs against his or her will, restricting the victim’s freedom by tying, or locking the doors. Threat of violence shall be understood as specific words, actions, or gestures showing the intention of the offender to harm the victim. The Plenum noted that non-violent acts, such as obtaining consent by deception or abuse of trust (such as the promise to marry or to reward sexual favors) do not qualify under Arts. 166-167 of the Criminal Code. The Plenum further explained that “using the helpless state of the victim,” which is the alternative condition to violence or threat of violence for the commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall mean that the victim due to young age, mental disorder, loss of consciousness, alcohol or drug intoxication could not understand the nature of actions performed with him or her or that due to a physical disability could not oppose it. The Plenum noted that it does not matter whether the offender made or witnessed the victim take alcohol or drugs or other intoxicating substances, rather the offender simply has to be aware of the intoxication that renders the victim helpless. The Plenum also explained that a person is not guilty of attempted rape or commission of violent acts of sexual nature if that person voluntary abandons the commission of the crime. Abandonment caused by circumstances beyond the control of the offender, such as resistance by the victim, third party interference, or physiological inability to commit the crime is not voluntary.

Article 235 of the Criminal Code provides for criminal penalties for people who distribute, broadcast or sell “obscene” material, and to people who manufacture or possess obscene material “with the intent to distribute, broadcast or sell.” The Court held that the term “obscene” is not an indefinite “concept of law,” but rather includes material containing, among other things, violent or sexually abusive content. As such, the Court held that the law is a reasonable restraint on free speech and free publication. Thus, the law is constitutional and bans, among other things, material that includes violent or sexually abusive content.

刑法第235條規定對散布、播送或販賣，以及意圖散布、播送、販賣而製造、持有「猥褻」物品的人，處以刑事處罰。法院認為，「猥褻」一詞並非不確定的「法律概念」，而是包括含有暴力或性虐待等內容。於此情形，法院認為，此一法條是對言論自由和出版自由的合理限制。因此，該法律為合憲，而且禁止包含暴力或性虐待之內容。

The respondent had drunken intercourse with the complainant. He claimed that he mistook the complainant for his wife in his drunken stupor. She also mistook the respondent to be her husband during the intercourse. After intercourse, she realized that the respondent was not her husband. The respondent also claimed that he did not know the complainant was not his wife until this moment. Consequently, the court acquitted the respondent of rape and criminal trespass. The lower court reasoned that the onus was on the prosecution to establish whether the respondent had done something to impersonate the complainant’s husband and concluded that there was no evidence to support a finding of impersonation with the intent to deceive. The Attorney-General appealed this decision. The appellate court remarked that the lower court’s conclusion that there was no evidence of impersonation was incorrect. Whereas the lower court was focused on the testimony of the complainant regarding her own state of mind, the proper analysis should have concerned the state of mind of the respondent. While the Court of Appeal was suspicious of the respondent’s account that his actions had been the result of a mistake, it still found that the trial judge “had the great advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses,” and could have reasonably found the respondent’s testimony credible. Therefore, the lower court could have had “reasonable doubt” as to his guilt. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

X was a 14-year-old girl who became pregnant and suicidal after being raped. Her parents tried to take her to England in order to obtain a first-trimester abortion that was illegal in Ireland, but the Attorney General obtained an interim injunction from the High Court restraining the girl and her parents from leaving the country for a period of nine months or from arranging an abortion for her. The family appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution's prohibition on abortion did not prevent a suicidal 14-year-old, pregnant as the result of rape, from obtaining an abortion in Ireland because the suicide was a substantial risk to the life of the pregnant girl. The Court also struck down the injunction prohibiting the girl from leaving the country.

The issue on appeal in this case was whether the doctrine of common purpose can be applied to the common law crime of rape. Under the common law, rape is an instrumentality offense, which means that the perpetrator must have committed the act himself or facilitated the offense by his conduct. The doctrine of common purpose, however, is applied when a crime is committed by a group of people “with a mutual objective intended to produce a specific result against a targeted victim.” In this case, a group of young men terrorized a township, breaking into homes, attacking occupants, and several of the attackers repeatedly raped eight women. The men were charged and convicted of eight counts of rape, respectively, seven of which were imposed based on the doctrine of common purpose. The Constitutional Court reasoned that it is unsustainable to simply characterize rape as an act of a man inserting his genitalia into an unconsenting woman’s genitalia, especially in a group rape context where the mere presence of the group results in power and dominance over the victim. Thus, it held, the law must dispose of the misguided idea that rape is only a sex crime. The Court, therefore, declared that the instrumentality approach perpetuates gender inequality and promotes discrimination because it seeks to absolve those who may not have committed the crime itself but who contributed toward the commission of the crime from liability. The Court further reasoned that the doctrine of common purpose should apply to rape because the object and purpose of the doctrine is to “overcome an otherwise unjust result… by removing the element of causation from criminal liability and replacing it with the imputing deed which cased the [crime] to all the co-perpetrators.” It observed that it is “irrational and arbitrary” to not apply the doctrine to common law rape, as opposed to murder and assault, based on the distinction that a genital organ must be used to perpetrate rape. It argued that courts should be aiming to afford the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and the protection of bodily and psychological integrity to victims of sexual assault. Therefore, in this case, the Court observed that the applicants knowingly and with the requisite intention participated in the activities of the group and fully associated themselves with its criminal designs. Thus, the Court held them guilty of rape based on the doctrine of common purpose.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of a woman he had once dated. The complainant claimed that on the night in question, she had called to the accused’s house for drinks and that he snapped, dragged her to his bedroom, hit her, and forced her to have sex with him. At trial, the accused requested that evidence of a “friends with benefits” relationship be admitted to the jury as it was important context for the jury to know. The trial judge allowed what he called the “benign” evidence to be admitted. The jury found the accused not guilty but the Court of Appeal said the evidence should not have been allowed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court said the evidence should not have been allowed and that it was used to suggest that as she had agreed to sex in the past, she was more likely to agree on this occasion which is exactly what the “rape shield law” (section 276 of the Criminal Code (evidence of complainant’s sexual history)) is designed to protect. The Supreme Court said that the judge should have made the accused show that the evidence was useful for some other important reason. A new trial was ordered.

The accused pled guilty to one count of conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in contravention of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Between August 2005 and March 2008, the accused recruited and facilitated the placement of 11 Thai women in brothels in various Australian cities. Each of the women (except for those who worked for one particular brothel) transferred a portion of their net earnings to the accused to repay the debts they were told they owed. She was sentenced to two years and three months imprisonment.

The case concerns the defendants, a married couple, who kept five Thai women as slaves in a secret room in the basement of their licensed brothel in Sydney. The defendants purchased the Thai women through contacts in Thailand (for between AUD 12,500 – 15,000). Upon arriving in Australia, four of the women were informed that they owed between AUD 35,000 and 45,000 that they had to repay by working in the brothel (one of the victims was told about the debt in Thailand). The defendants confiscated the women’s passports and kept them in locked confinement either at the brothel or at their residence. The women worked extremely long hours, seven days a week. The defendants were each found guilty of five counts of intentionally possessing a slave and five counts of intentionally exercising ownership authority over a slave, in violation of section 270.3(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. The court sentenced Mr. McIvor to 12 years’ imprisonment and Ms. Tanuchit to 11 years’ imprisonment.

The plaintiff (under the pseudonym ‘Jane Doe’) brought proceedings to enforce the judgement of a United States district court against her former employers, Mr. and Mrs. Howard. The claims against them included involuntary servitude, forced labour, and human trafficking. Mr. Howard did not contest the claim and had since died. Mrs. Howard disputed the claim but failed to comply with court orders, then moved to Victoria and participated no further in the proceedings. The U.S. district court had found that the plaintiff was raped, sexually abused, and forced to work 80 hours or more per week, and entered a default judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Howard in the amount of US $3,306,468. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that all criteria for enforcing the U.S. judgment were satisfied. The fact that the U.S. judgment was a default judgment that could theoretically be set aside did not prevent it from being “final and conclusive.” While Mrs. Howard argued that the default judgment was procured by fraud and should not be enforced in Victoria, the Supreme Court found that Mrs. Howard had “no reasonable prospect of establishing” her defences, and entered summary judgment against Mrs. Howard for the equivalent of US $3,306,468, plus interest.

The defendant published numerous comments on his Twitter account, including the statements: “53 murdered by gender violence so far this year, they are few in my opinion since they are so many whores;” “in 2015 there were 56 women murdered, it's not a good rate but we did what we could, let’s double that rate in 2016, thanks;” “I have the explosives already prepared for this night to use in Sol, Happy New Year, Allah is great;” and “I've already abused her, you're the next” (attaching an image of a woman). The Court ruled that the right to freedom of expression is not a defense for the type of speech in which the defendant engaged. The defendant’s speech not only constituted hostility towards women, discrimination, diminishing of women as different and inferior to men, and denigration of women. Such speech also encourages affronts and physical attacks of women. The Supreme Court condemned the defendant for hate crimes (Article 510.1 of the Criminal Code).

El acusado publicó varios comentarios en su cuenta de Twitter, incluyendo las siguientes declaraciones: “53 han sido asesinadas por la violencia de género en lo que va del año, son pocas en mi opinión ya que son tantas prostitutas.” “En el 2015 hubo 56 mujeres asesinadas, no es una buena tasa, pero hicimos lo que pudimos, dupliquemos esa tasa en el 2016, gracias.” “Tengo los explosivos ya preparados para esta noche para usar en Sol, feliz año nuevo, Allah es genial.” “Ya he abusado de ella, eres la siguiente” (adjuntando una imagen de una mujer). El Tribunal dictaminó que el derecho a la libertad de expresión no era una defensa para el tipo de lenguaje en el que participó el acusado. El discurso del acusado constituyó hostilidad hacia las mujeres, discriminación, disminución de las mujeres como diferentes e inferiores a los hombres, y denigración de las mujeres. Tal discurso también alienta las ofensas y los ataques físicos de las mujeres. El Tribunal Supremo condenó al acusado por delitos de odio (artículo 510.1 del Código Penal).

R.Z. sexually assaulted his female partner, C.J., with his fingers. During this action, R.Z. threatened to hurt her. In their testimony, the parties both said that he had done so to check whether the plaintiff had been cheating. The question was thus whether the act could be considered non-sexual. However, under the Swedish Penal Code, one of the prerequisites for an act to be classified as rape (Chapter 6 Section 1 first paragraph) or the subsidiary, sexual compulsion (Chapter 6 Section 2), is that it must be sexual. The Supreme Court considered whether the defendant’s intention could affect whether the act was a sexual act under the Swedish Penal Code. The Supreme Court ruled that it was inherently sexual. The intention behind the act does not matter. Furthermore, without the victim’s consent, the act constitutes a serious violation of her sexual integrity. The Supreme Court further found that the sexual act can be compared to sexual intercourse, which is another prerequisite for the act to be considered rape. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that R.Z.’s act should be classified as rape.

The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that a man, E.K., who filmed a rape and broadcasted it live on Facebook committed the crime of aggravated defamation, as opposed to the separate crime of failing to report an ongoing rape. The defendant filmed and "live-streamed" two other men raping a woman (Secrecy D). The Uppsala District Court and the Court of Appeal in Stockholm convicted E.K. of failing to report the rape and of aggravated defamation, but not in aiding in the rape. The Swedish Supreme Court reasoned that because E.K. was initially prosecuted for involvement in the crime, he could not also be prosecuted for failure to report it, as fear of prosecution is a legal defense to a crime of failure to report. The Swedish Supreme Court further examined whether the Swedish Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression was applicable to the broadcast on Facebook, but found that it was not. E.K. was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment.

A man was sentenced to nine years in prison in the Skane and Blekinge Court of Appeal for approximately 100 cases of rape and other sexual offenses against a child over the course of five years. The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that when assessing the penalty value for repeated serious sexual offenses against the same plaintiff, the court must weigh the connection between the crimes and their characteristics. When the perpetrator has committed crimes for a long time against the same person, the victim is often vulnerable and in a constrained situation. There is therefore particular reason to consider the effects of the crime on the victim. Considering these factors, the Supreme Court increased the sentence to 12 years' imprisonment.

The trial court convicted the appellant of murdering her brother-in-law, which the High Court confirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court based its conviction solely on the appellant's confession to killing the deceased with a katari (type of dagger). However, the appellant also stated that the deceased had attacked and attempted to rape her before she grabbed the katari and used it in self-defense. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances of this case constituted valid self-defense to prevent rape pursuant to Indian Criminal Code Section 100 and thus acquitted the appellant.

Four defendants were charged with War Crimes against the Civilian Population in violation of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo and the Geneva Conventions, for variously beating “A” and “B,” both Kosovar Albanian female civilians, raping A, and subjecting them to a mock execution. All the defendants were acquitted by the Basic Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Basic Court’s acquittal of two of the defendants as the victims could not positively testify about their participation, and no other evidence conclusively linked them to the crimes. However, the panel held that the lower court failed to fully adjudicate the mock execution charge. It also dismissed as “incomprehensible” the first instance court’s ruling that there was no credible evidence that the victims had direct contact with S.S. (one of the remaining defendants who allegedly beat them), noting the victims’ testimony indicated they were certain of the identity of the defendant. The tribunal held that the lower court’s refusal to allow an in-court identification of S.S. was a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the appellate court agreed that witness identification should be approached with great caution, here the victims had the opportunity to see the defendant clearly for an extended time. The panel disagreed that witness testimonies are by default unreliable, explaining that they are entitled to the same evidentiary value and analysis as any other evidence and in certain cases the victim’s testimony is the only available evidence. The appellate court then pointed out the lower court’s contradiction with regard to the rape charge: it accepted that A was kidnapped, and also that there were intercourses while she was in captivity, yet then assumed that the intercourses may have occurred with consent, only because A and H.2. (the defendant accused of raping her), had an earlier intimate relationship. The tribunal held that it was absurd to assume that someone in captivity would be able to validly express consent, and even if A did consent due to the Stockholm Syndrome, a traumatic bonding of that kind would be a psychological condition and “any consent expressed by a victim in such circumstances would hardly be considered legally valid.” The appellate court further ruled that the events took place during a war, and consent in such a coercive environment would be “void by default,” citing the definition of rape in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. On the question of whether H.2.’s actions constituted a war crime, the panel held that it was irrelevant whether he had any association with the military. The relevant factors were instead whether there was an ongoing armed conflict, whether it was governed by international or domestic conflict norms, whether the victims were protected persons under international law, and whether there was a causal link between the armed conflict and the offense. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Basic Court to clarify facts on the mock execution and the involvement of H.2. in the alleged rape, and to conduct an in-court identification of S.S. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was added to an expanded ongoing rape investigation against his associates, charged and convicted of rape in violation of Article 193 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and sentenced to three years of imprisonment. Following the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the first instance court’s judgment, the prosecutor filed a Request for Protection of Legality in favor of the defendant, claiming that the court of first instance failed to assess relevant evidence in favor of the defendant and based its decision on evidence which did not meet the requisite standard of “beyond any reasonable doubt.” In particular, the prosecutor argued that the conviction was based on the statement of the alleged victim in court, corroborated only by hearsay, that the victim in the immediate early stages of the police investigation did not claim the defendant had committed any crimes against her, and that her allegations against the defendant were evolving and increasing with time. The prosecutor noted that there was an absence of medical and physical evidence to support the conviction, and the police officers involved were not interviewed. The Supreme Court rejected the Request. The court first repudiated the notion that “beyond any reasonable doubt” was the requisite standard of proof under Kosovar law. It then noted that the hearsay was a direct confirmation that the victim had reported the rape to the witness. The tribunal dismissed the prosecutor’s argument that there was no physical evidence, because of the way the rape was committed – without physical violence as the victim surrendered under threat – it was meaningless to expect any trace of violence to be found. The court also saw no reason to discredit the victim on the basis that the victim only denounced the defendant one year after the commission of the rape, stating that it was “absolutely normal that a victim of rape finds the courage to denounce the aggressor only once the risk of revenge against the denouncer . . . has ceased.” Finally, the tribunal held that the defendant was investigated only at the end of the investigation against his associates, and that the details of the rape increased with time, were features common in many rape investigations and normally had no significance in the assessment of the evidence. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was convicted of trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution after the lower court found that he lured the victims from Hungary into Austria under the false pretext that they could work as cleaners in an Austrian Hotel and then threatened them with injury or death to force them to work as prostitutes. The Austrian Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The Regional Court of Vienna’s decision from May 25, 2011 [021 Hv 8/11i-48] was not available at the time of publication.

Der Beschwerdeführer wurde u.a. wegen grenzüberschreitenden Prostitutionshandels verurteilt. Das Landgericht Wien stellte fest, dass der Beschwerdeführer seine Opfer unter Vorspiegelung falscher Tatsachen von Ungarn nach Österreich gelockt hat, indem er ihnen versprach, eine Anstellung als Putzkraft in einem österreichischen Hotel zu erhalten. Nach Ankunft in Österreich hat er die Opfer mit Gewaltanwendung und sogar dem Tod gedroht und sie hierdurch zur Prostitution gezwungen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof hat die Verurteilung aufrechterhalten.

The appellant was found guilty of raping his stepdaughter AAA six times by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. As a result, AAA gave birth to a baby in 2001. On appeal, the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, stating that (1) there was no sign that AAA was outraged and defended her honor with courage and (2) of the three instances of intercourse he admits to, such instances were consensual and between lovers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for the following reasons: (1) victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not mean the victim was consenting, and victim’s physical resistance is not an element of proving rape, and (2) a romantic relationship does not negate rape. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, (I) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim and (II) accomplished the act through force or intimidation, or when the victim was deprived of reason or unconscious, or under age 12, or demented. The court found that the prosecution proved all elements by providing: AAA’s credible testimony, the results of AAA's medical examination, the appellant's use of a knife and bolo to threaten physical violence, and his moral influence as stepfather over AAA. The court sentenced the appellant to reclusión perpetua and ordered him to pay P225,000 in moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages to AAA.​

The appellant was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of raping a 13-year-old girl by dragging her to a nearby farm, raping her and later threatening her with retaliation if she did not stay silent. The appellant appealed, pointing to inconsistencies in the number of times the victim testified as being raped and arguing that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. According to the court, the victim making inconsistent statements about the number of times the appellant raped her did not harm her credibility, given the fear and distress the victim suffered, and the frequency is also not an element of the crime. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age, or demented. The medical examination and victim’s credible testimony meets the first element. The element of force or intimidation is met by the fact that the appellant dragged her and pushed her to the ground to abuse her. The appellant also intimidated her after the act. Thus, the required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are met. The appellant’s alibi or denials were weak and uncorroborated.

The court considered the issues of open justice, fair trials, and the right of the accused to confront the accuser. The prosecution in a rape case applied to the court for orders permitting the complainant to leave the courtroom without going through the public gallery and to give her evidence behind a screen so that she would be shielded from view by members of the public gallery. The defendant opposed the application for the screen, claiming that it would be prejudicial to him. The Court of First Instance held that the use of the screen to shield the witness from the public did not infringe on the right of an accused to confront the accuser, since the screen did not shield the complainant from the defendant.

The Trial Court sentenced the 28-year-old accused (AA) to seven years and six months in prison for the crimes of rape, kidnapping and robbery. On March 27, 2011, AA approached the 18-year-old victim (BB) at a bus station and threatened her with a knife. BB offered him money, but AA put a knife to her throat and took her to a nearby field where he sexually assaulted her several times during the night, hit her repeatedly, and videotaped the sexual assault with his cellphone. AA then tied up BB and, before leaving her in the field, used BB’s cellphone to text her mother the location where BB could be found. He stole the cellphone and sold it at a fair. On July 22, 2011, AA was arrested. The police found in his possession a memory card with pornography and the video of BB’s rape. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court amended the qualification of the crimes to aggravated and rendered opinion that the sentence imposed by the Trial Court should have been more severe due to the proven dangerous nature of AA.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) de 28 años a siete años y seis meses de prisión por los delitos de violación, secuestro y robo. El 27 de marzo de 2011, AA se acercó a la víctima que tenía 18 años (BB) en una estación de autobuses y la amenazó con un cuchillo. BB le ofreció dinero, pero AA le puso un cuchillo en la garganta y la llevó a un campo cercano donde la agredió sexualmente varias veces durante la noche, la golpeó repetidamente y grabó en video la agresión sexual con su teléfono celular. AA luego ató a BB y, antes de dejarla en el campo, usó el teléfono celular de BB para enviarle un mensaje de texto a su madre sobre el lugar donde se podía encontrar a BB. Robó el teléfono celular y lo vendió en una feria. El 22 de julio de 2011, AA fue arrestado. La policía encontró en su poder una tarjeta de memoria con pornografía y el video de la violación de BB. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones modificó la calificación de los delitos a agravada y emitió una opinión de que la sentencia impuesta por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia debería haber sido más severa debido a la naturaleza peligrosa comprobada de AA.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to four years in prison for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor (BB). AA and the mother of BB had a common law marriage. AA had been sexually abusing BB since she was eight years old and started raping her when she turned 11. At age 14, BB became pregnant as a result of rape committed by AA. BB’s mother discovered AA’s abuse and filed the criminal complaint. AA confessed to being the victim’s “lover.” The court found aggravating circumstances including that AA had taken advantage of his domestic relationship with BB’s mother and that he had abused his victim during the night. AA’s confession constituted an attenuating circumstance, reducing the sentence imposed. The Appeals Court dismissed AA’s appeal and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, ruling that there was enough evidence presented to establish the facts of the case.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a cuatro años de prisión por abuso sexual agravado de un menor (BB). AA y la madre de BB tenían un matrimonio común. AA había abusado sexualmente de BB desde que tenía ocho años y comenzó a violarla cuando cumplió los 11. A los 14 años, BB quedó embarazada como resultado de una violación cometida por AA. La madre de BB descubrió el abuso de AA y presentó esta denuncia penal. AA confesó ser el "amante" de la víctima. El tribunal encontró circunstancias agravantes, incluyendo que AA se había aprovechado de su relación doméstica con la madre de BB y que había abusado de su víctima generalmente durante las noches. La confesión de AA constituyó una circunstancia atenuante, reduciendo la sentencia impuesta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación de AA y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, dictaminando que se presentaron suficientes pruebas para establecer los hechos del caso.

The defendant was convicted for the crimes of human trafficking and association to commit crimes on May 15, 2014 in the state of Nueva Esparta. In its decision, the lower court said that in cases of rape and trafficking of persons, anyone who has been accused of having a relationship or knowledge of such crime could be deprived of liberty during trial, if it is deemed appropriate by the authorities. In the defendant’s case, he was accused of seducing and luring the female victim into the island of Margarita, where she was subjected, tortured, drugged, and raped. The defendant appealed the decision, alleging that it violated his right to be judged in freedom. The Court of Appeal for Violence Against Women on January 8, 2016 dismissed the appeal action and ratified the decision of the lower court and determined that the apprehension of the accused before his conviction did not represent a violation of the law. The appellate court ratified the criteria of the lower court according to which those defendants who are linked to the act of people trafficking and gender violence can be arrested before issuing a conviction decision, if deemed appropriate by the authorities.

The female victim declared to the competent authorities that she worked as a motorcycle taxi driver in La Fria, Táchira State. On the morning of September 9, 2014, she transported a male passenger. During the journey, the passenger threatened and sexually assaulted her with an object. On November 18, 2014, the lower court convicted the defendant of the crime of sexual violence even though psychological or physical violence were not proven at the trial, which used to be one of the elements for such crime. The defendant requested a review of the court’s decision to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (the “TSJ”) on the basis that neither physical nor psychological violence were confirmed by the lower court. The TSJ ratified the decision of the lower court and decided that it is no longer necessary to verify that physical or psychological violence occurred in order to determine the crime of sexual violence. As a result of this decision, each of the crimes of sexual, psychological, and physical violence can be committed separately, reinforcing the protection of women’s rights. This decision represents an improvement in rights for women in Venezuela.

The appellant advertised in Korea for families to come to Australia to attend a missionary school. The appellant was responsible for settling those families’ affairs, and they were dependent on him to organize the necessary extensions of visas. Most of the time, the parents spoke no English and their children spoke little English. The appellant organized accommodation for the parents of the complainant among other families, and at the same time he arranged for separate accommodation for their daughter with children of other families. The accommodation for the daughter was close to the appellant’s house, but an hour’s drive from her parents’ house. The appellant was the only individual who had the keys to the children’s rooms. The appellant advised the father of the complainant to return to Korea to seek more families, and he did. One night, the appellant returned around 1:00 AM to the children’s accommodation and entered the complainant’s room where another girl was with her. That girl left after certain remarks by the appellant. The appellant took the complaint in his van to a remote place where he proceeded to touch her, took off her pyjamas, and then had sexual intercourse with her, despite her resistance. During this resistance, they both fell to the floor of the van and the appellant injured his arm. The appellant threatened the complainant not to inform anyone about this incident, reminding her that her family needed him to renew their visas. The complainant immediately told her friends at the accommodation of the sexual assault. In the morning, the complainant walked to a public telephone where she called her father in Korea and told him about the incident, and then called her mother to inform her of the same. In fear with respect to their visas, the family went with the appellant to Brisbane where they had their visas renewed, acting as if nothing happened. Later, the father flew back to Australia and immediately lodged a complaint with the police. Through investigation, the police found physical evidence of rape, including injuries to her genitals consistent with rape, the appellant’s DNA, and wounds consistent with complainant’s statement of the rape. Based on the evidence, the District Court sentenced the appellant to eight years for two counts of rape and one count of indecent dealing with a circumstance of aggravation. Relying on older cases, the appellant filed this appeal to lower his sentence, claiming it was too high for someone his age, considering he had no previous convictions and that there were no violence or weapon used. The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, stating that the older cases referenced by the appellant were dated before the implementation of new rules that increased the sentences for rape. In addition, even though no violence was used against the complainant, the court found that the appellant took advantage of her because of her visa situation, and this was an aggravating factor. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

In a pending divorce case, the trial court entered an order for the parties to “refrain from molesting, harassing, besetting, intimidating and/or threatening and carrying out physical or other abuse of the other.” The wife subsequently accused the husband of sexual molestation and violating the court’s order. The court explained that “an allegation of sexual molestation in any form is very serious and the onus is on the wife to prove to the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband breached the Order by committing the acts of sexual molestation as alleged.” The court held that the “wife has failed to discharge this burden” because: (i) there was no evidence from any corroborating witness; (ii) there was no corroborating evidence from the doctor who examined the wife; (iii) both parties chose not to cross-examine the deponents who swore to the affidavits in the committal application; and (iv) “the husband’s version of the events on 5th March is equally plausible as the wife’s” version of events.

Mientras un caso de divorcio estaba pendiente, el tribunal de primera instancia emitió una orden para que las partes "se abstengan de molestar, acosar, acosar, intimidar y / o amenazar y llevar a cabo abuso físico o de otro tipo del otro." Posteriormente, la esposa acusó al marido de abuso sexual y de violar la orden del tribunal. El tribunal explicó que “una acusación de abuso sexual en cualquier forma es muy grave y la esposa tiene la responsabilidad de demostrarle al tribunal más allá de toda duda razonable que el esposo violó la Orden al cometer los actos de abuso sexual como se alega.” El tribunal sostuvo que la “esposa no había cumplido con esta carga” porque: (i) no hubo evidencia de ningún testigo que lo corrobore; (ii) no hubo evidencia que corrobore por parte del médico que examinó a la esposa; (iii) ambas partes optaron por no contrainterrogar a los declarantes que habían jurado las declaraciones en la solicitud inicial; y (iv) "la versión del marido de los hechos del 5 de marzo era igualmente plausible que la versión de la esposa" donde lo acusaba de los hechos.

The 47-year-old male applicant requested bail pending the appeal of his conviction and 15-year sentence for raping the 16-year-old complainant. The applicant appealed, arguing that the intercourse was consensual because the victim did not scream or immediately report the rape after a witness stumbled upon the incident. The applicant had to show, among other things, the likelihood of success of his appeal to obtain bail. The court dismissed the bail application after rejecting the state's concession that the applicant had a meritorious appeal because complainant's failure to scream or to immediately report the rape cast doubts upon her lack of consent. Citing research about cultural inhibitions on gender violence victims, the court concluded that silence could not be equated to acquiescence. With women often held culturally as custodians of appropriate sexual conduct, and with the responsibility for sexual restraint being placed on a woman, regardless of her age or power imbalances, the court found it understandable that the complainant failed to make an immediate report. The court noted that a young girl may not make a voluntary report because her cultural context makes it difficult for her to do so without being re-victimized. Consequently, the proposition that the victim's initial silence implied consent was untenable and could not be ground for bail.

The defendant sexually abused the plaintiff between 1969 and 1978 when she was 5-14 years old. The plaintiff turned 18, the age of majority in Virginia, in 1982. She first received information from her psychologist regarding the causal connection between the childhood sexual abuse and the severe emotional harm she manifested in March 1990, and she subsequently filed a lawsuit against defendant for the abuse in July 1991. However, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit as untimely. The issue before the Virginia Supreme Court was whether, upon the lapse of the time fixed in the statute of limitations and the tolling statute (the grace period before the statute of limitations begins), the defendant acquired a right protected by due process guarantees notwithstanding a recent statute by the legislature with provisions to: (a) retroactively apply a ten-year statute of limitations . . . in cases in which the statute of limitations had expired . . . and (b) to create a twelve-month period during which such cases could be filed regardless of when the cause of action accrued. In affirming the lower court’s ruling the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its well-established principle that the legislature possesses the power to enact retrospective legislation only if the statute is not destructive of vested rights. Here, defendant’s statute of limitations defense was a vested right. Infant plaintiff suffered an injury in that "she experienced positive, physical or mental hurt" each time defendant committed a wrongful act against her "and her right of action accrued on that date." The last such act was committed in 1978. Because plaintiff was 14 years old at that time, the statute of limitations was tolled until she attained her majority in 1982. The two-year time limitation expired in 1984. At that time defendant right to a statute of limitations defense vested and could not be repealed by subsequent legislation. The court therefore affirmed the lower courts’ ruling that defendant had acquired a right protected by due process guarantees and plaintiff’s suit was untimely.

The defendant appealed his convictions for rape and sodomy, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that the victim was incapacitated due to voluntary intoxication. The victim suffered from bipolar disorder and substance abuse. She was found non-responsive and half-naked behind a convenience store with rape-related injuries. She had high amounts of cocaine and alcohol in her blood, but low amounts of her prescribed lithium. She stated that she had kissed the defendant but did not consent to sexual intercourse and had no recollection of intercourse with the defendant. The defendant claimed the intercourse was consensual. The issue before the Court was whether defendant could be convicted for rape because of the victim’s incapacity if such incapacity was not a permanent condition but a transitory condition such as voluntary intoxication. In affirming the conviction, the court explained that “[n]othing in the statutory definition itself limits the definition of ‘mental incapacity’ to a permanent condition,” but rather the statute defines incapacity to mean a condition existing “at the time of the offense” that “prevents the complaining witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act.” Accordingly, the Court held that “mental incapacity” could extend to a transitory circumstance such as intoxication because the nature and degree of the intoxication went beyond the stage of merely reduced inhibition and reached a point where the victim did not understand “the nature or consequences of the sexual act.” Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions.

A bus driver was convicted of sexually assaulting three developmentally disabled women, two of whom were passengers on the defendant’s bus route. On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the trial court erred in precluding him from questioning the victim’s mother about a previous incident that suggested the victim was promiscuous. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to question the victim’s mother about the incident, because the defendant did not notify the trial justice beforehand of his intention to probe into the victim’s conduct or otherwise seek a hearing with the court about the admissibility of such evidence.

The plaintiff-appellant, an Albanian citizen who entered the United States on a non-immigrant visa, fled her home country after facing three attempted kidnappings that she believed would have led her into forced prostitution. After escaping the third attempt, her uncle arranged for her to obtain a fake passport to enter the United States. After she applied for asylum with the Immigration and Nationalization Service, she was notified that she was subject to removal as an alien not in possession of valid entry documents. Both an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied her application for asylum. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these denials, finding that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that she was a member of a persecuted social group and unable to show that the Albanian government was unwilling or unable to protect her.

The accused conceived a child after incestuous sexual intercourse with her brother. After the child was born, the mother tied a scarf around its neck and buried it alive. At trial, she claimed that the child was strangled by its own umbilical cord and was already dead when she buried it. However, medical and forensic evidence showed that the child died from strangulation and suffocation due to the mother’s actions. She was convicted of murder.

The appellant was convicted of rape under the Combating of Rape, Act 8 of 2000 (the “Act”) in the Regional Court for inserting his finger into the vagina of his friend’s eight-year-old daughter (the “complainant”). This insertion caused bruising to the complainant’s vagina that lasted longer than 72 hours. The complainant’s hymen, however, remained intact. The appellant was sentenced to 15 years in prison, of which five were conditionally suspended. On appeal, the appellant argued that he had not committed rape under the Act because he had not penetrated the complainant’s “vagina” as that term is defined under the Act, but rather touched the areas around her vagina. Accordingly, he argued that, at most, he had committed indecent assault, and therefore his sentence should be reduced. The appellate court denied the appeal and upheld the original sentence, finding that the labia minora, labia majora and the para-urethral fort all form part of the complainant’s genital organs and therefore satisfy the definition of “vagina” within the Act.

The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the applicability of certain procedural rules, confirmed the main international definitions of violence within relationships. Particularly, the local court dismissed the case against a man charged with the crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, without giving any notice of the motion to dismiss to the person injured by the crime in accordance with Article 408 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The injured person appealed the decision of the local court and requested that the Italian Supreme Court declare the dismissal of the case null and void. In deciding the procedural issue at hand, the Italian Supreme Court pointed out that the Italian criminal law has drawn the definitions of gender violence and violence against women mainly from international law provisions, which are directly enforced in the system pursuant to Article 117 of the Constitution. In this decision the Italian Supreme Court gave all the definitions of violence within gender relationships in consideration of international conventions and specifically European law, and concluded that such definitions, even if not directly included in domestic regulations, “are fully part of our national system through international law and are therefore enforceable.” According to this interpretation, the definitions of gender violence given by the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence are directly applicable in the Italian legal framework. On this basis, the Court ruled that notice of dismissal of the case must always be served on the person injured by crimes of stalking and mistreatment in the family pursuant to articles 612-bis and 572 of the Italian Criminal Code, as those provisions relate to the gender violence notion set forth under the international and EU provisions applicable in the Italian legal framework.

La Corte di Cassazione, in una decisione riguardo all’applicabilità di alcune regole procedurali, ha confermato l’applicabilità delle principali definizioni internazionali in tema di violenza di genere. In particolare, il Tribunale ha archiviato un caso contro un uomo accusato di aver commesso i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, senza aver dato avviso della richiesta di archiviazione alla parte offesa secondo quanto disposto dall’articolo 408 del codice di procedura penale italiano. Il difensore della persona offesa ricorreva per cassazione e chiedeva alla Corte di Cassazione di dichiarare nullo il provvedimento di archiviazione. Nel decidere la questione procedurale, la Corte di Cassazione evidenziava che il diritto penale italiano ha tratto le definizioni di violenza di genere e violenza contro le donne principalmente dalle disposizioni di diritto internazionale, che sono direttamente applicabili nel sistema ai sensi dell’articolo 117 della Costituzione. In questa decisione la Corte di Cassazione ha fornito tutte le definizioni di violenza di genere in considerazione delle convenzioni internazionali e in particolare del diritto europeo, e ha concluso che tali definizioni, anche se non direttamente incluse nelle normative nazionali, “per il tramite del diritto internazionale sono entrate a far parte dell’ordinamento e influiscono sull’applicazione del diritto”. Secondo questa interpretazione, le definizioni di violenza di genere previste dalla Convenzione di Istanbul sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica sono direttamente applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano. Sulla base di ciò, la Cassazione ha ritenuto che l’avviso della richiesta di archiviazione debba sempre essere notificato alla persona offesa nel caso in cui si proceda per i reati di stalking e maltrattamenti in famiglia di cui agli articoli 612 bis e 572 del codice penale italiano, in quanto queste disposizioni si riferiscono alla nozione di violenza di genere sancita dalle disposizioni internazionali e comunitarie applicabili nel quadro giuridico italiano.

Appellant (who was 38 years of age at the time of the offences) appealed a sentence of imprisonment for kidnapping, disfiguring with intent to injury and wounding with intent to injure the complainant (who was 17 years of age at the time of the offences). The complainant and appellant began a relationship after the complainant left the care of Child, Youth and Family (Ministry for Vulnerable Children). The appellant accused the complainant of sexually assaulting his daughter. As punishment for the sexual assault and a condition for continuing their relationship, he convinced the complainant to allow him to break her finger with a rock. He subsequently subjected the complainant to other physical abuse, after which she fled to a neighbor for help. The appellant argued at the Court of Appeal that a High Court Judge had wrongly withheld the defense of consent on the charge of wounding with intent to injure. The Court dismissed the appeal and concluded that it was possible to eliminate the defense of consent depending on the specific facts of the case. In this case, the Court found it permissible to eliminate the defense of consent because of the power imbalance between the parties, the fact that the complainant acquiesced because of a threat to their relationship, the gravity of domestic violence, and the severity of the injury.

The appellant was convicted of grievous harm (was also charged but acquitted of rape) and was sentenced to a fine of $10,000 or in default a term of three years imprisonment, as well as being ordered to pay the complainant $3,000. The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in law by not giving a proper instruction to the jury on the issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding “no miscarriage of justice,” where the jury “clearly accepted the version [of events] given by the complainant in relation to the offence of grievous harm, and rejected the version given by the appellant,” and a different self-defense instruction would not have changed the result.

The appellant was convicted of abduction and rape and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. The complainant was kidnaped from a car, driven to a remote location, and raped multiple times by two men. Upon arrival at the remote location, the police chased after the two men, but only caught and arrested one of the men – the appellant. The complainant testified that the appellant wore a stocking mask, and although he had spoken to her many times the night of her kidnaping, she did not recognize him until his stockinged face was illuminated by a car light. This identification was not made until a few days after the police arrested the appellant. The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions because the trial judge did not direct the jury on issues related to voice identification in general or concerns related to the timing of complainant’s identification. The Court of Appeals also faulted the prosecution for not conducting a controlled identification procedure to test the complainant’s ability to identify the appellant by the sound of his voice. The Court did not however order a retrial because it found the evidence to be “insufficient to justify a conviction by any jury which had been properly directed” due to the “glaring evidential gaps”.

The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) brought charges against defendant, “B” (name omitted from public record), for the crime of rape for having anal sex with the victim without the victim’s consent. The Lower Court found B guilty. B appealed, arguing that the victim facilitated the anal penetration, and therefore the court should find that the victim consented. The Appellate Court found that, although the victim facilitated penetration, the victim did so to preserve his integrity, which does not qualify as consent. The Appellate Court affirmed the Lower Court’s decision finding B guilty of rape under section 164 of the Penal Code.

O Ministério Público trouxe acusações contra o réu, “B” (nome omitido do registro público), pelo crime de estupro por ter feito sexo anal com a vítima, sem o consentimento dela. O Tribunal da Relação condenou B. B apelou, argumentando que a vítima facilitou a penetração anal, e então a corte deveria considerar que a vítima consentiu. O Tribunal da Relação considerou que, apesar da vítima facilitar a penetração, a vítima fez isso para preservar a sua integridade, o que não qualifica como consentimento. O Tribunal da Relação reafirmou a decisão da Corte Inferior condenando B pelo crime de estupro sob a seção 164 do Código Penal.

One month after marrying the victim, “BB” (name omitted from public record), the defendant, “AA” (name omitted from public record) coerced BB to become a prostitute so she could help with their financial problems. After BB engaged in sexual relations as a prostitute, AA began to physically assault BB and to threaten to kill her children, alleging that was enjoying being a prostitute. Concurrently, AA’s 15-year old daughter “CC” (name omitted from public record) moved in with AA and BB, and shortly thereafter, AA engaged in non-consensual sexual activities with CC for approximately six months. AA had previously convictions for robbery, physical harassment and child pornography, among others. The Superior Court of Justice found AA guilty of the crimes of promoting prostitution under section 169 of the Portuguese Penal Code, domestic violence under section 152 of the Portuguese Penal Code, sexual abuse of a person incapable of resistance under sections 164 and 177 of the Portuguese Penal Code and illegal possession of weapon, and sentenced AA to 16 years of imprisonment.

Um mês depois de se casar com a vítima, “BB” (nome omitido do registro público), o réu, “AA” (nome omitido do registro público) coagiu BB a se tornar uma prostituta para que ela pudesse ajudar com os seus problemas financeiros. Depois de BB começar a ter relações sexuais como uma prostituta, AA começou a agredir fisicamente BB e ameaçar a matar os seus filhos, alegando que ela estava gostando de ser uma prostituta. Simultaneamente, “CC” (nome omitido do registro público), a filha de 15 anos de “AA”, se mudou para morar com AA e BB, e logo após, AA começou a ter relações sexuais não consentidas com CC por aproximadamente seis meses. AA tinha condenações anteriores por roubo, assédio físico e pornografia infantil, entre outros. A Corte Superior de Justiça considerou AA culpado dos crimes de promoção de prostituição sob a seção 169 do Código Penal Português, violência doméstica sob a seção 152 do Código Penal Português, abuso sexual de pessoa incapaz de resistir sob as seções 164 e 177 do Código Penal Português e posse ilegal de arma, e sentenciou AA a 16 anos de prisão.

The Appellant was convicted of raping his step-daughter on three occasions and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed the decision on the basis of lack of evidence. The prosecution’s case relied on evidence provided by the victim (deceased at the time of the trial), her nine-year-old sister, and a medical professional who examined the victim at the hospital immediately after she was raped. The defence argued that evidence provided by the victim immediately before her death was hearsay. The court held that, while under Liberian law hearsay cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction, “a dying declaration” (i.e., when a victim provides evidence concerning her or his attacker whilst at impending death in extremis) can be admitted as evidence and is not hearsay. The court also pointed out that, despite her young age, the victim’s sister’s evidence, which was admitted, was not hearsay because she was a direct witness to the attack and was subject to comprehensive cross examination. Finally, the court rejected the defence’s claims that the medical professional who inspected the victim in the hospital was not an expert witness because of her credentials that included a medical degree and over ten years of experience treating children victims of sexual violence. The conviction was upheld.

The defendant, X., procured women for the purpose of prostitution from a recruiter operating in Thailand. She deliberately chose women from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds because of their greater vulnerability and their perceived inability to resist demands made by X. On February 14, 2000, the Zurich District Court convicted X on charges relating to the promotion of prostitution of others under Article 195(3) of the Penal Code (Switzerland), but found the defendant not guilty in relation to trafficking in persons, assault, and other prostitution related offenses. Her conviction resulted in a sentence of two-and-a-half years of imprisonment and a fine of CHF 10,000. On January 24, 2001, the Zurich Court of Appeal, found X. guilty of multiple counts of trafficking in human beings (under Article 196 of the Criminal Code), promotion of prostitution (under Article 195(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code), and for offenses relating to bribery (Articles 288a and 305). X.’s prison sentence was increased to four and a half (4.5) years and the fine of CHF 10,000 was affirmed. X. appealed to the Supreme Federal Court for the annulment of the decision made by the Zurich Court of Appeal. The Supreme Federal Court confirmed the decision of the Zurich Court of Appeal, adding that any consent that may have been given by any of the trafficked women after they had been trafficked and were present in Switzerland would have been irrelevant.

Y. was married to X. until 1993. After the divorce, he continued to live with his former wife until March 2001, when he moved into his own flat. The former spouses continued their sexual relationship until September 2, 2001, after which they finally separated. From September 21 to October 12, 2001, Y. sent X. a large number of messages demanding that she perform certain sexual acts and threatening her. X. finally consented to the sexual acts demanded - including sexual intercourse and filming a sex tape. X. was forced to film pornography and suffered sexual abuse for about two months. Initially, the Winterthur Court condemned Y. to sixteen (16) months in prison for sexual coercion and rape. On appeal, the prison sentence was reduced to four (4) months, but Y.’s culpability was firmly reiterated. Y. appealed to the Supreme Federal Court, claiming that the threats to X. were not as severe as the prosecution had claimed. This appeal was rejected by the Supreme Federal Court, and the sentence of four (4) months remained in place.

A. was a drug-addicted prostitute working in the Sihlquai area in Zurich who agreed to perform certain sexual acts with client X. for a remuneration of Fr. 50. X. took A. to a rented room outside of the city of Zurich where X. beat A. with a whip and forced her to perform violent and humiliating sexual acts. A. claimed not to have agreed to perform these acts with X., while X. countered that they were part of the agreed transaction. X. was sentenced by the Baden District Court to imprisonment for sexually abusing A. X. appealed the verdict and the Canton Aargau Supreme Federal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the preconditions of sexual assault fulfilled. The Supreme Federal Court determined that, even if A. voluntarily agreed to perform certain sexual acts with X., she did not consent to the violent acts and she could not express her refusal in any other manner than verbally and through limited physical resistance. The Supreme Federal Court also found that the client X. could not expect the victim A. to agree to such violent sexual practices, even for remuneration.

A man invaded his neighbor’s house at night while two girls (12 and 17 years old) and their grandmother slept, and sexually assaulted the two girls. The trial court convicted him of sexual abuse and physical violence. After the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, the defendant brought a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court of appeals erred by (1) selectively giving weight only to certain testimony of the victims and their grandmother, while ignoring exculpatory evidence; and (2) finding facts without articulating grounds for each finding. Noting that weighing of evidence and fact finding are the exclusive domain of the trial court and that appellate review must be limited to assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence, the Supreme Court denied the appeal, expressly rejecting it as an attempt to replay the appeal below.

A 13-year-old girl reported having consensual sex with her 26-year-old boyfriend. He was charged under a statute that outlaws sexual relations, even without violence or intimidation, to the detriment of a woman who is “vulnerable” because of her age. The trial court convicted the defendant, finding the girl “vulnerable” based on psychological evaluations. On appeal, the court of appeals focused on the girl’s “discernment” to “decide concerning an active sexual life.” The court of appeals then found the girl not “vulnerable” in light of her testimony that she consented to the alleged crime. The court thus vacated the conviction. The court of appeals also found that the psychological evaluations had “nothing to do with” the issue, because they did not focus on the girl’s “discernment,” but rather on her emotional state, which, in any event, was caused by “rigid standards and values” at home and the “the presence of a controlling feminine figure” (her mother), and not by the relationship with the boyfriend. Because the couple had been dating for four months before deciding “by mutual accord” to have sex, the court found that the boyfriend had not taken advantage of the girl. Prosecutors then brought a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court of appeals had misinterpreted and misapplied the statute. Although the Supreme Court also focused on the “degree of discernment or maturity possessed by the victim to make decisions regarding her sexual freedom,” the Court also held that the girl’s emotional state was essential to the analysis of her vulnerability and her ability to give “free consent,” because “emotions are determinants” that “directly influence human behavior.” The Supreme Court thus remanded the case to a new appeals panel, with directions to rehear the defendant’s appeal in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion.

A 12-year-old girl with the cognitive ability of a nine-year-old reported that she had had consensual sex with her boyfriend and separately with his roommate, both adult males. A medical exam confirmed she had engaged in intercourse. The roommate came forward to the police, saying that he wished to clear his name and felt “remorse” because he “had been with” the girl. The two men were charged under a statute that outlaws sexual relations, even without violence or intimidation, to the detriment of a woman who is “vulnerable” because of her age. A girl under 13 is per se vulnerable under the statute. At trial, the girl’s mother and a psychologist testified that the girl had told them that she falsely accused the defendants because the real perpetrator, who had subsequently died, had threatened her. But the psychologist further explained the girl’s contradiction was the product of cognitive limitations and did not mean that the defendants were innocent. For his part, the roommate admitted that he had made the above-quoted statements to the police, but added that he made them under coercion. Based on that admission, the trial court convicted the roommate and sentenced him to over 17 years of imprisonment. The roommate appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to articulate the grounds for finding each element of the alleged offense. The appellate court denied the appeal in a conclusory opinion. On a cassation appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the roommate’s argument, vacated the appellate decision, and remanded the appeal for rehearing before a different appellate court.

The Turkish Criminal Code, Article 103, Number 5237, provides sentencing for child sexual abuse without graduating the sentence in proportion to the child’s age. The Bafra High Criminal Court applied to the Constitutional Court to annul this provision, and the Court annulled the following two provisions: (1) child sexual abuse carries a sentence between eight and fifteen years; (2) child sexual molestation carries a sentence between three and eight years. The Court reasoned that the legislature may consider the country’s moral values and social and cultural structure in determining the punishment, and while heavier sentences for crimes against younger children who are more vulnerable to sexual assault would be reasonable, the Court opined that in some cases the crime and the punishment might not be proportional, which would violate the “state of law” principle. Therefore, the Court annulled the sentencing guidelines, effective six months following publication in the Official Gazette.

The appellant was charged for carnal abuse of a girl under the age of 12 years and buggery. On 20 April 2009, the appellant was convicted for carnal abuse (but not for buggery). On 9 November 2010 the appellant filed for leave against the conviction and the sentence. He argued in his appeal that the trial judge was obliged to give the jury a separate and distinct warning related to the dangers of convicting relying solely on the uncorroborated evidence from children (in addition to the warning she gave them in relation to the dangers of convicting relying solely on the uncorroborated evidence of complainants in sexual cases). However, the Court decided that it’s entirely within the discretion of the trial judge to determine (taking into account the content and manner of the witness’ evidence, the circumstances of the case and the issues raised), whether to give any warning at all, and if so, in what terms. As a result, in exercising her discretion, the judge decided the girl’s age did not warrant a specific, separate warning other than the one given related to the danger of acting on uncorroborated evidence in a sexual case.

On 29 July 2009, the applicant was convicted in the Home Circuit Court for rape of a 17-year-old girl. She claimed that he hauled her to the back of an abandoned house while asking her indecent questions and threatening her, and then proceeded to forcibly have sexual intercourse with her. He confirmed that they had had sexual intercourse in the yard of a building, but claimed they were in a long-term relationship. As to prove this, a witness testified that the applicant introduced the complainant to her as his girlfriend. However, her testimony was contradictory and unclear. His application for leave to appeal was heard and refused by a single judge of the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal. He then renewed application for leave to appeal, arguing that the learned trial judge failed to adequately address questions raised by the jury during their deliberations, only giving them broad and general directions concerning their role and legal duty. His application for leave to appeal was again refused by the full Court. The application was denied because the court determined that the lower court made an accurate comparison of precedents offered, and that the trial judge’s jury direction was appropriate and within the acceptable parameters of what has become known as the Watson direction (as established by the English Court of appeal in the case R v. Watson). The judge was found to have avoided giving the jury any hint of pressure, correctly advised them to apply both their individual and collective experiences, and urged them to share their perspectives, but also to be willing to adapt to the other’s view if they agreed.

Two men were traveling in a car with a sleeping woman. While the woman was still asleep, and under the influence of narcotics, the defendants raped her. Both were convicted of rape. One of the defendants appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, which found that, because the defendant raped the woman and subsequently helped his co-defendant move the woman from the front to the back seat of the car for the purpose of raping her, he was properly convicted. Swedish law classifies multiple acts of rape from multiple persons as aggravated rape. Here, the defendants committed some of the acts together and the individual acts in succession, so the acts were viewed as aggravated rape.

Defendant, an 18-year-old man, was convicted of rape and sentenced to one year in prison. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the jail sentence was too long, given the defendant’s age. The Supreme Court noted that that the punishment for rape of the “normal degree” (Sw. normalgraden) is between two and four years’ imprisonment. Normally, courts reduce jail sentences by fifty percent when the defendant is 18 years old. However, for long jail sentences, the courts have discretion to further reduce the punishment. The court also recognized that punishments other than jail sentences also may be considered. Given the crime, the court determined that community service was inappropriate, but reduced the defendant’s sentence to probation and three months’ imprisonment. Though rape is a serious offense, the Supreme Court adhered to the principle that imprisoning young individuals should be avoided, to the extent possible.

K.K. had sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old child. The issue before the court was whether KK had reasonable reason to believe that the child was under the age of 15 and, thus, whether the sexual act constituted rape against a child. The child (Sw. målsäganden) initially lied about her age to K.K. but, according to her own testimony, she revealed her true age to KK before they had sex. The Supreme Court concluded that the child’s age was unclear and, in any event, that her testimony was not trustworthy because the defendant’s attorney was not present when she was initially questioned and she was not subject to cross examination. As a result, the Supreme Court held that evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.

This case is an appeal from a judgment by a lower court. Judge Delmy Elizabeth Mejia Salazar found Alvin, a 27-year-old farmer originating from Concepcion de Ataco, guilty of attempted rape of a minor (11 years old) in violation of articles 159 and 172 of the El Salvadoran criminal code, and sentenced Alvin to seven years imprisonment. In the underlying case, the victim testified that Alvin forced her into a crawling position, raped, and sodomized her. On appeal, Alvin argued that the sentencing judge did not properly apply article 179 of the criminal code of procedure as the evidence presented by the forensic expert did not show any injuries in support of a finding of rape and/or sodomization. On appeal, the court emphasized that the medical examination was conducted a month and a half after the attempted rape and sodomization, which provided sufficient time for any injuries to heal. The court further stated that article 159 of the penal code does not require the use of violence and indicated that not every attempted violation will leave physical evidence (e.g., if the victim has a passive reaction to the aggression which does not result in the use of force). Additionally, Alvin did not deny attempting to sexually assault the victim by putting her in a crawling position. Thus, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling and sentence, which was shorter than the eight years imprisonment recommended by the relevant statute.

Este caso es una apelación de una decisión de un tribunal inferior. La jueza Delmy Elizabeth Mejía Salazar encontró culpable a Alvin, un campesino de Concepción de Ataco de 27 años, por intento de violación de una menor (11 años) en violación de los Artículos 159 y 172 del Código Penal salvadoreño, y sentenció a Alvin. a siete años de prisión. En el caso visto en el tribunal inferior, la víctima testificó que Alvin la obligó a gatear, la violó y la sodomizó. En la apelación, Alvin argumentó que el juez de sentencia no había aplicado correctamente el Artículo 179 del Código de Procedimiento Penal, ya que las pruebas presentadas por el perito forense no mostraban lesiones que respaldaran la determinación de violación y / o sodomización. En la apelación, el tribunal enfatizó que el examen médico se realizó un mes y medio después de la violación y sodomización, lo que proporcionó tiempo suficiente para que cicatrizaran las heridas. El tribunal declaró además que el Artículo 159 del Código Penal no requiere el uso de la violencia e indicó que no todo intento de violación dejará evidencia física (por ejemplo, si la víctima tiene una reacción pasiva a la agresión que no da lugar al uso de fuerza). Además, Alvin no negó haber intentado agredir sexualmente a la víctima poniéndola en una posición de gateo. Por lo tanto, el tribunal de apelación confirmó las conclusiones y la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia, la cual era más breve que los ocho años de prisión recomendados por la ley pertinente.

In May 2015, a girl purchased bread from Defendant Luis Alonso, a 50-year-old baker, at his home. While the girl was at Luis’ home, Luis physically attacked her and stated that he would “rape her.” Although Luis did not carry out his threat, he threatened the girl that if she reported him, she would pay and that he would continue to harass her and physically assault her every time he saw her on the street. In February, 2016, the girl was approached by Luis in a small town in Ciudad Delgado and was afraid that Luis would sexually assault her again so she reported the previous events to patrolling officers. The patrolling officers arrested Luis for sexual harassment. Section 165 of the El Salvadoran Penal Code provides that a person is liable for sexual harassment—punishable by three to five years imprisonment—when that person engages in unwanted sexual conduct involving phrases, touching, signs or other unequivocal sexual conduct that does not in itself constitute a more serious offense. The court found that the defendant Luis Alonso sexually harassed the girl in violation of article 165. The court replaced the three-year prison sentence with 144 days of community service and ordered that Luis pays the victim a civil penalty of $300.

En mayo del 2015, una niña le compró pan al acusado Luis Alonso, quien era un panadero de 50 años, en su casa. Mientras la niña estaba en la casa de Luis, Luis la agredió físicamente y le dijo que la “violaría.” Aunque Luis no cumplió con su amenaza, amenazó a la niña con que si lo denunciaba, ella pagaría y que seguiría acosándola y agrediéndola físicamente cada vez que la viera en la calle. En febrero del 2016, Luis se acercó a la niña en un pequeño pueblo de Ciudad Delgado. La niña, quien temía que Luis la agrediera sexualmente, denunció los hechos anteriores a los agentes de patrulla. Los agentes de patrulla arrestaron a Luis por acoso sexual. La Sección 165 del Código Penal salvadoreño establece que una persona es responsable de acoso sexual, punible con tres a cinco años de prisión, cuando esa persona participa en una conducta sexual no deseada que involucre frases, tocamientos, señas u otra conducta sexual inequívoca que no constituyen un delito más grave. El tribunal determinó que el acusado Luis Alonso acosó sexualmente a la niña en violación del Artículo 165. El tribunal reemplazó la sentencia de tres años de prisión por 144 días de servicio comunitario y ordenó que Luis pagara a la víctima una multa civil de $300.

In 2002, the Basic Court in Doboj convicted A.P. of Trafficking of Minors for the Purpose of Prostitution under Article 188 of the Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska. The Court sentenced A.P. to two years’ imprisonment and prohibited him from operating a catering business for five years. A.P. appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the Republika Srpska and then to the Constitutional Court of BiH. He argued his right to a fair trial under the Constitution of BiH and the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated because he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the victims at his trial. Instead, the statements of the victims were read aloud in court. The Constitutional Court of BiH found that, despite A.P. not having an opportunity to cross-examine the victims, his right to a fair trial had not been violated. First, the victims were not present at A.P’s trial because they are foreign nationals who no longer resided in the Republika Srpska. Second, the victims gave their testimony in person during preliminary criminal proceedings, and A.P. was allowed to refute the statements at his trial. Third, the judgment of the Basic Court was not based solely on the victims’ statements, but also on the testimony of a third witness – who had paid to have sex with one of the victims at A.P.’s establishment – and material evidence.

Decision available in English here.

Between May 2003 and June 2005, Tasim Kučević (“Kučević”) and his common law wife, Meliha Pjević (“Pjević”), procured and exploited at least six women by forcing them to dance and serve cocktails at their hotel and provide sexual services to customers. Through advertisements for dancing positions in Spain and Serbia, the couple enticed four women from Russia and Ukraine to come to Serbia; the victims were then trafficked to BiH. By taking advantage of a Bosnian woman’s drug addiction and a Romanian woman’s illegal immigrant status in BiH, Kučević and Pjević forced two other women into prostitution at the same hotel. Eight of Kučević’s acquaintances supervised the women, guarded the hotel, and ran the prostitution business. In 2007, the Court of BiH convicted Kučević and Pjević of Organized Crime in conjunction with Pandering. In 2009, a panel of the Appellate Division convicted Kučević and Pjević of Organized Crime in relation to Trafficking in Persons in violation of Articles 250(3) and 186(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH. The panel, taking into consideration extenuating and aggravating factors, sentenced Kučević and Pjević to 12 and six years’ imprisonment, respectively. The two were also forced to forfeit the material gain from their criminal enterprise, BAM 286,440. Lastly, the eight men who assisted Kučević and Pjević in trafficking and exploiting the women were convicted of the same charges and sentenced to between three months’ and four years’ imprisonment.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

In the summer of 1992, during an assault on the non-Serb civilian population of Foča in the early months of the Bosnian War, Radovan Stanković, a member of the Republika Srpska Army, established a small detention center for women at an apartment known as “The Brothel.” He and others brought at least nine non-Serb females, most of whom were minors, to the apartment and detained them there. Between August and November 1992, Stanković repeatedly raped one woman and her underage sister and incited other soldiers who visited the apartment to rape the detainees. In addition, Stanković forced the victims to perform physical labor, including cooking for the soldiers, washing the soldiers’ uniforms, and bathing the soldiers. In 2002, Stanković was arrested by the NATO peacekeeping force, KFOR, and transferred to the ICTY. The ICTY referred Stanković’s case to the Court of BiH in 2005. One year later, the Court of BiH convicted Stanković of Crimes against Humanity (enslavement, imprisonment, torture, and rape) under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH and sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment. In 2007, a panel of the Appeals Division increased the prison term to twenty years. Stanković appealed his sentence, which the ICTY and The Hague Court of Appeal upheld. This case is notable because it was the first time the ICTY referred a case to a court of national jurisdiction.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

In 2007, the Court of BiH found Radmilo Vuković, a member of the Republika Srpska Army, guilty of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 173(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH for raping a Bosnian woman at least six times between June and August 1992, the early months of the Bosnian War. In 2008, a panel of the Appellate Division acquitted Vuković of these charges, finding the testimonies of the claimant and her sister to be inconsistent and thus not credible. First, the Court noted factual inconsistencies between the testimony of the claimant and her sister (e.g., the date of the first assault, whether the claimant told her mother of the assault). Second, the Court found the testimonies of the claimant and her sister were inconsistent with prior statements they had given in 1994 and 2001. Third, the Court noted that two defense witnesses testified that Vuković and the claimant were cohabiting partners engaged in an extramarital affair before the Bosnian War (however, the claimant denied any relationship). Lastly, the Court questioned why the claimant did not obtain an abortion to terminate the pregnancy resulting from the alleged rape once she was in safe territory. This case is notable because of the demanding standard set by the court regarding the testimony of rape victims: “The testimony of the injured party must not raise any suspicion as to its exactness and truthfulness, credibility and integrity of the witness exactly because the act of rape, as a rule, is never attended by a witness who might decisively support the testimony of the injured party.” This case is also notable because the Court considered the claimant’s decision to not have an abortion to be evidence that a rape had not occurred.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

In September 1992, during the Bosnian War, the Army of BiH attacked Serb houses in the village of Džepi. During this assault, Ćerim Novalić and an unidentified soldier entered a home to see if the couple was hiding Serbs. While the unidentified soldiers interrogated the husband about his neighbors of Serb ethnicity, Novalić forced the wife into an upstairs room and raped her. In 2010, the Court of BiH found Novalić guilty of a War Crime against a Civilian under Article 173(1) of the CC BiH and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. The following year, a panel of the Appellate Division of the Court of BiH revised Novalić’s conviction, finding him guilty under Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the law in effect at the time of Novalić’s crime. The Appellate Panel considered the “extremely humiliating manner” in which Novalić raped the victim – her underage children and mother-in-law were in an adjacent room and her husband was downstairs – and increased his sentence to eight years and six months imprisonment. This is the upper-end of the typical prison sentence mandated by the Court of BiH for one count of rape during the Bosnian War.

Second revised verdict available in English here.

Between 1992 and 1995 during the Bosnian War, Veselin Vlahović a member of the Serbian paramilitary forces, committed various crimes against humanity against the civilian non-Serb population of Sarajevo, including murder, rape, physical and mental abuse, robbery, and enforced disappearance. His crimes were so horrific that he was known by victims as the “Monster of Grbavica.” In 2010, Vlahović was arrested in Spain and extradited to BiH. In 2013, the Court of BiH found Vlahović guilty of sixty different crimes against humanity, including 35 murders and 11 rapes, as well as torture, imprisonment, and looting. He was sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment. In 2014, the Court of BiH acquitted Vlahović of one of the 60 counts of the indictment and reduced his prison sentence to 42 years. Notably, Vlahović’s original prison sentence of 45 years was the maximum possible penalty and is the longest sentence handed down by the Bosnian war crimes court.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

The appellant was convicted in a regional magistrates' court of one count of human trafficking, three counts of rape, one count of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and one count of common assault against a 14-year-old schoolgirl, whom he had married in accordance with customary marriage laws. After she ran away from the appellant, the appellant took the complainant to Cape Town by taxi, where they resided with the appellant's brother and his wife. There, the incidents of rape and assault occurred. The appellant raised as one of his defenses and as a ground of appeal that the alleged rapes took place in the context of a customary arranged marriage, or ukuthwala. According to expert evidence, ukuthwala was an irregular form of initiating a customary marriage. Experts have stated that, in its traditional form, ukuthwala was consensual and innocuous, but there existed an 'aberrant' form in which young girls were abducted and often raped and beaten to force them into marriage. The magistrate held that the matter was not about ukuthwala and its place in our constitutional democracy, but about whether the state had shown that the accused had committed the offences he was charged with and, if so, whether he acted with the knowledge of wrongfulness and the required intent. The court held that child-trafficking and any form of abuse or exploitation of minors for sexual purposes is not tolerated in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, it ruled that the appellant could not rely on traditional ukuthwala as justification for his conduct because practices associated with an aberrant form of ukuthwala could not secure protection under the law. Thus, the Court could not find that he did not traffic the complainant for sexual purposes or that he had committed the rapes without the required intention ̶ even on the rather precarious grounds of appellant’s assertion that his belief in the aberrant form of ukuthwala constituted a 'traditional' custom of his community.

Die appêlant is skuldig bevind in 'n streek magistraat hof op een geval van mensehandel, drie gevalle van verkragting, een geval van aanranding met die opset om ernstige liggaamlike skade te berokken en een geval van algemene aanranding teen ’n 14 jarige skoolmeisie met wie hy getroud is volgens die gebruiklike huwelikswette. Nadat sy weggehardloop het van die appèllant, het die appèllant die klaer per taxi na Kaapstad geneem waar hulle by die broer van die appellant en sy vrou gewoon het. Daar het die voorval van verkragting en aanranding gebeur. Die appèllant het as verdediging en op gronde van ’n appel beweer dat die sogenaamde verkragting plaas gevind het binne konteks van ’n gebruiklike gerëelde huwelik of ‘ ukuthwala’. Volgens kundige getuienis was ukuthwala ’n onreëlmatige vorm om ’n gebruilike huwelik te begin. Kenners meen dat ukuthwala in sy traditionele vorm, konsensueel en onskuldig was maar dat daar ’n afwykende vorm bestaan waarin jong meisies ontvoer en dikwels verkrag en geslaan is om hulle tot die huwelik te dwing. Die landdros het gesê dat die aangeleedheid nie oor ukuthwala en die plek daarvan in ons grondwettige demokratse gaan nie maar wel of die staat bewys het dat die beskuldigde die misdrywe gepleeg het waarvoor hy aangekla is en indien wel, of hy opgetree het met die wete van onregmatigheid en die vereiste opset(intent). Die hof het beslis dat mensenhandel of uitbuiting van minderjariges vir seksuele doeleindes nie geduld word in Suid-Afrika se gondwetlike bedeling nie. Verder het dit beslis dat die appèllant nie op die tradisionele ukuthwala kon staatmaak as regsverdediging vir sy optrede nie omdat prakyke wat verband hou met ’n afwykende vorm van ukuthwala nie beskerming onder die wet verkry nie. Die Hof kon dus nie bevind dat hy die klaer nie vir mensenhandel met seksuele doeleindes gebruik het nie en dat hy die verkragtings sonder die verwagte intensie gepleeg het nie - selfs op die taamlike onveilige gronde van die bewering van die appellant dat sy geloof in die afwykende vorm van ukuthwala, ’n tradisionele gewoonte in sy gemeenskap is.

The defendant committed acts of obscenity upon a young girl. He alleged that it was only for a monetary purpose—to record the act and give the recording to his acquaintance in return for receiving a loan —and that he had no sexual intent. The defendant appealed the High Court’s ruling that sexual intent is not required to establish a prima facie case of indecent assault, which is proscribed by Article 176 of the Japanese Penal Code. He argued that the High Court’s finding was inconsistent with judicial precedent holding that sexual intent is an element of the crime. The Supreme Court, upon noting that the scope of sexual crimes cannot be properly determined without taking into account the views of contemporary society, found that, in the present day, the focus should be on the existence, details, and extent of sexual damage caused to a victim rather than an assailant’s intent. Thus, the Supreme Court, upheld the High Court’s finding and overturned the 47-year-old jurisprudence. The Court found that, while it could not deny that there may be a situation in which the sexual intent of a perpetrator becomes an important factor in finding the crime, it was not reasonable to uniformly require the existence of such a factor for the crime of indecent assault.

被告人は、金を借りようとしたところ、金を貸す条件として若い女の子にわいせつ行為を行い、その行為を撮影するよう指示された。被告人はこれに関して、その行為の目的は金銭を得ることであり、性的意図はなかったと主張した。被告人は、刑法第176条の強制わいせつ罪の成立には性的意図が必要で、高裁判決は以前の判例に違反するとして、強制わいせつ罪が成立するとした高裁判決を不服とした。最高裁は、性犯罪の範囲は社会の受け止め方を考慮しなければ処罰対象を適切に決することができないとし、現代においては、加害者の意図だけでなく、被害者に与えた性的被害の有無、内容、程度に焦点を当てるべきであると判断し、加害者の性的意図が犯罪認定の重要な要素となる場合はあるが、強制わいせつ罪にこの要素の存在を一律に要求することは妥当ではないとして、高裁判決を支持した。

The accused was charged with one count of rape contrary to Sections 132 and 133 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The accused denied the charge. However, following the trial (during which the prosecution called five witnesses, and after considering the evidence of the accused which was given on oath), the trial magistrate found the accused guilty and convicted him of the subject offence. The case was then remitted to the High Court for sentencing pursuant to Section 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Zambia. Before passing any sentence, the Court was required to satisfy itself that the relevant legal and procedural provisions had been observed by the trial court. The Court held that there was medical evidence in support of the violent nature of the act as well as other corroborative evidence, such as the distressed state of the victim when she reported the act. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence in support of the identification of the accused by the victim including the trial magistrate’s finding that the victim was a truthful witness. On the totality of the evidence, the High Court held that the trial judge’s finding of guilt and the conviction was ‘anchored on firm ground’ and, therefore, concluded that it should be upheld. The High Court sentenced the accused to 25 years imprisonment with hard labor effective from the date of arrest.

The appellant was charged in the Subordinate Court of attempted rape contrary to Section 137 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The statement of offence read defilement, contrary to Section 138 of the Penal Code. The appellant was convicted of indecent assault, a minor offence per Section 181(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellant appealed on two grounds. First, the statement of offence was defective, as (i) it did not specify the offence by section and subsection of the provision of the law contravened, and (ii) it was amended late which was unjust. Second, on the available evidence, a court could not have properly convicted appellant for attempted rape or indecent assault because the allegation of attempted rape impliedly includes both an allegation of assault and of indecency; on the facts, there was only an element of indecency (and not assault). The Supreme Court rejected both grounds of appeal on the basis that: (i), indecent assault, attempted rape, rape and defilement are offences of the same genus and therefore a defendant charged with attempted rape may be convicted of a lesser related charge like indecent assault; (ii) the appellant had an opportunity to defend himself in relation to the alternative charge, so there was no constitutional violation of the fairness of the trial; and (iii) the findings of fact were in accordance with the evidence on the record, as the appellant was ‘caught in the act’ and there was medical evidence of injuries sustained by the victim. Accordingly, there was no reason to interfere with the findings of fact or the minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge. The Court dismissed the appeal.

This case was brought by the complainant, who was attacked and raped by robbers at her home. She immediately reported the matter to police and requested a medical practitioner to prescribe emergency contraception. The medical practitioner said he required the presence of a police officer to do so. Because she was advised at the police station that the officer who had dealt with her case was not available, the victim returned to the hospital, where she was refused treatment without a police report. The next day she went to the hospital with another police officer and was informed that the prescribed 72 hours had already elapsed. When the complainant was confirmed pregnant, she indicated to the prosecutor that she wanted her pregnancy terminated, but was told that she had to wait until the rape trial had been completed. She finally obtained the necessary magisterial certificate, but when she sought the termination, the hospital matron felt that it was no longer safe to carry out the procedure. After the full term of her pregnancy, the complainant brought an action against the Ministers of Health, Justice and Home Affairs for pain and suffering endured as well as maintenance of the child. The High Court dismissed her claim that the employees of the respondents had been negligent in their failure to prevent the pregnancy, and subsequently to facilitate its termination. She appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which determined the claim by applying the test for negligence, finding the doctor negligent for having failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the pregnancy and the police negligent for failing to timely take the victim to the doctor for her pregnancy to be prevented. The Supreme Court recognized the relevance of regional and international human rights norms and standards, making reference to various provisions relating to the reproductive rights of women in CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol, but held that, pursuant to Constitutional terms, these cannot operate to override or modify domestic laws until they are internalized and transformed into rules of domestic law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that it was the responsibility of the victim of the alleged rape to institute proceedings for the issuance of a magisterial certificate allowing the termination of her pregnancy. Ultimately, the Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal and granted the complainant general damages for pain and suffering arising from failure to prevent her pregnancy. Although conceding that Zimbabwe’s Termination of Pregnancy Act is “ineptly framed and lacks sufficient clarity as to what exactly a victim of rape is required to do when confronted with an unwanted pregnancy,” the Supreme Court dismissed the complainant's claim for damages for pain and suffering beyond the time her pregnancy was confirmed and for the maintenance of her minor child, as the authorities could not be liable for not assisting her to terminate the pregnancy because they do not have any legal duty to initiate and institute court proceedings on her behalf.

Due to the increase of femicide crimes in the Dominican society, the Constitutional Court proclaimed the termination of violence against women in all its forms as it is a violation of the Constitution. The proclamation was made in commemoration of the murder of Mirabal, Minerva, Patria and María Teresa, political opponents of the regime of Rafael Trujillo, and in accordance with the international agreements executed in defense of women's rights, as well as the laws issued against gender violence, sexual violence and femicide.

Debido al aumento de los delitos de femicidio en la sociedad dominicana, el Tribunal Constitucional proclamó el cese de la violencia contra la mujer en todas sus formas, incluyéndolo como una forma de violación de la Constitución. Dicha proclamación se realizó en conmemoración del asesinato de Mirabal, Minerva, Patria, y María Teresa, quienes fueron opositores políticos del régimen de Rafael Trujillo. La proclamación está en conformidad con los acuerdos internacionales celebrados en defensa de los derechos de las mujeres y con las leyes emitidas contra la violencia basada en género sexual, violencia sexual en sí, y femicidio.

Two minor children, an eight-year-old boy and a twelve-year-old girl, were raped by their father, once and multiple times over several years, respectively. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison, but the Criminal Appeals Court reduced the sentence to 19.6 years in prison on October 11, 2001, after finding that the 20-year sentence was impermissible under Paraguay’s sentencing guidelines.

Dos niños menores, un niño de ocho años y una niña de doce, fueron violados sexualmente por su padre, una y varias veces durante varios años, respectivamente. El acusado fue sentenciado a 20 años de prisión, pero la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal redujo la sentencia a 19,6 años de prisión el 11 de octubre de 2001, tras concluir que la sentencia de 20 años era inadmisible según las directrices de sentencia de Paraguay.

Clorinda Mora Romero was sentenced to jail for seven years and six months because the lower court of Asunción found that she was guilty with her co-defendant Guido Arturo Villalba of human trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation. She appealed the sentence, and the Court of Appeals rejected her motion, confirming the lower court sentence. Finally, she challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, which dismissed the action in 2016.

Clorinda Mora Romero fue condenada a siete años y seis meses de cárcel porque el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Asunción determinó que ella era culpable con su coacusado Guido Arturo Villalba de trata de personas con fines de explotación sexual. Ella apeló la sentencia y el Tribunal de Apelaciones rechazó su moción, confirmando la sentencia del tribunal inferior. Finalmente, presentó la decisión ante la Corte Suprema, que desestimó la acción en 2016.

The child victim was sexually abused by Derlis Mauro Rodriguez. The parents of the victim stated that the child was found with the defendant in an abandoned house while he was touching her. Medical reports confirmed the defendant had been sexually abusing the victim. The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 16, 2002.

La niña víctima fue abusada sexualmente por Derlis Mauro Rodríguez. Los padres de la víctima afirmaron que la menor fue encontrada con el acusado en una casa abandonada mientras la tocaba inapropiadamente. Los informes médicos confirmaron que el acusado había abusado sexualmente de la víctima. El imputado fue condenado a quince años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 16 de abril de 2002.

The accused was charged with rape of his seven-year-old granddaughter between the months of August to October 2008. The prosecution alleged that the accused did intentionally have unlawful sexual intercourse with a female seven-year-old minor who is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. The complainant, her brother who was sharing a bedroom with her during the rapes, the complainant’s aunt who the complainant first told of the rapes, a neighbor who had been told of the accused’s actions by his wife, the doctor who examined the complainant, and the constable all testified for the prosecution. The accused denied the charges and argued that all of the witnesses were lying, specifically that the children had been coached by the police. The Court discussed the elements that the Crown must prove in order for the accused to be found guilty of rape, namely (1) the accused must be identified; (2) there must be sexual intercourse; and (3) there must be lack of consent by the complainant. The accused was found guilty of rape. In sentencing, the Court found that the Crown proved that there were aggravating factors under Section 185(bis) of the Criminal Evidence Act (1938), namely, (1) the victim was a minor of a tender age; (2) the accused sexually assaulted the victim on more than one occasion; and (3) the accused stood in locus parentis to the victim and this abused the relationship of trust. The Court found the witnesses credible and found the accused guilty as charged.

The defendant in this case sexually assaulted his stepdaughter, who was 12-years-old at the time. The defendant was sentenced to 15 years in prison for rape. During his appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court failed to legally assess all the evidence presented. During her initial testimony, the victim declared that it was her stepfather who had caused the sexual abuse apparent in her psychological and physical examinations. However, she recanted two months later and stated that the abuse had actually been inflicted by her boyfriend. Nonetheless, the trial court convicted the victim’s stepfather. On appeal the Court found no error. It reasoned that the timing between the contradictory declarations and, most importantly, the nature of the second declaration indicated that the first testimony was correct. The Court found that such a declaration was a product of the stepfather’s pressure as it lacked many details and appeared disingenuous. The Court dismissed the procedural challenge and confirmed the sentence.

En este caso, el acusado agredió sexualmente a su hijastra, que tenía 12 años en ese momento. El acusado fue condenado a 15 años de prisión por violación. Durante su apelación, el acusado argumentó que el tribunal de primera instancia no evaluó legalmente todas las pruebas presentadas. En su testimonio inicial, la víctima declaró que fue su padrastro quien había causado el abuso sexual aparente en sus exámenes físicos y psicológicos. Sin embargo, ella se retractó dos meses después y declaró que el abuso había sido infligido por su novio. No obstante, el tribunal de primera instancia condenó al padrastro de la víctima. En la apelación, La Corte no encontró ningún error. Razonó que el momento entre las declaraciones contradictorias y, lo más importante, la naturaleza de la segunda declaración indicaban que el primer testimonio era correcto. El Tribunal determinó que la segunda declaración era producto de la presión del padrastro, ya que carecía de muchos detalles y parecía poco sincera. El tribunal terminó la apelación y confirmó la sentencia como decisión final.

The defendant invited a 16-year-old girl for a walk to a park, but refused to take her home when she requested. He instead took her to another residence and, along with other individuals, sexually assaulted her using force, insults and intimidation. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for rape. He appealed the sentence alleging that the facts demonstrated establish that the accused had only “sexual relations” with the victim and Honduras criminal law, rape necessitates acts beyond sexual relations; specifically, penetration, which he claimed was not demonstrated in the facts. The Court reasoned that “sexual relations” was not limited to penetration, but included penetration. Therefore the Court rejected the appeal. The case was dismissed and the sentence upheld.

El acusado invitó a una niña de 16 años a caminar al parque, pero se negó a llevarla a su casa cuando lo solicitó. Él, en cambio, la llevó a otra residencia y, junto con otros individuos, la agredió sexualmente usando la fuerza, insultos, e intimidación. El acusado fue posteriormente condenado a 15 años de prisión por violación. Apeló la sentencia alegando que los hechos demostrados establecen que el acusado solo tenía "relaciones sexuales" con la víctima y con la ley penal de Honduras, la violación requiere actos más allá de las relaciones sexuales. Específicamente, la violación require la penetración, que según él no se demostró en los hechos. El Tribunal razonó que las "relaciones sexuales" no se limitaban a la penetración, sino que meramente incluían la penetración, sin ser un hecho exclusivo. Por lo tanto, el Tribunal rechazó la apelación. El caso fue desestimado y la sentencia fue confirmada.

This case considered whether the Australian Minister for Immigration owed a duty of care to procure the safe and legal abortion for the Applicant refugee who arrived unlawfully in Australia from Africa (personal identifying information is redacted). After being resettled as a “transitory person” on Nauru, she was raped while unconscious during a seizure and became pregnant. Specifically, the Applicant sought an injunction preventing her abortion from occurring in Papua New Guinea where it would not be safe and legal and instead sought to be returned to Australia for the procedure. The Court granted the injunction to prevent the Applicant’s abortion from being performed in Papua New Guinea or any location where a participant could be subject to criminal liability. The Court held that the Minister for Immigration and the Australian Government owed the applicant a duty of care, which required them to “exercise reasonable care in the discharge of the responsibility that they assumed to procure for her a safe and lawful abortion.” However, the Court declined to require that the Minister bring the Applicant to Australia for the procedure. In reaching this decision, the Court considered the risks of the applicant seeking an abortion in Papua New Guinea, including the illegality of abortions, the poor quality of medical care, the Applicant’s dependence on Australia, and the Applicant’s medical needs. The Court also considered the imminence of harm and the insufficiency of damages as a remedy for this harm.

Plaintiffs, minor female children in the custody of Alabama’s Department of Youth Services (“DYS”), brought an action against DYS and its executive director, in which they alleged that the defendants failed to adequately respond to “a sexually hostile education environment” and sexual abuse and harassment. The plaintiffs brought federal claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), and state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision of employees, and intentional misrepresentation. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims based on various immunity arguments. The defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus directing the Alabama Supreme Court to dismiss the complaint. In ruling on the defendants’ petition, the Alabama Supreme Court considered each claim for immunity. First, the Alabama Supreme Court held that DYS was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims brought under Title IX. Second, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the executive director was not entitled to federal qualified immunity for the § 1983 because the complaint alleged that he had notice of the sexual harassment and abuse yet failed to protect the plaintiffs from further harm. Finally, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the sovereign immunity provision of the Alabama constitution and found that dismissal of the plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the executive director in his official capacity was proper. Nonetheless, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the doctrine of state-agent immunity did not warrant dismissal of the plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the executive director in his individual capacity.

Rider was charged with sexual battery on his wife. The trial court dismissed the charges, reasoning that under a common-law exception to rape, a court could not convict a husband for the rape of his wife. The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding no legal authority for the exception and noting that Florida had replaced the common-law crime of rape with the statutory crime of sexual battery. Accordingly, consent to marriage did not include consent to acts of violence. Thus, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded with an order to reinstate prosecution.

The state sought involuntary commitment of the defendant as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act. The Act, enacted in 1999, provided for civil commitment procedures for “all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future.” The defendant had been convicted of rape in 1969 and 1976. In 2004, he was sentenced to prison for burglary charges. He argued that the Act did not authorize his commitment since he had not been convicted of any sexually violent offense since the effective date of the Act. The trial court disagreed and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the “current confinement period need not be for a sexual offense as long as the individual has been convicted of a sexually violent offense sometime in the past.”

Following the divorce of the applicant, E.A.Ö (the mother), and R.Y. (the father), the court gave custody of their daughter to E.A.Ö and limited the father’s visitation rights to certain dates and times indicated by the court. E.A.Ö took her daughter to a Child and Adolescent Health and Disease Specialist (a psychiatrist) to address issues regarding the child’s aggressive sex-related movements and fears about witches and similar beings. The psychiatrist reported that the child had been a victim of sexual abuse by her father. The applicant filed a lawsuit before the Court of First Instance (family court) requesting that the court terminate the father’s visitation rights citing the evidence that the father might have sexually abused the daughter and might continue to sexually abuse her if he had access to her. E.A.Ö. claimed that the father posed a serious threat to the material and moral integrity of the child as well as E.A.Ö. While she was pursuing this claim, the Prosecution Office decided to not pursue criminal charges against the father citing a lack of evidence regarding the father’s sexual abuse of the child. Based on the Prosecution Office’s non-prosecution decision, the Court of First Instance decided against E.A.Ö leading to her application to the Constitutional Court. While, her application to the Constitutional Court was pending E.A.Ö. filed another lawsuit before the Court of First Instance and did not inform the Constitutional Court about this second lawsuit. In the second lawsuit, the Court of First Instance rendered an injunction decision, which prohibited any contact between the father and the daughter. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court rejected E.A.Ö.’s application because there was no longer any risk of danger to the daughter, since the Court of First Instance had already issued a protective order preventing the father from seeing the child.

The 38-year-old female complainant identified the defendant as the soldier who slapped her, tore her hair and clothes, and threatened her with a gun before repeatedly raping her in his truck from approximately 8:00 PM until 5:00 AM the next morning. The defendant denied her claims, but two soldiers stationed near the assault corroborated her statements. The judge, citing the complainant's demeanor and experience as a mother, believed the her testimony about the assault despite the lack of medical evidence. The judge sentenced the defendant to seven years imprisonment in addition to the year already served.

At issue in this case is the distinction between rape, simple defilement, and aggravated defilement in the Uganda Penal Code. The crime of defilement, created in 1990, prohibits having or attempting sexual intercourse with a girl under 18 years of age and carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Defilement is considered aggravated if the girl is under 14 years old, the offender has HIV/AIDS, the offender is the victim’s parent or guardian, the girl has a disability, or the offender is a serial offender, and it carries a maximum penalty of death. There is no consent requirement for defilement because children cannot consent to sexual intercourse. The Penal Code section prohibiting rape describes it as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl without her consent” (emphasis added) or if consent is obtained through any force, threat, or intimidation. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The victim in this case was 16 when the defendant had unlawful carnal knowledge of her without her consent. The defendant argued that he should be charged with simple defilement instead of rape because rape only applies to an adult woman who can give consent. The State argued that the statutes give the State discretion to choose between the charges. Citing other cases in which the State charged for rape instead of defilement because the defendant used excessive force, the State argued that this case the charge of rape was justified. The Court found that these cases were decided before Parliament had fully settled the statutory details of rape, simple defilement, and aggravated defilement. Now that the law is settled, the law does not allow rape charges for children because of the element of consent; unlawful sexual intercourse with children must be prosecuted as defilement.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and aggravated child trafficking for transporting minor girls, who were promised supermarket jobs in Uganda, from Rwanda to Uganda for the purposes of forced unpaid household labor and prostitution. The accused pleaded not guilty and maintained that she transported the girls to Uganda with their parents’ permission for a holiday. The Court found her guilty of the charges related to two of the girls, but found that one of the girls was over the age of majority (19 years old). The Court sentenced the accused to two concurrent terms of imprisonment: eight years for aggravated child trafficking and five years for trafficking in persons.

The appellant appeals his conviction for trafficking in persons for the purposes of prostitution in violation of Penal Law sec. 203A(a), pimping for prostitution, and threats and false imprisonment. The appellants’ two co-conspirators reached plea agreements with prosecutors. The appellant generally admits the underlying facts of the case, but argues on appeal that these facts do not amount to trafficking in persons but rather pimping for prostitution, which has a lower sentence. The appellant “acquired” the two complainants in November of 2001 and brought them to a facility in Tel Aviv operated by the first co-conspirator for the purpose of employing them as prostitutes. Appellant “imprisoned the complainants in the facility, took their passports, and abused them physically.” The first co-conspirator supervised the complainants, forced them to work as prostitutes, and collected fees. In or around February 2002, the first co-conspirator transferred the complainants to the custody and supervision of the appellant. The appellant housed the complainants in his apartment and managed all aspects of their work as prostitutes, from arranging clients to fee collection. The appellant made each complainant pay him part of her profits for food and rent. The complainants were not allowed to leave the apartment without the appellant’s permission and supervision. The appellant argued that the lower court erred by not applying a narrow definition of “purchase” as used in property law. The Supreme Court held that section 203A(a) prohibits any deal intended to create a property relationship in which a person acquires rights in another human being. The meaning of the phrases “sale and purchase” in section 203A(a) refer to any deal, in exchange for any consideration, that grants a person any kind of property right in another human being who serves as the object of the deal. It is immaterial whether the business arrangement is under the guise of ownership, rental, borrowing, partnership, or any other means of creating a property interest in a person. The Court held that the appellant’s actions clearly constituted a business arrangement that created a property interest in a human being and that, therefore, these circumstances met the legal criteria for the crime of trafficking in persons.

The complainant alleged that the defendant raped her. The defendant vehemently denied the allegations and testified that the sex was consensual. The High Court treated the defendant’s claim of consent as an affirmative defense ruling that he had the burden of proving consent. The Court found that the defense was unable “through cross examination, to show that the sex was consensual” (p. 4). Consequently, the Court convicted the defendant of rape. This was a landmark case because it essentially shifted the burden of proof in rape cases. Instead of requiring the prosecution to prove a lack of consent, the court made the defendant prove that the victim consented to the sexual encounter.

The plaintiff sued the government for false arrest and assault. The plaintiff, who worked for the government as an accounts clerk, claimed she was robbed by two armed men while she was transporting government funds. The next day, the police arrested her. The plaintiff alleged that she was taken to a police post, stripped down to her underwear, placed on her back, beaten, and interrogated, while the officers beat her and poured water over her head. The High Court determined that the plaintiff’s arrest was lawful but the torture was not. A medical certificate entered into evidence showed that plaintiff had injuries when she was released from police custody. Because there was no proof that she had those injuries before she was detained, the Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to relief.

The defendant was convicted for sexual assault and attempted rape of his 16-year-old niece. The appellate court upheld the conviction, but overturned the sentence imposed by the trial court. The appellate court held that the lower court failed to consider aggravating factors, including the close relationship between the parties. Given the prevalence of sexual assault in Lesotho, the court determined that jail sentences needed to serve as a deterrent for both the perpetrator and the general public. According to the court, “a very loud and clear message must be sent to all those who consider themselves with power and right to abuse or rape girls and women, that they will be dealt with the seriousness their unlawful actions demand” (p. 5). The Court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment with one year suspended for five years, unless the defendant commits another violent offense.

The Defendant was running a massage parlor that had hidden rooms with beds where a young female employee massaged the whole body of a male customer. The female employee, usually wearing a short skirt and a short-sleeved tee, would undress the male customer, grab his sexual organ with her hands with lotion on, touch the body part just like engaging in a sexual intercourse, and ultimately let him ejaculate. The issue was whether the act of the female employee in the Defendant’s parlor could be considered as "acts that are similar to sexual intercourse" under Article 2 (1) 1 sub paragraph Na of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic. The Act, which aimed to eradicate prostitution and protect the human rights of the victims of prostitution, did not distinguish “sexual intercourse” from “acts that are similar to sexual intercourse”. The Supreme Court interpreted "acts that are similar to sexual intercourse" as stipulated in the above Act to refer to acts of penetrating the body through the mouth or the anus, or at least acts for gaining sexual satisfaction similar to sexual intercourse. Then the Court went through a comprehensive evaluation of the circumstances, including the place where such act was conducted, the clothes the people were wearing, the body parts that were touched, the specific content of the act, and the degree of the resulting sexual satisfaction to decide whether the female employee’s act could be considered as “acts that are similar to sexual intercourse”. The Supreme Court held that the female employee’s act could be deemed as an act of bodily contact for gaining sexual satisfaction similar to sexual intercourse, and therefore dismissed the appeal by the Defendant.

Defendant was roaming the street after drinking alone at night. He followed Victim (a 17-year-old girl) getting off the bus and walking alone. Upon nearing a desolated place, Defendant approached the Victim, while wearing and mask, holding both of his arms high to hug her. Sensing someone behind her, the Victim turned around and yelled “What are you doing?” to which the Defendant remained still and stared for a few seconds before retreating. Defendant was indicted on attempting to assault a child or juvenile which is in violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse. The first instance court found the Defendant guilty but the appeals court reversed the first instance judgment and acquitted Defendant. The Prosecutor then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held the crime of indecent act by force includes an indecent act committed after making the other party unable to resist by use of violence or threat and the act of assault itself is considered as an indecent act, and such assault is not confined to the extent of suppressing the other party’s will. An indecent act refers to an act that deviates from sexual moral norms causing a victim to feel shame or disgust, and violating the victim’s sexual freedom. Whether such crime is established should be carefully determined by factoring in: the victim’s reciprocity, gender, and age; relationship between the victim and perpetrator prior to the act; circumstances leading to the act; means and method used to commit the act; objective circumstances; and sexual moral norms at the time. In addition, the crime of attempted indecent act by force is established when the act of violence with the intention to commit an indecent act does not lead to actual commission of indecent act, and this legal principle applies to cases of “indecent act by surprise” where the act of assault in itself is acknowledged as an indecent act. Accordingly, Defendant was charged of violating the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse.

The defendant, who was in his mid-20s, illegally had sex on four occasions with the victim (a 14-year-old middle school student) with a Level Three intellectual disability (which means a weak cognitive capacity and decision-making capacity). He initially met the victim through an online chat room and lied about his age. He used his cell phone to record videos of his sexual intercourse with the victim and to take nude pictures of the victim. The victim instantaneously objected but half-heartedly acquiesced to the defendant's requests and ultimately asked him to erase the photos. Under the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, the Prosecutor indicted Defendant on charges of having illicit sex with a disabled juvenile and producing juvenile pornography. The trial and appellate courts found the defendant guilty, and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that “cognitive capacity” means the ability to rationally discern between good and evil or right and wrong, and “decision-making capacity” means the ability to control one’s behavior. Evaluating these capacities requires relying on an expert’s opinion of the child or juvenile's capacities, objective evidence, testimonies of witnesses on the child or juvenile's daily verbal expressions and behaviors, and circumstances that led to the charge, including the child or juvenile’s speech and behavior. The Court held that the Article 8(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse ("the Act") punishes those who have illicit sex with a disabled child or juvenile who has a cognitive capacity much weaker than ordinary children and juveniles, and who lacks the ability to exercise the right to sexual self-determination. Furthermore, the Court held that Article 11(1) of the Act punishes those who produced, imported, or exported child or juvenile pornography. The Court held that even if the victim implicitly consented, such consent could not be viewed as an act of a child or juvenile with sufficient cognitive capacity who voluntarily or earnestly exercised the right to sexual self-determination on an informed or educated basis. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. English version available here.

피고인은 자신의 나이를 속이면서 처음부터 피해자가 중학교 3학년생인 아동 청소년임을 알고도 단지 성적 행위를 목적으로 피해자에게 인터넷 채팅을 통해 접근하여 몇 차례 연락하고 만난 사이다. 피해자는 지적 장애 3급으로서 사물을 분별하거나 의사를 결정할 능력이 미약하다. 피고인은 피해자와 처음 만난 날에 성관계를 2회 가지는 등 몇 차례 만나 성관계를 가지면서 그 장면과 피해자의 나체 사진을 촬영했다. 피해자는 순간적으로 거부감을 표시했지만 피고인은 계속 요구를 하였고 결국 피해자는 소극적으로 응하였다. 일부 사진에 대해서는 지워 달라고 요청하기도 하였다. “사물을 변별할 능력”이란 사물의 선악과 시비를 합리적으로 판단하여 정할 수 있는 능력을 의미하고, “의사를 결정할 능력을 의미한다. 사물변별능력이나 의사결정능력이 미약한지 여부는 전문가의 의견, 아동 청소년의 평소 언행에 관한 제3자의 진술 등 객관적 증거, 공소사실과 관련된 아동 청소년의 언행 및 사건의 경위등 여러 사정을 종합하여 판당할 수 있다. 아동 청소년의 성보호에 관한 법률 제8조 제1항은 19세 이상의 사람이 “장애 아동 청소년”을 간음하는 행위를 처벌한다. 청소년성보호법 제11조 제1항은 아동 청소년이용음란물을 제작 수입 또는 수출한 자를 처벌한다. 대법원은 피고인이 원심판시와 같은 사진을 각 촬영한 행위는 청소년성보호법 제11조 제1항에서 규정하는 아동 청소년이용음란물의 제작에 해당한다고 파결을 내렸다. 설령 피해자의 묵시적 동의가 있었다고 불 여지가 있더라도 사리분별력이 충분한 아동 청소년이 성적 행위에 관한 자기결정권을 자발적이고 진지하게 행사한 것으로 보기 어렵다고 판단했다. 따라서 원심이 이 부분 공소사실을 유죄로 판단한 것은 정당하다고 판단했다.

Female prisoners in Washington prisons alleged sexual abuse by the prison guards. As a remedial remedy, the Department of Corrections designated 110 positions as female-only. These female-only positions include observing female prisoners in sensitive locations, such as showers, as well as performing pat downs. The union of correctional officers sued the Department for Title VII violations for sexual discrimination in employment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department. The Circuit Court affirmed citing sex as a bona fide occupational qualification for those positions given that sexual abuse is present in prisons and positions which require observing prisoners in sensitive areas or tasks can be performed by females only in order to protect female prisoners from abuse.

The defendants Yang and Li trafficked 17 Vietnamese women who were prostitutes in Vietnam to Yunnan Province, China. Yang and Li pretended to be clients and brought the women to hotels and restaurants where they kidnapped the women and transported them to China. The defendants offered the women to villagers in remote rural area of Yunnan Province, China and forced the women to marry buyers by force or threats. Under Article 48 and Article 240 of Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, the two defendants were sentenced to the death penalty and their private property was confiscated by the court. The women were provided with assistance to return to Vietnam.

包办婚姻与早婚、性暴力与强奸、人口拐卖

被告人杨某和李某将17名从事卖淫活动的越南妇女拐卖至中国云南省。被告人以嫖娼为名，采用暴力手段，强行将越南籍妇女被害人绑架并带入中国。被告人将这些妇女转卖至云南省偏远地区的村民并强迫和威胁他们嫁给买家。依照中华人民共和国刑法第四十八条和第二百四十条，两名被告人被判决死刑、并处没收全部个人财产。中国司法机关将被解救妇女全部安全地送返国籍国。

In July 2010, W.J. and L.N, 12- and 13-year-old female students at Jamhuri Primary School, were invited to the home of their teacher, Astarikoh Henry Amkoah. Amkoah forced the girls to perform household chores and later attempted to defile W.J. in the restroom and defiled L.N. in the hall. On several occasions later that month, Amkoah raped both girls. The girls’ education was severely interrupted by the trauma of Amkoah’s attacks and L.N. dropped out of school completely. Ultimately, Amkoah was acquitted in criminal court. In this suit filed by their guardians, W.J. and L.N. sued claiming that Amkoah’s actions unconstitutionally interfered with their rights to health, education, and dignity, and claimed that the school and state should be vicariously liable for the teacher’s actions. They invited the court to look at the claims from the perspective of a tort in negligence and as a human rights violation. However, the violations took place prior to the adoption of a revised 2010 Constitution, so the Court was required to rely partially on the 1963 Constitution which did not include those same guarantees. Still, the 1963 Constitution offered a right to freedom and security of the person. Additionally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted through Kenya’s Children Act, promises children the right to be free from sexual or physical violence, the right to receive an education, and the right to dignity. As a result, the Court was able to rely on the guarantees of the Children Act. Moreover, Justice Ngugi recognized the 2010 constitutional right to dignity as a continuing right, meaning that while the initial crime may have occurred prior to the 2010 Constitution’s adoption, the continuous nature of the effects of sexual violence on an individual’s dignity make the provision applicable in this case. Here, the Court determined that the criminal acquittal would not serve as a bar to the action because of the differing standards of proof in a criminal and a civil trial. Importantly, the Court decided that “any educational or other institution in which teachers or other care givers commit acts of sexual abuse against those who have been placed under their care is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of its employees.” The court noted that because children are particularly vulnerable, it is appropriate to impose strict liability on “those in charge of educational and other institutions . . . for abuses committed by those whom they have placed in charge of vulnerable groups such as minors in educational institutions” and held the four named plaintiffs—the teacher, the school, the teachers service commission, and the state—jointly and severally liable for damages of KSH two million for W.J. and KSH three million for L.N.

This decision concerned three separate cases of assault: New South Wales v. Lepore, Samin v. Queensland, and Rich v. Queensland. Each case involved the abuse of students by public school teachers. The victims alleged that the educational authority was liable on the basis of a non-delegable duty of care. The Court found the argument unpersuasive and overly broad: “The proposition that, because a school authority's duty of care to a pupil is non-delegable, the authority is liable for any injury, accidental or intentional, inflicted at school upon a pupil by a teacher, is too broad.” The victims also sought damages from the government on an alternative theory of vicarious liability. The Court considered related decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada and the House of Lords where educational authorities were held vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees. The Court asserted that vicarious liability for the criminal conduct of an employee exists where the employee was acting as agent, servant, or representative of the employer when the incident occurred. The Court ordered a new trial in the case of Lepore, and dismissed the appeals of Samin and Rich.

The complainant had been severely intoxicated while the defendant had sex with her. It was found that in order for sex to be consensual the victim must have the capacity (the ability) to say no. If one is so inebriated as to be incapable of refusing intercourse, such intercourse is rape. If, through drink (or for any other reason) the complainant has temporarily lost her capacity to choose whether to have intercourse on the relevant occasion, she is not consenting, and subject to questions about the defendant's state of mind, if intercourse takes place, this would be rape. However, where the complainant has voluntarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so, this would not be rape.