Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

A statute of limitations is a law that imposes a time limit for bringing a case; once the statute of limitations expires, a person cannot pursue even an otherwise valid claim. The Supreme Court has imposed few due process limits on state laws that create, alter, or eliminate statutes of limitations for civil suits.1

The Court has held that a statute of limitations does not deprive a person of property without due process of law, unless it applies to an existing right of action in a way that unreasonably limits the opportunity to enforce the right by suit. By the same token, a state may shorten an existing statute of limitations, provided that the state allows a reasonable time for bringing an action after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. What constitutes a reasonable period depends on the nature of the right and the particular circumstances.2

A state may also extend the time in which civil suits may be brought in its courts and may even entirely remove a statutory bar to the commencement of litigation. The Court has held that the repeal or extension of a statute of limitations does not impose an unconstitutional deprivation of property on a debtor-defendant who previously might have invoked the statute as a defense. The Court explained, “A right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitation . . . [is not] a vested right” protected by the Constitution.3 Accordingly, the Court has upheld against Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the revival of an action on an implied obligation to pay a child for the use of her property,4 a suit to recover the purchase price of securities sold in violation of a Blue Sky Law,5 and a right of an employee to seek an additional award out of a state-administered fund on account of the aggravation of a former injury.6

However, when a right of action to recover property has been barred by a statute of limitations and title as well as real ownership have become vested in the possessor, the Court has held that any later act removing or repealing the statute of limitations would be void as attempting an arbitrary transfer of title.7 The Court has also held unconstitutional the application of a statute of limitation to extend a period that parties to a contract agreed should limit their right to remedies under the contract.8

Footnotes

1

By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that a legislature may not retroactively reimpose criminal liability after it the limitations period has lapsed. See ArtI.S9.C3.3.6 Imposing Criminal Liability and Ex Post Facto Laws.

2

Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Ky. Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911). Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (discussing discretion of states in erecting reasonable procedural requirements for triggering or foreclosing the right to an adjudication). Thus, in a 1911 case, the Court held that where a receiver for property is appointed 13 years after the disappearance of the owner and notice is made by publication, it is not a violation of due process to bar actions relative to that property one year after such appointment. Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court likewise found no constitutional violation when a state enacted a law prohibiting all actions to contest tax deeds that had been of record for two years unless such actions were brought within six months after passage of the law. Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 94 (1897). In another case, the Court upheld a statute providing that, when a person had been in possession of wild lands under a recorded deed continuously for twenty years and paid taxes thereon, while the former owner paid nothing, no action to recover such land shall be entertained unless commenced within twenty years, or before the expiration of five years following enactment of said provision. Soper v. Lawrence Bros., 201 U.S. 359 (1906). Similarly, an amendment to a workmen’s compensation act, limiting to three years the time within which a case may be reopened for readjustment of compensation on account of aggravation of a disability, does not deny due process to one who sustained his injury at a time when the statute contained no limitation. Mattson v. Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 154 (1934).

3

Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623, 628 (1885).

4

Id.

5

Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).

6

Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).

7

Campbell, 115 U.S. at 623. See also Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403, 417 (1935).

8

Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930). ( “When the parties to a contract have expressly agreed upon a time limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates . . . [said] agreement and directs enforcement of the contract after . . . [the agreed] time has expired unconstitutionally imposes a burden in excess of that contracted.” ).