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GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER (No. 06-1321)
476 F. 3d 54, reversed and remanded.
Syllabus

Opinion
[Alito]
Dissent
[Roberts]
Dissent
[Thomas]
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553 U. S. ____ (2008)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MYRNA GOMEZ-PEREZ, PETITIONER v. JOHN E.
POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL

on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the first circuit


[May 27, 2008]

    Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting.

    I join all but Part I of the Chief Justice’s dissent. I write separately to reiterate my view that Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005) , incorrectly conflated the concepts of retaliation and discrimination. The text of the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is clear: It prohibits only “discrimination based on age.” 29 U. S. C. §633a(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V). If retaliation is not “discrimination on the basis of sex,” Jackson, supra, at 185 (Thomas, J., dissenting), or “discrimination based on race,” CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, at 4(Thomas, J., dissenting), it is certainly not “discrimination based on age.” Because §633a(a) provides no basis for implying a private right of action for retaliation claims, and its context only reaffirms its plain meaning, see ante, at 5–9 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.), I would affirm the judgment below.