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AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION ( No. 09-893 )
584 F. 3d 849, reversed and remanded.
Syllabus

Opinion
[Scalia]
Concurrence
[Thomas]
Dissent
[Breyer]
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Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v . CONCEPCION et ux.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit


No. 09–893. Argued November 9, 2010—Decided April 27, 2011

The cellular telephone contract between respondents (Concepcions) and petitioner (AT&T) provided for arbitration of all disputes, but did not permit classwide arbitration. After the Concepcions were charged sales tax on the retail value of phones provided free under their service contract, they sued AT&T in a California Federal District Court. Their suit was consolidated with a class action alleging, inter alia , that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on “free” phones. The District Court denied AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration under the Concepcions’ contract. Relying on the California Supreme Court’s Discover Bank decision, it found the arbitration provision unconscionable because it disallowed classwide proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the provision was unconscionable under California law and held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” 9 U. S. C. §2, did not preempt its ruling.

Held:  Because it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz , 312 U. S. 52 , California’s Discover Bank rule is pre-empted by the FAA. Pp. 4–18.

     (a) Section 2 reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U. S. 1 , and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract,” Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson , 561 U. S. ____, ____. Thus, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna , 546 U. S. 440 , and enforce them according to their terms, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. , 489 U. S. 468 . Section 2’s saving clause permits agreements to be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses,” but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. Doctor’s Associates , Inc. v. Casarotto , 517 U. S. 681 . Pp. 4–5.

     (b) In Discover Bank , the California Supreme Court held that class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable if the agreement is in an adhesion contract, disputes between the parties are likely to involve small amounts of damages, and the party with inferior bargaining power alleges a deliberate scheme to defraud. Pp. 5–6.

     (c) The Concepcions claim that the Discover Bank rule is a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” under FAA §2. When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule. But the inquiry is more complex when a generally applicable doctrine is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors or interferes with arbitration. Although §2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, it does not suggest an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives. Cf. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. , 529 U. S. 861 . The FAA’s overarching purpose is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings. Parties may agree to limit the issues subject to arbitration, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U. S. 614 , to arbitrate according to specific rules, Volt , supra, at 479, and to limit with whom they will arbitrate, Stolt-Nielsen , supra, at ___. Pp. 6–12.

     (d) Class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration. The switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices arbitration’s informality and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment. And class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. The absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected. That risk of error may become unacceptable when damages allegedly owed to thousands of claimants are aggregated and decided at once. Arbitration is poorly suited to these higher stakes. In litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision and a final judgment, but 9 U. S. C. §10 limits the grounds on which courts can vacate arbitral awards. Pp. 12–18.

584 F. 3d 849, reversed and remanded.

     Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.,  joined.