22 U.S. Code § 5901 - Demilitarization of independent states of former Soviet Union

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The Congress finds that it is in the national security interest of the United States—
(1) to facilitate, on a priority basis—
(A) the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union, including the safe and secure storage of fissile materials, dismantlement of missiles and launchers, and the elimination of chemical and biological weapons capabilities;
(B) the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their components and destabilizing conventional weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the establishment of verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons;
(C) the prevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise of the former Soviet Union to terrorist groups or third countries; and
(D) other efforts designed to reduce the military threat from the former Soviet Union;
(2) to support the demilitarization of the massive defense-related industry and equipment of the independent states of the former Soviet Union and conversion of such industry and equipment to civilian purposes and uses; and
(3) to expand military-to-military contacts between the United States and the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Source

(Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title XIV, § 1411,Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2563.)
Short Title

Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title XIV, § 1401,Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2563, provided that: “This title [enacting this chapter and amending provisions set out as a note under section 2551 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992’.”
Policy on Reduction of Russian Nuclear Forces

Pub. L. 106–38, § 3,July 22, 1999, 113 Stat. 205, provided that: “It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.”
Nuclear Weapons Reduction

Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title XIII, § 1321,Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2549, provided that:
“(a) Findings.—The Congress makes the following findings:
“(1) On February 1, 1992, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation agreed in a Joint Statement that ‘Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries’ and stated further that, ‘We will work to remove any remnants of cold war hostility, including taking steps to reduce our strategic arsenals’.
“(2) In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for the non-nuclear-weapon states agreeing not to seek a nuclear weapons capability nor to assist other non-nuclear-weapon states in doing so, the United States agreed to seek the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide, as declared in the preamble to the Treaty, which states that it is a goal of the parties to the Treaty to ‘facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery’ as well as in Article VI of the Treaty, which states that ‘each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’.
“(3) Carrying out a policy of seeking further significant and continuous reductions in the nuclear arsenals of all countries, besides reducing the likelihood of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increasing the likelihood of a successful extension and possible strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995, when the Treaty is scheduled for review and possible extension, has additional benefits to the national security of the United States, including—
“(A) a reduced risk of accidental enablement and launch of a nuclear weapon, and
“(B) a defense cost savings which could be reallocated for deficit reduction or other important national needs.
“(4) The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty and the agreement by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of each country to a level between 3,000 and 3,500 weapons are commendable intermediate stages in the process of achieving the policy goals described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
“(5) The current international era of cooperation provides greater opportunities for achieving worldwide reduction and control of nuclear weapons and material than any time since the emergence of nuclear weapons 50 years ago.
“(6) It is in the security interests of both the United States and the world community for the President and the Congress to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in every country through multilateral agreements and other appropriate means.
“(7) In a 1991 study, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that: ‘The appropriate new levels of nuclear weapons cannot be specified at this time, but it seems reasonable to the committee that U.S. strategic forces could in time be reduced to 1,000–2,000 nuclear warheads, provided that such a multilateral agreement included appropriate levels and verification measures for the other nations that possess nuclear weapons. This step would require successful implementation of our proposed post-START U.S.-Soviet reductions, related confidence-building measures in all the countries involved, and multilateral security cooperation in areas such as conventional force deployments and planning.’.
“(b) United States Policy.—It shall be the goal of the United States—
“(1) to encourage and facilitate the denuclearization of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan, as agreed upon in the Lisbon ministerial meeting of May 23, 1992;
“(2) to rapidly complete and submit for ratification by the United States the treaty incorporating the agreement of June 17, 1992, between the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons in each country’s arsenal to a level between 3,000 and 3,500;
“(3) to facilitate the ability of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan to implement agreed mutual reductions under the START Treaty, and under the Joint Understanding of June 16–17, 1992 between the United States and the Russian Federation, on an accelerated timetable, so that all such reductions can be completed by the year 2000;
“(4) to build on the agreement reached in the Joint Understanding of June 16–17, 1992, by entering into multilateral negotiations with the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China, and, at an appropriate point in that process, enter into negotiations with other nuclear armed states in order to reach subsequent stage-by-stage agreements to achieve further reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in all countries;
“(5) to continue and extend cooperative discussions with the appropriate authorities of the former Soviet military on means to maintain and improve secure command and control over nuclear forces;
“(6) in consultation with other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies, to initiate discussions to bring tactical nuclear weapons into the arms control process; and
“(7) to ensure that the United States assistance to securely transport and store, and ultimately dismantle, former Soviet nuclear weapons and missiles for such weapons is being properly and effectively utilized.
“(c) Annual Report.—By February 1 of each year, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on—
“(1) the actions that the United States has taken, and the actions the United States plans to take during the next 12 months, to achieve each of the goals set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (b); and
“(2) the actions that have been taken by the Russian Federation, by other former Soviet republics, and by other countries to achieve those goals.
Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary.”

 

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