Whether a member of the public can recover damages from negligent infliction of emotional distress against a municipality for its employee's actions.

No. Allowing such a claim would impose a new duty on an office of the city where none was found to currently exist.

Lauer's three year old child died. Its autopsy was performed by a New York City Medical Examiner. Initially the report and death certificate stated that the child's death was a homicide. Lauer was the primary suspect. Upon further examination, the examiner concluded the death resulted from natural causes. He failed to correct the death certificate, autopsy report, or to notify law enforcement officers. Only after a newspaper expose, 17 months after the death, was the death certificate amended and the homicide investigation ceased. Lauer claimed damages of emotional distress from the negligently prolonged investigation. The Supreme Court maintained the emotional distress claims and the majority of the Appellate Division upheld them.

Traditionally municipal tort immunity has extended only to discretionary acts, and not to ministerial acts. It was undisputed that examiner's failure to file the correct record was a ministerial act. However, this did not automatically remove the issue of immunity. Without a duty running directly to the injured person there is no liability. Standard scope of duty analysis imposes liability only where the defendant owed a specific duty to the plaintiff, as distinguished from a general duty to society.

The Court rejected Lauer's claim that New York City Charter § 557, requiring "full and complete records" to be kept by the medical examiner, provided the necessary legal duty, because the intent of the statute was not for the protection of an individual. Neither plaintiff, nor other members of the general public who may become criminal suspects upon the death of a person, are persons "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." The Court also found no "special relationship" between plaintiff and the examiner because necessary direct contact and reliance requirements were not met. Balancing the policies of providing a remedy to those injured and extending exposure of tort liability without limit, the Court held that plaintiff's claims were outside the scope of duty that allowed for damages in tort. The orders of the Supreme Court and Appellate Division were reversed.

Dissents: Judge Smith dissented on the ground that the special relationship test had been met. Judge Bellacosa dissented on the ground that recognizing a claim based on the relationship in the case at bar would not significantly expand the scope of current tort liability. He suggested liability is especially warranted when the public servant who precipitated the investigation fails to remove, or at least to mitigate, the risk and harm that enveloped the life of the plaintiff.