ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - LANDLORD-TENANT - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - NOTICE - DEFAULT - NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY - JUDICIAL REVIEW - FACTUAL RECORD


ISSUE & DISPOSITION

Issue(s)

Whether the statute of limitations for challenging the denial of a tenant's request to vacate a New York City Housing Authority default determination begins to run upon the agency's entry and notification of default.

Disposition

No. The statute of limitations begins to toll when the tenant receives a denial of a request to vacate the default judgment, because only then has the agency ruled on all appealable issues of fact.

SUMMARY

Petitioner Yarbough was a tenant in property owned by Respondent, New York City Housing Authority. After failing to appear at a hearing concerning charges that she had failed to follow Respondent's rules, the agency entered a default judgment against her on December 3, 1996. However, the tenant did not receive notification of the default until April 1997. She immediately filed a request to vacate the default on the ground that she had not received notice of the hearing. The Housing Authority denied her request, ruling that the four-month statute of limitations for requests to vacate had expired.

The Supreme Court agreed that the statute of limitations began to run upon entry of default. The Appellate Division upheld Petitioner's request, holding that the statute of limitations did not commence until receipt of the denial of the request to vacate the default. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for Petitioner.

The Court held that receiving a denial of a request to vacate a default ruling must be the point at which the statute of limitations begins. The motion to vacate the default gives the defaulting party an opportunity to establish a factual record, including the reason for defaulting, and any defenses. If the statute of limitations began to run upon entry of default, there would be no meaningful judicial review as there would be no record for the court to consider. Moreover, the Court held, the motion to vacate the default is not a motion to reconsider. A motion to reconsider advances the same arguments already considered, whereas a motion to vacate a default presents new and unconsidered factual arguments. The Court found this case particularly compelling as the Petitioner filed her motion to vacate the default immediately upon receiving notice of the default. Thus the Court found arguments regarding efficiency concerns by the Respondent unpersuasive.


Prepared by the liibulletin-ny Editorial Board.