Whether a Defendant can be convicted of endangering the welfare of a child if his actions were directed at the children's mother.

Yes. The statute governing endangering the welfare of a child is broad enough to encompass conduct directed at others that is likely to cause harm to children.

Defendant violently attacked his ex-girlfriend in an ordeal lasting over ten hours, during which he verbally abused the victim, beat her with his hands, feet, and a metal pipe, threw cups, plates, and glasses at the walls of the victim's apartment and her, and threatened to kill her. The attack initiated in front of the victim's children who then retreated to the bedroom. Once in the room, they could still hear the Defendant's yelling and cursing, their mother's screams, and breaking glass. They emerged from the bedroom only after the Defendant's arrest.

The trial court convicted Defendant on a number of counts, including two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed only the endangerment conviction, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient. The Court of Appeals granted both parties leave to appeal.

Dismissing Defendant's appeal as lacking in merit or unpreserved, the Court solely addressed the People's appeal. The relevant statute, Penal Law § 260.10(1), provides that a person endangers the welfare of a child when "[h]e knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old." The Court of Appeals noted that the text of the statute is broadly written to impose a criminal sanction for the mere "likelihood" of harm, and has no indication that its application is restricted solely to harmful conduct directed at children. The Court further reasoned that the use of "knowingly" in the statute suggests that the defendant must simply be aware that the conduct may likely result in harm to a child, whether directed at the child or not. Noting the well documented evidence of the psychological and developmental damage which incurs to children exposed to domestic violence, the Court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably determined that Defendant knew his conduct created a likelihood of harm to the children. The Court explicitly overruled lower court precedents holding that Penal Law § 260.10(1) requires a defendant's conduct be focused upon the child or that evidence of a child witnessing a severe act of violence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction under the statute. The Court modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case for consideration of the facts.