Whether the trial readiness period established by CPL § 30.30(1) is altered by a subsequent reduction of the charges that is not among the exceptions addressed by CPL § 30.30(5).

No. Trial readiness time periods set forth in CPL § 30.30(1) apply unless a specific CPL § 30.30(5) contingency applies, and since reductions from class A to class B misdemeanors are not among the exceptions enumerated in CPL § 30.30(5), the readiness period remains unaltered with such reductions in charges.

After initially charging Defendant with three class D felonies and four class A misdemeanors, the People dismissed the felony charges and charged Defendant by information with the remaining class A misdemeanors. The alteration reduced the time readiness period under CPL § 30.30(5) from six months to 90 days, measured from the date of information filing. Prior to the trial, which began 73 days after the information filing, the People moved to reduce the charges further, from class A to class B misdemeanors. Defendant argued that reducing the seriousness of the charges should reduce the CPL § 30.30 time period from 90 to 60 days, which would render the proceeding time-barred and the prosecution untimely. The Trial Court granted the motion for reduced charges, and Defendant was convicted of the class B misdemeanors. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court noted that the CPL § 30.30(1) time period is based on the highest grade of offense charged in the criminal action, and is measured from the date of commencement of the action, which is generally the date on which the first accusatory instrument is filed. The Court then pointed out that in express situations, CPL § 30.30(5) requires deviations from this general rule and deems the action to have commenced on the date of the filing of the new accusatory instrument. In this case, the subsequent reduction from class A to class B misdemeanors is not one of the express scenarios addressed by CPL § 30.30(5). The Court concluded that the general time requirement of CPL § 30.30(1) governs unless a specific CPL § 30.30(5) contingency applies.

The Court observed that in two prior cases where the effect of changes in the charges did not fall within an express situation under CPL § 30.30(5), the Court consistently upheld the supremacy of CPL § 30.30(1) to apply the period associated with the most serious offense charged, regardless of whether or not the most serious offense was part of the first or last accusatory instrument. See People v. Tychanski, 78 N.Y.2d 909 (1991) (a reduction from a felony complaint to a misdemeanor indictment); See also People v. Cooper, 90 N.Y.2d 292 (1997) (an increase from a class A misdemeanor to felony complaint). Finally, the Court stated that its conclusion "comports with the policies underlying the CPL § 30.30 readiness rule" by providing both parties with a "temporal framework for action" and encouraging prosecutors to reduce charges when warranted. As such, the Court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that the 90-day readiness period was appropriate and that the prosecution was therefore timely.