Syllabus | Opinion [ Rehnquist ] | Concurrence [ Scalia ] | Concurrence [ Souter ] |
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HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version |
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
et al., PETITIONERS v. JOHN DOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[March 5, 2003]
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I join the Courts opinion, and add that even if the requirements of Connecticuts sex offender registration law implicate a liberty interest of respondent, the categorical abrogation of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute suffices to provide all the process that is duejust as a state law providing that no one under the age of 16 may operate a motor vehicle suffices to abrogate that liberty interest. Absent a claim (which respondent has not made here) that the liberty interest in question is so fundamental as to implicate so-called substantive due process, a properly enacted law can eliminate it. That is ultimately why, as the Courts opinion demonstrates, a convicted sex offender has no more right to additional process enabling him to establish that he is not dangerous than (in the analogous case just suggested) a 15-year-old has a right to process enabling him to establish that he is a safe driver.