| Syllabus | Opinion [ Ginsburg ] | Concurrence [ Stevens ] | Dissent [ Kennedy ] |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version |
[June 14, 2004]
Justice Stevens, concurring.
In Part IV of his dissent, Justice Kennedy observes that years of unexamined habit by litigants and the courts do not lessen this Courts obligation correctly to interpret a statute. Post, at 15. It merits emphasis, however, that prolonged congressional silence in response to a settled interpretation of a federal statute provides powerful support for maintaining the status quo. In statutory matters, judicial restraint strongly counsels waiting for Congress to take the initiative in modifying rules on which judges and litigants have relied. See BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op., at 3) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Federal Election Commn v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 100105 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 101103 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189192 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In a contest between the dictionary and the doctrine of stare decisis, the latter clearly wins. The Courts fine opinion, which I join without reservation, is consistent with these views.