|RAYMOND B. YATES, M.D., P.C. PROFIT SHARINGPLAN V. HENDON (02-458) 541 U.S. 1 (2004)
287 F.3d 521, reversed and remanded.
[ Ginsburg ]
[ Scalia ]
[ Thomas ]
RAYMOND B. YATES, M.D., P.C. PROFIT
PLAN, and RAYMOND B. YATES, trustee,
v. WILLIAM T. HENDON,
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[March 2, 2004]
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. The Court
persuasively addresses the Court of Appeals many errors
in this case. See ante, at 1419. I do not,
however, find convincing the Courts reliance on textual
indications, ante, at 8. The text of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), is
certainly consistent with the Courts interpretation of
the word employee to include so-called
As an example, the Court places
weight on the exception to the exemption from 29 U.S.C. §
1106 which bars loans made to parties in interest that are
Since the text is inconclusive, we must turn to the common-law understanding of the term employee. Darden, supra, at 322323. On remand, then, I would direct the Court of Appeals to address whether the common-law understanding of the term employee, as used in ERISA, includes Dr. Yates. I would be surprised if it did not, see In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 639 (CA7 1997) (corporations separate legal existence from shareholder must be respected), Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 11 F.3d 444, 448449 (CA4 1993) (same), but this is a matter best resolved, in the first instance, by the court below.
*. * The Court does not clearly define who exactly makes up this class of working owners, even though members of this class are now considered categorically to fall under ERISAs definition of employee.