|Moskal v. United States (89-0964), 498 U.S. 103 (1990)|
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
MOSKAL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit
Petitioner participated in a "title washing" scheme in which automobile titles that had been altered to reflect rolled-back odometer mileage figures were sent from Pennsylvania to Virginia. After Virginia authorities, unaware of the alterations, issued Virginia titles incorporating the false figures, Moskal received the "washed" titles in Pennsylvania, where they were used in connection with car sales to unsuspecting buyers. Moskal was convicted of receiving two washed titles under 28 U.S.C. 2314 which prohibits the knowing transportation of "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities" in interstate commerce. (Emphasis added.) In affirming Moskal's conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected his contention that, because the washed titles were genuine, inasmuch as the Virginia officials who issued them did not know of the falsity, the titles therefore were not "falsely made."
Held: A person who receives genuine vehicle titles, knowing that they incorporate fraudulently tendered odometer readings, receives those titles knowing them to have been "falsely made" in violation of 2314. Pp. 2-14.
(a) Moskal misconstrues the doctrine of lenity when he contends that because it is possible to read 2314 as applying only to forged or counterfeited securities, and because some courts have so read it, this Court should simply resolve the issue in his favor under that doctrine. The doctrine applies only to those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute. Such factors demonstrate that 2314 unambiguously applies to Moskal's conduct. Pp. 2-4.
(b) Both the plain meaning of the words "falsely made" and the legislative purpose underlying them provide ample support for applying 2314 to a fraudulent scheme for washing vehicle titles. The quoted words are broad enough, on their face, to encompass washed titles containing fraudulently tendered odometer readings, since such titles are made to contain false, or incorrect, information. The fact that the state officials responsible for issuing such titles did not know that they were incorporating false readings is irrelevant, since 2314 liability depends on transporting the "falsely made" security with unlawful or fraudulent intent and not on the scienter of the person who physically produces the security. Moskal's construction of 2314 as excluding any security that is "genuine" or valid deprives the "falsely made" phrase of any meaning independent of the statutory terms "forged" and "counterfeited," and therefore violates the established principle that a court should give effect, if possible, to every clause or word of a statute. That "falsely made" encompasses genuine documents containing false information is also supported by 2314's purpose of curbing the type of trafficking in fraudulent securities that depends for its success on the exploitation of interstate commerce to avoid detection by individual states, such as a title washing operation. The fact that the legislative history contains references to counterfeit securities but not to odometer rollback schemes does not require a different conclusion, since, in choosing the broad phrase "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities," Congress sought to reach a class of frauds that exploited interstate commerce. This Court has never required that every permissible application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legislative history. Moreover, the Court's 2314 precedents specifically reject constructions that limit the statute to instances of fraud rather than the class of fraud encompassed by its language. See United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 390, 391; McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 655, 656, 658. Pp. 4-9.
(c) The foregoing reading of 2314 is not precluded by the principle of statutory construction requiring that, where a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the term must generally be given that meaning. Although, at the time Congress enacted the relevant clause of 2314, many courts had interpreted "falsely made" to exclude documents that were false only in content, that interpretation was not universal, other courts having taken divergent views. Where no fixed usage existed at common law, it is more appropriate to inquire which of the common-law readings of the term best accords with the overall purpose of the statute, rather than simply to assume, for example, that Congress adopted the reading that was followed by the largest number of common-law courts. Moreover, Congress' general purpose in enacting a law may prevail over the"common-law meaning" rule of construction. Since the position of those common-law courts that define "falsely made" to exclude documents that are false only in content does not accord with Congress' broad purpose in enacting 2314 — namely to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities that exploits interstate commerce — it is far more likely that Congress adopted the common-law view of "falsely made" that encompasses "genuine" documents that are false in content. Pp. 10-14.
(d) Moskal's policy arguments for narrowly construing "falsely made" are unpersuasive. First, there is no evidence to suggest that States will deem washed titles automatically invalid — thereby creating chaos in the stream of automobile commerce — simply because federal law punishes those responsible for introducing such fraudulent securities into commerce. Second, construing "falsely made" to apply to securities containing false information will not criminalize a broad range of "innocent" conduct. A person who transports such securities in interstate commerce violates 2314 only if he does so with unlawful or fraudulent intent and if the false information is itself material, and conduct that satisfies these tests is not "innocent." Pp. 13-14.
888 F. 2d 283, affirmed.
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Souter, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.