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90-906 -- OPINION
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
No.
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Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
An Act of Congress authorizing the transfer of operating control of two major airports from the Federal Government to the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA) conditioned the transfer on the creation by MWAA of a unique "Board of Review" composed of nine Members of Con- gress and vested with veto power over decisions made by MWAA's Board of Directors. [n.1] The principal question pre- sented is whether this unusual statutory condition violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers, as inter- preted in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and Springer v. Philippine Is- lands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928). We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that the condition is unconstitutional.
I In 1940, Congress authorized the Executive Branch to ac- quire a tract of land a few miles from the Capitol and to con- struct what is now Washington National Airport (National). 54 Stat. 686. From the time it opened until 1987, National was owned and operated by the Federal Government. The airport was first managed by the Civil Aeronautics Agency, a division of the Commerce Department. 54 Stat. 688. In 1959, control of National shifted to the newly-created Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), an agency that, since 1967, has been a part of the Department of Transportation. See 72 Stat. 731; 80 Stat. 932, 938.
A few years after National opened, the Truman Adminis- tration proposed that a federal corporation be formed to op- erate the airport. See Congressional Research Service, Federal Ownership of National and Dulles Airports: Back- ground, Pro-Con Analysis, and Outlook 4 (1985) (CRS Re- port), reprinted in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 404 (1985). The proposal was endorsed by the Hoo- ver Commission in 1949 but never adopted by Congress. In- stead, when Congress authorized construction of a second major airport to serve the Washington area, it again pro- vided for federal ownership and operation. 64 Stat. 770. Dulles International Airport (Dulles) was opened in 1962 under the direct control of the FAA. See CRS Report 1-2.
National and Dulles are the only two major commercial air- ports owned by the Federal Government. A third airport, Baltimore Washington International (BWI), which is owned by the State of Maryland, also serves the Washington metro- politan area. Like Dulles, it is larger than National and lo- cated in a rural area many miles from the Capitol. Because of its location, National is by far the busiest and most profit- able of the three. [n.2] Although proposals for the joint operat- ing control of all three airports have been considered, the plan that gave rise to this litigation involves only National and Dulles, both of which are located in Virginia. Mary- land's interest in the overall problem explains its representa- tion on the Board of Directors of MWAA. See 49 U. S. C. App. 2456(e)(3)(c).
Throughout its history, National has been the subject of controversy. Its location at the center of the Metropolitan area is a great convenience for air travelers, but flight paths over densely populated areas have generated concern among local residents about safety, noise, and pollution. Those liv- ing closest to the airport have provided the strongest support for proposals to close National or to transfer some of its oper- ations to Dulles. See CRS Report 3.
Despite the FAA's history of profitable operation of Na- tional and excellent management of both airports, the Secre- tary of Transportation concluded that necessary capital im- provements could not be financed for either National or Dul les unless control of the airports was transferred to a regional authority with power to raise money by selling tax-exempt bonds. [n.3] In 1984, she therefore appointed an advisory com- mission to develop a plan for the creation of such a regional authority. Id., at 6.
In 1985, Virginia and the District both passed legislation authorizing the establishment of the recommended regional authority. See 1985 Va. Acts, ch. 598; 1985 D. C. Law 6-67. A bill embodying the advisory commission's recommenda- tions passed the Senate. See 132 Cong. Rec. 7263-7281 (1986). In the House of Representatives, however, the leg- islation encountered strong opposition from Members who expressed concern that the surrender of federal control of the airports might result in the transfer of a significant amount of traffic from National to Dulles. See Hearings on H. R. 2337, H. R. 5040, and S. 1017 before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works & Trans- portation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3, 22 (1986).
Substitute bills were therefore drafted to provide for the establishment of a review board with veto power over major actions of MWAA's Board of Directors. Under two of the proposals, the board of review would clearly have acted as an agent of the Congress. After Congress received an opinion from the Department of Justice that a veto of MWAA action by such a board of review "would plainly be legislative action that must conform to the requirements of Article 1, 7 of the Constitution," [n.4] the Senate adopted a version of the review board that required Members of Congress to serve in their individual capacities as representatives of users of the air- ports. See 132 Cong. Rec. 28372-28375, 28504, 28521-28525 (1986). The provision was further amended in the House, Id., at 32127-32144, and the Senate concurred, id., at 32483. Ultimately, 2456(f) of the Transfer Act as enacted defined the composition and powers of the Board of Review in much greater detail than the Board of Directors. Compare 49 U. S. C. App. 2456(f) with 2456(e).
Subparagraph (1) of 2456(f) specifies that the Board of Review "shall consist" of nine Members of the Congress, eight of whom serve on committees with jurisdiction over transportation issues and none of whom may be a Member from Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia. [n.5] Subparagraph 4(B) details the actions that must be submitted to the Board of Review for approval, which include adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds, promulgation of regula- tions, endorsement of a master plan, and appointment of the chief executive officer of the Authority. [n.6] Subparagraph 4(D) explains that disapproval by the Board will prevent submit- ted actions from taking effect. [n.7] Other significant provisions of the Act include paragraph 5, which authorizes the Board of Review to require Authority directors to consider any action relating to the airports; [n.8] subsection (g), which requires that any action changing the hours of operation at either National or Dulles be taken by regulation and therefore be subject to veto by the Board of Review; [n.9] and subsection (h), which con- tains a provision disabling MWAA's Board of Directors from performing any action subject to the veto power if a court should hold that the Board of Review provisions of the Act are invalid. [n.10]
On March 2, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation and the MWAA entered into a long-term lease complying with all of the conditions specified in the then recently enacted Transfer Act. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 163a-187a. The lease pro- vided for a 50-year term and annual rental payments of three million dollars "in 1987 dollars." Id., at 170a, 178a. After the lease was executed, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted bylaws providing for the Board of Review, Id., at 151a-154a, and Virginia and the District of Columbia amended their leg- islation to give MWAA power to establish the Board of Re- view, 1987 Va. Acts, ch. 665; 1987 D. C. Law 7-18. On Sep- tember 2, 1987, the directors appointed the nine members of the Board of Review from lists that had been submitted by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Presi- dent pro tempore of the Senate. App. 57-58.
On March 16, 1988, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted a master plan providing for the construction of a new terminal at National with gates capable of handling larger aircraft, an additional taxiway turnoff to reduce aircraft time on the run- way and thereby improve airport capacity, a new dual-level roadway system, and new parking facilities. Id., at 70-71, 89-91. On April 13, the Board of Review met and voted not to disapprove the master plan. Id., at 73-78.
II In November 1988, Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., and two individuals who reside under flight paths of aircraft departing from and arriving at National (col- lectively CAAN) brought this action. CAAN sought a dec- laration that the Board of Review's power to veto actions of MWAA's Board of Directors is unconstitutional and an in- junction against any action by the Board of Review as well as any action by the Board of Directors that is subject to Board of Review approval. Id., at 10. The complaint alleged that most of the members of CAAN live under flight paths to and from National and that CAAN's primary purpose is to de- velop and implement a transportation policy for the Washing- ton area that would include balanced service among its three major airports, thus reducing the operations at National and alleviating noise, safety, and air pollution problems associ- ated with such operations. Id., at 4. The complaint named MWAA and its Board of Review as defendants. Id., at 5.
The District Court granted the defendants' motion for sum- mary judgment. 718 F. Supp. 974 (DC 1989). As a prelimi- nary matter, however, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action for two reasons: [n.11] first, be- cause the master plan will facilitate increased activity at Na- tional that is harmful to plaintiffs, and second, because the composition of the Board of Review diminishes the influence of CAAN on airport user issues since local congressmen and senators are ineligible for service on the Board. Id., at 980-982. On the merits, the District Court concluded that there was no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers because the members of the Board of Review acted in their individual capacities as representatives of airport users, and therefore the Board was not an agent of Congress. Id., at 985. Moreover, the Board's powers were derived from the legislation enacted by Virginia and the District, as imple- mented by MWAA's bylaws, rather than from the Transfer Act. Id., at 986. "In short, because Congress exercises
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 286 U. S. App. D.C. 334, 917 F. 2d 48 (1990). The court agreed that plaintiffs had standing because they had alleged a distinct and palpable injury that was "fairly traceable" to the implementation of the master plan and a favorable ruling would prevent MWAA from im- plementing that plan. Id., at 339, 917 F. 2d, at 53. On the merits, the majority concluded that it was "wholly unrealistic to view the Board of Review as solely a creature of state law immune to separation-of-powers scrutiny" because it was fed- eral law that had required the establishment of the Board and defined its powers. Id., at 340, 917 F. 2d, at 54. It held that the Board was "in essence a congressional agent" with disapproval powers over key operational decisions that were "quintessentially executive," id., at 343, 917 F. 2d, at 57, and therefore violated the separation of powers, ibid. The dis- senting judge, emphasizing the importance of construing fed- eral statutes to avoid constitutional questions when fairly possible, concluded that the Board of Review should not be characterized as a federal entity but that, even if it were so characterized, its members could, consistent with the Con- stitution, serve in their individual capacities even though they were Members of Congress. Id., at 345-347, 917 F. 2d, at 59-61.
Because of the importance of the constitutional question, we granted MWAA's petition for certiorari. 498 U. S. --- (1991). Although the United States intervened in the Court of Appeals to support the constitutionality of the Transfer Act, see 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), the United States did not join in MWAA's petition for certiorari. As a respondent in this Court pursuant to this Court's Rule 12.4, the United States has again taken the position that the Transfer Act is constitutional. [n.12]
III Petitioners (MWAA and the Board of Review) renew the challenge to respondents' standing that was rejected by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. To establish stand- ing, respondents "must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Petitioners argue that respondents' asserted injuries are caused by factors independent of the Board of Review's veto power and that the injuries will not be cured by invalidation of the Board of Review. We believe that petitioners are mistaken.
Respondents alleged that the master plan allows increased air traffic at National and a consequent increase in accident risks, noise, and pollution. App. 10. "For purposes of rul- ing on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allega- tions of the complaint." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). If we accept that the master plan's provisions will result in increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents, this "personal injury" to respondents is "fairly traceable" to the Board of Review's veto power because knowledge that the master plan was subject to the veto power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's Board of Directors when it drew up the plan. Because invalidation of the veto power will prevent the enactment of the master plan, see 49 U. S. C. App. 2456(h), the relief respondents have requested is likely to redress their alleged injury. Moreover, the harm respond- ents have alleged is not confined to the consequences of a pos- sible increase in the level of activity at National. The harm also includes the creation of an impediment to a reduction in that activity. See App. 8. The Board of Review was cre- ated by Congress as a mechanism to preserve operations at National at their present level, or at a higher level if possible. See supra, at ---. The Board of Review and the Master Plan, which even petitioners acknowledge is at a minimum "noise neutral," Brief for Petitioners 37-38, therefore injure CAAN by making it more difficult for CAAN to reduce noise and activity at National. [n.13]
IV
Petitioners argue that this case does not raise any separation-of-powers issue because the Board of Review nei- ther exercises federal power nor acts as an agent of Con- gress. Examining the origin and structure of the Board, we conclude that petitioners are incorrect.
Petitioners lay great stress on the fact that the Board of Review was established by the bylaws of MWAA, which was created by legislation enacted by the State of Virginia and the District of Columbia. Putting aside the unsettled ques- tion whether the District of Columbia acts as a State or as an agent of the Federal Government for separation-of-powers purposes, we believe the fact that the Board of Review was created by state enactments is not enough to immunize it from separation-of-powers review. Several factors combine to mandate this result.
Control over National and Dulles was originally in federal hands, and was transferred to MWAA only subject to the condition that the States create the Board of Review. Con- gress placed such significance on the Board that it required that the Board's invalidation prevent the Airports Authority from taking any action that would have been subject to Board oversight. See 49 U. S. C. App. 2456(h). Moreover, the Federal Government has a strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports, which are vital to the smooth conduct of Government business, especially to the work of Congress, whose Members must maintain offices in both Washington and the districts that they represent and must shuttle back and forth according to the dictates of busy and often unpredictable schedules. This federal interest was identified in the preamble to the Transfer Act, [n.14] justified a Presidential appointee on the Board of Directors, and moti- vated the creation of the Board of Review, the structure and the powers of which Congress mandated in detail, see 2456(f). Most significant, membership on the Board of Re- view is limited to federal officials, specifically members of congressional committees charged with authority over air transportation.
That the Members of Congress who serve on the Board nominally serve "in their individual capacities, as represent- atives of users" of the airports, 2456(f)(1), does not prevent this group of officials from qualifying as a congressional agent exercising federal authority for separation-of-powers pur- poses. As we recently held, "separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity," Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 393. The Transfer Act imposes no requirement that the Members of Congress who are appointed to the Board actually be users of the airports. Rather, the Act im- poses the requirement that the Board members have con- gressional responsibilities related to the federal regulation of air transportation regulation. These facts belie the ipse dixit that the Board members will act "in their individual capacities."
Although the legislative history is not necessary to our conclusion that the Board members act in their official con- gressional capacities, the floor debates in the House confirm our view. See, e. g., 132 Cong. Rec. 32135 (1986) (The bill "also provides for continuing congressional review over the major decisions of the new airport authority. A Congres- sional Board will still have veto power over the new airport authority's: annual budget; issuance of bonds; regulations; master plan; and the naming of the Chief Executive Officer") (Rep. Lehman); id., at 32136 ("In addition, the motion pro- vides continued congressional control over both airports. Congress would retain oversight through a Board of Review made up of nine Members of Congress. This Board would have the right to overturn major decisions of the airport au- thority") (Rep. Coughlin); id., at 32137 ("Under this plan, Congress retains enough control of the airports to deal with any unseen pitfalls resulting from this transfer of author- ity. . . . We are getting our cake and eating it too. . . . The beauty of the deal is that Congress retains its control without spending a dime") (Rep. Smith); id., at 32141 ("There is, however, a congressional board which is established by this. . . . [T]hat board has been established to make sure that the Nation's interest, the congressional interest was at- tended to in the consideration of how these two airports are operated") (Rep. Hoyer); id., at 32142 (The bill does "not give up congressional control and oversight -- that remains in a Congressional Board of review") (Rep. Conte); id., at 32143 ("I understand that one concern of Members is that by leas- ing these airports to a local authority, we would be losing control over them. But, in fact, under this bill exactly the opposite is true. We will have more control than before") (Rep. Hammerschmidt).
Congress as a body also exercises substantial power over the appointment and removal of the particular Members of Congress who serve on the Board. The Transfer Act pro- vides that the Board "shall consist" of "two members of the Public Works and Transportation Committee and two mem- bers of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Repre- sentatives from a list provided by the Speaker of the House," "two members of the Commerce, Science, and Transporta- tion Committee and two members of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate from a list provided by the Presi- dent pro tempore of the Senate," and "one member chosen alternately . . . from a list provided by the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate, respec- tively." 49 U. S. C. App. 2456(f)(1). Significantly, ap- pointments must be made from the lists, and there is no re- quirement that the lists contain more recommendations than the number of Board openings. Cf. 28 U.S.C. 991(a) (Sentencing Reform Act upheld in Mistretta required only that the President "conside[r]" the recommendations of the Judicial Conference); 31 U.S.C. 703(a) (Congressional Commission only "recommend[s]" individuals for selection as Comptroller General). The list system, combined with con- gressional authority over committee assignments, guaran- tees Congress effective control over appointments. Control over committee assignments also gives Congress effective re- moval power over Board members because depriving a Board member of membership in the relevant committees deprives the member of authority to sit on the Board. See 49 U. S. C. App. 2456(f)(1) (Board "shall consist" of relevant committee members). [n.15]
We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Con- gress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the pur- pose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which is restricted to congressional offi- cials. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal
power as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of- powers scrutiny. Any other conclusion would permit Con- gress to evade the "carefully crafted" constraints of the Con- stitution, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983), simply by delegating primary responsibility for execution of national policy to the States, subject to the veto power of Members of Congress acting "in their individual capacities." Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 755 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). [n.16]
Petitioners contend that the Board of Review should nev- ertheless be immune from scrutiny for constitutional defects because it was created in the course of Congress' exercise of its power to dispose of federal property. See U. S. Const., Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. [n.17] In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), we held that a grant of highway funds to a State con- ditioned on the State's prohibition of the possession of alco- holic beverages by persons under the age of 21 was a lawful exercise of Congress' power to spend money for the general welfare. See U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 1. Even assum- ing that "Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly," we held that this indirect "encouragement to state action" was a valid use of the spend- ing power. Id., at 212. We thus concluded that Congress could endeavor to accomplish the federal objective of regulat- ing the national drinking age by the indirect use of the spend- ing power even though that regulatory authority would oth- erwise be a matter within state control pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment. [n.18]
Our holding in Dole did not involve separation-of-powers principles. It concerned only the allocation of power be- tween the Federal Government and the States. Our reason- ing that, absent coercion, a Sovereign State has both the in- centive and the ability to protect its own rights and powers, and therefore may cede such rights and powers, see id., at 210-211, is inapplicable to the issue presented by this case. Here, unlike Dole, there is no question about federal power to operate the airports. The question is whether the mainte- nance of federal control over the airports by means of the Board of Review, which is allegedly a federal instrumental- ity, is invalid, not because it invades any state power, but be- cause Congress' continued control violates the separation-of- powers principle, the aim of which is to protect not the States but "the whole people from improvident laws." Chadha, at 951. Nothing in our opinion in Dole implied that a highway grant to a State could have been conditioned on the State's creating a "Highway Board of Review" composed of Mem- bers of Congress. We must therefore consider whether the powers of the Board of Review may, consistent with the separation of powers, be exercised by an agent of Congress.
V Because National and Dulles are the property of the Fed- eral Government and their operations directly affect inter- state commerce, there is no doubt concerning the ultimate power of Congress to enact legislation defining the policies that govern those operations. Congress itself can formulate the details, or it can enact general standards and assign to the Executive Branch the responsibility for making neces- sary managerial decisions in conformance with those stand- ards. The question presented is only whether the Legisla- ture has followed a constitutionally acceptable procedure in delegating decision-making authority to the Board of Review.
The structure of our Government as conceived by the Framers of our Constitution disperses the federal power among the three branches -- the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial -- placing both substantive and procedural limitations on each. The ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the gov- erned. As former Attorney General Levi explained:
"The essence of the separation of powers concept formu- lated by the Founders from the political experience and philosophy of the revolutionary era is that each branch, in different ways, within the sphere of its defined powers and subject to the distinct institutional responsibilities of the others is essential to the liberty and security of the people. Each branch, in its own way, is the people's agent, its fiduciary for certain purposes.
. . . . .
"Fiduciaries do not meet their obligations by arrogating to themselves the distinct duties of their master's other agents." Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 385-386 (1976).
Violations of the separation-of-powers principle have been uncommon because each branch has traditionally respected the prerogatives of the other two. Nevertheless, the Court has been sensitive to its responsibility to enforce the princi- ple when necessary.
"Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme of the separation of govern- mental powers into the three coordinate branches. See, e. g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S., at 725 (citing Hum- phrey's Executor, 295 U. S., at 629-630). As we stated in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the system of separated powers and checks and balances established in the Constitution was regarded by the Framers as `self- executing safeguard against the encroachment or ag grandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.' Id., at 122. We have not hesitated to invalidate provi- sions of law which violate this principle. See id., at 123." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
The abuses by the monarch recounted in the Declaration of Independence provide dramatic evidence of the threat to lib- erty posed by a too powerful executive. But, as James Mad- ison recognized, the representatives of the majority in a dem- ocratic society, if unconstrained, may pose a similar threat:
"It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.
. . . . .
"The founders of our republics . . . seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to lib- erty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legisla- tive usurpations; which by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threat- ened by executive usurpations. . . . [I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the peo- ple ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.
"The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its con- stitutional powers being at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater facil- ity, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate depart- ments. It is not unfrequently a question of real-nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particu- lar measure, will, or will not extend beyond the legisla- tive sphere." The Federalist No. 48, pp. 332-334 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
To forestall the danger of encroachment "beyond the legis- lative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and re- lated constraints on the Congress. It may not "invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power." J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaus- tively considered, procedures" specified in Article I. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). [n.19]
The first constraint is illustrated by the Court's holdings in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Springer involved the validity of acts of the Philippine legislature that author- ized a committee of three -- two legislators and one execu- tive -- to vote corporate stock owned by the Philippine Gov- ernment. Because the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands incorporated the separation-of-powers principle, and because the challenged statute authorized two legislators to perform the executive function of controlling the management of the government-owned corporations, the Court held the statutes invalid. Our more recent decision in Bowsher involved a delegation of authority to the Comptroller General to revise the federal budget. After concluding that the Comptroller General was in effect an agent of Congress, the Court held that he could not exercise executive powers:
"To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws. . . . The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess." Bowsher, 478 U. S., at 726.
The second constraint is illustrated by our decision in Chadha. That case involved the validity of a statute that au- thorized either House of Congress by resolution to invalidate a decision by the Attorney General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. Congress had the power to achieve that result through legislation, but the statute was nevertheless invalid because Congress cannot exercise its legislative power to enact laws without following the bicam- eral and presentment procedures specified in Article I. For the same reason, an attempt to characterize the budgetary action of the Comptroller General in Bowsher as legislative action would not have saved its constitutionality because Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to its own agents or to its own Members. [n.20]
Respondents rely on both of these constraints in their chal- lenge to the Board of Review. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to discuss the second constraint because the court was satisfied that the power exercised by the Board of Review over "key operational decisions is quintessentially executive." 286 U. S. App. D.C., at 342, 917 F. 2d, at 56. We need not agree or disagree with this characterization by the Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review's power is constitutionally impermissible. If the power is ex- ecutive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Con- gress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and pre- sentment requirements of Art. I, 7. In short, when Con- gress "[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of al- tering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch," it must take that action by the procedures authorized in the Constitution. See Chadha, 462 U. S., at 952-955. [n.21]
One might argue that the provision for a Board of Review is the kind of practical accommodation between the Legisla- ture and the Executive that should be permitted in a "work- able government." [n.22] Admittedly, Congress imposed its will on the regional authority created by the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia by means that are unique and that might prove to be innocuous. However, the statu- tory scheme challenged today provides a blueprint for exten- sive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitu- tionally-confined role. Given the scope of the federal power to dispense benefits to the States in a variety of forms and subject to a host of statutory conditions, Congress could, if this Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to enable its Members or its agents to retain control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of national policy. As James Madison presciently observed, the legislature "can with greater facility, mask under compli- cated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments." The Federalist No. 48, at 334. Heeding his warning that legislative "power is of an encroaching nature," we conclude that the Board of Review is an impermissible encroachment. [n.23]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.