[ Kennedy ]
|Syllabus ||Concurrence |
[ Ginsburg ]
[ Thomas ]
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
THINGS REMEMBERED, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
Respondent commenced this action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guaranty of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, petitioner here, removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and the general federal removal statute, §1441(a). The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper, and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and, in effect, remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely under §§1441(a) and 1452(a) and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that §§1447(d) and 1452(b) barred appellate review of the District Court's remand order.
Held: If an order remands a removed bankruptcy case to state court because of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the order under §1447(d). That section, a provision of the general removal statute, bars appellate review of any "order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed." Under Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-346, §1447(d) must be read in pari materia with §1447(c), so that only remands based on the grounds recognized by §1447(c), i.e., a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, are immune from review under §1447(d). Section 1447(d) bars review here, since the District Court's order remanded the case to "the State court from which it was removed," and untimely removal is precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by §1447(c). The same conclusion pertains regardless of whether the case was removed under §1441(a) or §1452(a). Section 1447(d) applies "not only to remand[s] . . . under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes." United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752 (emphasis added). Moreover, there is no indication that Congress intended §1452 to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy or to exclude bankruptcy cases from §1447(d)'s coverage. Although §1452(b) expressly precludes review of certain remand decisions in bankruptcy cases, there is no reason §§1447(d) and 1452 cannot comfortably coexist in the bankruptcy context. The Court must, therefore, give effect to both. Pp. 3-5.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.