|Felker v. Turpin, Warden (95-8836), 518 U.S. 1051 (1996). |
[ Stevens ]
[ Souter ]
[ Rehnquist ]
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FELKER v. TURPIN,
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
After he was convicted of murder and other crimes and sentenced to death by a Georgia state court, petitioner was denied relief on direct appeal, in two rounds of state collateral proceedings, and in a first round of federal habeas corpus proceedings. While he was awaiting execution, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Act), Title I of which, as here pertinent, requires dismissal of a claim presented in a state prisoner's second or successive federal habeas application if the claim was also presented in a prior application, §106(b)(1); compels dismissal of a claim that was not presented in a prior federal application, unless certain conditions apply, §106(b)(2); creates a "gatekeeping" mechanism, whereby the prospective applicant files in the court of appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the district court, and a three judge panel determines whether the application makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies §106(b)'s requirements, §106(b)(3); and declares that a panel's grant or denial of authorization to file "shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for . . . writ of certiorari," §106(b)(3)(E). Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second federal habeas petition, which the Eleventh Circuit denied on the grounds, inter alia, that the claims to be raised therein had not been presented in his first petition and did not meet §106(b)(2)'s conditions. Petitioner then filed in this Court a pleading styled a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [and] for Appellate or Certiorari Review . . . ." The Court granted certiorari, ordering briefing on the extent to which Title I's provisions apply to a habeas petition filed in this Court, whether application of the Act suspended habeas in this case, and whether Title I, especially §106(b)(3)(E), unconstitutionally restricts the Court's jurisdiction.
1. The Act does not preclude this Court from entertaining an application for habeas corpus relief, although it does affect the standards governing the granting of such relief. Pp. 5-10.
(a) Title I does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions filed as original matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. No Title I provision mentions the Court's authority to entertain such original petitions; in contrast, §103 amends the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to bar consideration of original habeas petitions in the courts of appeals. Although §106(b)(3)(E) precludes the Court from reviewing, by appeal or certiorari, the latter courts' decisions exercising the "gatekeeping" function for second habeas petitions, it makes no mention of the Court's original habeas jurisdiction. Thus, the Court declines to find a repeal of §2241 by implication. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 105. This conclusion obviates any claim by petitioner under the Constitution's Exceptions Clause, Art. III, §2, which provides, inter alia, that, "[i]n all . . . Cases . . . the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make." Since the Act does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain a habeas petition, there can be no plausible argument that it deprives the Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of that Clause. Pp. 6-9.
(b) Title I changes the standards governing this Court's consideration of habeas petitions by imposing new requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which limits the Court's authority to grant relief to state prisoners. Section 106(b)(3)'s "gatekeeping" system does not apply to the Court because it is limited to applications "filed in the district court." There is no such limitation, however, on the restrictions imposed by §§106(b)(1) and (2), and those restrictions inform the Court's authority to grant relief on original habeas petitions, whether or not the Court is bound by the restrictions. Pp. 9-10.
2. The Act does not violate the Constitution's Suspension Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 2, which provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended." The new restrictions on successive habeas petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas practice "abuse of the writ." The doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489. The new restrictions are well within the compass of this evolutionary process and do not amount to a "suspension" of the writ. Pp. 10-12.
3. The petition for an original writ of habeas corpus is denied. Petitioner's claims do not satisfy the §106(b)(2) requirements, let alone this Court's Rule 20.4(a), which requires that the habeas petitioner show "exceptional circumstances" justifying the issuance of the writ and says that habeas relief is rarely granted. Petitioner's claims here do not materially differ from numerous other claims made by successive habeas petitioners that the Court has had occasion to review on stay applications. P. 12.
Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction; writ of habeas corpus denied.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined.