|GRAY v. MARYLAND (96-8653)
344 Md. 417, 687 A. 2d 660, vacated and remanded.
|Syllabus ||Opinion |
[ Breyer ]
[ Scalia ]
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
GRAY v. MARYLAND
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Anthony Bell confessed to the police that he, petitioner Gray, and another man participated in the beating that caused Stacy Williams death. After the third man died, a Maryland grand jury indicted Bell and Gray for murder, and the State tried them jointly. When the trial judge permitted the State to introduce a redacted version of Bells confession, the detective who read it to the jury said deleted or deletion whenever the name of Gray or the third participant appeared. Immediately after that reading, however, the detective answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked, after [Bell] gave you that information, you subsequently were able to arrest Gray; is that correct? The State also introduced a written copy of the confession with the two names omitted, leaving in their place blanks separated by commas. The judge instructed the jury that the confession could be used as evidence only against Bell, not Gray. The jury convicted both defendants. Marylands intermediate appellate court held that Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, prohibited use of the confession and set aside Grays conviction. Marylands highest court disagreed and reinstated that conviction.
Held: The confession here at issue, which substituted blanks and the word delete for Grays proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Brutons protective rule applies. Pp. 311.
(a) Bruton also involved two defendants tried jointly for the same crime, with the confession of one them incriminating both himself and the other. This Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendants Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. The Court explained that this situation, in which the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial, is one of the contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow limiting instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so devastating to the defendant, that the introduction of the evidence cannot be allowed. See 391 U.S., at 135136. Brutons scope was limited by Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, in which the Court held that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendants confession with a proper limiting instruction when the confession is redacted to eliminate not only that defendants name, but any reference to his or her existence. Pp. 35.
(b) Unlike Richardsons redacted confession, the confession here refers directly to Grays existence. Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as deleted or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Brutons unredacted statements as to warrant the same legal results. For one thing, a jury will often react similarly to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted as here, for it will realize that the confession refers specifically to the defendant, even when the State does not blatantly link the defendant to the deleted name, as it did below by asking the detective whether Gray was arrested on the basis of information in Bells confession. For another thing, the obvious deletion may well call the jurors attention specially to the removed name. By encouraging the jury to speculate about the reference, the redaction may overemphasize the importance of the confessions accusationonce the jurors work out the reference. Finally, Brutons protected statements and statements redacted to leave a blank or some other similarly obvious alteration, function the same way grammatically: They point directly to, and accuse, the nonconfessing codefendant. Pp. 58.
(c) Although Richardson placed outside Brutons scope statements that incriminate inferentially, 481 U.S., at 208, and the jury must use inference to connect Bells statements with Gray, Richardson does not control the result here. Inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference. If it did, then Richardson would also place outside Brutons scope confessions that use, e.g., nicknames and unique descriptions, whereas this Court has assumed that such identifiers fall inside Brutons protection, see Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253. Thus, Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richardsons inferences involved statements that did not refer directly to the defendant himself, but became incriminating only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial. 481 U.S., at 208. In contrast, the inferences here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously to Gray, and involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial. Richardsons policy reasons for its conclusionthat application of Brutons rule would force prosecutors to abandon use either of the confession or of a joint trial in instances where adequate redaction would not [be] possible, id., at 209, and would lead to those same results, or provoke mistrials, because of the difficulty of predicting, before introduction of all the evidence, whether Bruton barred use of a particular confession that incriminated by connection, see ibid.are inapplicable in the circumstances here. Pp. 811.344 Md. 417, 687 A. 2d 660, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, OConnor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined.