| Syllabus | Opinion [ Ginsburg ] | Dissent [ Rehnquist ] |
|---|---|---|
| HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version |
[April 5, 1999]
Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
Respondent faxed petitioner a copy of the file-stamped complaint in its commenced state-court action, and I believe that the receipt of this facsimile triggered the 30-day removal period under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The Court does little to explain why the plain language of the statute should not control, opting instead to superimpose a judicially created service of process requirement onto §1446(b). In so doing, it departs from this Courts practice of strictly construing removal and similar jurisdictional statutes. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108109 (1941). Because I believe the Eleventh Circuits analysis of the issue presented in this case was cogent and correct, see 125 F.3d 1396, 13971398 (1997), I would affirm the dismissal of petitioners removal petition for the reasons stated by that court.