| Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
(No. 79-243)
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Burger ] | Concurrence
[ White ] | Concurrence
[ Stevens ] | Concurrence
[ Brennan ] | Concurrence
[ Stewart ] | Concurrence
[ Blackmun ] | Dissent
[ Rehnquist ] |
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
This is a watershed case. Until today, the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever. An additional word of emphasis is therefore appropriate.
Twice before, the Court has implied that any governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe and no matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally acceptable so long as it did not single out the press for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large. In a dissent joined by MR JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850, MR. JUSTICE POWELL unequivocally rejected the conclusion that
any governmental restriction on press access to information, [p583] so long as it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First Amendment concern.
Id. at 857 (emphasis in original). And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19-40, I explained at length why MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and I were convinced that
[a]n official prison policy of concealing . . . knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Id. at 38. Since MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN were unable to participate in that case, a majority of the Court neither accepted nor rejected that conclusion or the contrary conclusion expressed in the prevailing opinions. [n1] Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment.
It is somewhat ironic that the Court should find more reason to recognize a right of access today than it did in Houchins. For Houchins involved the plight of a segment of society least able to protect itself, an attack on a longstanding policy of concealment, and an absence of any legitimate justification for abridging public access to information about how government operates. In this case, we are protecting the interests of the most powerful voices in the community, we are concerned with an almost unique exception to an established tradition of openness in the conduct of criminal [p584] trials, and it is likely that the closure order was motivated by the judge's desire to protect the individual defendant from the burden of a fourth criminal trial. [n2]
In any event, for the reasons stated in Part II of my Houchins opinion, 438 U.S. at 338, as well as those stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE today, I agree that the First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial Branch; given the total absence of any record justification for the closure order entered in this case, that order violated the First Amendment.
Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control.
438 U.S. at 15 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.) .
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by government. . . . The Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once government has opened its doors.
Id. at 16 (STEWART, J., concurring in judgment).
2. Neither that likely motivation nor facts showing the risk that a fifth trial would have been necessary without closure of the fourth are disclosed in this record, however. The absence of any articulated reason for the closure order is a sufficient basis for distinguishing this case from Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368. The decision today is in no way inconsistent with the perfectly unambiguous holding in Gannett that the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are rights that may be asserted by the accused, rather than members of the general public. In my opinion, the Framers quite properly identified the party who has the greatest interest in the right to a public trial. The language of the Sixth Amendment is worth emphasizing:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
(Emphasis added.)