Stevens, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 97—463

TEXTRON LYCOMING RECIPROCATING ENGINE DIVISION, AVCO CORP., PETITIONER v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICUL-
TURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL
UNION and ITS LOCAL 787

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[May 18, 1998]

Justice Stevens, concurring.

If the Union’s allegations are true, it seems clear that petitioner violated its statutory duty to bargain in good faith. Our conclusion that the federal courts do not have §301(a) jurisdiction over the Union’s suit therefore comports with the important goal of protecting the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in resolving disputes arising from the collective-bargaining process. As the Court has long recognized, “[i]t is implicit in the entire structure of the [National Labor Relations] Act that the Board acts to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining.” H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107—108 (1970). “Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules.” Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). The rules governing disputes that arise out of the collective-bargaining process are within the special competence of the National Labor Relations Board. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The fact that the Board undoubtedly has more expertise in the collective-bargaining area than federal judges provides an additional reason for concluding that Congress meant what it said in §301(a) and for rejecting the Union’s and the Government’s broad reading of the “[s]uits for violation of contracts” language.