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Political Question Doctrine

Federal courts will refuse to hear a case if they find it presents a political question.  This phrase is construed narrowly, and it does not stop courts from hearing cases about controversial issues like abortion, or politically important topics like campaign finance.  Rather, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts should not hear cases which deal directly with issues that Constitution makes the sole responsibility of the other branches of government.  Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Therefore, the Court has held that the conduct of foreign relations is the sole responsibility of the executive branch, and cases challenging the way the executive is using that power present political questions. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). Similarly, the Court has held that lawsuits challenging congress' procedure for impeachment proceedings present political questions.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 

 

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 

The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution.  In terms relevant to the question for decision in this case, the judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to "cases" and "controversies." As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the  words "cases" and "controversies" are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.

Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is illustrated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated in federal courts have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no standing to maintain the action.

Flast v Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)