administrative law

Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra

Issues

Are patients “entitled to” SSI benefits when they are eligible for SSI benefits or when they are receiving cash SSI benefits?

The Disproportionate Share Hospital adjustment (“DSH”) is a statutory provision administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) that increases payments to hospitals serving high percentages of low-income patients to account for their increased treatment costs. At issue here is how eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) affects these DSH payments. Advocate Christ Medical Center argues that the phrase “entitled to [SSI] benefits” in the DSH provision should include all patients enrolled in the SSI program, even if they do not receive monthly cash payments. HHS counters that only patients receiving cash benefits during hospitalization should count. This case has important ramifications on agency interpretation, administrative workability, and hospitals’ ability to accept low-income patients.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the phrase “entitled ... to benefits,” used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, means the same thing for Medicare part A and Supplemental Social Security benefits, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the Medicare program aims to provide health insurance to elderly or disabled individuals. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Becerra at 349, 351. Hospitals receive a fixed payment for treating a Medicare patient. Id. At 349.

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American Hospital Association v. Becerra

Issues

Is the Department of Health and Human Services entitled to deference in its interpretation of a statute that enabled it to reduce drug reimbursement rates for hospitals; alternatively, is the Department of Health and Human Services’ action unreviewable because of 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12)?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of authority granted to the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in setting hospital Medicare reimbursement rates for outpatient drugs. The Medicare Modernization Act (“MMA”) prescribes two alternative reimbursement rate methodologies for outpatient drugs—hospital acquisition cost or average drug price—and conditions HHS’s choice on whether HHS collects hospital drug cost-acquisition data. American Hospital Association et al. argue that MMA prevents HHS from tailoring rates to hospital acquisition costs and varying rates by group unless HHS has the requisite data. Xavier Becerra responds that MMA gives HHS the authority to “adjust” reimbursement rates as necessary, and therefore deference under Chevron permits HHS discretion to set reasonable rates. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the financial health of 340B hospitals, and the Medicare system more broadly, as well as the scope of the administrative state and judicial deference under Chevron.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council permits the Department of Health and Human Services to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and very such rates by hospital group if it has not collected adequate hospital acquisition cost survey data; and (2) whether petitioners’ suit challenging HHS’s adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12).

The Medicare program consists of Part A and Part B. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar at 820. Under Medicare Part B, which provides coverage for certain hospital-administered drugs, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) sets hospital reimbursement rates. Id. The “Outpatient Prospective Payment System” (“OPPS”) regulates the establishment of these rates.

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Arellano v. McDonough

Issues

Does the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling, which would allow a veteran to apply for disability benefits past the normal deadline, apply to 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1), and if so, has the Government rebutted that presumption?

38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) allows veterans who apply for disability compensation benefits within one year of discharge from the military to have retroactive disability compensation benefits counted from the date of discharge instead of the date of application for benefits. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether equitable tolling, an exemption to statutes of limitations under which plaintiffs who could not discover the basis to bring their lawsuits until after the expiration of the limitations period may bring a claim, applies to this one-year deadline. Although 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) does not have an explicit statute of limitation, Arellano argues that the statute functionally serves as a statute of limitations and that the Court has held that equitable tolling applies by default to functional statutes of limitations, including those applicable to suits against the government. McDonough counters that § 5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations, and that if Congress intended to allow equitable tolling to apply to the statute, it would have explicitly stated so in the law. The Court’s decision in this case will impact veterans’ welfare and the speed and procedure of disability claims administration.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling from Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs applies to the one-year statutory deadline in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) for seeking retroactive disability benefits, and, if so, whether the government has rebutted that presumption; and (2) whether, if 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) is amenable to equitable tolling, this case should be remanded so the agency can consider the particular facts and circumstances in the first instance.

Congress has authorized disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 for veterans who suffered disabilities during their service. Arellano v. McDonough at 1061. The size of the benefits is partly determined by the effective date of the award.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian

Issues

Does the federal “Superfund” Act prevent property owners from seeking restoration damages under state law?

Court below

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether private citizens can fashion their own cleanup remedies at federal “Superfund” sites. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, commonly known as “Superfund,” allows the Environmental Protection Agency to create cleanup plans for polluted sites across the nation. Gregory Christian and other resident landowners (“Landowners”) near the Superfund site of Anaconda, Montana, sued the owner of the site, Atlantic Richfield, alleging that the company owed them damages to restore their properties to pre-pollution status. Atlantic Richfield argues that the Superfund Act preempts any party from seeking state-law restoration damages. The Landowners counter that the Superfund Act leaves room for additional damages beyond what the Environmental Protection Agency has already deemed appropriate. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the certainty and finality of Superfund cleanups, private-property rights, and the balance of state and federal power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a common-law claim for restoration seeking cleanup remedies that conflict with remedies the Environmental Protection Agency ordered is a jurisdictionally barred “challenge” to the EPA’s cleanup under 42 U.S.C. § 9613 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.

(2) Whether a landowner at a Superfund site is a “potentially responsible party” that must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action, even if the EPA has never ordered the landowner to pay for a cleanup.

(3) Whether CERCLA pre-empts state common-law claims for restoration that seek cleanup remedies that conflict with EPA-ordered remedies.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company smelted copper near the town of Anaconda, Montana. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial District Court at 517. Over time, smelting operations created large levels of pollutants—particularly, arsenic and lead—in the surrounding town.

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Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC

Issues

Does the FTC Act remove subject-matter jurisdiction from district courts to hear constitutional challenges to the FTC’s structure, procedures, and existence by providing for FTC administrative adjudication of antitrust issues and review of these decisions by the courts of appeals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether claims brought by parties like Axon Enterprise, Inc. (“Axon”) that challenge the structure of the Federal Trade Commission can be reviewed by district courts prior to the completion of agency proceedings. Axon contends that federal district courts should be able to hear constitutional challenges to agency structure concurrently with agency enforcement proceedings because enjoining such proceedings is necessary to avoid “here-and-now” constitutional injury. The FTC counters that the Federal Trade Commission Act implicitly strips district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over these challenges, making judicial review available only in the courts of appeals and only after a final order by the FTC. The case carries significant implications for administrative law because allowing businesses subject to FTC regulation to preemptively challenge agency proceedings could significantly scale back the agency’s enforcement powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Congress impliedly stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedures, and existence by granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction to “affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside” the commission’s cease-and-desist orders.

The Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”) empowers the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to address the use of “unfair methods of competition” by initiating administrative proceedings and issuing cease-and-desist orders. Axon Enter. v. Trade Comm’n at 1189.

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Babcock v. Kijakazi

Issues

Under the Social Security Act’s Windfall Elimination Provision, does the uniform-services exemption apply to Civil Service Retirement System payments derived from service as a dual-status technician?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the uniformed services exemption under the Social Security Act applies to the Civil Service Retirement System pensions of dual-status technicians. Petitioner David Babcock argues that the entirety of his service as a dual-status technician was as a uniformed member of the National Guard and he thus should entirely fall under the exemption. The Social Security Administration, under Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi, argues that the portion of Babcock’s service as a dual-status technician that was compensated by the Civil Service Retirement System pension was performed in his capacity as a civilian employee and therefore it should not fall under the exemption. The outcome of this case will impact the benefits available to dual-status technicians and clarify the distinction between dual-status technicians and other military personnel.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a civil service pension received for federal civilian employment as a “militarytechnician (dual status)” is “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the Social Security Act’s windfall elimination provision.

From 1975 to 2014, Petitioner David Babcock (“Babcock”) was employed as a National Guard dual-status technician. Babcock v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. at 1–2. A dual-status technician, under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1) and 32 U.S.C.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Jed Stiglitz for his guidance and insights

into this case.

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Biden v. Texas

Issues

Is the Department of Homeland Security required by law to continue returning certain undocumented aliens to Mexico, consistent with the Migrant Protection Protocols; and, was the Fifth Circuit correct in holding DHS erred in terminating MPP?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must continue enforcing the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). On October 29, 2021, DHS issued a decision terminating MPP, a Trump administration policy where Border Patrol returns certain undocumented aliens arriving at the southern border to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. The Biden Administration (“President Biden”) argues that DHS permissibly rescinded MPP via agency memoranda because the amended Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives DHS discretion over whether to remove, detain, or parole noncitizens. Texas and Missouri respond that DHS’s rescission of MPP has no legal effect because if DHS lacks capacity to detain undocumented aliens, the INA obligates DHS to remove such persons by continuing to enforce MPP. The outcome of this case has significant implications for undocumented aliens seeking asylum in the United States and immigrant communities within the United States, as well as the role of the executive in determining immigration policy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 requires the Department of Homeland Security to continue implementing the Migrant Protection Protocols, a former policy under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration and proceedings; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred by concluding that the secretary of homeland security’s new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.

In December 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). Texas v.

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Bufkin v. McDonough

Issues

Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process when reviewing veterans’ benefits claims? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the standard of review that the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) should apply to claims on appeal. Bufkin argues that the Veterans Court must review the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ and the Board of Veteran Appeals’ application of “the benefit of the doubt” where any evidence material to the veteran’s disability-benefits claim is in approximate balance. Further, Bufkin contends that in conducting this separate review, the Veterans Court is reviewing a matter of law, which requires a more demanding standard of review than clear error. McDonough counters that the Veterans Court is instead engaging in a factual review, arguing it should not reassess the facts to determine whether the benefit-of-the-doubt rule applies unless clearly erroneous. McDonough asserts that the Veterans Court need only consider whether the Department of Veterans Affairs properly applied the rule when raised. The outcome of this case has future implications for veterans’ disability benefits claims and the scope of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims must ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the court to “take due account” of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule.

In 1988, Congress enacted the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”) creating the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), a specialized Article I tribunal meant to review

Additional Resources

●  Jimmy Hoover, Justices Will Decide If Vets Are Getting the 'Benefit of the Doubt', The National Law Journal (Apr. 30, 2024).

●  Sarah Barker, Supreme Court to Rule on Benefit of the Doubt Rule in Veterans’ Benefits Cases, Mason Veterans and Servicemembers Legal Clinic (May 13, 2024).

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Campos-Chaves v. Garland

Issues

When providing notice to an immigrant in deportation proceedings, does the government comply with its obligations under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) by providing a Notice to Appear with no date and location and a subsequent, updated Notice of Hearing including that information?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government complies with the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)) (“INA”) when it provides notice of deportation proceedings in a separate document from their date and time. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), the government must provide “written notice” to undocumented immigrants who are subject to deportation. This “written notice” is provided in a document called a “notice to appear” (“NTA”) and must include the “time and place” of the proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). However, the government routinely sends two documents: one NTA to alert the immigrant about the removal proceedings, and another Notice of Hearing (“NOH”) to communicate the time and place of the hearing. Campos-Chaves argues that this scheme violates the INA because the statute requires this information to be provided in one document. The United States argues that it complies with the INA because its disjunctive language permits dual-document notice and because a curative NOH overcomes a defective NTA. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to immigrants in deportation proceedings and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the government provides notice “required under” and “in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information, such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order.

Moris Campos-Chaves (“Campos-Chaves”) is a citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization on January 24, 2005. Campos-Chaves v. Garland at 1-2. On February 10, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or “government”) served Campos-Chaves with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), initiating deportation proceedings against him. Id. at 2. This NTA did not contain the time and place of his deportation hearing.

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Carr v. Saul

Issues

Must claimants seeking Social Security benefits administratively exhaust their constitutional claims before seeking judicial review?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Social Security claimants must exhaust constitutional legal issues before an intra-agency adjudicative body—such as a Social Security Administration administrative law judge or appeals board—before seeking review of that issue in court. Petitioner Willie Carr argues that a requirement of issue exhaustion is inappropriate for his Appointments Clause challenge because no statute mandates issue exhaustion and a judicially-crafted requirement would break with historical precedent. Respondent Andrew Saul, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, counters that a general rule of judicial economy is applicable here, and that all issues can and must be exhausted before an administrative body before a claimant can seek review. This case has important implications for the procedural ease of new challenges to prior adverse benefits rulings for Social Security claimants, as well as the dockets of reviewing courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a claimant seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeits an appointments-clause challenge to the appointment of an administrative law judge by failing to present that challenge during administrative proceedings.

In 2014, Willie Earl Carr attempted to claim disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Carr v. Comm’r, SSA at 5. In 2017, administrative law judges (“ALJs”) denied the claims. Id. Carr then sued in the Northern District of Oklahoma.

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