adoption
Adoption refers to the act where an adult formally becomes the guardian of a child and incurs the rights and obligations of a parent.
Adoption refers to the act where an adult formally becomes the guardian of a child and incurs the rights and obligations of a parent.
Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, decided to adopt a baby girl from a single mother. After Baby Girl's birth, Adoptive Couple began the official adoption process and Birth Father, a member of the Cherokee Nation, signed a form relinquishing his rights to Baby Girl. Later, however, Birth Father claimed that he did not intend to relinquish his rights and sought to invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") because Baby Girl is of Indian heritage. Both the Charleston County Family Court and the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that Birth Father should have custody of Baby Girl. Adoptive Couple argues that Birth Father does not qualify as a “parent” under the ICWA and, thus, does not have parental rights to stop Baby Girl’s adoption. Furthermore, Adoptive Couple asserts that given the intent of the ICWA and the fact that Baby Girl has no parental relationship to Birth Father or other ties to the Cherokee Nation, the ICWA cannot be applied to oppose her adoption. Respondents Birth Father and the Cherokee Nation claim that Birth Father does meet the “parent” definition of ICWA because he has proven his biological link to Baby Girl and also acknowledged her as his child. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will have an impact on the adoption process and system for children of Indian heritage, their biological parents, and prospective adoptive parents.
Whether a non-custodial parent can invoke ICWA to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law.
Whether ICWA defines "parent" in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.
Under the ICWA, can a non-custodial parent or an unwed biological father prevent a non-Indian parent from pursuing adoption?
Does the Indian Child Welfare Act discriminate based on race and commandeer state apparatuses in the adoption placements of Indian children?
Note: The authors mirror the parties’ and courts’ use of the terms “Indian” and “Indian child” as legal terms in this Preview.
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) violates the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee and contravenes anticommandeering principles rooted in the Tenth Amendment. Deb Haaland, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, argues that ICWA’s classification of “Indian child” is constitutional because the classification is political and tied to Congress’s “unique obligation” to Indian tribes. Haaland further contends that Congress has the power to regulate Indian child placement preferences under the Indian Commerce Clause. Chad Everet Brackeen asserts that ICWA’s classification of “Indian child” is race-based and violates the Equal Protection Clause. Brackeen also asserts that ICWA’s placement preferences exceed Congress’s authority by forcing state agencies to carry out federal laws. The outcome of this case has important implications for Indian children’s interests, tribal interests, and state sovereignty regarding the adoption proceedings of Indian children.
1. Whether ICWA’s placement preferences— which disfavor non-Indian adoptive families in child- placement proceedings involving an “Indian child” and thereby disadvantage those children—discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
2. Whether ICWA’s placement preferences exceed Congress’s Article I authority by invading the arena of child placement—the “virtually exclusive province of the States,” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)—and otherwise commandeering state courts and state agencies to carry out a federal child-placement program.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) to protect American Indian children from widespread removal from their native families and communities and placement in non-Indian homes. Brackeen v. Haaland at 28–29. Prior to ICWA’s adoption, 25 to 35 percent of Indian children were removed from their families.
The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Sliger and Derril B. Jordan, Esq. for their guidance and insights into this case.