death penalty

Ayers v. Belmontes (05-493)

Fernando Belmontes, a criminal defendant sentenced to death by a California jury, challenges the constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of California’s jury instruction, arguing that the instruction prevents the jury from considering evidence about his future prospects as a productive member of society. The Court will assess whether there is a reasonable likelihood that this jury instruction will prevent a jury from considering the defendant’s future conduct when determining whether to mitigate the defendant’s punishment to life without parole. If the Court determines that the instruction is insufficient, it will also consider whether its ruling should apply retroactively to other criminal defendants. The case will affect how states draft their capital sentencing jury instructions and will give Justices Roberts and Alito an opportunity to articulate their opinions on the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does Boyde confirm the constitutional sufficiency of California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction where a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his background and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his future prospects as a life prisoner?

2. Does the Ninth Circuit’s holding, that California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction is constitutionally inadequate to inform jurors they may consider "forward-looking" mitigation evidence constitute a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)?

The Crime and State Proceedings

On March 15, 1981, Fernando Belmontes burglarized the house of 19-year-old Steacy McConnell. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Upon finding McConnell at home, Belmontes struck her several times in the head with a metal dumbbell bar before stealing her stereo equipment. Id. at 2–3.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Sheri Johnson, Stephen Garvey, and John Blume for their insights into this case.

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Ayestas v. Davis

Issues

Is the Fifth Circuit’s “substantial need” test for awarding investigative resources to indigent defendants consistent with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f)?

Carlos Manuel Ayestas brought a state habeas petition after he was sentenced to death in Texas for murder. After the state denied his petition in 2008, Ayestas petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Ayestas requested funding for “investigative, expert, or other services” under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) to help support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ayestas’s claim and denied his § 3599(f) motion, finding that he had not demonstrated a “substantial need” for investigative assistance. Ayestas now challenges this substantial need test on appeal, arguing that it is inconsistent with the text, history, and purpose of § 3599(f). The Director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Lorie Davis, on the other hand, argues the test is proper in light of the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This case will allow the court to determine the appropriate statutory interpretation of § 3599(f), as well as its applicability to federal habeas proceedings. The case could have significant consequences for the resources available to capital defendants bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) withholds “reasonably necessary” resources to investigate and develop an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that state habeas counsel forfeited, where the claimant’s existing evidence does not meet the ultimate burden of proof at the time the § 3599(f) motion is made.

Petitioner Carlos Manuel Ayestas was convicted and sentenced to death for murder in 1995. See Ayestas v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 888, 892 (5th Cir.

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Bobby v. Bies

Issues

Whether the Sixth Circuit's definition of "acquittal" conflicts with the Supreme Court's prior decisions defining "acquittal" under AEDPA, whether relitigation to determine if a death-sentenced inmate is mentally retarded violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, and whether the Sixth Circuit violated the AEDPA when it applied the Double Jeopardy Clause's collateral estoppel argument to prevent relitigation, even if that issue might not have been necessary to the court's decision in that case.

 

Respondent Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, murder and attempted rape of a ten-year-old boy in 1992. Despite expert testimony indicating that he was functionally mentally retarded, a jury recommended and judge delivered a death sentence. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that Bies was mentally retarded, but held that the aggravating circumstances of the crime outweighed the mitigating factor of his mental retardation. However, in 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court held that execution of mentally retarded individuals violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Bies argues that in light of this, his death sentence should be commuted since the Ohio Supreme Court already indicated that he was mentally retarded, and re-litigating the issue would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The State of Ohio argues that since the issue of Bies' mental retardation was not necessary for the State's decision prior to Atkins v. Virginia, contesting the issue of his mental state is not blocked by collateral estoppel, or in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause. This case is important because it will help to determine whether states can have the opportunity to relitigate the issue of whether a convicted capital defendant is mentally retarded before his sentence is commuted in light of Atkins.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the Sixth Circuit violate the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") when, in overruling an Ohio post-conviction court on double jeopardy grounds, it crafted a new definition of "acquittal" that conflicts with this Court's decisions?

2. Do the Double Jeopardy Clause's protections apply to a state post-conviction hearing on the question of a death-sentenced inmate's mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that does not expose the inmate to the risk of any additional criminal punishment?

3. Did the Sixth Circuit violate AEDPA when it applied the Double Jeopardy Clause's collateral estoppel component to enjoin an Ohio post-conviction court from deciding the issue of a death-sentenced inmate's mental retardation under Atkins even though the Ohio Supreme Court did not actually and necessarily decide the issue on direct review?

In 1992, Respondent Michael Bies was convicted of the kidnapping, murder, and attempted rape of a ten-year-old boy. See Bies v. Bagley, 519 F.3d 324, 327 (2008). Bies admitted to participating in the murder with the aid of an accomplice. See State v. Bies, 74 Ohio St.

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Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Professor John H. Blume, Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and Director of the Cornell Death Penalty Project. He is serving as Counsel of Record for Respondent Michael Bies and lent insight on the most important issues that may shape the Supreme Court's decision in this case.

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Boyer v. Louisiana

The State of Louisiana indicted Jonathan Edward Boyer for the murder of Bradlee Marsh in 2002, but the case did not proceed to trial until 2009. The trial resulted in Boyer’s conviction, and a state appellate court affirmed. Boyer now argues before the Supreme Court that Louisiana violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Specifically, Boyer alleges that five years of delay were caused entirely by Louisiana’s failure to fund his appointed, capitally-certified counsel and that this funding failure should be weighed against the state. Louisiana counters that Boyer has no constitutional right to capitally-certified counsel and that Boyer, not the State, is responsible for the delay. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will determine whether a state’s failure to fund appointed, specially-qualified counsel for an indigent capital defendant should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes. The decision may substantially affect indigent defendants’ constitutional rights as well as state procedures for providing indigent capital defense.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state’s failure to fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years, particularly where failure was the direct result of the prosecution’s choice to seek the death penalty, should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes?

Issue

Whether the State of Louisiana’s five-year failure to fund appointed, specially-qualified counsel for an indigent defendant in a capital case should be weighed against the State for speedy trial purposes?

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Brewer v. Quarterman; Abdul-Kabir, fka Cole v. Quarterman

Issues

1. Could the jury give constitutionally sufficient consideration to mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and mental illness through deliberations on the deliberateness of the defendant’s action or on his future dangerousness?

2. Even if it is theoretically possible that jurors could sufficiently consider such evidence, is it reasonably likely that the prosecution’s reminders to answer the questions narrowly prevented the jurors from actually considering such mitigating evidence?

3. Has the Fifth Circuit drawn and unconstitutional line by distinguishing chronic, untreatable mental illness from other mental illnesses?

 

Brent Ray Brewer and Jalil Abdul-Kabir, the petitioners in these cases, are two inmates on death row in Texas. They are seeking writs of habeas corpus from the federal courts to overturn their death sentences. During the sentencing phase of their trials, the jury was asked to determine whether the defendant killed “deliberately,” and whether he would constitute a “continuing threat to society.” The juries in both cases returned two “yes” answers, which dictated a sentence of death under state law. The inmates argue that these questions did not give the jury a meaningful basis on which to consider mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and mental illness. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the habeas corpus petition for Abdul-Kabir but granted it for Brewer. The Fifth Circuit, in ruling for the state on both petitions on appeal, held that the jury instruction enabled the jury to consider mitigating evidence in their deliberations on the future dangerousness question. Therefore, it held that the state court did not misapply  federal  law, and the writ of habeas corpus could not be granted. The inmates disagree with this conclusion and are now making an as-applied challenge to the Texas statute before the U.S. Supreme Court. These cases could have a significant impact on the ongoing national debate about the appropriateness of applying the death penalty on the mentally ill.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Do the former Texas “special issue” capital sentencing jury instructions—which permit jurors to register only a “yes” or “no” answer to two questions, inquiring whether the defendant killed “deliberately” and probably would constitute a “continuing threat to society”—permit constitutionally adequate consideration of mitigating evidence about a defendant’s mental impairment and childhood mistreatment and deprivation, in light of this Court’s emphatic statement in Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004), that those same two questions “had little, if anything, to do with” Smith’s evidence of mental impairment and childhood mistreatment)?

2. Do this Court’s recent opinions in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (“Penry II”) and Smith, both of which require instructions that permit jurors to give “full consideration and full effect” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence in choosing the appropriate sentence, preclude the Fifth Circuit from adhering to its prior decisions—antedating Penry II and Smith—that reject Penry error whenever the former special issues might have afforded some indirect consideration of the defendant’s mitigating evidence?

3. Has the Fifth Circuit, in insisting that a defendant show as a predicate to relief under Penry that he suffers from a mental disorder that is severe, permanent or untreatable, simply resurrected the threshold test for “constitutional relevance” that this Court emphatically rejected in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)?

4. Where the prosecution, as it did here, repeatedly implores jurors to “follow the law” and “do their duty” by answering the former Texas special issues on their own terms and abjuring any attempt to use their answers to effect an appropriate sentence, is it reasonably likely that jurors applied their instructions in a way that prevented them from fully considering and giving effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence?

Brent Ray Brewer was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the murder of Robert Laminack. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Brewer v. Dretke, No. 05-11287 (May 30, 2006) (“Brewer Petition for Cert.”). At trial, counsel for Brewer introduced mitigating evidence indicating that Brewer suffered mental illness and an abusive childhood. Id. at 3.

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Brown v. Sanders

Issues

Did the California Supreme Court err by upholding Sanders' death sentence despite the fact that it invalidated two of the four special circumstances used to determine the penalty in the lower court, and failed to reweigh the circumstance or determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

 

Ronald Lee Sanders was found guilty of murder and other charges related to a 1981 attack in Bakersfield, California. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that there were four “special circumstances” related to his crimes, and accordingly sentenced him to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated two of the special circumstances, but upheld the death sentence without reweighing whether it was warranted by the remaining special circumstances. The California Supreme Court also failed to specifically find that the presence of the invalid circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and petitions for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that it was unconstitutional for the California Supreme Court to uphold the death sentence without reweighing the special circumstances or finding the error to be harmless. Petitioner, the state of California, argues that the state's sentencing code is not the type of “weighing” statute that would render a death sentence invalid simply because certain special circumstances were found to be invalid. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will significantly impact the prospects for successful appeals or writs for habeas corpus by defendants similarly situated to Sanders.

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Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Is the California death penalty statute a “weighing statute” for which the state court is required to determine that the presence of an invalid special circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the jury's determination of penalty?
  2. If an affirmative answer to the first question was dictated by precedent, was it necessary for the state supreme court to specifically use the phrases “harmless error” or “reasonable doubt” in determining that there was no “reasonable possibility” that the invalid special circumstance affected the jury's sentence selection?

At trial in the Superior Court of Kern County California, Ronald Lee Sanders was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery, attempted robbery, and burglary, all stemming from an attempted robbery in Bakersfield, California. See People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 566–67 (Cal. 1990).

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Brumfield v. Cain

Issues

Are indigent prisoners entitled to government funds to present new claims of mental incompetency in post-conviction proceedings in state court?

The Supreme Court will determine the extent to which indigent prisoners sitting on death row are entitled to government resources in order to present new claims of mental incompetency in post-conviction proceedings. Brumfield argues that the Louisiana state court violated federal law by interfering with his due process rights. In contrast, Cain argues that the state court did not violate any of Brumfield’s clearly established rights under federal law. This case raises questions about the extent to which federal courts may rely on states’ pre-Atkins proceedings to uphold death sentences imposed on prisoners now offering evidence that they were mentally incompetent. Determining this question implicates the extent to which a state’s quality or reliability of review should factor into the federal courts’ deference to the previous state court determination. This case will have implications for indigent prisoners sentenced to death prior to the Court’s decision in Atkins. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Has a state court that considers the evidence presented at a petitioner’s penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the petitioner’s claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), based its decision on an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)?
  2. Has a state court that denies funding to an indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his “opportunity to be heard,” contrary to Atkins and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and his constitutional right to be provided with “basic tools” for an adequate defense, contrary to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 69 (1985)?

This case arises from Kevan Brumfield’s 1993 conviction for the murder of a Baton Rouge police officer and an attempted armed robbery. See Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371 (M.D. La. 2012). On January 5, 1993, Brumfield and an associate went to a self-described psychic counselor for a reading. See State of Louisiana ex rel. Cain v. Brumfield, 737 So. 2d 660, 662 (La.

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The authors would like to thank Professors Keir Weyble, Michael Dorf, and John Blume for their help.

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Bucklew v. Precythe

Issues

When an inmate with a rare and severe medical condition brings an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution, should the court assume that the execution will go as planned? And is the inmate constitutionally required to prove an alternative method of execution? Here, did Russell Bucklew meet his burden to prove the procedures of his proposed alternative method and the degree of pain he would likely suffer, and did he show how they compare to the method he challenges?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a death row inmate challenging an execution method must prove a feasible alternative execution method when the challenged method will allegedly inflict an unconstitutional level of pain as applied to the inmate’s medical condition. Russell Bucklew argues that the state should bear the burden of proving an alternative method in such an “as-applied” challenge. He reasons that because there is no risk that the challenged execution method will be outlawed in its entirety and because the state is in the best position to evaluate the effect of existing execution methods on the inmate’s medical condition, the Court should place the burden on the state. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) argues that the inmate in an “as-applied” challenge case should bear this burden. The DOC notes that the inmate would be able to obtain an exemption from capital punishment and needlessly delay their execution by bringing meritless claims if the Court placed the burden on the state rather than on the inmate. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the ability of inmates to challenge execution methods, the administrability of common execution methods such as lethal injection, and the effect of the capital punishment process on drug regulators, physicians, and state corrections officers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution based on an inmate’s rare and severe medical condition should assume that medical personnel are competent to manage his condition and that the procedure will go as intended;
  2. Whether evidence comparing a state’s method of execution with an alternative proposed by an inmate must be offered via a single witness, or whether a court at summary judgment must look to the record as a whole to determine whether a factfinder could conclude that the two methods significantly differ in the risks they pose to the inmate;
  3. Whether the Eighth Amendment requires an inmate to prove an adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s proposed method of execution based on his rare and severe medical condition; and
  4. Whether petitioner Russell Bucklew met his burden under Glossip v. Gross to prove what procedures would be used to administer his proposed alternative method of execution, the severity and duration of pain likely to be produced, and how they compare to the state’s method of execution.

In March 1996, Russell Bucklew followed his former girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the trailer home of Michael Sanders, where she was living. Bucklew v. Precythe (“Precythe”) at 1–2. Bucklew entered the trailer and shot Sanders. Id. While Sanders bled to death, Bucklew handcuffed Ray, dragged her into his car, and drove away.

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Cruz v. Arizona

Issues

Does Arizona’s requirement of a “significant change in law” before filing a petition for postconviction relief prevent the United States Supreme Court from reviewing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law?

Court below

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure, which only allows postconviction relief if there has been a significant change in law to make it an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment, prevents federal review. Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz claims that the rule cannot apply because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent requiring the application of settled rules of constitutional law on postconviction review. Cruz also asserts that the rule requires consideration of federal law, and thus that the Supreme Court may review determinations made under it for consistency with federal law. Respondent, the state of Arizona, argues that its Rule prevents federal review because it is premised on a matter of state law, rather than federal law. Arizona asserts that its rule only regulates when a claim may be brought, not the rule to be applied when evaluating the claim.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (g) precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.

In 2005, John Montenegro Cruz was convicted of first degree murder for killing a police officer and was sentenced to death in a jury trial. State v. Cruz at 992.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors John Blume and Keir Weyble for their guidance and insights into this case.

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