28 CFR 16.76 - Exemption of Justice Management Division.
(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d):
(1) Controlled Substances Act Nonpublic Records (JUSTICE/JMD-002).
(b) Exemption from subsection (d) is justified for the following reasons:
(1) Access to and use of the nonpublic records maintained in this system are restricted by law. Section 3607(b) of Title 18 U.S.C. (enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Chapter II) provides that the sole purpose of these records shall be for use by the courts in determining whether a person found guilty of violating section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act qualifies:
(i) For the disposition available under 18 U.S.C. 3607(a) to persons with no prior conviction under a Federal or State law relating to controlled substances, or
(ii) For an order, under 18 U.S.C. 3607(c), expunging all official records (except the nonpublic records to be retained by the Department of Justice) of the arrest and any subsequent criminal proceedings relating to the offense.
(2) Information in this system consists of arrest records, including those of co-defendants. The records include reports of informants and investigations. Therefore, access could disclose investigative techniques, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and invade the privacy of third parties.
(c) The following system of records is exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g): Federal Bureau of Investigation Whistleblower Case Files (Justice/JMD-023). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record contained within this system is subject to exemptions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k).
(d) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:
(1)Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures.
(2)Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).
(3)Subsection (d)(1). Information within this record system could relate to official federal investigations and matters of law enforcement. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential law enforcement investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States.
(4)Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of these records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(5)Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
(6)Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory information contained in this system is accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
(7)Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve to notify the subject individual that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.
(8)Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.
(9)Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory information contained in this system is accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
(10)Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.
(11)Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.