Post-Conviction Proceedings.

The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment applies to “criminal prosecutions,” a restriction that limits its scope but does not exhaust all constitutional rights to representation in adversarial contexts associated with the criminal justice process. The Sixth Amendment requires counsel at the sentencing stage,433 and the Court has held that, where sentencing was deferred after conviction and the defendant was placed on probation, he must be afforded counsel at a hearing on revocation of probation and imposition of the deferred sentence.434 Beyond this, however, the Court has eschewed Sixth Amendment analysis, instead delimiting the right to counsel under due process and equal protection principles.435


Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). back
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (applied retroactively in McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968)). back
State criminal appeals, applications for collateral relief, and post-sentencing parole or probation determinations are examples of procedures with respect to which the Court has not invoked the Sixth Amendment. Using due process analysis, the Court has found no constitutional right to counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560–70 (1974); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1976). See Fourteenth Amendment, “Rights of Prisoners,” infra. back