RIGHT TO TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY
By the time the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights were drafted and ratified, the institution of trial by jury was almost universally revered, so revered that its history had been traced back to Magna Carta.53 The jury began in the form of a grand or presentment jury with the role of inquest and was started by Frankish conquerors to discover the King’s rights. Henry II regularized this type of proceeding to establish royal control over the machinery of justice, first in civil trials and then in criminal trials. Trial by petit jury was not employed at least until the reign of Henry III, in which the jury was first essentially a body of witnesses, called for their knowledge of the case; not until the reign of Henry VI did it become the trier of evidence. It was during the seventeenth century that the jury emerged as a safeguard for the criminally accused.54 Thus, in the eighteenth century, Blackstone could commemorate the institution as part of a “strong and two-fold barrier . . . between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of the crown” because “the truth of every accusation . . . . [must] be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.”55 The right was guaranteed in the constitutions of the original 13 states, was guaranteed in the body of the Constitution56 and in the Sixth Amendment, and the constitution of every state entering the Union thereafter in one form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.57 “Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great privilege ‘as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.’ ”58
“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. . . . [T]he jury trial provisions . . . reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power . . . found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.”59
Because “a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants,” the Sixth Amendment provision is binding on the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 But, as it cannot be said that every criminal trial or any particular trial that is held without a jury is unfair,61 a defendant may waive the right and go to trial before a judge alone.62
The Attributes and Function of the Jury.
It was previ-ously the Court’s position that the right to a jury trial meant “a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was adopted.”63 It had therefore been held that this included trial by a jury of 12 persons64 who must reach a unanimous verdict65 and that the jury trial must be held during the first court proceeding and not de novo at the first appellate stage.66 However, as it extended the guarantee to the states, the Court indicated that at least some of these standards were open to re-examination,67 and in subsequent cases it has done so. In Williams v. Florida,68 the Court held that the fixing of jury size at 12 was “a historical accident” that, although firmly established when the Sixth Amendment was proposed and ratified, was not required as an attribute of the jury system, either as a matter of common-law background69 or by any ascertainment of the intent of the framers.70 Being bound neither by history nor framers’ intent, the Court thought the “relevant inquiry . . . must be the function that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial.” The size of the jury, the Court continued, bore no discernable relationship to the purposes of jury trial—the prevention of oppression and the reliability of factfinding. Furthermore, there was little reason to believe that any great advantage accrued to the defendant by having a jury composed of 12 rather than six, which was the number at issue in the case, or that the larger number appreciably increased the variety of viewpoints on the jury. A jury should be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility that a cross-section of the community will be represented on it, but the Court did not speculate whether there was a minimum permissible size and it recognized the propriety of conditioning jury size on the seriousness of the offense.71
When the unanimity rule was reconsidered, the division of the Justices was such that different results were reached for state and federal courts.72 Applying the same type of analysis as that used in Williams, four Justices acknowledged that unanimity was a common-law rule but observed for the reasons reviewed in Williams that it seemed more likely than not that the framers of the Sixth Amendment had not intended to preserve the requirement within the term “jury.” Therefore, the Justices undertook a functional analysis of the jury and could not discern that the requirement of unanimity materially affected the role of the jury as a barrier against oppression and as a guarantee of a commonsense judgment of laymen. The Justices also determined that the unanimity requirement is not implicated in the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and is not necessary to preserve the feature of the requisite cross-section representation on the jury.73 Four dissenting Justices thought that omitting the unanimity requirement would undermine the reasonable doubt standard, would permit a majority of jurors simply to ignore those interpreting the facts differently, and would permit oppression of dissenting minorities.74 Justice Powell, on the other hand, thought that unanimity was mandated in federal trials by history and precedent and that it should not be departed from; however, because it was the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that imposed the basic jury-trial requirement on the states, he did not believe that it was necessary to impose all the attributes of a federal jury on the states. He therefore concurred in permitting less-than-unanimous verdicts in state courts.75
Certain functions of the jury are likely to remain consistent between the federal and state court systems. For instance, the requirement that a jury find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, which had already been established under the Due Process Clause,76 has been held to be a standard mandated by the Sixth Amendment.77 The Court further held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment require that a jury find a defendant guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, including questions of mixed law and fact.78 Thus, a district court presiding over a case of providing false statements to a federal agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 erred when it took the issue of the “materiality” of the false statement away from the jury.79 Later, however, the Court backed off from this latter ruling, holding that failure to submit the issue of materiality to the jury in a tax fraud case can constitute harmless error.80 Subsequently, the Court held that, just as failing to prove materiality to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt can be harmless error, so can failing to prove a sentencing factor to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. “Assigning this distinction constitutional significance cannot be reconciled with our recognition in Apprendi that elements and sentencing factors must be treated the same for Sixth Amendment purposes.”81
When the Jury Trial Guarantee Applies.
The Sixth Amend-ment is phrased in terms of “all criminal prosecutions,” but the Court has always excluded petty offenses from the guarantee to a jury trial in federal courts, defining the line between petty and serious offenses either by the maximum punishment available82 or by the nature of the offense.83 This line has been adhered to in the application of the Sixth Amendment to the states,84 and the Court has now held “that no offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”85 A defendant who is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses, however, does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, even if the aggregate of sentences authorized for the offense exceeds six months.86
The Court has also made some changes in the meaning of the term “criminal proceeding.” Previously, the term had been applied only to situations in which a person has been accused of an offense by information or presentment.87 Thus, a civil action to collect statutory penalties and punitive damages, because not technically criminal, has been held not to implicate the right to jury trial.88 Subsequently, however, the Court focused its analysis on the character of the sanction to be imposed, holding that punitive sanctions may not be imposed without adhering to the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.89 There is, however, no constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings, at least in state systems and probably in the federal system as well.90
In a long line of cases, the Court had held that no constitutional right to jury trial existed in trials of criminal contempt.91 In Bloom v. Illinois,92 however, the Court announced that “[o]ur deliberations have convinced us . . . that serious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution . . . and that the traditional rule is constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty contempts to be tried without honoring a demand for a jury trial.” The Court has consistently held, however, that a jury is not required for purposes of determining whether a defendant is insane or mentally retarded and consequently not eligible for the death penalty.93
Within the context of a criminal trial, what factual issues are submitted to the jury was traditionally determined by whether the fact to be established is an element of a crime or instead is a sentencing factor.94 Under this approach, the right to a jury had extended to the finding of all facts establishing the elements of a crime, but sentencing factors could be evaluated by a judge.95 Evaluating the issue primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court initially deferred to Congress and the states on this issue, allowing them broad leeway in determining which facts are elements of a crime and which are sentencing factors.96
Breaking with this tradition, however, the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey held that a sentencing factor cannot be used to increase the maximum penalty imposed for the underlying crime.97 “The relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.”98 Apprendi had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for no more than ten years, but had been sentenced to 12 years based on a judge’s findings, by a preponderance of the evidence, that enhancement grounds existed under the state’s hate crimes law. “[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” the Court concluded, “must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”99 The one exception Apprendi recognized was for sentencing enhancements based on recidivism.100 In Alleyne v. United States, the Court extended Apprendi to require “that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] . . . must be submitted to the jury.”101
Apprendi’s importance soon became evident as the Court applied its reasoning in other situations to strike down state or federal laws on Sixth Amendment grounds.102 In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied Apprendi to invalidate an Arizona law that authorized imposition of the death penalty only if the judge made a factual determination as to the existence of any of several aggravating factors.103 Although Arizona had required that the judge’s findings as to aggravating factors be made beyond a reasonable doubt, and not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court held that the findings must be made by a jury.104 Similarly, in Hurst v. Florida, the Court applied Apprendi, as well as the precedent of Ring, to invalidate a Florida statute authorizing a “hybrid” proceeding in which the “jury renders an advisory verdict[,] but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determination[.]”105 According to the Court, such proceedings run afoul of the Sixth Amendment because the judge, not the jury, makes the findings of fact that result in the imposition of the death penalty.106
In Blakely v. Washington,107 the Court applied Apprendi to cast doubt on types of widely adopted reform measures that were intended to foster more consistent sentencing practices. Blakely, who pled guilty to an offense for which the “standard range” under the Washington State’s sentencing law was 49 to 53 months, was sentenced to 90 months based on the judge’s determination—not derived from facts admitted in the guilty plea—that the offense had been committed with “deliberate cruelty,” a basis for an “upward departure” under the statute. The 90-month sentence conformed to statutory limits, but the Court made “clear . . . that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”108
Then, in United States v. Booker,109 the Court held that the same principles limit sentences that courts may impose under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.110 As the Court restated the principle in Booker, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”111 Attempts to distinguish Blakely were rejected. The Court concluded that the fact that the Guidelines were developed by the Sentencing Commission rather than by Congress “lacks constitutional significance.”112 Instead, the Guidelines were suspect in application because, on the one hand, they curtailed the role of jury factfinding in determining the upper range of a sentence and, on the other hand, they mandated sentences from which a court could depart only in a limited number of cases and after separately finding the existence of factors not presented to the jury.113 The mandatory nature of the Guidelines was also important to the Court’s formulation of a remedy.114 Rather than engrafting a jury trial requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act, under which the Guidelines were adopted, the Court instead invalidated two of its provisions, one making application of the Guidelines mandatory, and, concomitantly, one requiring de novo review for appeals of departures from the mandatory Guidelines, and held that the remainder of the Act could remain intact.115 As the Court explained, this remedy “makes the Guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.”116
In Cunningham v. California,117 the Court addressed whether California’s determinate state sentencing law, yet another style of legislative effort intended to regularize criminal sentencing, survived the Booker-Blakely line of cases. That law, and its implementing rules, required that the trial judge in the case sentence the defendant to 12 years in prison unless the judge found one or more additional “circumstances in aggravation,” in which case the sentence would be 16 years. Aggravating circumstances could include specific factual findings made by a judge under a “preponderance of the evidence” standard in apparent violation of Booker and Blakely. The court was also free to consider “additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.”118 The state argued that this latter provision conformed the California sentencing scheme to Booker, which contemplated that judges retain discretion to select a specific sentence within a statutory range, subject to appellate review to determine “reasonableness.” The Court rejected this argument, finding that the scheme impermissibly allocated sole authority to judges to find the facts that permitted imposition of a higher alternative sentence.119
The Court, however, has refused to extend Apprendi to a judge’s decision to impose sentences for discrete crimes consecutively rather than concurrently.120 The Court explained that, when a defendant has been convicted of multiple offenses, each involving discrete sentencing prescriptions, the states apply various rules regarding whether a judge may impose the sentences consecutively or concurrently.121 The Court held that “twin considerations—historical practice and respect for state sovereignty—counsel against extending Apprendi‘s rule” to preclude judicial fact-finding in this situation, as well.122
In Rita v. United States, the Court upheld the application, by federal courts of appeals, of the presumption “that a sentence imposed within a properly calculated United States Sentencing Guidelines range is a reasonable sentence.”123 Even if the presumption “increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find ‘sentencing facts,’ ” the Court wrote, it “does not violate the Sixth Amendment. This Court’s Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence. Nor do they prohibit the sentencing judge from taking account of the Sentencing Commission’s factual findings or recommended sentences. . . . The Sixth Amendment question, the Court has said, is whether the law forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede). . . . A nonbinding appellate presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable does not require the judge to impose that sentence. Still less does it forbid the sentencing judge from imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the jury-determined facts standing alone.”124
In United States v. Gall,125 the Court held that, “while the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”126 The Court rejected “an appellate rule that requires ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range,” and also rejected “the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence.” These approaches, the Court said, “come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.”127
Subsequently, in Spears v. United States,128 the Court, emphasizing that the Guidelines “are advisory only,” clarified “that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the . . . Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”129 In Spears, a district court had given a defendant a sentence significantly below the Guidelines for distribution of crack cocaine, noting that the Guidelines required 100 times more powder cocaine than crack cocaine to trigger a particular sentencing range. The Supreme Court held that, if a sentencing court believes “that the 100-to-1 ratio embodied in the sentencing guidelines for the treatment of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine creates ‘an unwarranted disparity within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a),’ ” then it may vary downward from the Guidelines even when the particular defendant “presents no special mitigating circumstances” to justify a lower sentence.130
The Booker line of cases addresses the role of the Sentencing Guidelines in imposing and reviewing individual sentences. Booker, however, did not overturn the Sentencing Reform Act in its entirety, nor did it abolish the Guidelines themselves. One set of provisions left intact directed the Sentencing Commission to review the Guidelines periodically, authorized it to reduce the Guidelines range for individual offenses and make the reduced ranges retroactive, but also generally foreclosed a court from then reducing a sentence previously imposed to one less than the minimum contained in the amended Guideline range. In Dillon v. United States,131 the Court distinguished this sentence modification process from a sentencing or resentencing, and upheld mandatory limits on judicial reductions of sentences under it.
The requirement of an impartial jury is secured not only by the Sixth Amendment, which is as applicable to the states as to the Federal Government,132 but also by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,133 and perhaps by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, the Court’s has directed its supervisory power over the federal system to the issue.134 Even before the Court extended the right to a jury trial to state courts, it was firmly established that, if a state chose to provide juries, the juries had to be impartial.135
Impartiality is a two-fold requirement. First, “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”136 This requirement applies only to jury panels or venires from which petit juries are chosen, and not to the composition of the petit juries themselves.137 “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”138 Further, once a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie violation, the defendant faces a formidable burden: the jury selection process may be sustained under the Sixth Amendment only if those aspects of the process that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group, such as exemption criteria, “manifestly and primarily” advance a “significant state interest.”139 Thus, in one case the Court voided a selection system under which no woman would be called for jury duty unless she had previously filed a written declaration of her desire to be subject to service, and, in another it invalidated a state selection system granting women who so requested an automatic exemption from jury service.140
Second, there must be assurance that the jurors chosen are unbiased, i.e., willing to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented. The Court has held that in the absence of an actual showing of bias, a defendant in the District of Columbia is not denied an impartial jury when he is tried before a jury composed primarily of government employees.141 A violation of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury does occur, however, when the jury or any of its members is subjected to pressure or influence which could impair freedom of action; the trial judge should conduct a hearing in which the defense participates to determine whether impartiality has been undermined.142 Exposure of the jury to possibly prejudicial material and disorderly courtroom activities may deny impartiality and must be inquired into.143 Private communications, contact, or tampering with a jury, or the creation of circumstances raising the dangers thereof, is not to be condoned.144 When the locality of the trial has been saturated with publicity about a defendant, so that it is unlikely that he can obtain a disinterested jury, he is constitutionally entitled to a change of venue.145 It is undeniably a violation of due process to subject a defendant to trial in an atmosphere of mob or threatened mob domination.146
Because it is too much to expect that jurors can remain uninfluenced by evidence they receive even though they are instructed to use it for only a limited purpose and to disregard it for other purposes, the Court will not permit a confession to be submitted to the jury without a prior determination by the trial judge that it is admissible. A defendant is denied due process, therefore, if he is convicted by a jury that has been instructed to first determine the voluntariness of a confession and then to disregard the confession if it is found to be inadmissible.147 Similarly invalid is a jury instruction in a joint trial to consider a confession only with regard to the defendant against whom it is admissible, and to disregard that confession as against a co-defendant which it implicates.148
Nonetheless, there are limits on the extent to which an inquiry can be made into whether a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial has been denied by a biased jury. With origins dating from the English common law, a rule of evidence has been adopted by the federal rules of evidence149 and by the vast majority of the states150 that forbids the “impeachment” or questioning of a verdict by inquiring into the internal deliberations of the jury.151 The “no impeachment” rule, which aims to promote “full and vigorous discussion” by jurors and to preserve the “stability” of jury verdicts, has limited the ability of criminal defendants to argue that a jury’s internal deliberations demonstrated bias amounting to a deprivation of the right to a jury trial.152 Indeed, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment justifies an exception to the no impeachment rule in only the “gravest and most important cases.”153 As a result, the Court has rejected a Sixth Amendment exception to the rule when evidence existed that jurors were under the influence of alcohol and drugs during the trial.154 Likewise, the Court concluded that the no-impeachment rule prevented evidence from being introduced indicating that a jury forewoman had failed to disclose a prodefendant bias during jury selection (voir dire) and allegedly influenced the jury with such bias.155 In the Court’s view, three safeguards—(1) the voir dire process, (2) the ability for the court and counsel to observe the jury during trial, and (3) the potential for jurors to report untoward behavior to the court before rendering a verdict— adequately protect Sixth Amendment interests while preserving the values underlying the no impeachment rule.156
However, in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Court for the first time recognized a Sixth Amendment exception to the no-impeachment rule.157 In that case, a criminal defendant contended that his conviction by a Colorado jury for harassment and unlawful sexual contact should be overturned on constitutional grounds because evidence from two jurors revealed that a fellow juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward the petitioner and his alibi witness during deliberations.158 The Court agreed, concluding that where a juror makes a “clear statement” indicating that he relied on “racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way . . . .”159 In so holding, Pena-Rodriguez emphasized the “imperative to purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice” that underlies the Fourteenth Amendment, which, in turn, makes the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states.160 Contrasting the instant case from earlier rulings that involved “anomalous behavior from a single jury—or juror—gone off course,” the Court noted that racial bias in the judicial system was a “familiar and recurring evil” that required the judiciary to prevent “systematic injury to the administration of justice.”161 Moreover, the Court emphasized “pragmatic” rationales for its holding, noting that other checks on jury bias, such as questioning during voir dire or jurors reporting inappropriate statements during the course of deliberations, unlikely would disclose racial bias.162
Inquiries into jury basis have arisen in the context of the imposition of the death penalty. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,163 the Court held that the exclusion in capital cases of jurors conscientiously scrupled about capital punishment, without inquiring whether they could consider the imposition of the death penalty in the appropriate case, violated a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury. “A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror.”164 A jury, the Court wrote, must “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death,” and the automatic exclusion of all with generalized objections to the death penalty “stacked the deck” and made of the jury a tribunal “organized to return a verdict of death.”165 A court may not refuse a defendant’s request to examine potential jurors to determine whether they would vote automatically to impose the death penalty; general questions about fairness and willingness to follow the law are inadequate.166
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court held that the proper standard for exclusion is “whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”167 Thus, to be excluded, a juror need not indicate that he would “automatic[ally]” vote against the death penalty, nor need his “bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ”168 Instead, a juror may be excused for cause “where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.”169 Persons properly excludable under Witherspoon may also be excluded from the guilt/innocence phase of a bifurcated capital trial.170 It had been argued that to exclude such persons from the guilt/innocence phase would result in a jury somewhat more predisposed to convict, and that this would deny the defendant a jury chosen from a fair cross-section. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that “it is simply not possible to define jury impartiality . . . by reference to some hypothetical mix of individual viewpoints.”171 Moreover, the state has “an entirely proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially decide all of the issues in [a] case,” and need not select separate panels and duplicate evidence for the two distinct but interrelated functions.172 For the same reasons, there is no violation of the right to an impartial jury if a defendant for whom capital charges have been dropped is tried, along with a codefendant still facing capital charges, before a “death qualified” jury.173
In Uttecht v. Brown,174 the Court summed up four principles that it derived from Witherspoon and Witt: “First a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause. Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes. Third, to balance these interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible. Fourth, in determining whether the removal of a potential juror would vindicate the State’s interest without violating the defendant’s right, the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts.”175 If there is ambiguity in a prospective juror’s statement, a court is “entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.”176
Exclusion of one juror qualified under Witherspoon constitutes reversible error, and the exclusion may not be subjected to harmless error analysis.177 However, a court’s error in refusing to dismiss for cause a prospective juror prejudiced in favor of the death penalty does not deprive a defendant of his right to trial by an impartial jury if he is able to exclude the juror through exercise of a peremptory challenge.178 The relevant inquiry is “on the jurors who ultimately sat,” the Court declared, rejecting as overly broad the assertion in Gray that the focus instead should be on “ ‘whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could have been affected by the trial court’s error.’ ”179
It is the function of the voir dire to give the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to inquire into, or have the trial judge inquire into, possible grounds of bias or prejudice that potential jurors may have, and to acquaint the parties with the potential jurors.180 It is good ground for challenge for cause that a juror has formed an opinion on the issue to be tried, but not every opinion which a juror may entertain necessarily disqualifies him. The judge must determine whether the nature and strength of the opinion raise a presumption against impartiality.181 It suffices for the judge to question potential jurors about their ability to put aside what they had heard or read about the case, listen to the evidence with an open mind, and render an impartial verdict; the judge’s refusal to go further and question jurors about the contents of news reports to which they had been exposed did not violate the Sixth Amendment.182
Under some circumstances, it may be constitutionally required that questions specifically directed to the existence of racial bias must be asked. Thus, in a situation in which defendant, a black man, alleged that he was being prosecuted on false charges because of his civil rights activities in an atmosphere perhaps open to racial appeals, prospective jurors must be asked about their racial prejudice, if any.183 A similar rule applies in some capital trials, where the risk of racial prejudice “is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence.” A defendant accused of an interracial capital offense is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the victim’s race and questioned as to racial bias.184 But in circumstances not suggesting a significant likelihood of racial prejudice infecting a trial, as when the facts are merely that the defendant is black and the victim white, the Constitution is satisfied by a more generalized but thorough inquiry into the impartiality of the veniremen.185
Although government is not constitutionally obligated to allow peremptory challenges,186 typically a system of peremptory challenges has existed in criminal trials, in which both prosecution and defense may, without stating any reason, excuse a certain number of prospective jurors.187 Although, in Swain v. Alabama,188 the Court held that a prosecutor’s purposeful exclusion of members of a specific racial group from the jury would violate the Equal Protection Clause, it posited so difficult a standard of proof that defendants could seldom succeed. The Swain standard of proof was relaxed in Batson v. Kentucky,189 with the result that a defendant may establish an equal protection violation resulting from a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from the jury.190 A violation can occur whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors are of the same race.191 Racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges does not, however, constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the Court ruled in Holland v. Illinois.192 The Sixth Amendment “no more forbids the prosecutor to strike jurors on the basis of race than it forbids him to strike them on the basis of innumerable other generalized characteristics.”193 To rule otherwise, the Court reasoned, “would cripple the device of peremptory challenge” and thereby undermine the Amendment’s goal of “impartiality with respect to both contestants.”194
The restraint on racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is now a two-way street. The Court ruled in 1992 that a criminal defendant’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race constitutes “state action” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.195 Disputing the contention that this limitation would undermine “the contribution of the peremptory challenge to the administration of justice,” the Court nonetheless asserted that such a result would in any event be “too high” a price to pay. “It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trail includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race.”196 It followed, therefore, that the limitation on peremptory challenges does not violate a defendant’s right to an impartial jury. Although a defendant has “the right to an impartial jury that can view him without racial animus,” this means that “there should be a mechanism for removing those [jurors] who would be incapable of confronting and suppressing their racism,” not that the defendant may remove jurors on the basis of race or racial stereotypes.197
- Historians no longer accept this attribution. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 265 (1892), and the Court has noted this. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 n.16 (1968).
- W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1852).
- W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349–350 (T. Cooley, 4th ed. 1896). The other of the “two-fold barrier” was, of course, indictment by grand jury.
- In Art. III, § 2.
- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
- Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1898), quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1773 (1833).
- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968). At other times the function of accurate factfinding has been emphasized. E.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). Although federal judges may comment upon the evidence, the right to a jury trial means that the judge must make clear to the jurors that such remarks are advisory only and that the jury is the final determiner of all factual questions. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968).
- 391 U.S. at 159. Thus, state trials conducted before Duncan was decided were held to be valid still. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
- Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). As with other waivers, this one must be by the express and intelligent consent of the defendant. A waiver of jury trial must also be with the consent of the prosecution and the sanction of the court. A refusal by either the prosecution or the court to defendant’s request for consent to waive denies him no right since he then gets what the Constitution guarantees, a jury trial. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). It may be a violation of defendant’s rights to structure the trial process so as effectively to encourage him “needlessly” to waive or to penalize the decision to go to the jury, but the standards here are unclear. Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), with Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and see also State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
- Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
- Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). Dicta in other cases was to the same effect. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 519 (1905); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
- Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948). See dicta in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
- Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). Preserving Callan, as being based on Article II, § 2, as well as on the Sixth Amendment and being based on a more burdensome procedure, the Court in Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), approved a state two-tier system under which persons accused of certain crimes must be tried in the first instance in the lower tier without a jury and if convicted may appeal to the second tier for a trial de novo by jury. Applying a due process standard, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, found that neither the imposition of additional financial costs upon a defendant, nor the imposition of increased psychological and physical hardships of two trials, nor the potential of a harsher sentence on the second trial impermissibly burdened the right to a jury trial. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented. Id. at 632. See also North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1968).
- 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Justice Marshall would have required juries of 12 in both federal and state courts, id. at 116, while Justice Harlan contended that the Sixth Amendment required juries of 12, although his view of the due process standard was that the requirement was not imposed on the states. Id. at 117.
- The development of 12 as the jury size is traced in Williams, 399 U.S. at 86–92.
- 399 U.S. at 92–99. Although the historical materials were scanty, the Court thought it more likely than not that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not intend to incorporate into the word “jury” all its common-law attributes. This conclusion was drawn from the extended dispute between House and Senate over inclusion of a “vicinage” requirement in the clause, which was a common law attribute, and the elimination of language attaching to jury trials their “accustomed requisites.” But see id. at 123 n.9 (Justice Harlan).
- 399 U.S. at 99–103. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court unanimously, but with varying expressions of opinion, held that conviction by a unanimous five-person jury in a trial for a nonpetty offense deprived an accused of his right to trial by jury. Although readily admitting that the line between six and five members is not easy to justify, the Justices believed that reducing a jury to five persons in nonpetty cases raised substantial doubts as to the fairness of the proceeding and proper functioning of the jury to warrant drawing the line at six.
- Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), involved a trial held after decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and thus concerned whether the Sixth Amendment itself required jury unanimity, while Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), involved a pre-Duncan trial and thus raised the question whether due process required jury unanimity. Johnson held, five-to-four, that the due process requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not violated by a conviction on a nine-to-three jury vote in a case in which punishment was necessarily at hard labor.
- Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger). Justice Blackmun indicated a doubt that any closer division than nine-to-three in jury decisions would be permissible. Id. at 365.
- 406 U.S. at 414, and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 380, 395, 397, 399 (1972) (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall).
- 406 U.S. at 366. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), however, held that conviction by a non-unanimous six-person jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty offense, under a provision permitting conviction by five out of six jurors, violated the right of the accused to trial by jury. Acknowledging that the issue was “close” and that no bright line illuminated the boundary between permissible and impermissible, the Court thought the near-uniform practice throughout the Nation of requiring unanimity in six-member juries required nullification of the state policy. See also Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (holding Burch retroactive).
- See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
- 515 U.S. at 523.
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
- Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220 (2006). Apprendi is discussed in the next section.
- District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
- District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159–62 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
- Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). Justices Black and Douglas would have required a jury trial in all criminal proceedings in which the sanction imposed bears the indicia of criminal punishment. Id. at 74 (concurring); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384, 386 (1966) (dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart objected to setting this limitation at six months for the States, preferring to give them greater leeway. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 76; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117, 143 (1970) (dissenting). No jury trial was required when the trial judge suspended sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). There is a presumption that offenses carrying a maximum imprisonment of six months or less are “petty,” although it is possible that such an offense could be pushed into the “serious” category if the legislature tacks on onerous penalties not involving incarceration. No jury trial is required, however, when the maximum sentence is six months in jail, a fine not to exceed $1,000, a 90-day driver’s license suspension, and attendance at an alcohol abuse education course. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542–44 (1989).
- Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996).
- United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896).
- 161 U.S. at 481. See also Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The statute at issue in Mendoza-Martinez automatically divested an American of citizenship for departing or remaining outside the United States to evade military service. A later line of cases, beginning in 1967, held that the Fourteenth Amendment broadly barred Congress from involuntarily expatriating any citizen who was born in the United States.
- McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
- E.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183–87 (1958), and cases cited; United States v. Burnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692–700 (1964), and cases cited. A Court plurality in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), held, asserting the Court’s supervisory power over the lower federal courts, that criminal contempt sentences in excess of six months imprisonment could not be imposed without a jury trial or adequate waiver.
- 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968). Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented. Id. at 215. As in other cases, the Court drew the line between serious and petty offenses at six months, but because, unlike other offenses, no maximum punishments are usually provided for contempts it indicated the actual penalty imposed should be looked to. Id. at 211. See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). The distinction between criminal and civil contempt may be somewhat more elusive. International Union, UMW v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (fines levied on the union were criminal in nature where the conduct did not occur in the court’s presence, the court’s injunction required compliance with an entire code of conduct, and the fines assessed were not compensatory).
- Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–417 (1986); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002); Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7 (2005). See Eighth Amendment, “Limitations on Capital Punishment: Diminished Capacity,” infra.
- In Washington v. Recuenco, however, the Court held that “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element [of a crime] to the jury, is not structural error,” entitling the defendant to automatic reversal, but can be harmless error. 548 U.S. 212, 222 (2006).
- In James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), the Court found no Sixth Amendment issue raised when it considered “the elements of the offense . . . without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.” Id. at 202 (emphasis in original). The question before the Court was whether, under federal law, attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” and therefore constitutes a “violent felony,” subjecting the defendant to a longer sentence. Id. at 196. In answering this question, the Court employed the “categorical approach” of looking only to the statutory definition and not considering the “particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction.” Id. at 202. Thus, “the Court [was] engaging in statutory interpretation, not judicial factfinding,” and “[s]uch analysis raises no Sixth Amendment issue.” Id. at 214.
- For instance, the Court held that whether a defendant “visibly possessed a gun” during a crime may be designated by a state as a sentencing factor, and determined by a judge based on the preponderance of evidence. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). After resolving the issue under the Due Process Clause, the Court dismissed the Sixth Amendment jury trial claim as “merit[ing] little discussion.” Id. at 93. For more on the due process issue, see the discussion in “Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions,” infra.
- 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
- 530 U.S. at 494. “[M]erely because the state legislature placed its hate crime sentence enhancer within the sentencing provisions of the criminal code does not mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense.” Id. at 495 (internal quotation omitted).
- 530 U.S. at 490.
- 530 U.S. at 490. Enhancement of sentences for repeat offenders is traditionally considered a part of sentencing, and a judge may find the existence of previous valid convictions even if the result is a significant increase in the maximum sentence available. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (deported alien reentering the United States is subject to a maximum sentence of two years, but upon proof of a felony record, is subject to a maximum of twenty years). Almendarez-Torres was cited with approval on this point in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 214 n.8 (2007) (“prior convictions need not be treated as an element of the offense for Sixth Amendment purposes”). See also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) (if the prosecutor has the burden of establishing a prior conviction, a defendant can be required to bear the burden of challenging its validity).
- 570 U.S. ___, No. 11–9335, slip op. at 1–2 (2013) (overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)).
- Apprendi has influenced the Court’s ruling on matters of statutory interpretation. For example, in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, No. 15–6092, slip op. (2016), a plurality of the Court concluded that the “elements based approach” to interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—wherein a judge is prohibited from inquiring into the specific conduct of a particular offender’s previous acts in determining whether a sentence enhancement applies—is necessitated by Apprendi’s holding that generally only a jury, and not a judge, may find facts that increase a maximum penalty. Id. at 10; see also id. at 1 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the five-Justice majority opinion, but expressing a “reservation” about the majority’s reliance on Apprendi, “as that case was incorrect, and . . . does not compel the elements based approach.”); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, No. 11–9540, slip op. at 14 (2013) (noting the “serious Sixth Amendment concerns” that would arise if the element-centric, categorical approach was not adopted with regard to interpreting the ACCA).
- 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
- “Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ . . . the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Id. at 509 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19). The Court rejected Arizona’s request that it recognize an exception for capital sentencing in order not to interfere with elaborate sentencing procedures designed to comply with the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 605–07.
- 577 U.S. ___ , No. 14–7505, slip op. at 1–2 (2016) (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 584 n.6) (quotation marks omitted). In so doing, the Court expressly overruled its earlier decisions in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984), and Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640–41 (1989) (per curiam), which had approved of Florida’s “hybrid” proceedings on the grounds that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by a jury.” Id. at 9 (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640–41). Both of these decisions had been issued prior to Ring.
- Id. at 6.
- 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
- 542 U.S. at 303–304 (italics in original; citations omitted). In Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–94, slip op. (2012), the Court cited this passage in Blakely as a springboard to its conclusion that the Apprendi line of cases apply in imposing criminal fines. The maximum fine that could be imposed in Southern Union Co. was pegged to the number of days a violation continued, but the jury was not asked to determine the duration of the violation. The Court saw no “principled basis” for treating criminal fines differently from imprisonment or capital punishment. In all these cases, the Sixth Amendment guards against “judicial factfinding that enlarges the maximum punishment a defendant faces beyond what the jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admissions allow.”
- 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
- Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted binding Sentencing Guidelines, and courts were required to impose sentences within the narrow, defined ranges. A judge could depart from the applicable Guideline only upon finding in writing that an aggravating or mitigating factor was present that had not adequately been considered by the Commission. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
- 543 U.S. at 244.
- 543 U.S. at 237. Relying on Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Court also rejected a separation-of-powers argument. Id. at 754–55.
- 543 U.S. at 233–35.
- There were two distinct opinions of the Court in Booker. The first, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg (the same Justices who comprised the five-Justice Blakely majority), applied Blakely to find a Sixth Amendment violation; the other, authored by Justice Breyer, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg (the Blakely dissenters joined by Justice Ginsburg), set forth the remedy.
- 543 U.S. at 259. Consistent with the role it envisioned for a sentencing judge, the Court substituted a “reasonableness” standard for the statutory de novo appellate review standard that it struck down. 543 U.S. at 262.
- 543 U.S. at 245–246 (statutory citations omitted). Although not addressed in the Booker ruling, a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that limits district courts from departing from the Guidelines during resentencing (the previous sentence having been vacated) on grounds other than those considered during for the first sentencing, was subsequently struck down as conflicting with the now-advisory nature of the Guidelines. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. ___, No. 09–6822, slip op. (2011).
- 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
- 549 U.S. at 278–79, quoting California Rule 4.408(a).
- 549 U.S. at 279–80. “The reasonableness requirement that Booker anticipated for the federal system operates within the Sixth Amendment constraints delineated in our precedent, not as a substitute for those constraints.” 549 U.S. at 292–93.
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
- Most states follow the common-law tradition of giving judges unfettered discretion over the matter, while some states presume that sentences will run consecutively but allow judges to order concurrent sentences upon finding cause to do so. “It is undisputed,” the Court noted, “that States may proceed on [either of these] two tracks without transgressing the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 163.
- Id. at 168. The Court also noted other decisions judges make that are likely to evade the strictures of Apprendi, including determining the length of supervised release, attendance at drug rehabilitation programs, terms of community service, and imposition of fines and orders of restitution. Id. at 171–72.
- 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007). The Court emphasized that it was upholding “an appellate court presumption. Given our explanation in Booker that appellate ‘reasonableness’ review merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion, the presumption applies only on appellate review. . . . [T]he sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply.” Id. at 351, quoted in part in Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 891 (2009) (per curiam), where the Court added, “The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable.” Id. at 892 (emphasis in original).
- 551 U.S. at 352, 353 (emphasis in original). The Court added: “The fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness. . . . [A]ppellate courts may not presume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreasonable. . . . Several courts of appeals have also rejected a presumption of unreasonableness. . . . However, a number of circuits adhere to the proposition that the strength of the justification needed to sustain an outside-Guidelines sentence varies in proportion to the degree of the variance.” Id. at 354–55.
- 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (upholding a sentence of probation where the Guidelines had recommended imprisonment).
- 128 S. Ct. at 591. “As explained in Rita and Gall, district courts must treat the Guidelines as the ‘starting point and the initial benchmark.’ ” Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) (upholding lower-than-Guidelines sentence for trafficker in crack cocaine, where sentence “is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses”). A district court judge may determine “that, in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564.
- 128 S. Ct. at 595. Justice Alito, dissenting, wrote, “we should not forget [that] . . . Booker and its antecedents are based on the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. . . . It is telling that the rules set out in the Court’s opinion in the present case have nothing to do with juries or factfinding and, indeed, that not one of the facts that bears on petitioner’s sentence is disputed. What is at issue, instead, is the allocation of the authority to decide issues of substantive sentencing policy, an issue on which the Sixth Amendment says absolutely nothing. The yawning gap between the Sixth Amendment and the Court’s opinion should be enough to show that the Blakely-Booker line of cases has gone astray.” Id. at 605 (Alito, J., dissenting).
- 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam).
- 129 S. Ct. at 842, 843–44.
- 129 S. Ct. at 842.
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. ___, No. 09–6338, slip op. (2010).
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).
- Thus, it violates the Equal Protection Clause to exclude African-Americans from grand and petit juries, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), whether defendant is or is not an African-American, Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), and exclusion of potential jurors because of their national ancestry is unconstitutional, at least where defendant is of that ancestry as well, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
- In the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Court has permitted any defendant to challenge the arbitrary exclusion from jury service of his own or any other class. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83–87 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), male defendants were permitted to challenge the exclusion of women as a Sixth Amendment violation.
- Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
- Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953). In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), and Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948), the Court in 5-to-4 decisions upheld state use of “blue ribbon” juries from which particular groups, such as laborers and women, had been excluded. With the extension of the jury trial provision and its fair cross section requirement to the States, the opinions in these cases must be considered tenuous, but the Court has reiterated that defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. Congress has implemented the constitutional requirement by statute in federal courts by the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90–274, 82 Stat. 53, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq.
- Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). “We have never invoked the fair cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.” 476 U.S. at 173. The explanation is that the fair cross-section requirement “is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (emphasis original).
- Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). To show that underrepresentation resulted from systematic exclusion requires rigorous evidence beyond merely pointing to a single factor or a host of factors that might have caused fewer members of a distinct group to have been included. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08–1402, slip op. (2010).
- 439 U.S. at 367–68.
- Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
- Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950). On common-law grounds, the Court in Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909), disqualified such employees, but a statute removing the disqualification because of the increasing difficulty in finding jurors in the District of Columbia was sustained in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
- Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (attempted bribe of a juror reported by him to authorities); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (during trial one of the jurors had been actively seeking employment in the District Attorney’s office).
- E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Exposure of the jurors to knowledge about the defendant’s prior criminal record and activities is not alone sufficient to establish a presumption of reversible prejudice, but on voir dire jurors should be questioned about their ability to judge impartially. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). The Court indicated that under the same circumstances in a federal trial it would have overturned the conviction pursuant to its supervisory power. Id. at 797–98, citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). Essentially, the defendant must make a showing of prejudice into which the court may then inquire. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575, 581 (1981); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215–18 (1982); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (placing jury in charge of two deputy sheriffs who were principal prosecution witnesses at defendant’s jury trial denied him his right to an impartial jury); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (influence on jury by prejudiced bailiff). Cf. Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (felony); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (felony); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (misdemeanor). Important factors to be considered, however, include the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred; whether the publicity was blatantly prejudicial; the time elapsed between the publicity and the trial; and whether the jurors’ verdict supported the theory of prejudice. Skilling v. U.S., No. 08–1394, slip op. at 16–18 (June 24, 2010).
- Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (overruling Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)).
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957)). The rule applies to the states. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). But see Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) (co-defendant’s out-of-court statement is admissible against defendant if co-defendant takes the stand and denies having made the statement).
- See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (“During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.”).
- See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___, No. 15–606, slip op. at 9 (2017) (noting that 42 jurisdictions follow the federal rule).
- The no-impeachment rule does have three central exceptions, allowing a juror to testify about (1) extraneous prejudicial information improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (2) outside influences brought to bear on any juror; and (3) a mistake made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2). As a result, the rule prohibits all juror testimony excepting for when the jury considers prejudicial extraneous evidence or is subject to other outside influence. See Pena-Rodriguez, slip. op at 8.
- See Pena-Rodriguez, slip. op at 11.
- See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
- See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).
- See Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. ___, No. 13–517, slip op. at 3–4 (2014).
- See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127. In addition, while the no-impeachment rule, by its very nature, prohibits testimony by jurors, evidence of misconduct other than juror testimony can be used to impeach the verdict. Id.
- See Pena-Rodriguez, slip. op at 17.
- Id. at 3–4.
- Id. at 17. The Court noted that “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry,” but that instead the no-impeachment rule does not govern when a juror makes a statement exhibiting “overt racial bias” that was a “significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.” Id. If the Pena-Rodriguez exception to the no-impeachment rule applies, the trial court must examine the underlying evidence and determine whether a retrial is necessary in “light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence.” Id.
- Id. at 13.
- Id. at 15–16.
- Id. (“[T]his Court has noted the dilemma faced by trial court judges and counsel in deciding whether to explore potential racial bias at voir dire . . . The stigma that attends racial bias may make it difficult for a juror to report inappropriate statements during the court of juror deliberations.”).
- 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
- 391 U.S. at 519.
- 391 U.S. at 519, 521, 523. The Court thought the problem went only to the issue of the sentence imposed and saw no evidence that a jury from which death-scrupled persons had been excluded was more prone to convict than were juries on which such person sat. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968). Witherspoon was given added significance when, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the Court held mandatory death sentences unconstitutional and ruled that the jury as a representative of community mores must make the determination as guided by legislative standards. See also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (holding Witherspoon applicable to bifurcated capital sentencing procedures and voiding a statute permitting exclusion of any juror unable to swear that the existence of the death penalty would not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact).
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
- 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
- 469 U.S. at 424. Accord, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (appropriateness of exclusion should be determined by context, including excluded juror’s understanding based on previous questioning of other jurors).
- See Witt, 469 U.S. at 425–26.
- Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
- 476 U.S. at 183.
- 476 U.S. at 180.
- Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
- 551 U.S. 1 (2007).
- 551 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted). In Uttecht, the Court reasoned that deference was owed to trial courts because the lower court is in a “superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.” See id. at 22. In White v. Wheeler, the Court recognized that a trial judge’s decision to excuse a prospective juror in a death penalty case was entitled to deference even when the judge does not make the decision to excuse the juror contemporaneously with jury selection (voir dire). See 577 U.S. ___, No. 14–1372, slip op. at 7–8 (2015) (per curiam). The Court explained that the deference due under Uttecht to a trial judge’s decision was not limited to the judge’s evaluation of a juror’s demeanor, but extended to a trial judge’s consideration of “the substance of a juror’s response.” See id. at 8. When a trial judge “chooses to reflect and deliberate” over the record regarding whether to excuse a juror for a day following the questioning of the prospective juror, that judge’s decision should be “commended” and is entitled to substantial deference. See id. at 8.
- See Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 7 (internal citations omitted).
- Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
- Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1987). The same rule applies in the federal setting. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
- 487 U.S. at 86, 87.
- Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
- Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1879). See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513–15, 522 n.21 (1968).
- Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
- Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
- Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). The quotation is from a section of Justice White’s opinion not adopted as the opinion of the Court. Id. at 35.
- Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). The Court noted that under its supervisory power it would require a federal court faced with the same circumstances to propound appropriate questions to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Id. at 597 n.9. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). But see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), in which the trial judge refused a defense request to inquire about possible bias against Mexicans. A plurality apparently adopted a rule that, all else being equal, the judge should necessarily inquire about racial or ethnic prejudice only in cases of violent crimes in which the defendant and victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups, id. at 192, a rule rejected by two concurring Justices. Id. at 194. Three dissenting Justices thought the judge must always ask when defendant so requested. Id. at 195.
- “This Court has long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.” Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (state trial court’s erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge does not warrant reversal of conviction if all seated jurors were qualified and unbiased).
- Cf. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919), holding that it is no violation of the guarantee to limit the number of peremptory challenges to each defendant in a multi-party trial.
- 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
- 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
- See Fourteenth Amendment discussion of “Equal Protection and Race,” infra.
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (defendant has standing to raise equal protection rights of excluded juror of different race).
- 493 U.S. 474 (1990). But see Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992) (claim of Sixth Amendment violation resulting from racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges treated as sufficient to raise equal protection claim under Swain and Batson).
- 493 U.S. at 487.
- 493 U.S. at 484. As a consequence, a defendant who uses a peremptory challenge to correct the court’s error in denying a for-cause challenge may have no Sixth Amendment cause of action. Peremptory challenges “are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1987). Similarly, there is no due process violation, at least where state statutory law requires use of peremptory challenges to cure erroneous refusals by the court to excuse jurors for cause. “It is for the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise.” Id.
- Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
- 505 U.S. at 57.
- 505 U.S. at 58.