The Constitution is almost completely silent concerning the organization of the federal judiciary. “That there should be a national judiciary was readily accepted by all.”1 But whether it was to consist of one high court at the apex of a federal judicial system or a high court exercising appellate jurisdiction over state courts that would initially hear all but a minor fraction of cases raising national issues was a matter of considerable controversy.2 The Virginia Plan provided for a “National judiciary [to] be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature . . . .”3 In the Committee of the Whole, the proposition “that a national judiciary be established” was unanimously adopted,4 but the clause “to consist of One supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals”5 was first agreed to, then reconsidered. The provision for inferior tribunals was ultimately stricken out, it being argued that state courts could adequately adjudicate all necessary matters while the supreme tribunal would protect the national interest and assure uniformity.6 Wilson and Madison thereupon moved to authorize Congress “to appoint inferior tribunals,”7 which carried the implication that Congress could in its discretion either designate the state courts to hear federal cases or create federal courts. The word “appoint” was then adopted, but over the course of the Convention the phrasing was changed again so as to suggest somewhat more of an obligation to vest such powers in inferior federal courts.8

The requirement that judges hold their Officer during “good behavior” excited no controversy during the Convention,9 although the lack of an enforcement mechanism for this provision resulted in impeachment under Article II becoming the primary mechanism for removal of a federal judge.10 And finally, the only substantial dispute that arose regarding the denial to Congress of the power to reduce judicial salaries (a power which could be used to intimidate judges) came on Madison’s motion to bar increases as well as decreases.11

One Supreme Court

While the Convention specified that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would preside over any Presidential impeachment trial in the Senate,12 decisions on the size and composition of the Supreme Court, the time and place for sitting, its internal organization, and other matters were left to the Congress. The Congress soon provided these details in the Judiciary Act of 1789, one of the seminal statutes of the United States.13 Originally, the Court consisted of a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices.14 The number was gradually increased until it reached a total of ten under the act of March 3, 1863.15 As one of the Reconstruction Congress’s restrictions on President Andrew Johnson, the number was reduced to seven as vacancies should occur.16 The number actually never fell below eight before the end of Johnson’s term, and Congress thereupon made the number nine.17

Proposals have been made at various times for an organization of the Court into sections or divisions. No authoritative judicial expression is available, but Chief Justice Hughes, in a letter to Senator Wheeler in 1937, expressed doubts concerning the validity of such a device and stated that “the Constitution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts functioning in effect as separate courts.”18 Congress has also determined the time and place of sessions of the Court. It exercised this power once to change the Court’s term to forestall a constitutional attack on the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, with the result that the Court did not convene for fourteen months.19

Inferior Courts

Congress also provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789 for the creation of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Thirteen district courts were constituted to have four sessions annually,20 and three circuit courts were established. The circuit courts were to consist of two Supreme Court justices each and one of the district judges of such districts, and were to meet twice annually in the various districts comprising the circuit.21 This system had substantial faults in operation, not the least of which was the burden imposed on the Justices, who were required to travel thousands of miles each year under bad conditions.22 Despite numerous efforts to change this system, it persisted, except for one brief period, until 1891.23 Since then, the federal judicial system has consisted of district courts with original jurisdiction, intermediate appellate courts, and the Supreme Court.

Abolition of Courts.

That Congress “may from time to time ordain and establish” inferior courts would seem to imply that the system may be reoriented from time to time and that Congress is not restricted to the status quo but may expand and contract the units of the system. But if the judges are to have life tenure, what is to be done with them when the system is contracted? Unfortunately, the first exercise of the power occurred in a highly politicized situation, and no definite answer emerged. By the Judiciary Act of February 13, 1801,24 passed in the closing weeks of the Adams Administration, the districts were reorganized, and six circuit courts consisting of three circuit judges each were created. Although Adams appointed deserving Federalists to these so-called “midnight judge” positions just before the change in administration, the Jeffersonians soon set in motion plans to repeal the Act, which were carried out.25 No provision was made for the displaced judges, however, apparently under the theory that if there were no courts there could be no judges to sit on them.26 The validity of the repeal was questioned on related grounds in Stuart v. Laird,27 but Justice Paterson rejected the challenge without directly addressing the issue of the displaced judges.

Not until 1913 did Congress again exercise its power to abolish a federal court, this time the unfortunate Commerce Court, which had disappointed the expectations of most of its friends.28 But this time Congress provided for the redistribution of the Commerce Court judges among the circuit courts as well as a transfer of its jurisdiction to the district courts.

Diminution of Salaries.

“The Compensation Clause has its roots in the longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an independent Judiciary. A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.”29 Thus, once a salary figure has gone into effect, Congress may not reduce it nor rescind any part of an increase, although prior to the time of its effectiveness Congress may repeal a promised increase. This latter holding was rendered in the context of a statutory salary plan for all federal officers and employees under which increases went automatically into effect on a specified date. Four years running, Congress interdicted the pay increases, but in two instances the increases had become effective, raising the barrier of this clause.30

Also implicating this clause was a Depression-era appropriations act reducing “the salaries and retired pay of all judges (except judges whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office),” by a fixed amount. Although this provision presented no constitutional questions, it required an interpretation as to which judges were excepted. Judges in the District of Columbia were held protected by Article III,31 but the salaries of the judges of the Court of Claims, a legislative court, were held subject to the reduction.32

In Evans v. Gore,33 the Court invalidated the application of a 1919 income tax law to a sitting federal judge, over the strong dissent of Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis. This ruling was extended in Miles v. Graham34 to exempt the salary of a judge of the Court of Claims appointed subsequent to the enactment of the taxing act. Evans v. Gore was disapproved and Miles v. Graham was in effect overruled in O’Malley v. Woodrough,35 where the Court upheld section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932, which extended the application of the income tax to salaries of judges taking office after June 6, 1932. Such a tax was regarded neither as an unconstitutional diminution of the compensation of judges nor as an encroachment on the independence of the judiciary.36 To subject judges who take office after a stipulated date to a nondiscriminatory tax laid generally on an income, said the Court, “is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.”37

Formally overruling Evans v. Gore, the Court in United States v. Hatter reaffirmed the principle that judges should “share the tax burdens borne by all citizens.”38 “[T]he potential threats to judicial independence that underlie [the Compensation Clause] cannot justify a special judicial exemption from a commonly shared tax.”39 The Medicare tax, extended to all federal employees in 1982, is such a non-discriminatory tax that may be applied to federal judges, the Court held. The 1983 extension of a Social Security tax to then-sitting judges was “a different matter,” however, because the judges were required to participate while almost all other federal employees were given a choice about participation.40 Congress had not cured the constitutional violation by a subsequent enactment that raised judges’ salaries by an amount greater than the amount of Social Security taxes that they were required to pay.41

Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction

By virtue of its power “to ordain and establish” courts, Congress has occasionally created courts under Article III to exercise a specialized jurisdiction. These tribunals are like other Article III courts in that they exercise “the judicial power of the United States,” and only that power, that their judges must be appointed by the President and the Senate and must hold office during good behavior subject to removal by impeachment only, and that the compensation of their judges cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. One example of such a court was the Commerce Court created by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,42 which was given exclusive jurisdiction to enforce, inter alia, orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (except those involving money penalties and criminal punishment). This court actually functioned for less than three years, being abolished in 1913.

Another court of specialized jurisdiction, but created for a limited time only, was the Emergency Court of Appeals organized by the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942.43 By the terms of the statute, this court consisted of three or more judges designated by the Chief Justice from the judges of the United States district courts and circuit courts of appeal. The Court was vested with jurisdiction and the powers of a district court to hear appeals filed within thirty days against denials of protests by the Price Administrator. The Court had exclusive jurisdiction to set aside regulations, orders, or price schedules, in whole or in part, or to remand the proceeding, but the court was tightly constrained in its treatment of regulations. There was interplay with the district courts, which were charged with authority to enforce orders issued under the Act, although only the Emergency Court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of such orders.44

Other specialized courts are the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is in many respects like the geographic circuits. Created in 1982,45 this court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the United States Court of Federal Claims, from the Federal Merit System Protection Board, the Court of International Trade, the Patent Office in patent and trademark cases, and in various contract and tort cases. One of those courts, the Court of International Trade, began life as the Board of General Appraisers, became the United States Customs Court in 1926, was declared an Article III court in 1956, and came to its present form and name in 1980.46 Finally, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, staffed by federal judges from other courts, is authorized to transfer actions pending in different districts to a single district for trial.47

To facilitate the gathering of foreign intelligence information, through electronic surveillance, search and seizure, as well as other means, Congress in 1978 authorized a special court, composed of seven regular federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice, to receive applications from the United States and to issue warrants for intelligence activities.48 Even greater specialization was provided by the special court created by the Ethics in Government Act;49 the court was charged, upon the request of the Attorney General, with appointing an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute charges of illegality in the Executive Branch. The court also had certain supervisory powers over the independent counsel.

Legislative Courts

Legislative courts, so-called because they are created by Congress pursuant to its general legislative powers, have comprised a significant part of the federal judiciary.50 The distinction between constitutional courts and legislative courts was first made in American Ins. Co. v. Canter,51 which involved the question of the admiralty jurisdiction of the territorial court of Florida, the judges of which were limited to a four-year term in office. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court: “These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the constitution, but is conferred by congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.”52 The Court went on to hold that admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states only in those courts that are established pursuant to Article III, but that the same limitation does not apply to the territorial courts, for in legislating for them “Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.”53

Canter postulated a simple proposition: “Constitutional courts exercise the judicial power described in Art. III of the Constitution; legislative courts do not and cannot.”54 A two-fold difficulty attended this proposition, however. Admiralty jurisdiction is included within the “judicial power of the United States” specifically in Article III, requiring an explanation how this territorial court could receive and exercise it. Second, if territorial courts could not exercise Article III power, how might their decisions be subjected to appellate review in the Supreme Court, or indeed in other Article III courts, which could exercise only Article III judicial power?55 Moreover, if in fact some “judicial power” may be devolved upon courts not having the constitutional security of tenure and salary, what prevents Congress from undermining those values intended to be protected by Article III’s guarantees by giving jurisdiction to unprotected entities that, being subjected to influence, would be bent to the popular will?

Attempts to explain or to rationalize the predicament or to provide a principled limiting point have resulted from Canter to the present in “frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents” spelled out in cases comprising “landmarks on a judicial ‘dark-ling plain’ where ignorant armies have clashed by night, as Justice White apparently believes them to be.”56 Nonetheless, Article I courts are quite common entities in our judicial system.57

Power of Congress Over Legislative Courts.

In creating leg- islative courts, Congress is not limited by the restrictions imposed in Article III concerning tenure during good behavior and the prohibition against diminution of salaries. Congress may limit tenure to a term of years, as it has done in acts creating territorial courts and the Tax Court; it may subject the judges of legislative courts to removal by the President;58 and it may reduce their salaries during their terms.59 Similarly, it follows that Congress can vest in legislative courts nonjudicial functions of a legislative or advisory nature and deprive their judgments of finality. Thus, in Gordon v. United States,60 there was no objection to the power of the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress to revise or suspend the early judgments of the Court of Claims. Likewise, in United States v. Ferreira,61 the Court sustained the act conferring powers on the Florida territorial court to examine claims rising under the Spanish treaty and to report its decisions and the evidence on which they were based to the Secretary of the Treasury for subsequent action. “A power of this description,” the Court said, “may constitutionally be conferred on a Secretary as well as on a commissioner. But [it] is not judicial in either case, in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.”62

Review of Legislative Courts by Supreme Court.

Chief Jus- tice Taney’s view, which would have been expressed in Gordon,63 that the judgments of legislative courts could never be reviewed by the Supreme Court, was tacitly rejected in De Groot v. United States,64 in which the Court took jurisdiction from a final judgment of the Court of Claims. Since the decision in this case, the authority of the Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over legislative courts has turned not upon the nature or status of such courts but rather upon the nature of the proceeding before the lower court and the finality of its judgment. The Supreme Court will neither review the administrative proceedings of legislative courts nor entertain appeals from the advisory or interlocutory decrees of such a body.65 But, in proceedings before a legislative court that are judicial in nature, admit of a final judgment, and involve the performance of judicial functions and therefore the exercise of judicial power, the Court may be vested with appellate jurisdiction.66

The “Public Rights” Distinction.

A major delineation of the distinction between Article I courts and Article III courts appears in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.67 At issue was a summary procedure, without benefit of the courts, for the collection by the United States of moneys claimed to be due from one of its own customs collectors. It was argued that the assessment and collection was a judicial act carried out by nonjudicial officers and was thus invalid under Article III. Accepting that the acts complained of were judicial, the Court nonetheless sustained the act by distinguishing between any act, “which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty,” which, in other words, is inherently judicial, and other acts that Congress may vest in courts or in other agencies. “[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”68

In essence, the Court distinguished between those acts that historically had been determined by courts and those that had both been historically resolved by executive or legislative acts and comprehended matters that arose between the government and others. Thus, Article I courts “may be created as special tribunals to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it. The mode of determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control.”69 Among the matters susceptible of judicial determination, but not requiring it, are claims against the United States,70 the disposal of public lands and claims arising therefrom,71 questions concerning membership in the Indian tribes,72 and questions arising out of the administration of the customs and internal revenue laws.73 Other courts similar to territorial courts, such as consular courts and military courts martial, may be justified on like grounds.74

The impact of the “public rights” distinction, however, has varied dramatically over time. In Crowell v. Benson,75 the Court approved an administrative scheme for determining, subject to judicial review, maritime employee compensation claims, although it acknowledged that the case involved “one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.”76 This scheme was permissible, the Court said, because in cases arising out of congressional statutes, an administrative tribunal could make findings of fact and render an initial decision on legal and constitutional questions, as long as there is adequate review in a constitutional court.77 The “essential attributes” of decisions must remain in an Article III court, but so long as it does, Congress may use administrative decisionmakers in those private rights cases that arise in the context of a comprehensive federal statutory scheme.78 In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., discussed infra, the Court reasserted that the distinction between “public rights” and “private rights” was still important in determining which matters could be assigned to legislative courts and administrative agencies and those that could not be, but there was much the Court plurality did not explain.79

The Court continued to waver with respect to the importance of the public rights/private rights distinction. In two cases following Marathon, it rejected the distinction as “a bright line test,” and instead focused on “substance”—i.e., on the extent to which the particular grant of jurisdiction to an Article I court threatened judicial integrity and separation of powers principles.80 Nonetheless, the Court indicated that the distinction may be an appropriate starting point for analysis. Thus, the fact that private rights traditionally at the core of Article III jurisdiction are at stake leads the Court to a “searching” inquiry as to whether Congress is encroaching inordinately on judicial functions, whereas the concern is not so great where “public” rights are involved.81

However, in a subsequent case, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, the distinction was pronounced determinative not only of the issue whether a matter could be referred to a non-Article III tribunal, but whether Congress could dispense with civil jury trials.82 In so doing, however, the Court vitiated much of the core content of “private” rights as a concept and left resolution of the central issue to a balancing test. That is, “public” rights are, strictly speaking, those in which the cause of action inheres in or lies against the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity, the understanding since Murray’s Lessee. However, to accommodate Crowell v. Benson, Atlas Roofing, and similar cases, seemingly private causes of action between private parties will also be deemed “public” rights when Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its Article I powers, fashions a cause of action that is analogous to a common-law claim and integrates it so closely into a public regulatory scheme that it becomes a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.83

In Stern v. Marshall,84 the Court shifted away from the functionalism of previous cases and back towards the formalism of Northern Pipeline. Specifically, the Stern Court held that Article III prohibited a bankruptcy court from exercising jurisdiction over a common law claim concerning fraudulent interference with a gift because it did not fall under the public rights exception.85 The Court limited the public rights exception to claims deriving from a “federal regulatory scheme” or claims in which “an expert Government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective.”86 In rejecting the application of the public rights exception to the fraudulent interference claim, the Court observed that the claim was not one that could be “pursued only by grace of the other branches” or could have been “determined exclusively” by the executive or legislative branches.87 Additionally, the underlying claim did not “flow from a federal regulatory scheme” and was not limited to a “particularized area of law.”88 Because the claim involved the “most prototypical exercise of judicial power,” adjudication of a common law cause of action not created by federal law, the Court rejected the bankruptcy courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over the claim as violating Article III.89

Constitutional Status of the Court of Claims and the Courts of Customs and Patent Appeals.

Although the Supreme Court long accepted the Court of Claims as an Article III court,90 it later ruled that court to be an Article I court and its judges without constitutional protection of tenure and salary.91 Then, in the 1950s, Congress statutorily declared that the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were Article III courts,92 a questionable act under the standards the Court had used to determine whether courts were legislative or constitutional.93 In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,94 however, five of seven participating Justices united to find that indeed the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, at least, were constitutional courts and their judges eligible to participate in judicial business in other constitutional courts. Three Justices would have overruled Bakelite and Williams and would have held that the courts in question were constitutional courts.95 Whether a court is an Article III tribunal depends largely upon whether legislation establishing it is in harmony with the limitations of that Article, specifically, “whether . . . its business is the federal business there specified and its judges and judgments are allowed the independence there expressly or impliedly made requisite.” When a court is created “to carry into effect [federal] powers . . . over subject matter . . . and not over localities,” a presumption arises that the status of such a tribunal is constitutional rather than legislative.96 The other four Justices expressly declared that Bakelite and Williams should not be overruled,97 but two of them thought that the two courts had attained constitutional status by virtue of the clear manifestation of congressional intent expressed in the legislation.98 Two Justices maintained that both courts remained legislative tribunals.99 Although the result is clear, no standard for pronouncing a court legislative rather than constitutional obtained the adherence of a majority of the Court.100

Status of Courts of the District of Columbia.

Through a long course of decisions, the courts of the District of Columbia were regarded as legislative courts upon which Congress could impose nonjudicial functions. In Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe,101 the Court sustained an act of Congress which conferred revisory powers upon the Supreme Court of the District in patent appeals and made its decisions binding only upon the Commissioner of Patents. Similarly, the Court later sustained the authority of Congress to vest revisory powers in the same court over rates fixed by a public utilities commission.102 Not long after this the same rule was applied to the revisory powers of the District Supreme Court over orders of the Federal Radio Commission.103 These rulings were based on the assumption, express or implied, that the courts of the District were legislative courts, created by Congress pursuant to its plenary power to govern the District of Columbia. In dictum in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,104 while reviewing the history and analyzing the nature of the legislative courts, the Court stated that the courts of the District were legislative courts.

In 1933, nevertheless, the Court abandoned all previous dicta on the subject and found the courts of the District of Columbia to be constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States,105 with the result that it assumed the task of reconciling the performance of nonjudicial functions by such courts with the rule that constitutional courts can exercise only the judicial power of the United States. This task was accomplished by the argument that, in establishing courts for the District, Congress performs dual functions pursuant to two distinct powers: the power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and its plenary and exclusive power to legislate for the District of Columbia. However, Article III, § 1, limits this latter power with respect to tenure and compensation, but not with respect to vesting legislative and administrative powers in such courts. Subject to the guarantees of personal liberty in the Constitution, “Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state legislature has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts.”106

In 1970, Congress formally recognized two sets of courts in the District: federal courts (the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, created pursuant to Article III), and courts equivalent to state and territorial courts (including the District of Columbia Court of Appeals), created pursuant to Article I.107 Congress’s action was sustained in Palmore v. United States.108 When legislating for the District, the Court held, Congress has the power of a local legislature and may, pursuant to Article I, § 8, cl. 17, vest jurisdiction to hear matters of local law and local concerns in courts not having Article III characteristics. The defendant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to be tried before an Article III judge was denied on the basis that it was not absolutely necessary that every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense based on an act of Congress or a law made under its authority need be conducted in an Article III court. State courts, after all, could hear cases involving federal law as could territorial and military courts. “[T]he requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.”109

Bankruptcy Courts.

After extended and lengthy debate, Con- gress in 1978 revised the bankruptcy act and created a bankruptcy court as an “adjunct” of the district courts. The court was composed of judges vested with practically all the judicial power of the United States, serving for 14-year terms, subject to removal for cause by the judicial councils of the circuits, and with salaries subject to statutory change.110 The bankruptcy courts were given jurisdiction over not only civil proceedings arising under the bankruptcy code, but all other proceedings arising in or related to bankruptcy cases, with review in Article III courts under a clearly erroneous standard.

This broad grant of jurisdiction, however, brought into question what kinds of cases could be heard by an Article I court. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a case in which a company petitioning for reorganization made a claim against another company for breaches of contract and warranty—purely state law claims—the Court held that the conferral of jurisdiction upon Article I judges to hear state claims regarding traditional common law actions such as existed at the time of the drafting of the Constitution was unconstitutional.111 Although the holding was extremely narrow, a plurality of the Court sought to rationalize and limit the Court’s jurisprudence of Article I courts.

According to the plurality, a fundamental principle of separation of powers requires the judicial power of the United States to be exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Article III. Congress may not evade the constitutional order by allocating this judicial power to courts whose judges lack security of tenure and compensation. Only in three narrowly circumscribed instances may judicial power be distributed outside the Article III framework: in territories and the District of Columbia, that is, geographical areas in which no state operated as sovereign and Congress exercised the general powers of government; courts martial, that is, the establishment of courts under a constitutional grant of power historically understood as giving the political branches extraordinary control over the precise subject matter; and the adjudication of “public rights,” that is, the litigation of certain matters that historically were reserved to the political branches of government and that were between the government and the individual.112 In bankruptcy legislation and litigation not involving any of these exceptions, the plurality would have held, the judicial power to process bankruptcy cases could not be assigned to the tribunals created by the act.113

The dissent argued that, although on its face Article III provided that judicial power could only be assigned to Article III entities, the history since Canter belied that simplicity. Rather, the precedents clearly indicated that there is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may assign to an Article I court and that which must be given to an Article III court. Despite this, the dissent contended that Congress did not possess plenary discretion in choosing between the two systems; rather, in evaluating whether jurisdiction was properly reposed in an Article I court, the Supreme Court must balance the values of Article III against both the strength of the interest Congress sought to further by its Article I investiture and the extent to which Article III values were undermined by the congressional action. This balancing would afford the Court, the dissent believed, the power to prevent Congress, were it moved to do so, from transferring jurisdiction in order to emasculate the constitutional courts of the United States.114

No majority could be marshaled behind a principled discussion of the reasons for and the limitation upon the creation of legislative courts, not that a majority opinion, or even a unanimous one, would necessarily presage the settling of the law.115 But the breadth of the various opinions not only left unclear the degree of discretion left in Congress to restructure the bankruptcy courts, but also placed in issue the constitutionality of other legislative efforts to establish adjudicative systems outside a scheme involving the creation of life-tenured judges.116

Congress responded to Marathon by enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.117 Bankruptcy courts were maintained as Article I entities, and overall their powers as courts were not notably diminished. However, Congress did establish a division between “core proceedings,” which could be heard and determined by bankruptcy courts, subject to lenient review, and other proceedings, which, though initially heard and decided by bankruptcy courts, could be reviewed de novo in the district court at the behest of any party, unless the parties had consented to bankruptcy-court jurisdiction in the same manner as core proceedings. A safety valve was included, permitting the district court to withdraw any proceeding from the bankruptcy court on cause shown.118

Notice, however, that in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg119 the Court, evaluating the related issue of when a jury trial is required under the Seventh Amendment,120 found that a cause of action to avoid a fraudulent money transfer was founded on state law, and, although denominated a core proceeding by Congress, was actually a private right. Similarly, the Court in Stern v. Marshall121 held that a counterclaim of tortuous interference with a gift, although made during a bankruptcy proceeding and statutorily deemed a core proceeding, was a state common law claim that did not fall under any of the public rights exceptions.122 Nonetheless, as the Court later held in Wellness International v. Sharif,123 a bankruptcy court may adjudicate with finality a so-called Stern claim—that is, a core claim that does not fall within the public rights exception—if the parties have provided knowing and voluntary consent, arguably limiting the ultimate impact of Stern for federal bankruptcy law.124

Agency Adjudication.

In two decisions subsequent to Marathon involving legislative courts, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co.125 and CFTC v. Schor,126 the Court clearly suggested that the majority was now closer to the balancing approach of the Marathon dissenters than to the Marathon plurality’s position that Congress may confer judicial power on legislative courts only in very limited circumstances. Subsequently, however, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,127 a reversion to the fundamentality of Marathon, with an opinion by the same author, Justice Brennan, cast some doubt on this proposition.

In Union Carbide, the Court upheld a provision of a pesticide law which required binding arbitration, with limited judicial review, of compensation due one registrant by another for mandatory sharing of registration information pursuant to federal statutory law. And in Schor, the Court upheld conferral on the agency of authority, in a reparations adjudication under the Act, to also adjudicate “counterclaims” arising out of the same transaction, including those arising under state common law. Neither the fact that the pesticide case involved a dispute between two private parties nor the fact that the CFTC was empowered to decide claims traditionally adjudicated under state law proved decisive to the Court’s analysis.

In rejecting a “formalistic” approach and analyzing the “substance” of the provision at issue in Union Carbide, Justice O’Connor‘s opinion for the Court pointed to several considerations.128 The right to compensation was not a purely private right, but “bears many of the characteristics of a ‘public’ right,” because Congress was “authoriz[ing] an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program. . . .”129 Also deemed important was not “unduly constrict- [ing] Congress’s ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers”;130 arbitration seen as “a pragmatic solution to [a] difficult problem.”131 The limited nature of judicial review was seen as a plus in the sense that “no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement power.” On the other hand, availability of limited judicial review of the arbitrator’s findings and determination for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, and for due process violations, preserved the “ ‘appropriate exercise of the judicial function.’ ”132 Thus, the Court concluded, Congress in exercise of Article I powers “may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”133

In Schor, the Court described Art. III, § 1 as serving a dual purpose: to protect the role of an independent judiciary and to safeguard the right of litigants to have claims decided by judges free from potential domination by the other branches of government. A litigant’s Article III right is not absolute, the Court determined, but may be waived. This the litigant had done by submitting to the administrative law judge’s jurisdiction rather than independently seeking relief as he was entitled to and then objecting only after adverse rulings on the merits. But the institutional integrity claim, not being personal, could not be waived, and the Court reached the merits. The threat to institutional independence was “weighed” by reference to “a number of factors.” The conferral on the CFTC of pendent jurisdiction over common law counterclaims was seen as more narrowly confined than was the grant to bankruptcy courts at issue in Marathon, and as more closely resembling the “model” approved in Crowell v. Benson. The CFTC’s jurisdiction, unlike that of bankruptcy courts, was said to be confined to “a particularized area of the law;” the agency’s orders were enforceable only by order of a district court,134 and reviewable under a less deferential standard, with legal rulings being subject to de novo review; and the agency was not empowered, as had been the bankruptcy courts, to exercise “all ordinary powers of district courts.”135

Granfinanciera followed analysis different from that in Schor, although it preserved Union Carbide through its concept of “public rights.” State law and other legal claims founded on private rights could not be remitted to non-Article III tribunals for adjudication unless Congress, in creating an integrated public regulatory scheme, has so taken up the right as to transform it. It may not simply relabel a private right and place it into the regulatory scheme. The Court is hazy with respect to whether the right itself must be a creature of federal statutory action. The general descriptive language suggests that, but the Court seemingly goes beyond this point in its determination whether the right at issue in the case, the recovery of preferential or fraudulent transfers in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, is a “private right” that carries with it a right to jury trial. Though a statutory interest, the actions were identical to state-law contract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment the estate.136 Schor was distinguished solely on the waiver part of the decision, relating to the individual interest, without considering the part of the opinion deciding the institutional interest on the merits and utilizing a balancing test.137 Thus, although the Court has made some progress in reconciling its growing line of disparate cases, doctrinal harmony has not yet been achieved.

Noncourt Entities in the Judicial Branch

Passing on the constitutionality of the establishment of the Sentencing Commission as an “independent” body in the judicial branch, the Court acknowledged that the Commission is not a court and does not exercise judicial power. Rather, its function is to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines for federal courts. It acts, therefore, legislatively, and its membership of seven is composed of three judges and three nonjudges. But the standard of constitutionality, the Court held, is whether the entity exercises powers that are more appropriately performed by another branch or that undermine the integrity of the judiciary. Because the imposition of sentences is a function traditionally exercised within congressionally prescribed limits by federal judges, the Court found the functions of the Commission could be located in the judicial branch. Nor did performance of its functions contribute, in any meaningful way, to a weakening of the judiciary or an aggrandizement of power, the Court observed.138


The most complete account of the Convention’s consideration of the judiciary is J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 1 ch. 5 (1971). [Back to text]
D § 4005, p. 98 (1996). See also R. FALLON, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLERS THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009), Ch. III, p. 268 (hereinafter Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.)) [Back to text]
1 M. Farrand, supra at 21–22. It is possible that this version may not be an accurate copy, see 3 id. at 593–94. [Back to text]
1 id. at 95, 104. [Back to text]
Id. at 95, 105. The words “One or more” were deleted the following day without recorded debate. Id. at 116, 119. [Back to text]
Id. at 124–25. [Back to text]
Madison’s notes use the word “institute” in place of “appoint,” id. at 125, but the latter appears in the Convention Journal, id. at 118, and in Yates’ notes, id. at 127, and when the Convention took up the draft reported by the Committee of the Whole “appoint” is used even in Madison’s notes. 2 id. at 38, 45. [Back to text]
On offering their motion, Wilson and Madison “observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them.” 1 id. at 125. The Committee on Detail provided for the vesting of judicial power in one Supreme Court “and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the legislature of the United States.” 2 id. at 186. Its draft also authorized Congress “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” Id. at 182. No debate is recorded when the Convention approved these two clauses, Id. at 315, 422–23, 428–30. The Committee on Style left the clause empowering Congress to “constitute” inferior tribunals as was, but it deleted “as shall, when necessary” from the Judiciary article, so that the judicial power was vested “in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time”—and here deleted “constitute” and substituted the more forceful—“ordain and establish.” Id. at 600. [Back to text]
The provision was in the Virginia Plan and was approved throughout, 1 id. at 21. [Back to text]
See Article II, Judges, supra. [Back to text]
Id. at 121; 2 id. at 44–45, 429–430. [Back to text]
Article I, § 3, cl. 6. [Back to text]
Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. The authoritative works on the Act and its working and amendments are FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judicial Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); see also J. Goebel, supra at ch. 11. [Back to text]
Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 1. [Back to text]
12 Stat. 794, § 1. [Back to text]
Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 209, § 1. [Back to text]
Act of April 10, 1869, 16 Stat. 44. [Back to text]
Reorganization of the Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 75th Congress, 1st Sess. (1937), pt. 3, 491. For earlier proposals to have the Court sit in divisions, see F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra at 74–85. [Back to text]
1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222–224 (rev. ed. 1926). [Back to text]
Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 2–3. [Back to text]
Id. at 74, §§ 4–5 [Back to text]
Cf.Frankfurter & Landis, supra at chs. 1–3; J. Goebel, supra at 554–560, 565–569. Upon receipt of a letter from President Washington soliciting suggestions regarding the judicial system, WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1943), 31, Chief Justice Jay prepared a letter for the approval of the other Justices, declining to comment on the policy questions but raising several issues of constitutionality, that the same man should not be appointed to two offices, that the offices were incompatible, and that the act invaded the prerogatives of the President and Senate. 2 G. MC REE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 293–296 (1858). The letter was apparently never forwarded to the President. Writings of Washington, supra at 31–32 n.58. When the constitutional issue was raised in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 299, 309 (1803), it was passed over with the observation that the practice was too established to be questioned. [Back to text]
Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. The temporary relief came in the Act of February 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89, which was repealed by the Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. [Back to text]
Act of February 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89. [Back to text]
Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. Frankfurter & Landis, supra at 25–32; 1 C. Warren, supra at 185–215. [Back to text]
This was the theory of John Taylor of Caroline, upon whom the Jeffersonians in Congress relied. W. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 63–64 (1918). The controversy is recounted fully in id. at 58–78. [Back to text]
5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 299 (1803) (sustaining both the transfer of suits between circuits and the sitting of Supreme Court Justices on circuit courts without confirmation to those courts). [Back to text]
The Court was created by the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, and repealed by the Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 219. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra at 153–174; W. Carpenter, supra at 78–94. [Back to text]
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980). Hamilton, writing in THE FEDERALIST, No. 79 (J. Cooke ed., 1961), 531, emphasized that “[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.” [Back to text]
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 224–30 (1980). In one year, the increase took effect on October 1, although the President signed the bill reducing the amount during the day of October 1. The Court held that the increase had gone into effect by the time the reduction was signed. Will is also authority for the proposition that a general, nondiscriminatory reduction, affecting judges but not aimed solely at them, is covered by the clause. Id. at 226. [Back to text]
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933). [Back to text]
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). But see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). [Back to text]
253 U.S. 245 (1920). [Back to text]
268 U.S. 501 (1925). [Back to text]
307 U.S. 277 (1939). [Back to text]
307 U.S. at 278–82. [Back to text]
307 U.S. at 282. [Back to text]
532 U.S. 557, 571 (2001). [Back to text]
532 U.S. at 571. [Back to text]
532 U.S. at 572. [Back to text]
532 U.S. at 578–81. [Back to text]
Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. [Back to text]
56 Stat. 23, §§ 31–33. [Back to text]
In Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943), the limitations on the use of injunctions, except the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, was unanimously sustained. A similar court was created to be used in the enforcement of the economic controls imposed by President Nixon in 1971. Pub. L. 92–210, 85 Stat. 743, 211(b). Although controls ended in 1974, see 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, Congress continued the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and gave it new jurisdiction. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93–159, 87 Stat. 633, 15 U.S.C. § 754, incorporating judicial review provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act. The Court was abolished, effective March 29, 1993, by Pub. L. 102–572, 106 Stat. 4506. Another similar specialized court was created by § 209 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 93–226, 87 Stat. 999, 45 U.S.C. § 719, to review the final system plan under the Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp.), 419 U.S. 102 (1974). [Back to text]
By the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97–164, 96 Stat. 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Among other things, this Court assumed the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. [Back to text]
Pub. L. 96–417, 94 Stat. 1727. [Back to text]
28 U.S.C. § 1407. [Back to text]
Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1788, 50 U.S.C. § 1803. [Back to text]
Ethics in Government Act, Title VI, Pub. L. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1867, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591599. The court is a “Special Division” of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; composed of three regular federal judges, only one of whom may be from the D. C. Circuit, who are designated by the Chief Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 49. The constitutionality of the Special Division was upheld in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670–85 (1988). Authority for the court expired in 1999 under a sunset provision. Pub. L. 103–270, § 2, 108 Stat. 732 (1994). [Back to text]
In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), the Court held Article I courts to be “Courts of Law” for purposes of the appointments clause. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See id. at 888–892 (majority opinion), and 901–914 (Justice Scalia dissenting). [Back to text]
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). [Back to text]
26 U.S. at 546. [Back to text]
26 U.S. at 546. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544–45 (1962), Justice Harlan asserted that Chief Justice Marshall in Canter “did not mean to imply that the case heard by the Key West court was not one of admiralty jurisdiction otherwise properly justiciable in a Federal District Court sitting in one of the States. . . . All the Chief Justice meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article. . . .” [Back to text]
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 106 (1982) (Justice White dissenting). [Back to text]
That the Supreme Court could review the judgments of territorial courts was established in Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 307 (1810). See also Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434 (1872); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). [Back to text]
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90, 91 (1982) (Justice Rehnquist concurring). [Back to text]
In addition to the local courts of the District of Columbia, the bankruptcy courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, considered infra, these include the United States Tax Court, formerly an independent agency in the Treasury Department, but by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 951, 83 Stat. 730, 26 U.S.C. § 7441, made an Article I court of record, the Court of Veterans Appeals, Act of Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4105, 38 U.S.C. § 4051, and the courts of the territories of the United States. Magistrate judges are adjuncts of the District Courts, see infra, and perform a large number of functions, usually requiring the consent of the litigants. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). The U.S. Court of Military Appeals, strictly speaking, is not part of the judiciary but is a military tribunal, 10 U.S.C. § 867, although Congress designated it an Article I tribunal and has given the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over its decisions. [Back to text]
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891). [Back to text]
United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). [Back to text]
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). [Back to text]
54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852). [Back to text]
54 U.S. at 48. [Back to text]
The opinion in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864), had originally been prepared by Chief Justice Taney, but, following his death and reargument of the case, the Court issued the cited opinion. The Court later directed the publishing of Taney’s original opinion at 117 U.S. 697. See also United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 478 (1886), in which the Court noted that the official report of Chief Justice Chase’s Gordon opinion and the Court’s own record showed differences and quoted the record. [Back to text]
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867). See also United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886). [Back to text]
E.g., Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927); Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 576, 577–579 (1962). [Back to text]
Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944); D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). [Back to text]
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). [Back to text]
59 U.S. at 284. [Back to text]
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929). [Back to text]
Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864) (published 1885); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). On the status of the then-existing Court of Claims, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). [Back to text]
United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (Court of Private Land Claims). [Back to text]
Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court). [Back to text]
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). [Back to text]
See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (consular courts in foreign countries). Military courts may, on the other hand, be a separate entity of the military having no connection to Article III. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858). [Back to text]
285 U.S. 22 (1932). [Back to text]
285 U.S. at 51. On the constitutional problems of assignment to an administrative agency, see Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). [Back to text]
301 U.S. at 51–65. [Back to text]
301 U.S. at 50, 51, 58–63. Thus, Article III concerns were satisfied by a review of the agency fact finding upon the administrative record. Id. at 63–65. The plurality opinion denied the validity of this approach in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.39 (1982), although Justice White in dissent accepted it. Id. at 115. The plurality, rather, rationalized Crowell and subsequent cases on an analysis seeking to ascertain whether agencies or Article I tribunals were “adjuncts” of Article III courts, that is, whether Article III courts were sufficiently in charge to protect constitutional values. Id. at 76–87. [Back to text]
458 U.S. 50, 67–70 (1982) (plurality opinion). Thus, Justice Brennan observes that “a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others,’ ” but “that the presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing ‘private rights’ from ‘public rights.’ ” Id. at 69 & n.23. Crowell v. Benson, however, remained an embarrassing presence. [Back to text]
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). The cases also abandoned the principle that the Federal Government must be a party for the case to fall into the “public rights” category. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 586; see also id. at 596–99 (Justice Brennan concurring). [Back to text]
“In essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion)). [Back to text]
492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989). A Seventh Amendment jury-trial case, the decision is critical to the Article III issue as well, because, as the Court makes clear what was implicit before, whether Congress can submit a legal issue to an Article I tribunal and whether it can dispense with a civil jury on that legal issue must be answered by the same analysis. “[T]he question whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal . . . .” Id. at 52–53. [Back to text]
492 U.S. at 52–54. The Court reiterated that the government need not be a party as a prerequisite to a matter being of “public right.” Id. at 54. Concurring, Justice Scalia argued that public rights historically were and should remain only those matters to which the Federal Government is a party. Id. at 65. See also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–179, slip op. at 25 (2011) (“[W]hat makes a right ‘public’ rather than private is that the right is integrally related to particular Federal Government action”). [Back to text]
See 564 U.S. 462 (2011). [Back to text]
Id. at 487–88. [Back to text]
Id. at 465. [Back to text]
Id. [Back to text]
Id. [Back to text]
Id. [Back to text]
De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1866); United States v. Union Pacific Co., 98 U.S. 569, 603 (1878); Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925). [Back to text]
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); cf. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450–455 (1929). [Back to text]
67 Stat. 226, § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 171 (Court of Claims); 70 Stat. 532. § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 251 (Customs Court); 72 Stat. 848, § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 211 (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals). [Back to text]
In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438. 459 (1929), Justice Van Devanter refused to give any weight to the fact that Congress had bestowed life tenure on the judges of the Court of Customs Appeals because that line of thought “mistakenly assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred.” [Back to text]
370 U.S. 530 (1962). [Back to text]
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531 (1962) (Justices Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart). [Back to text]
370 U.S. at 548, 552. [Back to text]
370 U.S. at 585 (Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren concurring), 589 (Justices Douglas and Black dissenting). [Back to text]
370 U.S. at 585 (Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren). [Back to text]
370 U.S. at 589 (Justices Douglas and Black). The concurrence thought that the rationale of Bakelite and Williams was based on a significant advisory and reference business of the two courts, which the two Justices now thought insignificant, but what there was of it they thought nonjudicial and the courts should not entertain it. Justice Harlan left that question open. Id. at 583. [Back to text]
Aside from doctrinal matters, Congress in 1982 created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, giving it, inter alia, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 96 Stat. 25, title 1, 28 U.S.C. § 41. At the same time Congress created the United States Claims Court, now the United States Court of Federal Claims, as an Article I tribunal, with the trial jurisdiction of the old Court of Claims. 96 Stat. 26, as amended, § 902(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4516, 28 U.S.C. §§ 171180. [Back to text]
112 U.S. 50 (1884). [Back to text]
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). [Back to text]
Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930). [Back to text]
279 U.S. 438, 450–455 (1929). [Back to text]
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933). [Back to text]
289 U.S. at 545. Chief Justice Hughes in dissent argued that Congress’s power over the District was complete in itself and the power to create courts there did not derive at all from Article III. Id. at 551. See the discussion of this point of O’Donoghue in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court). [Back to text]
Pub. L. 91–358, 84 Stat. 475, D.C. Code § 11–101. [Back to text]
411 U.S. 389 (1973). [Back to text]
411 U.S. at 407–08. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363, 365–365 (1974); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59 (1978). Under Swain, provision for hearing of motions for post-judgement relief by convicted persons in the District, the present equivalent of habeas for federal convicts, is placed in Article I courts. That there are limits to Congress’s discretion is asserted in dictum in Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 201–202, 204 (1977). [Back to text]
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549, codified in titles 11, 28. The bankruptcy courts were made “adjuncts” of the district courts by § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. § 151(a). For citation to the debate with respect to Article III versus Article I status for these courts, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61 n.12 (1982) (plurality opinion). [Back to text]
The statement of the holding is that of the two concurring Justices, 458 U.S. at 89 (Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor), with which the plurality agreed “at the least,” while desiring to go further. Id. at 87 n.40. [Back to text]
458 U.S. at 63–76 (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens). [Back to text]
The plurality also rejected an alternative basis, a contention that as “adjuncts” of the district courts, the bankruptcy courts were like United States magistrates or like those agencies approved in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), to which could be assigned fact-finding functions subject to review in Article III courts, the fount of the administrative agency system. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76–86 (1982). According to the plurality, the act vested too much judicial power in the bankruptcy courts to treat them like agencies, and it limited the review of Article III courts too much. [Back to text]
458 U.S. at 92, 105–13, 113–16 (Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell). [Back to text]
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), was, after all, a unanimous opinion and did not long survive. [Back to text]
In particular, the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, under which judges may refer certain pretrial motions and the trial of certain matters to persons appointed to a specific term, was threatened. Pub. L. 90–578, 82 Stat. 1108, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631639. See United States v. Radios, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). [Back to text]
Pub. L. 98–353, 98 Stat. 333, judiciary provisions at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151et seq. [Back to text]
See 28 U.S.C. § 157. [Back to text]
492 U.S. 33 (1989). [Back to text]
See Seventh Amendment, Cases at Common law, infra. [Back to text]
564 U.S. ___, No. 10–179, slip op. (2011). [Back to text]
The Court noted that the claim “. . . is not a matter that can be pursued only by grace of the other branches . . . or one that ‘historically could have been determined exclusively by’ those branches . . . . It does not ‘depend[] on the will of Congress’s . . . ; Congress has nothing to do with it. [It] . . . does not flow from a federal statutory scheme . . . . [And it] is not ‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication of a claim created by federal law . . . . ” 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–179, slip op. at 27 (2011) (citations omitted). The Court also noted that filing of a claim in bankruptcy court (here, a defamation claim) did not constitute consent to a counter-claim, as the claimant had nowhere else to go to obtain recovery. Id. [Back to text]
575 U.S. ___, No. 13–935, slip op. (2015). [Back to text]
See id. at 20. [Back to text]
473 U.S. 568 (1985). [Back to text]
478 U.S. 833 (1986). [Back to text]
492 U.S. 33 (1989). [Back to text]
Contrast the Court’s approach to Article III separation of powers issues with the more rigid approach enunciated in INS v. Chadha and Bowsher v. Synar, involving congressional incursions on executive power. [Back to text]
473 U.S. at 589. [Back to text]
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (summarizing the Thomas rule). [Back to text]
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590. [Back to text]
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 591, 592 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932)). [Back to text]
473 U.S. at 594. [Back to text]
Cf. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 591 (fact that “FIFRA arbitration scheme incorporates its own system of internal sanctions and relies only tangentially, if at all, on the Judicial Branch for enforcement” cited as lessening danger of encroachment on “Article III judicial powers”). [Back to text]
See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986). Notwithstanding Schor’s efforts to distinguish between the context presented in that case and the bankruptcy context, the Court, in Wellness International v. Sharif, extended Schor’s holding to adjudications of private right claims by bankruptcy courts. See 575 U.S. ___, No. 13–935, slip op. (2015). Specifically, the Wellness International Court utilized the balancing approach employed by Schor to conclude that allowing bankruptcy courts to decide a fraudulent conveyance claim by consent would not “impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch,” id. at 12 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851), because (1) the underlying class of claims that was being adjudicated by the non-Article III court was “narrow” in nature, resulting in a “de minimis” intrusion on the federal judiciary; (2) the bankruptcy court was ultimately supervised and overseen by a constitutional court and not Congress; and (3) the Court found “no indication” that Congress, in allowing bankruptcy courts to decide with finality certain private right claims, was acting in “an effort to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.” Id. at 13–14. [Back to text]
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51–55, 55–60. [Back to text]
492 U.S. at 59 n.14. [Back to text]
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384–97 (1989). Clearly, some of the powers vested in the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under the Ethics in Government Act in respect to the independent counsel were administrative, but because the major nonjudicial power, the appointment of the independent counsel, was specifically authorized in the appointments clause, the additional powers were miscellaneous and could be lodged there by Congress. Implicit in the Court’s analysis was the principle that a line exists that Congress may not cross. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–685 (1988). [Back to text]