End-of-life notice: American Legal Ethics Library
As of March 1, 2013, the Legal Information Institute is no longer maintaining the information in the American Legal Ethics Library. It is no longer possible for us to maintain it at a level of completeness and accuracy given its staffing needs. It is very possible that we will revive it at a future time. At this point, it is in need of a complete technological renovation and reworking of the "correspondent firm" model which successfully sustained it for many years.
Many people have contributed time and effort to the project over the years, and we would like to thank them. In particular, Roger Cramton and Peter Martin not only conceived ALEL but gave much of their own labor to it. We are also grateful to Brad Wendel for his editorial contributions, to Brian Toohey and all at Jones Day for their efforts, and to all of our correspondents and contributors. Thank you.
We regret any inconvenience.
Some portions of the collection may already be severely out of date, so please be cautious in your use of this material.
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
The practice of law is a public trust. Lawyers are the trustees of the system by which citizens resolve disputes among themselves, punish and deter crime, and determine their relative rights and responsibilities toward each other and their government. Lawyers therefore are responsible for the character, competence and integrity of the persons whom they assist in joining their profession; for assuring access to that system through the availability of competent legal counsel; for maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients; by working to improve that system to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing society; and by defending the integrity of the judicial system against those who would corrupt, abuse or defraud it.
To achieve these ends the practice of law is regulated by the following rules. Violation of these rules is grounds for discipline. No set of prohibitions, however, can adequately articulate the positive values or goals sought to be advanced by those prohibitions. This preamble therefore seeks to articulate those values in much the same way as did the former canons set forth in the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers seeking to conform their conduct to the requirements of these rules should took to the values described in this preamble for guidance in interpreting the difficult issues which may arise under the rules.
The policies which underlie the various rules may, under certain circumstances, be in some tension with each other. Wherever feasible, the rules themselves seek to resolve such conflicts with clear statements of duty. For example, a lawyer must disclose, even in breach of a client confidence, a client's intent to commit a crime involving a serious risk of bodily harm. In other cases, lawyers must carefully weigh conflicting values, and make decisions, at the peril of violating one or more of the following rules. Lawyers are trained to make just such decisions, however, and should not shrink from the task. To reach correct ethical decisions, lawyers must be sensitive to the duties imposed by these rules and, whenever practical, should discuss particularly difficult issues with their peers.
Timely, affordable counsel is essential if disputes are to be avoided and, when necessary, resolved. Basic rights have little meaning without access to the judicial system which vindicates them. Effective access to that system often requires the assistance of counsel.
It is the responsibility of those licensed as officers of the court to use their training, experience and skills to provide services in the public interest for which compensation may not be available. It is the responsibility of those who manage law firms to create an environment that is hospitable to the rendering of a reasonable amount of uncompensated service by lawyers practicing in that firm.
Service in the public interest may take many forms. These include but are not limited to pro bono representation of persons unable to pay for legal services and assistance in the organized bar's efforts at law reform. An individual lawyer's efforts in these areas is evidence of the lawyer's good character and fitness to practice law, and the efforts of the bar as a whole are essential to the bar's maintenance of professionalism.
The absence from the proposed new rules of ABA Model Rule 6.1 regarding pro bono and public service therefore should not be interpreted as limiting the responsibility of attorneys to render uncompensated service in the public interest. Rather, the rationale for the absence of ABA Model Rule 6.1 is that this concept is not appropriate for a disciplinary code, because an appropriate disciplinary standard regarding pro bono and public service is difficult, if not impossible, to articulate. That ABA Model Rule 6.1 itself uses the word "should'' instead of "shall'' in describing this duty reflects the uncertainty of the ABA on this issue.
The quality of the legal professional can be no better than that of its members. Lawyers must exercise good judgment and candor in supporting applicants for membership in the bar.
Lawyers also must assist in the policing of lawyer misconduct. The vigilance of the bar in preventing and, where required, reporting misconduct can be a formidable deterrent to such misconduct, and a key to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession as a whole in the face of the egregious misconduct of a few.
Legal services are not a commodity. Rather, they are the result of the efforts, training, judgment and experience of the members of a learned profession. These rules reflect the sensitive task of striking a balance between making available useful information regarding the availability and merits of lawyers and the need to protect the public against deceptive or overreaching practices. All communications with clients and potential clients should be consistent with these values.
The lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Such confidence only can be maintained if the lawyer acts competently and zealously pursues the client's interests within the bounds of the law. "Zealously" does not mean mindlessly or unfairly or oppressively. Rather, it is the duty of all lawyers to seek resolution of disputes at the least cost in time, expense and trauma to all parties and to the courts.
"Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.
"Contingent fee agreement" denotes an agreement for the provision of legal services by a lawyer under which the amount of the lawyer's compensation is contingent in whole or in part upon the successful completion of the subject matter of the agreement, regardless of whether the fee is established by formula or is a fixed amount.
"Disclose" or "disclosure" denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.
"Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers engaged in the private practice of law in a partnership, professional corporation, or other entity or in the legal department of a corporation, legal services organization or other entity.
"Knowingly" "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
"Partner" denotes a lawyer who is a member of a partnership, or a shareholder or officer in a law firm organized as a professional corporation.
"Person" denotes natural persons, partnerships, business corporations, not-for-profit corporations, public and quasipublic corporations, municipal corporations, State and Federal governmental bodies and agencies, or any other type of lawfully existing entity.
"Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
"Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.
"Secret" denotes information gained in the professional relationship, that the client has requested be held inviolate or the revelation of which would be embarrassing to or would likely be detrimental to the client.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client in a legal matter in which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer is not competent to provide representation, without the association of another lawyer who is competent to provide such representation.
(c) After accepting employment on behalf of a client, a lawyer shall not thereafter delegate to another lawyer not in the lawyer's firm the responsibility for performing or completing that employment, without the client's consent.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after disclosure by the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after disclosure.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
(1) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;
(2) advance a claim or defense the lawyer knows is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; or
(3) fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal.
(g) A lawyer who knows a client has, in the course of representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
(i) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by these Rules or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement thereof, provided, however, that the prohibition set forth in Rule 1.5(d)(1) shall not extend to representation in matters subsequent to final judgments in such cases;
(e) Notwithstanding Rule 1.5(c), a contingent fee agreement regarding the collection of commercial accounts or of insurance company subrogation claims may be made in accordance with the customs and practice in the locality for such legal services.
(f) Except as provided in Rule 1.5(j), a lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not in the same firm, unless the client consents to employment of the other lawyer by signing a writing which discloses:
(g) A division of fees shall be made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each lawyer, except where the primary service performed by one lawyer is the referral of the client to another lawyer and
(1) the receiving lawyer discloses that the referring lawyer has received or will receive economic benefit from the referral and the extent and basis of such economic benefit, and
(2) the referring lawyer agrees to assume the same legal responsibility for the performance of the services in question as would a partner of the receiving lawyer.
(h) The total fee of the lawyers shall be reasonable.
(a) Except when required under Rule 1.6(b) or permitted under Rule 1.6(c), a lawyer shall not, during or after termination of the professional relationship with the client, use or reveal a confidence or secret of the client known to the lawyer unless the client consents after disclosure.
(1) confidences or secrets when permitted under these Rules or required by law or court order,
(d) The relationship of trained intervenor and a lawyer, judge, or a law student who seeks or receives assistance through the Lawyers' Assistance Program, Inc., shall be the same as that of lawyer and client for purposes of the application of Rule 8.1, Rule 8.3 and Rule 1.6.
(e) Any information received by a lawyer in a formal proceeding before a trained intervenor, or panel of intervenors, of the Lawyers' Assistance Program, Inc., shall be deemed to have been received from a client for purposes of the application of Rules 1.6, 8.1 and 8.3.
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after disclosure.
(c) When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the disclosure shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
(a) Unless the client has consented after disclosure, a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with the client if:
(b) Unless all aspects of the matter giving use to the employment have been concluded, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client or a prospective client by which the lawyer acquires an interest in publication, media, or other literary rights with respect to the subject matter of employment or proposed employment.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to the client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including, but not limited to, courts costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence if:
(e) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregate agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after disclosure, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(f) A lawyer shall not make an agreement with a client prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to the client unless such an agreement is permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.
(g) A lawyer shall not settle a claim against the lawyer made by an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
(h) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement with a client or former client limiting or purporting to limit the right of the client or former client to file or pursue any complaint before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
(2) contracting with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
(1) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless the former client consents after disclosure; or
(A) such use is permitted by Rule 1.6; or
(B) the information has become generally known.
(a) No lawyer associated with a firm shall represent a client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that another lawyer associated with that firm would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c) or 1.9, except as permitted by Rules 1.10(b), (c) or (d), or by Rule 1.11 or Rule 1.12.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not represent a person in a matter that the firm knows or reasonably should know is the same or substantially related to a matter in which the newly associated lawyer, or a firm with which that lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person unless:
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm may thereafter represent a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer if:
(1) the matter is not the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(d) A disqualification prescribed by Rule 1.10 may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly permitted by law, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after disclosure. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated and who knows or reasonably should know of the lawyer's prior participation may undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:
(b) Except as otherwise permitted by law, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person, acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no specific share of the fee therefrom.
(1) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or
(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, offset or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and
(e) As used in Rule 1.11, the term "confidential government information'' denotes information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time Rule 1.11 is applied, the government is prohibited by law from revealing to the public or has a legal privilege not to reveal, and which is not otherwise available to the public.
(a) Except as provided in Rule 1.12(d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as a lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge, other adjudicative officer, or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer, or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or a lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer, or arbitrator.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by Rule 1.12(a), a lawyer in the firm with which that lawyer is associated who knows or reasonably should know of that disqualification shall not undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of the law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability, or some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account or accounts maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of seven years after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
(d) All nominal or short-term funds of clients or third persons held by a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, and funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm, shall be deposited in one or more pooled interest- or dividend-bearing trust accounts, hereinafter "IOLTA accounts," established with an eligible financial institution selected by a lawyer or law firm in the exercise of ordinary prudence, and with the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois designated as income beneficiary. Each IOLTA account shall comply with the following provisions:
(1) Each lawyer or law firm in receipt of nominal or short-term client funds shall establish one or more IOLTA accounts with an eligible financial institution authorized by federal or state law to do business in the state of Illinois. An eligible financial institution is a bank or a savings bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or an open-end investment company registered with the Security and Exchange Commission, which offers IOLTA accounts within the requirements of this rule as administered by the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois.
(2) Eligible institutions shall maintain IOLTA accounts that pay the highest interest rate or dividend available from the institution to its non-IOLTA account customers when IOLTA accounts meet or exceed the same minimum balance or other account eligibility guidelines, if any. In determining the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA accounts, eligible institutions may consider factors, in addition to the IOLTA account balance, customarily considered by the institution when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers, provided that such factors do not discriminate between IOLTA accounts and accounts of non-IOLTA customers, and that these factors do not include that the account is an IOLTA account.
(3) An IOLTA account that meets the highest comparable rate- or dividendstandard set forth in (d)(2) must use one of the identified account options as an IOLTA account, or pay the equivalent yield on an existing IOLTA account in lieu of using the highest-yield bank product:
(a) a checking account paying preferred interest rates, such as money market or indexed rates, or any other suitable interest-bearing deposit account offered by the eligible institution to its non-IOLTA customers.
(b) for accounts with balances of $100,000 or more, a business checking account with automated investment feature, such as an overnight sweep and investment in repurchase agreements fully collateralized by U.S. Government securities as defined in (f).
(6) Each lawyer or law firm shall direct the eligible financial institution to remit monthly earnings on the IOLTA account directly to the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois. For each individual IOLTA account, the eligible financial institution shall provide: a statement transmitted with each remittance showing the name of the lawyer or law firm directing that the remittance be sent; the account number; the remittance period; the rate of interest applied; the account balance on which the interest was calculated, the reasonable service fee(s) if any; the gross earnings for the remittance period; and the net amount of earnings remitted. Remittances shall be sent to the Lawyers Trust Fund electronically unless otherwise agreed. Fees in excess of the earnings accrued on an individual IOLTA account for any month shall not be taken from earnings accrued on other IOLTA accounts or from the principal of the account.
(8) The decision as to whether funds are nominal in amount or are expected to be held for a short period of time rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the lawyer or law firm, and no charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend a lawyer’s or law firm’s judgment on what is nominal or short term.
(e) Ordinarily, in determining the type of account into which to deposit particular funds for a client or third person, a lawyer or a law firm shall take into consideration the following factors:
(1) "IOLTA account" means an interest- or dividend-bearing trust account benefiting the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois, established in an eligible institution for the deposit of nominal or short-term funds of clients or third persons as defined in (d) and from which funds may be withdrawn upon request as soon as permitted by law.
(2) "Open-end money market fund" is a fund of an open-end investment company that must hold itself out as a money market fund as defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations under the Investment Act of 1940, and, at the time of the investment, have total assets of at least $250 million.
(3) "U.S. Government securities" refers to U.S. Treasury obligations and obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest or any AAArated United States agency or instrumentality thereof. A daily overnight financial repurchase agreement ("repo") may be established only with an institution that is deemed to be "well capitalized" or "adequately capitalized" as defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations.
(4) "Safe harbor" is a yield that if paid by the financial institution on IOLTA accounts shall be deemed as a comparable return in compliance with this rule. Such yield shall be calculated as 70% of the Federal Funds Target Rate as reported in the Wall Street Journal on the first business day of the calendar month.
(5) "Allowable reasonable fees" for IOLTA accounts are per check charges, per deposit charges, a fee in lieu of a minimum balance, federal deposit insurance fees, automated investment ("sweep") fees, and a reasonable maintenance fee, if those fees are charged on comparable bank accounts maintained by non-IOLTA depositors. All other fees are the responsibility of, and may be charged to, the lawyer or law firm maintaining the IOLTA account.
(g) In the closing of a real estate transaction, a lawyer's disbursement of funds deposited but not collected shall not violate his or her duty pursuant to this Rule 1.15 if, prior to the closing, the lawyer has established a segregated Real Estate Funds Account (REFA) maintained solely for the receipt and disbursement of such funds, has deposited such funds into a REFA, and:
(1) is acting as a closing agent pursuant to an insured closing letter for a title insurance company licensed in the State of Illinois and uses for such funds a segregated REFA maintained solely for such title insurance business; or
(2) has met the "good-funds" requirements. The good-funds requirements shall be met if the bank in which the REFA was established has agreed in a writing directed to the lawyer to honor all disbursement orders drawn on that REFA for all transactions up to a specified dollar amount not less than the total amount being deposited in good funds. Good funds shall include only the following forms of deposits:
(c) a cashier's check, teller's check, bank money order, or official bank check drawn on or issued by a financial institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or a comparable agency of the federal or state government,
(e) a personal check or checks in an aggregate amount not exceeding $5,000 per closing if the lawyer making the deposit has reasonable and prudent grounds to believe that the deposit will be irrevocably credited to the REFA,
(f) a check drawn on the account of or issued by a lender approved by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development as either a supervised or a nonsupervised mortgagee as defined in 24 C.F.R. §202.2,
Without limiting the rights of the lawyer against any person, it shall be the responsibility of the disbursing lawyer to reimburse the trust account for such funds that are not collected and for any fees, charges and interest assessed by the paying bank on account of such funds being uncollected.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
If someone siphoned interest earnings from your savings account and gave them to someone else without you knowing about it, would you call it sneaky? If, upon learning of this practice, you told them to stop taking your interest money and they kept on doing it, would you call it stealing? If your answers to these two questions are no, you may be one of those people who thinks that the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois is a laudable undertaking.
Some fifteen years ago, this fund was established in Illinois by supreme court rule to take the interest earned on clients’ nominal or short-term monies that lawyers were holding in trust for the clients. 134 Ill.2d R. 1.15. Since its establishment in 1983, this program, known as Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA), has siphoned off and distributed millions of dollars to a variety of non-profit legal aid and similar organizations. Paradoxically, the rule establishing the program appears in article VIII of the supreme court rules, which is the article that governs attorneys’ professional conduct--that is to say, ethics.
Not only the Decalogue, but the Illinois Constitution as well, prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 15. The IOLTA program is a clear violation of this provision. In plain language, this means that this court has no constitutional authority to take the interest earned on clients’ funds and then distribute those funds to other persons, no matter how commendable may be the good works of those persons. If a lawyer were to take these monies and convert them to his own use, he would subject himself to disciplinary action and possible disbarment. That notwithstanding, our supreme court rule mandates the taking of those monies for distribution to others.
It is wholly beside the point that some or even all of these monies may be put to good use. Perhaps they are. However, if it is alright to take the interest earned, why not take the principal sum as well? Is it possible to have too much of a good thing? It is not surprising that organizations benefitting from this largesse applaud the program. But, contra, are landlords and creditors aware that monies of theirs on deposit with their lawyers are earning interest to fund and subsidize lawsuits of tenants and defaulting debtors, etc.? If they knew it, would they approve?
Apart from the supposed goodness of the causes, the further argument may be raised in support of this scheme that all states are doing it. That is, all 50 states have similar programs. Looting, however, has never been deemed acceptable simply because everyone is doing it.
When IOLTA programs were originally conceived many years ago, it may have been impossible to efficiently calculate and remit to clients interest on small amounts of funds held for short periods of time. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 94 F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1996). Even if correct, this fact could not have endowed the State of Illinois with authority to mandate the pooling of clients’ funds so that those funds might profitably earn interest, and then to assign those earnings to others. As income produced by clients’ funds, this interest, however small, belongs to the clients, and its assignment by the state to others represents an unconstitutional taking of property.
Furthermore, if the inefficiency of calculating interest on small sums was the original, though flawed, justification for the IOLTA program, that rationale now fails for another reason as well. Modern computer technology now allows interest from numerous sources to be easily separated, calculated and awarded. See In re Indiana State Bar Association’s Petition, 550 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind. 1990). There is no reason that clients whose attorneys hold small sums of money on their behalf should not earn interest on that money in the same manner as clients for whom the attorneys hold larger sums.
I was not a member of this court when the instant rule was adopted. If I had been, I would not have voted to establish a program which I believe to be so clearly unconstitutional. I therefore dissent from the adoption of the instant amendment, which furthers the unconstitutional policy embodied in the rule
(a) A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal shall withdraw from employment (with permission of the tribunal if such permission is required), and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client is bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person;
(b) Except as required in Rule 1.16(a), a lawyer shall not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and shall not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because:
(A) insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(F) substantially fails to fulfill an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees;
(3) the client consents to termination of the lawyer's employment after disclosure; or
(4) the lawyer reasonably believes that a tribunal will, in a proceeding pending before the tribunal, find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal.
(d) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.
A lawyer, the estate of a deceased lawyer, or the guardian or authorized representative of a disabled lawyer may transfer or sell, and a lawyer or a law firm may accept or purchase, a law practice, including goodwill, if the following conditions are satisfied.
(3) the fact that the client’s consent to the transfer of the client’s files will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of the receipt of the notice; and
(4) the expected date of final closing or transfer. If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.
(e) Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule.
(f) Lawyers who sell or transfer their law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.5 (Fees); Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule); Rule 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Former Client).
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations, such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation.
RULE 2.3. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and
(2) the client consents after disclosure.
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.
(9) intentionally degrade a witness or other person by stating or alluding to personal facts concerning that person which are not relevant to the case;
(10) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused, but a lawyer may argue, on analysis of evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matter stated herein;
(11) refuse to accede to reasonable requests of opposing counsel that do not prejudice the rights of the client;
(12) fail to use reasonable efforts to restrain and to prevent clients from doing those things that the lawyer ought not to do;
(15) pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness' testimony or the outcome of the case, but a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of expenses reasonably incurred in attending or testifying, and a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
(1) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
(3) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(A) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and
(B) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
(a) Before the trial of a case, a lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with anyone the lawyer knows to be a member of the venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of the case.
(d) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to a juror until the venire of which such juror is a member has been discharged, nor shall the lawyer thereafter ask questions of or make comments to a member of the venire that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence such juror's actions in future jury service.
(f) All restrictions imposed by Rule 3.5 also apply to communications with or investigations of the families of members of the venire or jury.
(g) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court the lawyer's knowledge of improper conduct by a member of the venire or jury or by another toward such a person or a member of such person's family.
(h) A lawyer shall not give or lend anything of value to a judge, official, or employee of a tribunal, except those gifts or loans which a judge or a member of the judge's family may receive under Rule 65(C)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and except that a lawyer may: make a gift, bequest, loan or campaign contribution to a judge that the judge is permitted to accept under the Code of Judicial Conduct, provided that no campaign contribution to a judge or candidate for judicial office may be made other than by means of a check, draft, or other instrument payable to or to the order of an entity which the lawyer reasonably believes to be a political committee supporting such judge or candidate, provided further, however, that the provision of volunteer services by a lawyer to a political committee shall not be deemed to violate this Rule.
(i) In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an official before whom the proceeding is pending, except:
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding.
(b) There are certain subjects which would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, or a criminal matter. These subjects relate to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person’s failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused,
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person,
(iii) the fact, time, and place of arrest, and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
(d) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
(e) No lawyer in a firm, or government agency, or otherwise associated with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).
(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in contemplated or pending litigation if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer may be called as a witness on behalf of the client, except that the lawyer may undertake the employment and may testify:
(3) if the testimony will relate to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or the firm to the client; or
(4) as to any other matter, if refusal to accept or continue the employment would work a substantial hardship on the client.
(b) If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer may be called as a witness other than on behalf of the client. the lawyer may accept or continue the representation until the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer's testimony is or may be prejudicial to the client.
(b) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when such prosecutor or lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the charges are not supported by probable cause.
(c) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the degree of the offense.
(d) In addition to his or her obligations under Rule 3.6, a public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the public prosecutor or other government lawyer would be forbidden from making under Rule 3.6.
(e) The prosecutor in a criminal case shall refrain from making extrajudicial comments that would pose a serious and imminent threat of heightening public condemnation of the accused, except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases
(March 1, 2001)
Paragraph (a) of Rule 3.8 is substantially similar to Standard 3-1.2(c) of the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice (3d ed. 1993); however, paragraph (a) of Rule 3.8 restates a principle that is far older than the ABA standard. In 1924, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a conviction for murder, noting that:
"The State’s attorney in his official capacity is the representative of all the people, including the defendant, and it was as much his duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of the defendant as those of any other citizen." People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 526 (1924).
In 1935, the United States Supreme Court described the duty of a federal prosecutor in the following passage:
"The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 ( 1935).
Paragraph (a) of Rule 3.8 does not set an exact standard, but one good prosecutors will readily recognize and have always adhered to in the discharge of their duties. Specific standards, such as those in Rules 3.3, 3. 4, 3.5, 3.6, the remaining paragraphs of Rule 3.8, and other applicable rules provide guidance for specific situations. Paragraph (a) of Rule 3.8 is intended to remind prosecutors that the touchstone of ethical conduct is the duty to act fairly, honestly, and honorably
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not:
RULE 4.2. Communications With Person Represented by Counsel
During the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in that matter unless the first lawyer has obtained the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or as may otherwise be authorized by law.
RULE 4.3. Dealing With Unrepresented Person
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
RULE 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.
RULE 5.1. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer
(a) Each partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct of all lawyers in the firm conforms to these Rules.
(b) Each lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer's conduct conforms to these Rules.
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to make reasonable remedial action.
(a) A lawyer is bound by these Rules notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate these Rules if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) The lawyer, and, in a law firm, each partner, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer and the firm;
(b) each lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm, or has direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer, and knows of the nonlawyer's conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer or may make payments in accordance with Rule 1.17; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
A lawyer shall not:
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of a relationship, except an agreement concerning either benefits upon retirement or an agreement pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17; or
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as:
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a not-for-profit legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer or law firm. The lawyer shall not participate in a decision or action of the organization if the lawyer knows that:
(1) participation in the decision would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the actions of the organization may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall reveal that fact to the organization but need not identify the client.
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as telephone directories, legal directories, newspapers or other periodicals, billboards, radio or television, or through written communication not involving solicitation as defined in Rule 7.3, provided:
(2) any communication made pursuant to Rules 7.1 and 7.2 includes the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending or having recommended the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written communication permitted by Rules 7.1 and 7.2 (including fees of personnel preparing such advertising or communication), may pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization, or may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.
Except as provided in this Rule 7.3, or as permitted by Rule 7.2, a lawyer shall not, directly or through a representative, solicit professional employment when a significant motive for doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit'' means contact with a person other than a lawyer in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient.
(a) Except as provided in Rule 7.3(b), a lawyer may initiate contact with a prospective client for the purpose of solicitation in the following circumstances:
(3) under the auspices of a public or charitable legal services organization or a bona fide political, social, civic, charitable, religious, fraternal, employee or trade organization whose purposes include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal services.
(2) the lawyer knows that the person solicited does not desire to receive a communication from the lawyer; or
(a) A lawyer or law firm may specify or designate any area or field of law in which the lawyer or firm concentrates or limits the practice of law. In this regard, a lawyer or firm may specify:
(1) a description of the types of legal matter, in which the lawyer or firm will accept employment and a statement as to whether the lawyer or firm concentrates or limits the practice of law to one or more particular fields; and
(2) other information about the lawyer or firm, the practice engaged in, or type of legal matters in which employment will be accepted, which a reasonable person might regard as relevant in determining whether to seek the services offered.
(b) The Supreme Court of Illinois does not recognize certifications of specialties in the practice of law, nor does it recognize certifications of expertise in any phase of the practice of law by any agency, governmental or private, or by any group, organization or association. However:
(1) a lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patents,'' "Patent Attorney,'' "Patent Lawyer,'' or "Registered Patent Attorney,'' or any combination of those terms;
(c) Except when identifying certificates, awards or recognitions issued to him by an agency or organization, a lawyer may not use the terms "certified,'' "specialist,'' "expert,'' or any other, similar terms to describe his qualifications as a lawyer or his qualifications in any subspecialty of the law. If such terms are used to identify any certificates, awards or recognitions issued by any agency, governmental or private, or by any group, organization or association, the reference must meet the following requirements:
(1) the reference must be truthful and verifiable and may not be misleading in violation of Rule 7.1;
(2) the reference must state that the Supreme Court of Illinois does not recognize certifications of specialties in the practice of law and that the certificate, award or recognition is not a requirement to practice law in Illinois.
RULE 7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads
(a) A lawyer who assumes a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative post or office shall not permit the lawyer's name to remain in the name of a law firm or to be used in professional notices of the firm during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm, and during such period other members of the firm shall not use the lawyer's name in the firm name or in professional notices of the firm.
(b) A law firm shall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions; however, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.
(c) A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it is not misleading. A lawyer or law firm using a trade name in any advertising must include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its contents.
(1) make a statement of material fact known by the applicant or the lawyer to be false; or
(2) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a material misapprehension known by that person to have arisen in the matter, or fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by these Rules or by law.
(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicative officer, public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
(a) A lawyer possessing knowledge not otherwise protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law that another lawyer has committed a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.
(b) A lawyer possessing knowledge not otherwise protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law that a judge has committed a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct which raises a question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
(c) Upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges, a lawyer possessing information not otherwise protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law concerning another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such information.
(d) A lawyer who has been disciplined as a result of a lawyer disciplinary action brought before any body other than the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission shall report that fact to the Commission.
(2) induce another to engage in conduct, or give assistance to another's conduct, when the lawyer knows that conduct will violate these Rules;
(4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In relation thereto, a lawyer shall not engage in adverse discriminatory treatment of litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others, based on race, sex, religion, or national origin. This subsection does not preclude legitimate advocacy when these or similar factors are issues in the proceeding;
(7) assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that the lawyer knows is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
(8) avoid in bad faith the repayment of an education loan guaranteed by the Illinois Student Assistance Commission or other governmental entity. The lawful discharge of an educational loan in a bankruptcy proceeding shall not constitute bad faith under this rule, but the discharge shall not preclude a review of the attorney's conduct to determine if it constitutes bad faith; or
(9)(A) violate a Federal, State or local statute or ordinances that prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. Whether a discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness as a lawyer shall be determined after consideration of all the circumstances, including
(B) No complaint of professional misconduct based on an unlawfully discriminatory act, pursuant to paragraph (9)(A) of this rule, may be brought until a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction has found that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory act, and that the determination of the court or administrative agency has become final and enforceable and the right of judicial review of the determination has been exhausted.
(1) use that office to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in a legislative matter for a client under circumstances where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such action is not in the public interest;
(3) represent any client, including a municipal corporation or other public body, in the promotion or defeat of legislative or other proposals pending before the public body of which such lawyer is a member or by which such lawyer is employed.
A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer may be subject, for the same conduct, to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted.
In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the Rules of Professional Conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide otherwise; and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.