A.T. is a Hungarian woman whose husband subjected her to continued domestic violence resulting in her hospitalization and ten medical certificates documenting separate incidents of abuse. Hungarian law did not provide a mechanism for A.T. to obtain a protection order against her husband, and accordingly, A.T. submitted a motion for injunctive relief for her exclusive right to the family apartment.
Amit Sundra v. Sheetal Khanna was a domestic violence case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Delhi High Court vacated a stay the husband had obtained on a Magistrate Court’s order allowing the wife to reside in the marital home and receive monthly maintenance.
M.P.B. suffered repeated domestic violence and abuse at the hands of her husband R.A.G. In civil suit, M.P.B. was granted exclusive control of the spousal home and custody of her children. The court imposed a restraining order on R.A.G.; he was unable to go within 300 meters of the family home, his wife’s work, or the 9 and 12 year-old children’s school. This case is fairly punitive toward the father by Argentinean standards. The judge cited both Argentinean statutes and international human rights law in arriving at her decision.
The Constitutional Court found that the legislature could take necessary measures to reduce violence within families. Articles 1.1 of the Law on the Protection of the Family allows judges to take measures against one spouse, not both, and not against the children or members of the family, if a spouse has subjected another family member to domestic violence. The Gulyaly Peace Court found that because the Articles did not provide for an injunction or penalty if a child committed a violent act, rather than a spouse or parent, the Articles violated the principle of equality.
The Constitutional Court held that a provision in the Turkish Penal Code that increases the penalty by half for the crime of laceration if committed against family members is constitutional. Although such a penalty treats family members differently than non-family members, the Court found that such differential treatment did not violate the equality principle under the Turkish Constitution. Under the equality principle, criminals who have committed the same offence may not be subject to the same penalty if they have different legal statuses.
In Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 713 A.2d 390 (1998), the plaintiff sought a restraining order against her husband under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-17 et seq., following an argument concerning the dissolution of their marriage. During the argument, the defendant threatened that the plaintiff would never gain custody of their children and that he would never sell the family home or share its proceeds.
Mr. Johns, the appellant, and Ms. Chalmers, the respondent, began their relationship in 1972; it has become increasingly troubled, in part from the respondent's alcoholism, leading to Mr. Johns being charged with assault, of which he was later acquitted. Ms. Chalmers obtained an occupation order requiring Mr.
This case concerns a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. In response to an application for protection by Ms. Corneau, who sought protection from domestic violence perpetrated by her partner in Saint Lucia, the Board held that authorities in Saint Lucia were “capable of providing the applicant with adequate protection.” The applicant sought review of this determination.
With the ruling for 19-22.793, the French Supreme Court reiterates that the family court has sovereign discretion to decide whether the conditions for issuing a protection order have been met. This decision reiterates that the characterisation of endangerment is decisive for justifying the issuance of a protection order. It should be noted that the law aimed at combating violence within the family has made the conditions for applying a protection order more flexible.
