marital property

This memorandum examines the definition of cohabitation and its effect upon agreements between cohabitants in Louisiana, U.S.A.

This Supreme Court case is notable for solidifying the “Jurisprudence of Equality” doctrine as predominant in determining the sharing of marital property upon divorce. Following the termination of the marriage, the wife was granted by the High Court of Accra in May 2010 (i) custody of the children; (ii) ownership of a house and a “half share of the ‘storey building’; and (iii) a half share of ‘the shops at Weija, Accra. The husband appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal set aside and replaced the orders of the High Court.

This case concerned the determination of what constitutes relationship property in a divorce proceeding and how trusts may affect this determination (e.g. if a sham trust is implemented to hide assets, therefore affecting a woman’s economic rights in a divorce).  The term “relationship property” is defined in the Property Relationships Act of 1976, the principles of which focus on the equality of spouses and that at the end of a relationship, any economic divisions should reflect equal contributions made by the couple during the relationship.

The family court awarded the marital home to Appellant's wife under Section 220-1 of the Civil Code, which provides that where one spouse threatens or perpetrates violence, the judge may rule that the couple should live apart, allocating the marital dwelling to the spouse who was not the perpetrator of the violence. Appellant appealed on the grounds that he had limited income, that the dwelling was his childhood home, that his wife had left voluntarily, and that she, a native of Algeria, had only married him for a French residence permit.

The appellant sued his ex-wife, the respondent, regarding the division of property acquired during the marriage as the ex-spouses’ joint property. The appellant noted that during their marriage, the spouses accumulated funds that were kept in the respondent’s bank account. However, immediately after the divorce, the respondent independently managed the funds and bought an apartment. The appellant’s main argument was that, according to Ukrainian family law, the dissolution of marriage does not terminate the right of joint co-ownership of property acquired during the marriage.

The plaintiff sued his ex-wife, the appellant, and requested recognition that a piece of real estate was his private property. The plaintiff noted that he and his wife were in a registered marriage for a certain period. The plaintiff made money as an individual entrepreneur (in Ukraine, this term means an individual that owns his or her business and possesses all the profit). While running his business, he acquired real estate and registered title. The plaintiff invested his own money in this property.

Mrs. Lesia filed an application for relief against her husband, alleging that he abandoned his family, abused her, and was attempting to sell their home without her consent. She alleged that she built and paid for the home, and so sought to have her husband enjoined from selling it. The court issued an interim order granting the requested relief. The defendant disregarded the court order, continued his efforts to sell the home, and threatened to kill Mrs.

This case concerns the sharing of spousal property upon divorce. On 22 December 1986, the High Court dissolved the marriage between the husband (“H”) and his wife (“W”) on a petition and cross-petition for divorce filed by H and W, respectively. Subsequently, the Court heard the parties’ claims for ancillary relief in which both H and W claimed ownership of the same house. The High Court found that W was the sole owner of the house.

The petitioner filed for divorce and sought an equal share of assets acquired during the marriage.  At the time of marriage, neither party owned any property.

The appellant challenged a lower court ruling granting the respondent, his ex-partner, an equitable division of marital assets (bienes de la comunidad de hecho) upon the dissolution of their relationship.  The appellant argued that 1) the court erroneously found the relationship to be a “common law marriage” (unión more uxurio) and 2) regardless of the character of the relationship, the appellant was the sole owner of the assets at issue as the respondent did not work outside the home.  The appellant and the respondent had been in a monogamous, cohabiting relationship for 17 years