Alaska Statutes §§ 11.41.260–.270 establish the laws for stalking in the first and second degree. Under § 11.41.270, a person commits stalking in the second degree by knowingly engaging in a course of nonconsensual conduct that recklessly places another in fear of death, physical injury to themselves or a family member.
In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997) is a case where the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether firearms seized following a domestic violence complaint must be returned once the complaint is withdrawn or dismissed. The Court held that the dismissal of a complaint does not mandate return of weapons under N.J.
Before the parties’ divorce, the plaintiff filed two domestic violence complaints against the defendant. Following the first complaint, police officers confiscated the defendant’s firearms and his firearms purchaser identification card. The weapons were later returned after the matter was resolved. While the divorce proceedings were pending, a second complaint was filed after the plaintiff went to the defendant’s home to pick up their son. Police again seized the defendant’s weapons.
William and Elizabeth Mescanti were married and had children together. William subjected Elizabeth to a pattern of harassment that lasted months. The couple had been experiencing marital difficulties and Elizabeth had been sleeping on the couch. She slept during the daytime because she worked the night shift. William would come home from work and wake her up to argue and instigate fights. He hacked into Elizabeth’s emails and looked through her pockets, cell phone logs, purses, and car. He would follow her when she was out with friends, and wrote her pages expr
The Regional Trial Court of Labo and the Court of Appeals found the appellant, Napoles y Bajas, guilty of six counts of rape of his stepdaughter. As a result of this sexual abuse, the victim became pregnant and gave birth. Napoles appealed, arguing that the victim did not resist or show any outrage during his advances; and that of the three instances of intercourse he admitted to, such instances were consensual and between lovers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the victim’s failure to shout or offer persistent resistance did not imply consent.
