Wis. Admin. Code Office of the Commissioner of Insurance Ins 40.025 - Acquisitions Involving Insurers Not Otherwise Covered
(1) DEFINITION. In
this section. "acquisition" means any agreement, arrangement, or activity the
consummation of which results in a person acquiring directly or indirectly the
control of another person, and includes the acquisition of voting securities
and the acquisition of assets, bulk reinsurance, and mergers.
(2) SCOPE. This section shall apply to any
acquisition in which there is a change in control of an insurer authorized to
do business in this state, except for the following:
(a) A purchase of securities solely for
investment purposes so long as the securities are not used by voting or
otherwise to cause or attempt to cause the substantial lessening of competition
in any insurance market in this state. If a purchase of securities results in a
presumption of control under s.
600.03(13),
Stats., it is not solely for investment purposes unless the commissioner of the
insurer's state of domicile accepts a disclaimer of control or affirmatively
finds that control does not exist and the disclaimer action or affirmative
finding is communicated by the domiciliary commissioner to the commissioner of
this state.
(b) The acquisition of
a person by another person when both persons are neither directly nor through
affiliates primarily engaged in the business of insurance, if pre-acquisition
notification is filed with the commissioner in accordance with sub. (3) 30 days
prior to the proposed effective date of the acquisition. However, such
pre-acquisition notification is not required if the acquisition would be
otherwise excluded under sub. (2).
(c) The acquisition of already affiliated
persons.
(d) An acquisition if, as
an immediate result of the acquisition any of the following apply:
1. In no market would the combined market
share of the involved insurers exceed 5% of the total market, or
2. There would be no increase in any market
share, or
3. In no market would the
combined market share of the involved insurers exceed 12% of the total market
and the market share would not increase by more than 2% of the total market.
For the purpose of par. (d), a market means direct written insurance premium in
this state for a line of business as contained in the annual statement required
under s.
Ins 50.20(1).
(e) An acquisition for which a
pre-acquisition notification would be required pursuant to this section due
solely to the resulting effect on the ocean marine insurance line of
business.
(f) An acquisition of an
insurer whose domiciliary commissioner affirmatively finds that the insurer is
in failing condition; there is a lack of feasible alternative to improving such
condition; the public benefits of improving the insurer's condition through the
acquisition exceed the public benefits that would arise from not lessening
competition; and the findings are communicated by the domiciliary commissioner
to the commissioner of this state.
(3) PRE-ACQUISITION NOTIFICATION. Any person
seeking a merger or acquisition, that is not otherwise exempted under sub. (2)
that results in a change of control of an insurer authorized to do business in
this state shall file a pre-acquisition notification in a sworn statement using
form E in the appendix to this chapter. The person being acquired may file the
pre-acquisition notification.
(a) The
commissioner may require such additional material and information as deemed
necessary to determine whether the proposed acquisition, if consummated, would
violate the competitive standard of sub. (4). The required information may
include an opinion of an economist as to the competitive impact of the
acquisition in this state accompanied by a summary of the education and
experience of such person indicating his or her ability to render an informed
opinion.
(b) The waiting period
required in this subsection shall begin on the date of receipt of the
commissioner of a pre-acquisition notification and shall end on the earlier of
the thirtieth day after the date of receipt, or termination of the waiting
period by the commissioner. Prior to the end of the waiting period, the
commissioner on a one-time basis may require the submission of additional
needed information relevant to the proposed acquisition, in which event the
waiting period shall end on the earlier of the thirtieth day after receipt of
the additional information by the commissioner or termination of the waiting
period by the commissioner.
(4) COMPETITIVE STANDARD.
(a) The commissioner may disapprove an
acquisition if there is substantial evidence that the effect of the acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of insurance in this
state or tend to create a monopoly or if the insurer fails to file adequate
information in compliance with sub. (3). In this subsection, a highly
concentrated market is one in which the share of the 4 largest insurers is 75%
or more of the market. Percentages not shown in the tables in this subsection
are interpolated proportionately to the percentages that are shown. If more
than 2 insurers are involved, exceeding the total of the two columns in the
table is prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard in this
subsection. For the purpose of this item, the insurer with the largest share of
the market shall be deemed to be Insurer A.
(b) In determining whether a proposed
acquisition would violate the competitive standard of par. (a) of this
subsection, the commissioner shall consider the following:
1. Any acquisition covered under sub. (2)
involving 2 or more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie
evidence of violation of the competitive standards if:
a. The market is highly concentrated and the
involved insurers possess the following shares of the market:
Insurer A Insurer B
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
b. Or, the market is not highly concentrated
and the involved insurers possess the following shares of the market:
Insurer A Insurer B
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
19% or more 1% or more
2. There is a significant trend toward
increased concentration when the aggregate market share of any grouping of the
largest insurers in the market, from the 2 largest to the 8 largest, has
increased by 7% or more of the market over a period of time extending from any
base year 5 to 10 years prior to the acquisition up to the time of the
acquisition. Any acquisition or merger covered under sub. (2) involving 2 or
more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie evidence of violation
of the competitive standard in par. (a) of this subsection if:
a. There is a significant trend toward
increased concentration in the market.
b. One of the insurers involved is one of the
insurers in a grouping of large insurers showing the requisite increase in the
market share; and
c. Another
involved insurer's market is 2% or more.
3. For the purposes of this subsection:
a. The term "insurer" includes any company or
group of companies under common management, ownership, or control;
b. The term "market" means the relevant
product and geographical markets. In determining the relevant product and
geographical markets, the commissioner shall give due consideration to, among
other things, the definitions or guidelines, if any, promulgated by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners and to information, if any,
submitted by parties to the acquisition. In the absence of sufficient
information to the contrary, the relevant product market is assumed to be the
direct written insurance premium for a line of business, such line being that
used in the annual statement required to be filed by insurers doing business in
this state, and the relevant geographical market is assumed to be this
state;
c. The burden of showing
prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard rests upon the
commissioner.
4. Even if
an acquisition is not prima facie violative of the competitive standard under
par. (a), the commissioner may establish the requisite anticompetitive effect
based upon other substantial evidence. Even if an acquisition is prima facie
violative of the competitive standard under par. (a), a party may establish the
absence of the requisite anticompetitive effect based upon other substantial
evidence. Relevant factors in making a determination under this subdivision
include, but are not limited to, the following: market shares, volatility of
ranking of market leaders, number of competitors, concentration, trend of
concentration in the industry, and ease of entry and exit into the market.
(c) The commissioner
may approve the acquisition if the public benefits of the acquisition exceed
the public benefits which would arise from not lessening
competition.
Notes
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