Oral argument: Nov. 29, 2010
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Sept. 23, 2009)
CRIMINAL LAW, HABEAS CORPUS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
In December 1993, Khalil Kholi was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Three years later, Kholi filed a motion to reduce his sentence, seeking discretionary leniency in state court. In 2007, Kholi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The federal district court denied Kholi's petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA”). The First Circuit reversed, holding that a discretionary post-conviction motion to reduce a sentence constitutes collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and tolls AEDPA's one-year limitation period. Petitioner A.T. Wall appealed, arguing that a discretionary sentence-reduction motion does not constitute collateral review because it does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. Kholi counters that collateral review includes motions seeking equitable, discretionary relief, and argues that his motion seeking a discretionary reduction of an imposed sentence tolls AEDPA's statute of limitations. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the finality of state court judgments, as well as the state court remedies a prisoner can pursue before filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.
Does a state court sentence-reduction motion consisting of a plea for leniency constitute an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review”, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), thus tolling the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year limitations period for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition?
Does a criminal defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence based on leniency count as an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” and therefore extend the usual one-year period during which a defendant may file a federal habeas corpus petition?
In December 1993, Respondent Khalil Kholi was convicted of ten counts of sexual assault in the first degree for molesting his two stepdaughters. See Kholi v. Wall, 582 F.3d 147, 149 (1st Cir. 2009). The judge in the Rhode Island Superior Court sentenced Kholi to two terms of life imprisonment to be served consecutively. See id. On February 29, 1996, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed Kholi’s conviction. See id. At this time, Kholi did not file a motion for a rehearing, or seek a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See id.
On May 16, 1996, Kholi filed a motion to reduce his sentence based on a plea for leniency, pursuant to Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). See Kholi, 582 F.3d at 149–50. The trial court denied Kholi’s Rule 35(a) motion, and Kholi appealed. See id. at 150. On August 27, 1996, the appeals court denied Kholi’s Rule 35(a) motion. See id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on January 16, 1998, on the grounds that the evidence at trial showed that Kholi repeatedly sexually abused his two stepdaughters. See Brief for Petitioner, A.T. Wall, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections at 5.
On May 23, 1997, Kholi filed a separate motion for post-conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Kholi, 582 F.3d at 150. The motion was denied by the state court on April 23, 2003, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial on December 14, 2006. See id.
On September 5, 2007, Kholi filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. See Kholi, 582 F.3d at 150. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner has one year from the final state court decision to file a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). However, the AEDPA has a tolling clause, which states that the time during which a prisoner has filed for “[s]tate post-conviction or other collateral review” does not count towards the one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Kholi’s 1997 motion triggered this tolling clause, and thus the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was suspended between May 23, 1997, the filing date of the motion, and December 14, 2006, the date of the final decision on the motion. See Kholi, 582 F.3d at 150.
Upon the federal district court’s request, a federal magistrate judge concluded that Kholi’s Rule 35(a) sentence reduction motion based upon a plea for leniency did not suspend the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Kholi, 582 F.3d at 150. Based upon this recommendation, the district court denied Kholi’s habeas corpus petition as untimely filed under the AEDPA because a year passed between the final date of his conviction, February 29, 1996, and the filing date of his May 23, 1997 motion for post-conviction relief. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that Kholi’s Rule 35(a) motion tolled AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, and, as a result, Kholi’s habeas petition was timely filed. See Kholi, 582 F.3d at 150. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 17, 2010 to resolve a circuit split on whether sentence reduction motions based upon a plea for leniency fall under AEDPA’s tolling clause. See Wall v. Kholi, 130 S. Ct. 3274 (2010).
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a motion for a reduction in sentence based on a plea for leniency constitutes an application for post-conviction relief or collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), which would extend the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s(“AEDPA”) one-year limitation period to file a habeas corpus petition.
Petitioner, A.T. Wall, the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, argues that allowing a motion for a reduction in sentence to toll AEDPA’s one-year limitation period would undermine the purpose of AEDPA. Wall asserts that the purpose of AEDPA is to strike a balance between the competing interests of allowing defendants to exhaust state remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition and respecting the finality of state judgments. According to Wall, limiting collateral review under Section 2244(d)(2) achieves this balance by giving prisoners one year to exhaust state remedies, but not delaying the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Several states support Wall, arguing that allowing a discretionary sentence-reduction motion to toll AEDPA’s limitations period would undermine the state’s interest in final judgments and do nothing to further the exhaustion of state remedies. The states contend that since there is no time limitation for when sentence-reduction motions must be filed or decided, applications for leniency are likely to cause delay in the determination of the finality of the defendant’s sentence. Moreover, the states argue that allowing motions for sentencing leniency to toll the one-year limitations period will lead to a greater risk of reversal of the state court judgment. In support of this argument, the states assert that as more time passes since the initial trial, the loss of memory and unavailability of witnesses make it harder to conduct a retrial after a habeas petition is brought. States are also concerned that if requests for sentence reductions were included in Section 2244(d)(2)’s tolling mechanisms, prisoners would file frivolous petitions for leniency to delay the finality of the judgments against them.
On the other hand, Respondent KhalilKholi argues that allowing motions for a reduction in sentence based on a plea for leniency to toll AEDPA’s one-year limitations period serves Congress’s interests in federalism and comity. Specifically, Kholi asserts that Congress’s use of the phrase “state post-conviction or other collateral review” in Section 2244(d)(2) shows that Congress intended to defer to the states and ensures that litigants fully pursue state court remedies before seeking relief in federal court. Moreover, Kholi asserts that tolling the limitation period to allow defendants to pursue discretionary relief in state court allows a defendant to seek relief from the state courts without giving up the opportunity to seek federal review if the state relief is inadequate. The First Circuit agrees with Kholi, adding that if discretionary motions for a sentence reduction did not toll the limitation period, federal courts would have to review state court convictions while state proceedings to review those convictions were still pending. According to Kholi, it would impose a burden upon district courts and create unpredictability and a lack of uniformity if district courts had to determine whether each state court motion sought equitable, discretionary relief. Kholi suggests that allowing discretionary motions to toll the limitation provision would create a predictable rule that would not put an increased burden on district courts or undermine the finality of state court judgments.
This case concerns an interpretation of federal habeas corpus law, particularly 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides that a person in custody as a result of a state court’s judgment generally cannot file a habeas corpus petition later than one year after his or her conviction goes to final judgment. An exception to this rule arises if the prisoner properly applied for “State post-conviction or other collateral review” within that year, in which case the one-year time period is tolled for as long as the prisoner’s application remains pending. Khalil Kholi maintains that his motion for a reduction of his sentence was sufficient to delay the expiration of the one-year timeframe for filing a habeas corpus petition in federal court. Petitioner A.T. Wall, the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, argues that such a motion does not fit under the statutory definition of “post-conviction or other collateral review” and, therefore, Kholi’s habeas corpus petition was untimely. Ultimately, the case turns on whether the phrase “post-conviction or other collateral review” is broad enough to encompass Kholi’s sentence-reduction motion.
Wall contends that, although the statute does not attempt to define the meaning of “collateral review,” that category cannot include a sentence-reduction motion. Specifically, Wall argues that a convict’s application for collateral review must essentially challenge the conviction’s or sentence’s lawfulness, with an aim toward upsetting the conviction or sentence outright. Because Kholi’s sentence-reduction motion did not claim that his conviction or sentence was actually illegal, Wall would place that motion outside the bounds of the statute’s tolling provision. Also, because the Court had historically used the term “collateral review” in just this way, Wall urges the Court to presume that Congress had this meaning in mind when it originally drafted Section 2244(d).
Kholi agrees that Congress did not explicitly define “post-conviction or other collateral review” but asserts that the common understanding of those words compels the inclusion of a sentence-reduction motion. Mainly, Kholi takes issue with Wall’s conclusion that the word “collateral” limits the type of post-conviction review that should toll the one-year limitations period. Kholi’s maintains that collateral review simply refers to any review of a judgment that takes place outside the direct appeal process. Accordingly, a motion need not challenge the actual legality of the defendant’s conviction or sentence in order for review to be “collateral.” Moreover, Kholi argues that the statutory language at play here is purposefully broad and has in mind a wide variety of post-conviction motions and applications, ranging from legal challenges to a conviction’s validity to pleas for discretionary, equitable relief. States have various different procedures and names for their post-conviction relief mechanisms, and Kholi believes that Congress intended for the statute’s tolling provision to cover all of them.
Wall additionally contends that his interpretation of the statute remains true to Congress’s original purpose in passing the AEDPA: judicial efficiency, specifically in reducing the delays before criminal sentences may be executed. According to Wall, federal habeas corpus law generally suggests that only motions to invalidate convictions or sentences should toll the one-year period. This rule arguably achieves the proper balance between, on the one hand, the traditional requirement that the prisoner of a state must exhaust all available state remedies before filing a federal habeas corpus petition, and on the other, a proper respect for the finality of state judgments. Wall contends that the original purpose of the statutory tolling provision was to allow state courts to resolve any questions that might potentially undo a conviction or sentence because such results naturally make writs of habeas corpus unnecessary. So, because Kholi’s motion sought only to reduce, not invalidate his sentence, it could have no effect on his need for a writ of habeas corpus, and there was thus no reason for that motion to delay the expiration of the one-year period. Therefore, Wall believes that allowing Kholi’s sentence-reduction motion to toll the time period would undermine the goal of preserving judgment finality and, consequently, disrupt the appropriate balance.
In response, Kholi asserts that other purposes besides exhaustion of state remedies stand behind the statute’s tolling provision, namely comity and federalism. He believes these goals are furthered by allowing a state to address every aspect of its criminal convictions, including leniency in sentencing, before a federal habeas corpus court becomes involved. Kholi also suggests that, given these opportunities, state courts may even grant relief sufficient to cause prisoners not to want to pursue federal habeas corpus writs. Finally, Kholi reiterates his argument that Congress intended for the statute’s tolling provision to encompass a broad range of prisoners’ motions, ultimately anything leading to any type of relief, including sentence reduction. Kholi finds problematic Wall’s proposed distinction between motions that seek legal invalidation of convictions or sentences and those that do not. Kholi instead urges the Court to allow all post-conviction applications for relief to toll the limitations period, arguing that his “bright-line” approach is clearer and would be much easier for future habeas courts to adjudicate.
In this case, the Supreme Court will address a circuit split on whether a state sentence reduction motion based on a plea for leniency extends AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition. Wall argues that a discretionary sentence reduction motion does not constitute collateral review under AEDPA and therefore does not toll the one-year limitations provision. On the other hand, Kholi contends that collateral review includes motions seeking equitable, discretionary relief, and argues that a motion seeking a discretionary reduction of an imposed sentence extends the one-year limitations provision. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the finality of state court judgments, and the state court remedies a prisoner can pursue before filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.
Edited by: Joanna Chen
· Wex: Habeas Corpus