McCoy v. Louisiana

WHAT LEVEL OF AUTONOMY IS GUARANTEED TO DEFENDANTS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT?

McCoy argues that allowing his trial attorney to admit McCoy’s guilt to the jury, when McCoy desired to maintain his innocence, is a violation of the Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment. McCoy asserts that the Sixth Amendment provides that only the accused may decide whether to admit guilt. According to McCoy, the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence” means that the defendant has a right to “ultimate authority and control” of his own defense. McCoy points to the established rights of defendants to conduct their own defense, to choose their own counsel, and to take the stand to present their version of events, as extensions of this right. McCoy argues that the Sixth Amendment was motivated by the Framers’ experience with English courts, which would procure involuntary confessions through appointed counsel by requiring counsel to endorse the defendant’s denial of guilt. The constitutional right against self-incrimination, argues McCoy, is obviated if counsel may admit guilt against the defendant’s wishes. Because the defendant faces the consequences of pleading guilty, reasons McCoy, the defendant is the only party that may decide to plead guilty. According to McCoy, the Sixth Amendment right cannot be abridged simply because the right to assistance of counsel is also exercised. McCoy differentiates between decisions a defendant’s counsel may make unilaterally as a “practical necessity” requiring legal expertise, and decisions that turn not on a “strategic assessment” but on the defendant’s own willingness to risk trial—including the decision to admit guilt. McCoy also distinguishes his case from past cases in which the Supreme Court said that the defendant did not have to explicitly consent to counsel’s admission of guilt, arguing that these cases apply to implicit acquiescence, but not to situations where the defendant explicitly maintains opposition to the admission of guilt.

Louisiana disagrees, claiming that a defendant relinquishes all autonomy over strategic and tactical decisions to counsel. Louisiana agrees that a defendant may exercise absolute control over his defense by electing to represent himself, but argues that a defendant “cedes significant control over his defense” when he accepts representation by counsel. Louisiana asserts that past Supreme Court decisions have established that the attorney-client relationship is based on a principal-agent model. According to Louisiana, this means that defendants must accept certain decisions of their counsel that do not constitute “fundamental decisions.” If counsel makes the strategic decision to concede certain elements of the crime to focus its defense on other elements, Louisiana contends that the defendant must relinquish the right to make decisions that conflict with the counsel’s strategy. Louisiana agrees that only the defendant may make the decision to plead guilty, but argues that “strategically conceding guilt in a capital case is not ‘the equivalent of a guilty plea.’” Louisiana reinforces this distinction by noting that while a guilty plea requires no proof from the prosecution, merely conceding guilt allows the defendant to retain his traditional criminal rights, such as presenting a strong defense during the penalty phase of the trial. Louisiana contends that McCoy seeks to create a category of decisions for which the defendant’s explicit consent is not required, but which may not be made if the defendant explicitly objects, where before there were only decisions which required explicit consent and those that did not. This new categorization is unnecessary, according to Louisiana, because it is already the rule that counsel may not concede guilt over the defendant’s objection where it would amount to ineffective assistance of counsel or breach ethical rules, which is true for most cases.

DID COUNSEL’S ACTIONS CONFORM TO RECOGNIZED ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS?

McCoy argues that it was improper for the Louisiana Supreme Court to conclude that English’s admission of McCoy’s guilt was ethically obligated because ethical rules required English to follow McCoy’s direction. According to McCoy, going to trial at the direction of the defendant in a “weak case” is not an ethically compromised position for counsel. McCoy points out that ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation.” If counsel disagrees with his client, then the ABA rules allow counsel to ask the court to withdraw, notes McCoy. But if the court denies withdrawal, then counsel must follow the client’s direction, according to McCoy. Unlike a prior case where counsel permissibly threatened to withdraw if the defendant gave false testimony, McCoy argues that English’s disagreement with McCoy did not involve the commission of a new crime and that English went too far by effectively testifying against McCoy.

Louisiana argues that although this case is a rare one, English’s actions did not breach a Sixth Amendment right because counsel’s “professional and ethical obligations inform the operation of the Sixth Amendment.” Louisiana asserts that conceding guilt was the only course of action consistent with English’s ethical obligations. Once English concluded that McCoy’s defense theory was unpersuasive, Louisiana argues, the only ethical option was to refuse to allow McCoy to give false testimony. Louisiana maintains that this follows from the rule that lawyers should not assist a client in criminal conduct. It does not matter whether English was absolutely certain that McCoy’s defense theory was false, contends Louisiana, because English’s conclusion was based on sufficient evidence. When English was unable to dissuade McCoy, or withdraw from the case, Louisiana asserts that the only remaining way for English to act ethically was to concede McCoy’s guilt. . Louisiana contends that where the defendant’s guilt was clear, adopting a strategy to avoid the death penalty was in the best interest of the defendant. . Louisiana further claims that English’s examination of McCoy may have even helped his client by demonstrating his delusions to the jury, regardless of whether a mental capacity defense was legally cognizable, because it raised the possibility of jury nullification.

WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE?

McCoy argues that English failed to render effective assistance, as required by the Sixth Amendment. McCoy claims that English’s actions “violated constitutional and professional norms governing the allocation of authority between lawyer and client” and resulted in English’s failure to meaningfully test the prosecution’s case in an adversarial manner. McCoy contends that the proper remedy in this situation is an “automatic reversal” and a new trial. According to McCoy, English’s admission of McCoy’s guilt created a “structural error” in the framework of the trial which deprived McCoy of constitutional rights and therefore requires an immediate retrial. Relying on the three rationales the Supreme Court used to conclude that an error was structural in Weaver v. Massachusetts, McCoy argues first that the right to choose whether to admit guilt is designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction because it is a guarantee of fairness in affirming the “autonomy of the accused.” McCoy then argues that the error was structural because English’s admission “changed the entire character of the proceeding” and its repercussions were thus so pervasive as to evade measurement. Thirdly, McCoy asserts that the error was structural because a trial where the defendant’s counsel admits the defendant’s guilt results in “fundamental unfairness.” McCoy concludes that English’s actions constitute a structural error and are therefore not subject to a review for harmless error.

Louisiana contends that English rendered effective assistance of counsel. . Louisiana argues that a strategy of conceding guilt is not an abdication of the responsibility of adversarial testing because it is a reasonable strategy in cases where counsel decides to focus on mitigating punishment in the penalty phase. Louisiana further argues that the defendant’s own objection to a strategy has no bearing on whether counsel renders effective assistance in adopting an otherwise valid strategy. Louisiana also contends that even if there was a partial failure to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing, the failure was not complete, as is required for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, because only certain charges were conceded and English otherwise continued a full-throated defense of McCoy. While conceding guilt is rarely the best course of action, where counsel reasonably determines that such is the case, as here, Louisiana claims that it is not improper to concede guilt over the objections of the defendant. If the Supreme Court, however, does find that the Sixth Amendment was violated, Louisiana argues that the question of whether the violation constitutes a structural error or a harmless error is not properly before the Court. Louisiana contends that the Court need not decide the proper remedy to resolve the issue on which it granted certiorari and should therefore remand the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for further consideration.