Carpenter v. Murphy

DETERMINING RESERVATION STATUS

Oklahoma State Penitentiary Interim Warden Mark Carpenter contends that the disputed territory does not qualify as a Creek Nation reservation, and therefore the state of Oklahoma had proper jurisdiction over criminal activity on the land. Carpenter argues that Congress’s revocation of tribal title to the land is an explicit dissolution of tribal authority that demonstrates the land is not a reservation. He claims that since Congress did not explicitly define the disputed land as a reservation, its status should be determined by later Congressional treatment, citing the Oklahoma Enabling Act’s merging of Indian territory into the state of Oklahoma as evidence that the land was not considered a reservation. Carpenter asserts that to be considered a reservation, a Native American settlement must be able to make its own laws for self-governance, and the Creek Nation’s inability to do so under the allotment system demonstrates that the state of Oklahoma had proper jurisdiction. He further maintains Congress stripped the Creek Nation of its territorial sovereignty by abolishing independent tribal courts, preventing tribal governments from passing legislation, and taking control of tribal schools and property.

Patrick Dwayne Murphy responds that the disputed land is a “reservation” belonging to the Creek Nation, and therefore federal courts should have ultimate jurisdiction over criminal activity on the land. Murphy states that a “reservation” is defined as “[a] defined tract . . . appropriated to . . . Indian occupation,” and that Congress’s conveyance of title to the Creek Nation established such an appropriation. Murphy maintains that the establishment of Oklahoma as a state did not necessarily require dissolution of tribal authority, because Congress had admitted other states that contained areas defined as reservations and thus had already allowed tribal sovereignty and state governance to exist concurrently at the time Oklahoma was granted statehood. Murphy also argues that if Congress intends to disestablish Native reservations, it must do so explicitly, and that statutory text is the best measure of Congressional intent. He contends that Congress has never clearly disestablished the Creek Nation’s authority on the disputed land, citing a lack of language requiring the Creek Nation to cede lands to the United States, compensating the Creek Nation for its land, or declaring the Nation dissolved or abolished. Murphy distinguishes the Oklahoma Enabling Act from other statutes where Congress did explicitly require cession of Creek Nation land in exchange for compensation, arguing that interpreting the statute as a dissolution of jurisdiction would be a departure from Congress’s normal method of converting territory away from Native American tribes. Murphy also refutes the argument that the allotment system functionally disestablished Creek governance, noting past Court precedent declaring allotment of land to be consistent with the maintenance of reservation status.

LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS

Carpenter argues that Oklahoma’s unique circumstances demonstrate that the Court should not require an explicit textual showing of statutory disestablishment. Carpenter contends that the land claimed by the Creek Nation should be treated differently from “traditional” reservations established by federal statute, because instead Congress granted the Creek Nation a fee simple title to the land—as opposed to providing compensation in exchange for a tribe’s agreement to allow the government to hold the land in trust. Petitioner also asserts that because the Oklahoma Enabling Act transferred all pending non-federal cases to newly established state courts, the Court should infer that Congress intended to dissolve the Creek Nation’s territorial jurisdiction over criminal cases on the disputed land. Carpenter cites the post-statehood transfer of cases charging tribe members with murder from federal courts to state courts, as well as subsequent state control over such prosecutions, to demonstrate the state government’s history of exercising jurisdiction over cases such as Murphy’s. He maintains that present Oklahoma state court control over these criminal cases, Native heirship determinations, and partitioning of property cannot comport with reservation status. Carpenter also claims that because Creek courts were abolished by statute—and federal courts have no jurisdiction over non-major crimes committed against Native Americans by Native Americans on tribal territory—state authority over criminal cases involving Native Americans on tribal territory is necessary to prevent an impermissible gap in the administration of criminal law.

Murphy responds that Oklahoma’s particular circumstances should not provide an exception to the requirement of explicit statutory disestablishment. He argues that the Oklahoma Establishment Act’s grant of title of the disputed land to the Creek Nation only further strengthens the Creeks’ claim to jurisdiction, because it gave the Creeks an additional guarantee to occupancy along with treaty guarantees. Murphy maintains that Oklahoma’s specific post‑statehood governance scheme is not relevant to the question of whether the disputed territory is a reservation, because this evidence does not demonstrate Congressional intent.Murphy asserts that regardless of tribal courts’ diminished powers following the Oklahoma Establishment Act, other statutes such as the Five Tribes Act authorized the Creek Nation to continue its “present tribal government” in the disputed land. Murphy contends that Carpenter is wrong to characterize the Oklahoma Enabling Act as transferring jurisdiction over criminal cases involving Native Americans to state courts, countering that the practice of Oklahoma state courts prosecuting these crimes is unauthorized and therefore has no bearing on reservation status. Murphy also refutes that Oklahoma has any unique jurisdictional gap, noting that the problem of jurisdiction over minor crimes existed in other states, leading to the establishment of administrative courts for minor crimes involving Native Americans.