Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

    Issues

    Does federal statute 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), which broadly preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of motor carriers and freight brokers, bar state common law-claims that hold brokers liable for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers?

    Oral argument:
    March 04, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

    This case asks whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s (“FAAAA”) preemption provision, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), bars state common-law negligence claims against freight brokers for negligent selection of a motor carrier or driver. The Petitioner, Shawn Montgomery, seeks to bring a state law tort claim against a broker for hiring an unsafe driver who severely injured him. Montgomery argues that the claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception for preemption because it reflects the State’s exercise of its safety regulatory authority over motor vehicle safety. The Respondents, including the motor carrier, the driver, and the freight broker, respond that the FAAAA preempts these claims because brokers do not own or operate the vehicles and therefore fall outside the scope of state safety regulation. The Court’s decision will clarify the scope of federal preemption over state tort law in the motor vehicle industry. The outcome of this case will impact the allocation of responsibility among brokers and, carriers, and will bring clarity to state and federal transportation liability law.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), preempts a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver.

    Facts

    Petitioner Shawn Montgomery was severely injured after a tractor-trailer left the road and struck Montgomery’s stopped vehicle “on the shoulder of an Illinois highway.”  The tractor-trailer was driven by Yosniel Varela-Mojena, who was transporting a shipment through Illinois for Respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC, a federally authorized motor carrier. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker, arranged the shipment under a broker-carrier agreement, which specified that Caribe was an independent contractor responsible for its own equipment, personnel, and performance of transportation services. Montgomery sued Caribe Transport, LLC and Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”), Varela-Mojena, and C.H. Robinson in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois (the “District Court”). 

    Relevant to this case, Montgomery sued Robinson under two separate state-law theories: vicarious liability and the negligent hiring of Varela-Mojena and Caribe. Montgomery’s vicarious liability claim, based on Illinois agency law, alleged that Robinson exercised enough control over Caribe's deliveries to face legal responsibility for Caribe’s conduct. Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim alleged that Robinson acted unreasonably in its hiring practices because Robinson knew or should have known that the carrier was unsafe given the carrier’s history. Robinson argued that the Federal Aviation Administration Act’s (“FAAAA”) preemption provision, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), which broadly preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of motor carriers and freight brokers, preempted Montgomery’s state law claims. Montgomery, in contrast, argued that the FAAAA preemption provision did not preempt his state-law negligent hiring claim against Robinson because his claim fell within the FAAAA’s safety exception. In 2021, the District Court dismissed the state law claims against Robinson, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent.

    In 2023, the Seventh Circuit, which binds the District Court, decided Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., holding that FAAAA § 14501(c)(1) preempts state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. In Ye, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the negligent hiring claim did not fall within the safety exception because a hiring claim does not have a “direct link” to motor vehicles, which is a requirement for the safety exception.  Relying on Ye, Robinson moved for judgment on the pleadings regarding Montgomery’s negligent hiring claims. The District Court granted judgment for Robinson, finding that the FAAAA barred Montgomery’s claims under Ye. Accordingly, the District Court entered final judgment in favor of Robinson, while the claims against Varela-Mojena and Caribe remained pending appeal.

    Montgomery appealed to the Seventh Circuit to challenge two aspects: the conclusion that Robinson lacked the requisite control to create an agency relationship and the application of Ye to bar the negligent hiring claims. On January 3, 2025, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decisions. The court agreed that Robinson lacked the requisite control and, in turn, could not face vicarious liability for Caribe’s conduct. The court further declined Montgomery’s request to overrule Ye, noting that cases should not be lightly overruled and that Ye foreclosed Montgomery’s negligent hiring claims.

    Montgomery petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari on June 2, 2025, asking that the Court only review whether Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim is barred by the FAAAA. ; The Court granted certiorari on October 3, 2025. 

    Analysis

    THE FAAAA SAFETY EXCEPTION

    Montgomery argues that his negligent hiring claim under state law should be allowed because it falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception to preemption. Montgomery explains that the plain language of the safety exception applies to any state law that (1) is an exercise of the state's regulatory authority and that (2) regulates motor vehicles. Montgomery asserts that the negligent hiring claim meets both requirements, so the claim should not be barred by the FAAAA. First, Montgomery argues that a state tort claim is an exercise of a state’s “regulatory authority” because the Supreme Court has long treated common-law duties and damages suits as a form of state regulation, especially in safety areas. Montgomery contends that state laws which create a negligent hiring right of action against a broker is a means by which a state regulates broker conduct because the law requires brokers to use reasonable care when choosing carriers by imposing liability if careless choices cause injury. Montgomery explains that the purpose of state negligent hiring doctrine in this setting is to prevent people from irresponsibly putting unsafe drivers behind the wheel in a business that involves heavy loads and high speeds.

    Second, Montgomery argues that his state law negligent hiring claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” because the claim is tied directly to a truck crash and to the safe operation of trucks. Montgomery explains that state law requires brokers to use due care when selecting a carrier to operate motor vehicles safely on public roads. Montgomery contends that the phrase “with respect to” is broad ordinary language, meaning “regarding” or “concerning,” and that his claim clearly concerns motor vehicles because the alleged harm came from a trucking accident. Montgomery explains that, under Illinois negligent hiring doctrine, the claim must show that the broker knew or should have known the carrier or driver was unfit and that this unfitness caused the crash. Montgomery highlights that the negligent hiring claim concerns motor vehicles because the claim alleges Robinson should have spotted safety problems with Caribe Transport and Varela Mojena before it assigned the load, which led to the truck crash that injured him.

    Finally, Montgomery argues that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. should not control. Montgomery contends that Ye wrongly added a “direct link” requirement that does not appear in the statute’s text. Montgomery notes that the safety exception never says the connection to motor vehicles must be “direct,” and he argues courts should not add limits Congress did not write. Montgomery further argues that even if “direct link” matters, his claim already requires a close causal connection because Illinois proximate-cause law demands that the injury be closely tied to the defendant’s conduct and be reasonably foreseeable. Montgomery also challenges Ye’s focus on the safety clause not referencing brokers. Montgomery argues that the clause speaks broadly in terms related to motor vehicles, not specific business categories. Montgomery contends a broker can still fall inside the clause when broker conduct creates motor-vehicle danger. Lastly, Montgomery argues that insurance requirements do not prove preemption, because Congress can require insurance for some risks without eliminating state tort liability for other safety-related harms.

    In response, Caribe Transport LLC, Caribe Transport II LLC, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., C.H. Robinson Company, Inc., and C.H. Robinson International, Inc. (“Caribe”) contend that the FAAAA’s safety savings clause does not preserve negligent-selection claims against brokers.  Caribe argues that Congress intended Section 14501(c)(2)(A) to be a narrow carveout that protects only a state’s preexisting authority to regulate motor vehicle safety. First, Caribe argues that the text and structure of the statute show the safety clause is aimed at regulation of motor vehicles themselves, not broker business decisions about which carrier to hire. Second, even if the clause were read broadly, Caribe contends that it still only preserves powers states already had, and states never had authority to second-guess which federally licensed interstate carriers could operate. Therefore, Caribe frames Montgomery’s claim as an attempt to relabel regulation of broker services as “safety” regulation.

    In addition, Caribe argues that “with respect to motor vehicles” should be read narrowly rather than broadly. Caribe highlights that brokers do not own trucks, operate trucks, or hire drivers, so a negligent-selection claim against a broker does not regulate a motor vehicle. Caribe contends that the negligent selection claim is too indirect with respect to “motor vehicles” and would collapse the statute’s distinction between economic regulation and motor-vehicle regulation. Instead, Caribe asserts that a negligent-selection claim targets a broker’s business choice about carrier selection. Caribe further stresses that Montgomery’s reading would make parts of the savings clause unnecessary. Caribe indicates that Congress separately preserved state authority over highway routing, hazardous materials controls, and motor-carrier insurance levels. Caribe contends that those separate entries lose value if any indirect safety link already triggers the safety clause.

    Finally, Caribe argues that the broader statutory context and historical background support a narrow reading. Following Ye’s logic, Caribe highlights how throughout Title 49, Congress generally regulates motor vehicle safety through rules aimed at motor carriers, drivers, and vehicle operation, while brokers are regulated mainly on the business side. Caribe emphasizes that Congress requires motor carriers, not brokers, to carry insurance for bodily injury and property damage caused by negligent truck operation, which suggests that Congress assigned crash-related safety responsibility to carriers. Caribe also points to Section 14501(b), which preempts state laws related to broker services in intrastate transportation but has no safety savings clause. Finally, Caribe emphasizes that Section 14501(c)(2)(A) is a savings clause, which is meant to preserve states’ power rather than expand it. Caribe explains that states historically could regulate road safety directly, including speed, weight, equipment, and driver conduct, but they could not decide which federally licensed interstate carriers could operate. Caribe, therefore, warns that Montgomery’s theory would enable states to do indirectly, through tort suits, what they could never do directly.

    THE FAAAA PREEMPTION PROVISION

    Montgomery argues that, even if the safety exemption does not apply, his negligent-hiring claim still should survive because the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s (“FAAAA”) preemption clause does not preempt it. Montgomery emphasizes that Caribe reads the statute inconsistently because Caribe’s reading treats the preemption clause broadly but treats the safety exception narrowly, even though the Court requires a fair reading of both provisions. Montgomery notes that a similar problem appears in Caribe’s argument because Caribe treats the common-lawclaim as a state “law” with the force and effect of law under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) but refuses to treat that same claim as state “regulatory authority” under § 14501(c)(2)(A). Montgomery explains that Supreme Court precedent under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), including Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, already treats common-law claims as state regulation, so one cannot rely on tort law to trigger preemption and then deny tort law status under the safety clause. Montgomery then contends that, although the shipment was “with respect to the transportation of property,” his crash claim based on unsafe hiring and unsafe driving fits motor-vehicle safety more naturally than it fits economic regulation of broker prices, routes, or services. Montgomery further maintains that ADA precedent supports his reading because courts have long refused to preempt ordinary personal-injury claims tied to unsafe transportation operations.

    In response, Caribe argues that § 14501(c)(1) broadly preempts Montgomery’s negligent-selection claim because Congress barred states from enforcing any state law, including common-law negligence rules, that is “related to” a broker’s services in arranging property transportation. Caribe emphasizes that Montgomery’s claim directly targets a broker’s “prices, routes, or services,” and applies a duty of care. Caribe notes that state negligent-selection suits would push brokers to change screening methods, spend more money, and avoid carriers based on state-by-state jury standards, which creates the patchwork Congress tried to stop. Caribe explains that Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. demonstrates that states cannot use state law to effectively block federally authorized carriers. Caribe argues that negligent-selection claims do that indirectly by pressuring brokers to selectively avoid certain carriers. Caribe then argues that Montgomery interprets the statute too narrowly because § 14501(c)(1) covers claims connected to broker services, not just claims that directly control them. Additionally, Caribe distinguishes that ADA airline injury cases do not control because airlines carry personal-injury insurance, which tort claims may pursue by statute, while brokers have no similar statutory requirement.

    Discussion

    HIGHWAY SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

    In support of Montgomery, the Institute for Safer Trucking (“IST”) argues that limiting liability to motor carriers is insufficient to properly compensate victims and their families for losses caused by crashes. The IST notes how most motor carriers are only required to carry the minimum $750,000 insurance while the average fatal truck crash leads to the equivalent of $6.1 million in losses, so injured families can hardly recover their losses against carriers alone. The American Truckers United (“ATU”), also in support of Montgomery, contends that imposing negligence liability on brokers will disincentivize them from hiring cheap, less safe motor carriers. Further in support of Montgomery, Robert Cox, who himself filed a lawsuit against a freight broker after a fatal motor vehicle crash, emphasizes that state negligence law promotes highway accountability by ensuring that brokers will exercise reasonable care when selecting motor carriers. 

    Conversely, in support of Caribe, the National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”) argues that barring negligent hiring claims against brokers does not lower accountability because motor carriers, who own and maintain their trucks as well as supervise their drivers, are already subject to liability under state law. NAM emphasizes that carriers have the most complete information about their vehicles, drivers, and safety risks, placing them in the best position to impose corrective measures to prevent accidents. NAM further contends that safety data is chiefly designed to help law enforcement, rather than to help brokers, investigate carriers, so extending liability to brokers would not lead to safety benefits. Overall, NAM argues that existing liability already disincentivizes the parties with the most control over highway safety to improve their capabilities, so extending liability to brokers would not enhance these incentives.

    ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND REGULATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY

    In support of Montgomery, eight law professors whose academic interests overlap with federal preemption of state laws (the “Preemption Scholars”) highlight that the “tort of negligent selection of an independent contractor” is a general principle that many states have adopted. The Preemption Scholars maintain that anti-competitive arguments against imposing a general duty of care upon brokers in other industries, like airlines, do not exist in the trucking industry because trucking brokers do not directly control the vehicles or set routes. Thus, the Preemption Scholars argue that imposing a negligence duty upon brokers would not impede a competitive, deregulated trucking industry, which Congress desires. Ohio, twenty-eight other states, and the District of Columbia (“Ohio et al.”) further argue that states have an interest in addressing the consequences of local crashes, especially since accidents impose great costs upon states. , Accordingly, Ohio et al. assert that states should retain the ultimate authority over their road-safety laws.

    In support of Caribe, NAM highlights this case’s major economic consequences given that freight brokers are essential intermediaries in a national supply chain that moves trillions of dollars of goods per year. NAM warns that varying state liability standards would force brokers to anticipate how different state juries will examine their carrier-selection decisions. Varying state liability standards, NAM contends, would also impose additional costs on brokers, as brokers may need to evaluate their motor carriers or hire different carriers. Six freight brokers assert that imposing negligence liability upon brokers would compel brokers to only hire large, well-capitalized carriers and hurt smaller carriers’ elevation in a competitive industry Washington Legal Foundation agrees, adding that imposing liability upon brokers would incentivize hiring long-haul carriers to ensure that shipments were completed by a single carrier, raising further barriers to entry for smaller carriers. 

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Raj Walia and Jeff Feng

    Edited by:      Sarah Chang

    Additional Resources