National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

    Issues

    Do statutes that limit the amount a political party can donate in coordination with a political candidate violate the First Amendment?

    Oral argument:
    December 09, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

    This case asks the Court to determine whether 52 U.S.C. § 30116 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) violates the First Amendment rights of political parties wishing to coordinate donations for their preferred candidates’ political campaigns. FECA was established to set a cap on a political party’s coordinated expenditures to prevent circumvention of contribution limits. Petitioners, National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”), former Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Stephen Chabot (collectively “NRSC”), argue that the limits on coordinated party expenditures violate the First Amendment because they infringe their speech and political association rights. NRSC further argues that Colorado II, a case in which the Supreme Court previously upheld coordinated party expenditure limits, should not control this case. The Court-appointed attorney Roman Martinez, invited to support the judgment below, argues that the coordinated party expenditure limits are necessary to achieve the government interest in preventing quid-pro-quo corruption between donors and candidates, and that Colorado II must control this case’s outcome. Martinez further highlights several justiciability concerns. The outcome of this case could impact political corruption deterrence and Congress’ ability to regulate campaign finance.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.

    Facts

    Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) in 1972 to regulate political campaign spending. The FECA imposes a variety of limits on individual contributions to political parties and on political parties’ campaign spending. The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) is tasked with enforcing the FECA. Section 30116(d) of the FECA, the “Party Expenditure Provision,” restricts a political party’s ability to spend in federal campaigns in coordination with candidates, treating the expenditure as a contribution.

    The limits on coordinated political expenditures, as opposed to independent political expenditures made without any coordination with candidates, stem from two earlier constitutional challenges to prior versions of the Party Expenditure Provision.In 1996, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (“Colorado I”), the Supreme Court held that political committees had a First Amendment right “to make unlimited independent expenditures.” Thus, the Court rejected the portion of the Party Expenditure Provision that applied to independent political expenditures as unconstitutional and left open a question of whether coordinated political expenditures were constitutional. In 2001, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (“Colorado II”), the Supreme Court upheld § 30116(d)’s limits on coordinated political party expenditures. There, the Court held that the statute, as applied to a political party’s coordinated expenditures, was “closely drawn” to deal with the government’s interest of preventing political corruption and the appearance of corruption.

    In 2022, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), the National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”), then-Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Steve Chabot challenged the validity of the expenditure limits imposed by § 30116(d). Specifically, the NRSC and NRCC sought to unify the Republican Party’s messaging by soliciting feedback from their preferred candidates on campaign advertisements, conduct restricted by § 30116(d). Additionally, Vance and Chabot wanted to engage in “coordinated” spending by accepting funds and providing input on how to direct those in support of their campaigns without the § 30116(d) limits.

    NRSC, NRCC, Vance, and Cabot, petitioners in this case, brought both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the coordinated party expenditure limits of § 30116(d) before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Petitioners proceeded under 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which required the district court to “immediately” certify the constitutional questions raised by their FECA challenges to the relevant court of appeals sitting en banc. After providing a record for the case and holding that petitioners raised a non-frivolous constitutional question, the district court certified the questions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

    Petitioners argued to the Sixth Circuit that § 30116(d)’s limits on coordinated party expenditures violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit noted that Cabot was no longer a political candidate, so there was a “possibility that his claim [wa]s moot,” but that this did not impact its authority to address the constitutional question at issue because the identical claims of the NRSC, NRCC, and Vance “remain[ed] live.” On the merits, the Sixth Circuit denied the facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to § 30116(d). The Sixth Circuit explained that the binding precedent of Colorado II, which had previously upheld the constitutionality of § 30116(d)’s limits on coordinated party expenditures, required the Court to reject these challenges.

    On December 4, 2024, the petitioners (collectively “NRSC”) petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, which the Court granted on June 30, 2025. The FEC declined to defend the constitutionality of § 30116(d), supporting NRSC’s contention that limits on coordinated party expenditures infringe on political parties’ free speech rights. Consequently, the Court invited Roman Martinez to brief the arguments in defense of the Sixth Circuit’s judgment. Additionally, the Court allowed the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (“DSCC”), and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”) (collectively, “DNC”) to intervene in defense of the judgment below.  

    Analysis

    FIRST AMENDMENT

    NRSC argues that FECA’s coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment by placing a burden on speech. NRSC asserts that the limits restrict the ability of political parties to speak with party candidates before spending funds on campaign advertising.  NRSC argues that burdens on speech must further a legitimate objective to pass the “closely drawn” scrutiny test. Section 30116(d) does not further a legitimate objective, according to NRSC because the Supreme Court previously determined that there is only one permissible justification for restricting political speech, which is to prevent quid-pro-quo corruption. NRSC argues that Congress did not actually pass the limits to prevent corruption but instead to reduce excessive campaign spending. Moreover, NRSC points out that § 30116(d) creates different monetary limits for different political offices and originally covered all party expenditures, including independent expenditures, neither of which make sense if the purpose was to prevent quid-pro-quo corruption. NRSC rejects the argument that the limits serve a legitimate objective by preventing donors from bribing candidates by circumventing donor-to-candidate contribution limits through donations to political parties. NRSC suggest that the argument is too speculative, indirect, and unlikely to justify the statute because it would require an implausible amount of coordination between the party committee and the donor to avoid a variety of other statutory safeguards. Even if the limits furthered a legitimate objective, NRSC argues that the limits are not narrowly tailored and therefore still fail “closely drawn” scrutiny. NRSC contends that the limits do not actually prevent bribery through circumvention and that if this was Congress’ goal, there are other ways to accomplish it without burdening speech.

    Martinez argues that § 30116(d) passes the “closely drawn” scrutiny for the same reasons the Supreme Court previously found the statute constitutional under Colorado II. Martinez contends that coordinated party spending includes both speech and non-speech activity, which means that “closely drawn” scrutiny is appropriate here. Martinez suggests that the government has a compelling interest in preventing quid-pro-quo corruption by stopping donors from using political parties to circumvent their base contribution limits. Martinez points out that quid-pro-quo corruption by circumvention has been an issue over the past fifty years, citing President Richard Nixon’s re-election campaign and modern “joint fundraising” arrangements that allow candidates to see who donated through the NRSC as if they had received a direct contribution from a donor. Further, Martinez argues that § 30116(d) is closely drawn to meet the government’s compelling interest. Martinez disagrees with NRSC that the proposed alternatives to § 30116(d) are adequate. Specifically, Martinezargues that NRSC’s proposed alternatives would only further infringe on the First Amendment rights of political parties.

    IMPACT OF COLORADO II

    NRSC contends that Colorado II, the case in which the Supreme Court previously upheld § 30116(d)’s limits on coordinated party expenditures, should not control this case’s outcome.NRSC argues that Colorado II has been undermined by the Court’s subsequent cases. Specifically, NRSC asserts that the Court’s prior decision upholding § 30116(d) did not rest on preventing quid-pro-quo corruption or its appearance, the only permissible basis for such restrictions, lacked evidence that the limits actually advanced that interest, and applied an overly deferential standard that failed to require narrow tailoring. NRSC further argues that stare decisis weighs in favor of overruling Colorado II for four reasons. First, NRSC asserts that Colorado II was “poorly reasoned” even considering First Amendment doctrine at the time because of its lack of a sufficient evidentiary standard and lowered scrutiny standard. Second, NRSC highlights how changes in First Amendment doctrine and the factual foundation of Colorado II have “eroded the decision’s underpinnings” and created unnecessary tension. Third, NRSC argues that Colorado II’s continued presence has negatively impacted jurisprudence and continues to threaten political speech. Finally, NRSC maintains that there is no concern with reliance interests, a key factor in determining whether to overrule precedent, because it would be “unconscionable” to continue abridging free speech simply because it has been abridged in the past.

    Conversely, Martinez maintains that the Sixth Circuit properly recognized Colorado II as controlling in this case. Martinez asserts that since NRSC is challenging “the same law, on the same grounds, under the same theory, seeking the same relief,” the Court should continue to uphold § 30116(d)’s constitutionality. Martinez contends that, despite NRSC’s assertions, Colorado II relied on preventing quid-pro-quo corruption based on “extensive evidence,” and properly applied the prevailing standard of “closely drawn” scrutiny. Moreover, Martinez and DNC, the intervening respondent, contends that overturning Colorado II would make the law less stable, which could lead to unintended consequences for overwise settled precedents and First Amendment doctrine. First, DNC argues that Colorado II aligns with subsequent decisions and that NRSC’s efforts to cast later precedent as conflicting with it are “mischaracterizations.” Further, DNC asserts that the factual foundation of Colorado II remains constant and, if anything, the increased risks of political corruption twenty-five years later support the necessity of the Court’s decision in Colorado II. Additionally, DNC points out that much of campaign finance regulation relies on Colorado II, so overruling the decision would destabilize other FECA limits and enhance the risk of political corruption.

    JUSTICIABILITY

    NRSC did not advance arguments related to justiciability of this case in its merits brief. However, Martinez, the Court-appointed attorney, raised several such arguments, which NRSC directly responded to in its reply brief.

    Martinez argues that the case is moot because there is no longer a live controversy between NRSC and the Executive Branch. Martinez highlights that there is no threat that the government will enforce limits on coordinated party expenditures because the FEC’s new position is that the limits are unconstitutional, and, regardless, Executive Order 14215 bars the FEC from enforcing § 30116(d) against anyone. Furthermore, Martinez notes that this is not a case of voluntary cessation. The FEC, Martinez asserts, is not temporarily ceasing its conduct to moot the case while preserving its ability to resume its conduct later because there is no ongoing FEC enforcement to stop and the government is not trying to moot the case.

    Martinez also contends that NRSC and NRCC are not proper parties because “the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over their interlocutory appeal.” According to Martinez, mandatory en banc appellate jurisdiction under § 30110 only authorizes review for claims brought by the FEC, a national political party committee, and any individual eligible to vote. Martinez identifies that neither the NRSC nor the NRCC fall into any of these three categories. Martinez further contends that Vance and Chabot are not proper parties because they have no firm intention to run for future federal office, a prerequisite for candidate standing, and have, in fact, expressly disclaimed such plans. Finally, Martinez argues that § 30116(d) did not cause an Article III injuryto either NRSC or NRCC because it only limits coordinated expenditures of national and state party committees.

    In response, NRSC counters that there is still a live threat of enforcement of § 30116(d), despite the government’s current position that it is unconstitutional, for three reasons. First, NRSC asserts that a live controversy remains because the government’s reply indicates it will continue to enforce § 30116(d) as long as Colorado II remains good law. Notably, the government clarifies in its reply that it is not declining to enforce § 30116(d); it is declining to defend it in Court. Second, NRSC claims it faces threat of enforcement by a future administration, which could come within the five-year statute of limitations for a § 30116(d) violation. Third, NRSC cites that the threat of private enforcement of a FECA violation still exists, including by DCCC, an intervening party in this case.  

    Next, according to NRSC, the Sixth Circuit maintained jurisdiction over the appeal under § 30110 because Vance and Chabot are eligible voters for presidential elections and “national committee of a political party” in FECA includes “national congressional campaign committee[s]” like NRSC and NRCC. NRSC maintains that the “national committee” referenced in § 30110 should be understood to include NRSC and NRCC because the phrase encompasses them in other parts of the statute. Additionally, NRSC argues that Vance is a proper party, so the case is not moot, because he does, in fact, intend to run for office in 2028. NRSC points to the fact that Vance maintains an active “Statement of Candidacy” with the FEC, which supports his intended Senate run in 2028. At the very least, NRSC emphasizes that Martinez does not offer enough evidence to support its position that Vance’s claim is moot.

    Discussion

    PREVENTING CORRUPTION 

    Ohio and nineteen other states (“Ohio et al.”), in support of NRSC, argue that contribution limits on political parties do not deter corruption of political candidates. The Supreme Court previously grounded campaign finance limits in the interest of preventing quid-pro-quo corruption or its appearance. However, Ohio et al. clarify that quid-pro-quo corruption, or bribes given to political candidates in exchange for favorable governmental treatment, is irrelevant in considering contributions from political parties. Ohio et al. argue that corruption deterrence works for other private entities, such as individuals, nonprofits, and Super Political Action Committees (“PACS”), where the interests between parties and the donor are less aligned. While those entities may donate with the intent to gain some benefit from successfully elected candidates, Ohio et al. assert that political parties are different because their interests are already aligned with the candidate. According to Ohio et al.,political parties raise money to elect candidates who advance their policy interests and, unlike other private entities, do not contribute to campaigns with any expectation of monetary benefit.

    Public Citizen, in support of the FEC, counters that eliminating coordinated party contribution limits would heighten both the actual risk of corrupting political candidates and the appearance of corruption that could undermine public confidence in elections. Public Citizens argues that quid-pro-quo corruption is relevant in considering contributions from political party committees because the threat of corruption is not from parties corrupting their own candidates. Rather, the risk is that parties would essentially serve as funnels for individual large donors to assert their private interests on candidates. Public Citizen highlights that while current individual limits for direct candidate contributions are $7,000 per election cycle, individual limits for political party committees are $44,300 each, totaling $265,800. Without limits on what the parties can donate in coordination with a political candidate, Public Citizen argues that candidates would be able to directly solicit about thirty-eight times as much in donations from individual donors. Public Citizen asserts that candidates may fundraise as much for the parties as themselves because money raised for the parties would be directed back to them. Thus, Public Citizen believes this would elevate the risk of both actual corruption of candidates and the perception of corruption.

    CONGRESSIONAL ABILITY TO REGULATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE

    The Cato Institute, in support of the NRSC, acknowledges that Congress may regulate federal elections but, in so doing, cannot violate free speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment. Highlighting how money from campaign contributions facilitates political speech, the Cato Institute contends that campaign contributions are inseparable from political speech itself. The Cato Institute argues that Congress’s current contribution limits reduce the “quantity and quality” of political parties’ political speech. Thus, the Cato Institute asserts that Congress is “prohibited from shrinking or diminishing freedom of speech” as it currently does through § 30116(d)’s contribution limits. Senator Mitch McConnell, in support of the NRSC, makes the related point that since Congress cannot restrict free speech, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down congressional campaign finance restrictions over the past twenty-five years.

    The Brennan Center for Justice (“The Brennan Center”), in support of the FEC, counters that limits on party contributions are a policy matter best left for congressional determination. The Brennan Center emphasizes that the Court is ill-equipped to weigh the risks and benefits of eliminating party contribution limits because it lacks Congress’ investigative and appraisal abilities. The Brennan Center highlights that Congress is the branch tasked with determining the best route forward when enacting legislation, while the Court’s role is to interpret the law. The Supreme Court’s recent pattern of “substituting its own judgment for that of Congress and the American people” by invalidating campaign finance regulations has, according to the Brennan Center, fostered increased bribery schemes and foreign election interference, while diminishing donor transparency and public trust in the government. Thus, the Brennan Center argues that striking down these contribution limits may have consequences that the Court cannot foresee, so the Court should defer to Congress’ policy judgment.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:Leonardo Costa Lins Villa-Forte and Keaton J. Klaus

    Edited by:Zachary Jacobson, Alexandra “Lexie” Kapilian, and Johanna Hussain

    Additional Resources